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ABSTRACT 
This study exanunes responses to medieval nominalist philosophy in the Latin hermeneutic 
writings of the Oxford theologian John Wyclif (d. 1384). It has long been the tendency in 
intellectual histories of the later Middle Ages to portray Wyclif as a staunch defender of 
philosophical realism, and as a tireless critic of contemporary nominalist methods. Though 
recent research has done much to clarify our understanding of the relationship between 
norninalists and realists in the medieval period, no comprehensive account of Wyclif's 
response to nominalist teaching has yet been produced. The objective of the present study is 
to trace the development of Wyclif's anti-nornýinalism from his early philosophical writings 
(the Stunina de Ente and the logical works) to his principal work on exegetical theory, the De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. The focal points of enquiry are the broad hermeneutic problems 
of truth, time and textuality, each of which conspicuously divided Wyclif from his anti-realist 
opponents. 
Chapter I examines Wyclif's place in the history of the hermeneutic sciences, and his 
status as an opponent of medieval norrýinalist teaching. It traces the development of medieval 
norninalism from its origins in the twelfth century to the debates of fourteenth-century Oxford 
and Europe. Recent revisions to contemporary understanding of nominalism and realism are 
considered, and related to the debate between Wyclif and his hermeneutic opponents. The 
case is made, in the concluding section, for a broader, more inclusive conception of 
'nominalist' thought. In Chapter 2, the concept of analogy - as it is presented in the Suninza 
de Ente, De Logica and Logicae Continuatio - is introduced. Analogy served as the guiding 
principle in Wyclif's hermeneutic project, both at a practical (exegetical) level, and (in the De 
Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae) at the level of textual theory. Wyclif believed that both exegetical 
and theological errors would arise out of a failure to apply the principles of analogy. Chapter 
3 surveys Wyclif's theories of predication and time, again within the context of the 
philosophical and logical writings. These together provided the theoretical framework for 
Wyclif's controversial claim that all parts of Scripture were literally true. The fourth chapter 
analyses the objections to Wyclif's philosophical and hermeneutic teaching raised by John 
Kenningham, who opposed Wyclif in a series of academic detenninationes. Kenningham's 
philosophy, which was broadly consistent with the basic metaphysical assumptions of 
vi 
Ockharn's system, posed a serious challenge to Wyclif's conception of the sacred text. 
Kenningham was particularly critical of Wyclif's literalism, and of the theories of truth and 
time on which it depended. In Chapter 5, the exegetical theory of the De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae is analysed in detail, in relation both to the hermeneutic concepts introduced in 
Chapters 2 and 3, and to the objections raised by Kenningharn (introduced in Chapter 4). The 
concepts of the Stunina de Ente are shown to play a fundamental r6le in Wyclif's conception 
of textual authority and authorship (which is described in detail in the De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae), as well as in his defence of the basic hermeneutic principles challenged by 
Kenningham. The strong degree of continuity between the earlier and the later texts, we 
argue, betrays an acute awareness of the threats posed by anti-realist interpretative paradigms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the small cluster of epithets which have been associated with the name of John 
Wyclif over the last century, the philosophical terms 'realist' and 'ultra-realist' must rank 
in familiarity alongside many of the more sensational political and theological labels we 
have come to know him by. Wyclif the philosopher, nevertheless, has not yet enjoyed the 
same attention as Wyclif the reformer or Wyclif the heresiarch. Since the publication of 
. 
ford Schools in 1961,1 there has been no book-length J. A. Robson's Wyclif and the Ox 
study of the main philosophical writings, despite a growing recognition of their significance 
for Wyclif's later pronouncements on Scripture, dominion and the sacraments. 
2 One 
consequence of this neglect has been that for the majority of contemporary commentators, 
he has remained a figure who made a modest - and for the most part unoriginal - 
contribution to European philosophical knowledge. The biographer Herbert Workman, 
who is seldom numbered among Wyclif's critics, remarked that 'as a schoolman, [he] does 
little more than gyrate on a well-beaten path, often concealing with a cloud of dust and 
digressions that he is but moving in a circle. ' 3 Predictably, this kind of assessment has 
done nothing to erode the simplistic and misleading opposition between (extreme) realism 
and nominalism which has grown up around his thinking. The fact that Wyclif was a tD 117 
'realist' (however we may choose to define this problematic term) is still widely assumed 
to entail that every one of his philosophical opponents must therefore have been a 
'nominalist'. Although it would certainly be no exaggeration to suggest that Wyclif had 
little time for the nominalists of his day (or of any other period), it would nevertheless be 
nalve to assume that they were the only thinkers worthy of his disparagement, or that he 
1 J. A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools: The Relation of the Summa de Ente to Scholastic Debates in 
Fourteenth-century Oxford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). 
2 Anthony Kenny's Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) is the most thorough and accessible study 
to date of the relationship between Wyclif's realism and his later theological, exegetical and political ideas. 
The publication, in the same year as Kenny's study, of an edition and a translation of Wyclif's De 
Universalibus, made available for the first time the text of one of the philosophical treatises which exerted 
a very tangible influence over the ideas developed in the Suninia Theologica. 
3 John Wyclif. A Study of the English Medieval Church (Connecticut: Archon, 1966), voI L, p. 143. Kenny 
offers a brief history of the modem reception of Wyclif's philosophical thought in Wyclif (pp. 100-109), and 
concludes with a more generous assessment of his achievement. If Wyclif had not become a heretic, he 
argues, 'he might have been remembered as one of the great triumvirate of scholastics along with Scotus and 
Ockham. ' (pp. 105-106) 
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would necessarily have been equally dismissive of every aspect of their teaching. We 
cannot expect, either, that Wyclif's opposition to William of Ockham and his Oxford 
followers (however few there may have been, and however scattered 4) would have 
remained a narrowly philosophical one. There are strong indications from Wyclirs later 
writings, as we suggest in Chapter 5, that this was not the case. 'Nominalist' is itself a 
highly ambiguous term, and one whose Latin equivalent (nonzinalis) is not found anywhere 
in fourteenth-century philosophical or theological texts. 5 If we are to make a detailed and 
explicit comparison between Wyclif and contemporary nominalists, therefore, we must be 
clear about how the modem term itself is being applied. Definitions of 'nominalism' will 
be considered in Chapter 1, which will include a brief overview of twentieth-century 
nominalist historiography. 
The problems which surround Wyclif s status as a philosopher should not, of course, 
deter us from examining more closely those aspects of his work on which his philosophy 
exerted an influence. This is particularly true of his views on the nature of scriptural truth 
and authority. For Wyclif, the sacred text existed principally as an idea in the mind of 
God, accessible only to those who could see beyond the material signs of the printed page. 
This conception of textuality, and the theories of truth and being on which it depended, 
rested on philosophical assumptions which ran contrary to the basic tenets of fourteenth- 
century nominalism. It is for this reason that the teaching of the contemporary Carmelite 
John Kenningham, who opposed Wyclif on key philosophical and hermeneutic issues, 
presented such a threat to the authority of his exegetical theory. Within Kenningham's 
restricted metaphysical system, there was no place for a text which existed principally as 
a divine idea, nor for a hermeneutic which, like Wyclif's own, effectively excluded the 
activities of the human author and reader from consideration. 
4 Recent scholarship has questioned the assumption that Ockham would have had a distinct group or 'school' 
of followers in England. See the discussion in Ch. I (sections 2.2 and 3), below. 
On the use of nonzinalis and related terms in the later Middle Ages, see Ch. I (sections 2 and 3), below. 
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The two focal points of debate between Wyclif and his hermeneutic opponents were 
truth and time, the broad aspects of scholastic thought highlighted in the title of the present 
study. As a realist, Wyclif regarded Scripture as an embodiment of the principle of truth, 
all of whose parts were - by virtue of their consistency with divine intention - 'literally' 
true. Like his Oxford mentor Walter Burley, he perceived truth to be a property of reality, 
and only secondarily as a logical or a linguistic phenomenon. Failure to accept this 
fundamental realist principle, Wyclif believed, lay at the heart of contemporary confusion 
over the nature of the sacred text. His conception of time, which was predicated on the 
same metaphysical premises as his controversial theory of being, became his chief means 
of defending scriptural texts against charges of falsity or logical inconsistency. The theories 
of truth and time together formed the basis of Wyclif's literalistic theory of scriptural 
signification, which was to become one of the most distinctive and controversial aspects 
of his hermeneutic programme. The literal sense of Scripture was for Wyclif ally sense 
which was consistent with the intention of the divine author. To this extent, it could 
include not only the historical sense, but any of the three 'spiritual' senses defined by the 
Alexandrian exegetes (the allegorical, tropological/moral and the anagogical). 
6 Unlike the 
most influential theories of the preceding century - those of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of 
Ghent and St Bonaventure, among others - Wyclif's literalism afforded the human author 
and his activities little respect,. dignity or authority. Latin terms for human authorial r6les, 
which had proliferated under the influence of these earlier writers (largely in response to 
the spread of Aristotelian exegetical conventions 7 ), were not, as we shall argue, 
systematically distinguished in Wyclif's works., Truth was ultimately a product (or an 
effect) of divine intention, and only coincidentally (a term which can hardly be stressed 
sufficiently) of the conscious activity of human agents. Misinterpretation of the Scriptures 
6 On the origins of the four categories in Alexandrian exegetical theory, see Henri de Lubac, Exjgýse 
Wdijvale (Paris: Aubier, 1959), vol. I -i, pp. 171-220. For a detailed exposition on the meaning of the 
four 
senses, see de Lubac, Exjgke Midijvale, vol. Lii, pp. 373-682. A concise account of the principal 
characteristics of the four senses is provided in Gillian Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The 
Earlier Middle Ages, pp. 114-122. Wyclif's treatment of the fourfold definition of the scriptural senses is 
analysed in detail in Chapter 5 (section 3.2), below. 
7 The spread of Aristotelianism (and the growth of interest in human authorial activity) has been associated, 
in particular, with the introduction of the 'Aristotelian Prologue' into scriptural commentaries of the thirteenth 
century. See AJ. Minnis and A. B. Scott, eds. Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, c. 1100-1375. The 
Commentary Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 197-212 (esp. pp. 203-207). See also 
Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages, 2nd. ed. 
(Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1988), pp. 28-33. 
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arose as a result of a failure to perceive truth and time as realities in the mind of God, which 
were no less distinct than the existential realities of the world of experience. This 
assumption, which would have appeared hopelessly extravagant to any contemporary 
opponent of metaphysical realism, also lay behind Wyclif's idiosyncratic interpretation of 
the logical principle of anipliatio ('extension'), a concept over which he and Kenningham 
remained rigidly divided. 
Any study of theoretical reflections on the nature of textuality, whether the texts in 
question are secular or sacred, implicitly addresses questions which pertain to a broad 
range of historical disciplines, including (principally) literary studies, philosophy and 
theology. In the case of the present investigation, there can be no question of the relevance 
of the latter two. The first is more problematic, and will be considered alongside the 
principal philosophical issues of medieval nominalism and realism in the first chapter. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, which focus on the major philosophical writings of the first half of 
Wyclif's career (the Logica, Logicae Continitatio and Siannia de Elite), the main textual 
concepts over which Wyclif and the norninalists disagreed will be introduced. These were 
the theory of analogy (analogia entis), which formed the backbone f Wyclif's 
hermeneutic project, and the controversial logical principles of 'real' predication and 
temporal extension (anipliatio temporis). The fourth chapter will consider the objections 
to Wyclif's scriptural philosophy which were raised by John Kenningham in a series of 
academic detenninationes. Kenningham's philosophy will be compared with that of the 
Ockharnists of the earlier part of the fourteenth century, and it will be argued that, in terms 
of their basic ontology (if not necessarily in all other respects), the two systems are highly 
consistent. Kenningharn is likely to have been as great a cause of metaphysical anxiety for 
Wyclif as any dedicated disciple of Ockham. or Scotus would have been. His incisive and 
influential objections placed in question many of the defining characteristics of Wyclif's 
notion of the sacred text (and hence of textual authority), including his theory of biblical 
truth and signification, temporal reference, and literalistic exegesis. In the fifth and final 
chapter, the exegetical theory of the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae will be analysed within 
the context of the philosophical and textual concepts discussed in the S11111111a de Elite, the 
two works on logic, and the Oxford detenninationes (of both Kenningharn and Wyclif). 
We show how the principles of analogia entis informed Wyclif's understanding of 
fundamental hen-neneutic concepts (those of the book, the author, and authority), as well 
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as his approach to exegetical practice. We also examine the relationship between Wyclif's 
conception of propositional truth (founded on the principles of 'real' predication examined 
in Chapter 3) and his pronouncements on scriptural truth and divine intention. In the 
concluding section, developments in Wyclif's understanding of key textual concepts (most 
notably, ampliatio and the 'literal' sense of Scripture) will be considered in the light of 
criticism voiced by Kenningharn and other anti-realist contemporaries. 
The objective of this study is not principally to cast doubt on earlier depictions of the 
controversy between 'nominalists' and 'realists' of fourteenth-century England. Recent 
revisionist historiography has already done much to reshape contemporary perceptions of 
later medieval thinking. 8 Rather, it seeks to highlight ways in which nominalism - 
considered as a group of related philosophical and theological assumptions - threatened to 
undermine the authority of specific interpretative discourses and practices. My emphasis 
is therefore principally upon the contemporary reception of nominalism, rather-than upon 
the details of nominalist theory itself. Whether or not we choose to endorse the popular 
assessment of Wyclif as a relentless, focused opponent of contemporary 'nominalist' 
teaching, we cannot ignore the fundamental ideological difference between his own 
hermeneutic assumptions and those of academic contemporaries like Kenningham. Though 
we should resist the temptation to perceive his anti-nominalist activity in simple 
teleological terms (as a product, that is, of the incipient 'decline' of scholastic realism), 9 we 
must be conscious that there was much at stake in the nominalist-realist controversy not 
only for the commited realist, but for any exponent of traditional hermeneutic principles. 
Patristic and early medieval hermeneutic theories, after all, had worked predominantly 
from within a broad realist paradigm. By dispensing with, or simply contradicting the 
fundamental tenets of philosophical realism, nominalist logicians and exegetes were 
threatening to undermine the very principles from which Christian texts and traditions drew 
their authority. Wyclif's Latin writings provide an unusual insight into this process, which 
was often obscured by the oblique relationship between 'speculative' and hermeneutic 
discourses throughout the scholastic period. Whether or not Wyclif's response can be 
8 See the discussion in Ch. 1, below. 
9 For a critical analysis of recent perspectives on medieval cultural and historical processes, see Ch. I (section 
3), below. 
5 
regarded as an accurate gaugue of the dangers posed by nominalist methodologies, they can 
leave us in no doubt whatever of the magnitude of the threat they were held to pose. 
Nominalism, after all, could redefine not only the theory of textuality itself, but many of 
the most significant sub-theories (that of the 'literal' sense being most conspicuous) from 
which Wyclif's hermeneutic programme drew its authority. 
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CHAPTER I 
NOMINALISM, REALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 
1. 'TEXTUAL' THEORY, HERMENEUTICS AND THE FoRms OF THEORETICAL DISCOURSE 
Wyclif's philosophical and exegetical writings occupy a significant position in the history 
of ideas about language and discourse, standing at the end of a long tradition of 
interpretative texts informed by Roman and early medieval grammatical writings (the artes 
granunaticae). 
1 They have a part, as such, in the late history of what Martine Irvine, in his 
ground-breaking study of the verbal arts in the early Middle Ages, has termed 'textual ZP 
culture'. 2 This broad label, as Irvine applies it, covers all of those areas of academic 
enquiry whose primary focus was textual, whether the nature of the particular text under 
scrutiny was ancient or medieval, secular or religious, Latin or vernacular. Throughout the 
whole of the ancient period, and for much of the Middle Ages, of course, the emphasis was 
on non-vernacular writings, these being originally the classical writings of Greece and 
Rome, and later Christianized Latin texts, Latin biblical texts, and even the texts of the 
Roman grammars themselves. 3 It also covers the so-called 'preceptive' disciplines, the arts 
of speaking and writing correctly. 4 These latter disciplines occupied a secondary position 
in relation to the expository and explicatory sciences, the 'arts of interpretation' out of 
which the long tradition of secular and Christian commentaries, glosses and exegetical texts 
arose. 
1 Most influential throughout the Middle Ages were the Ars Minor and Ars Maior of Donatus (fl. 4th century 
AD). Between them the two artes cover all of the basic grammatical concepts required to produce a textual 
commentary. Both contain descriptions of the eight parts of speech (noun, pronoun, verb, adverb, participle, 
conjunction, preposition and interjection), and the second includes detailed expositions on metrical units 
(voces, litterae, syllabae, pedes, accentus) as well as aI ist of grammatical 'faults' (vitia). The texts are edited 
by Heinrich Keil in GL, 4 (1864), pp. 355-366; pp. 367-401. 
2 The Making of Textual Culture: 'Granimatica'and Literary Theory, 350-1100 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). See especially the introductory chapter, pp. 1-24. 
3 The earliest commentaries on ancient texts were produced by the Greek scholar Heraclitus (author of the 
Quaestiones Hoinericae) and the Roman grammarian Donatus (author of commentaries on Terence and 
Vergil's Aeneid). See Irvine, The Making of Textual Culture, pp. 8-12. Examples of biblical exegesis, in the 
various forms which this took, are very numerous. Christianized pagan texts, less directly indebted to 
grannnatica than to patristic exegetical methods, include most famously Vergil's Aeneid and' the 
Metamorphoses of Ovid. See Beryl Smalley, English Friars andAntiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1960). Commentaries on the two grammars of Donatus are discussed in Vivien Law's 
The Insular Latin Grammarians (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1982), pp. 81-97. 
Irvine, The Making of Textual Culture, pp. 2-8 
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The emphasis of the late-medieval scholastic culture in which Wyclif was writing was 
similarly 'textual', its primary object, as in the earlier Middle Ages, being the explication 
of the sacred page. The form and context of this explicatory activity, however, by the late 
fourteenth century, was rather different. Academic commentaries, in terms of both style 
and structure, had undergone significant changes with the dawn of Scholasticism, and the 
critical apparatus available to the exegete had been transformed by new developments in 
logic and philosophy. 5 An understanding of the fundamentals of logic was now a 
prerequisite for the explication of scriptural texts, as indeed for all aspects of higher 
theological debate and discussion. The dissemination of ideas about philosophy, theology, 
and biblical interpretation was given new impetus in the later fourteenth century by the 
growing tendency to retain and circulate material delivered in the lecture halls of the 
universities. Wyclif's two major collections of academic writings, the Sullillia de Elite and 
the Siannia Theologica (of which De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae forms a part), belong very 
clearly to this tradition, as do his two tracts on the elements of logic (De Logica and 
Logicae Continuatio). It has been suggested that the texts of the first of the two suninzae 
occupy a similar place in Wyclif's writings to that which would traditionally have been 
filled by a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a piece of work which, until the 
middle of the fourteenth century, had been among the standard academic commentaries 
produced by all scholars in the Oxford Arts Faculty. 6 It is certainly true that many of the 
issues addressed in the Suninia de Elite bear a close resemblance to those typically 
examined in Sentence-commentaries, a fact which will be seen to be of particular 
importance in drawing doctrinal comparisons between Wyclif and Ockham. 7 
5 On the scholastic conunentary tradition see A. J. Minnis and A. B. Scott, eds., Medieval Literary Theory and 
Criticism, pp. I -11. 
6 j. I. Catto, 'Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford 1356-1430', in Jeremy Catto and Ralph Evans, eds., The 
History of the University of Oxford 11: Late Medieval Ogord (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 
175-261 (p. 179). 
7 See the discussion of analogical predication and the Trinity in Chapter 2 (section 2), below. 
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The most important influence on the literary style of Wyclif's writings was the 
academic quaestio or question, the dominant form of debate then current in the universities. 
This originally took the form of a disputation between a master and other scholars, who 
might have included both bachelors and masters of the faculty (whether that was the faculty 
of Arts or the higher faculty of Theology). The master began by presenting a thesis for 
consideration, against which the other students (amongst whom one was typically 
dominant) raised objections. These were considered by the other students present and by 
the master himself, who finally presented his defence of the thesis in a process known as 
8 detenninatio. The written record of the quaestio was typically of a highly formalized 
nature, proceeding through the different stages in an economical, logical and coherent 
manner (typically avoiding the irrelevant repetitions and digressions which must have 
occurred in the live debates) . The 
Stunnia Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas supplies us with 
some of the best examples of this, which also serve to highlight the contrast between the 
earlier and the later usages of the qitaestio-convention. The texts of Wyclif's two main 
surviving suniniae are typically structured far less rigidly than the earlier quaestiones of 
Aquinas and his contemporaries, though the basic discursive form (thesis-objection- 
reply/determination) is often still visible. Something much closer to the oral q1taestio is 
found in Wyclif's disputations with the contemporary Carmelite friar John Kenningham. 
9 
These survive as a series of exchanges, identified in the manuscripts as detenninationes 
rather than as quaestiones. This appears to reflect late fourteenth-century convention, 
according to which a single quaestio alone typically formed the basis of a protracted 
academic debate. 10 
8 Cf. the more detailed analysis of academic debate offered by C. J. F. Martin in his An Introduction to 
Medieval Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), Ch. 3. See also the discussion in 
Minnis and Scott, eds., Medieval Literary Theory, p. 112. On the relationship between the forms of the 
quaestio and the summa, see John Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy 1150-1350: An Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 1987), pp. 24-34. See also Jan Pinborg and Anthony Kenny, 'Medieval Philosophical 
Literature', in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Ch. 1. For an account of the origin 
and development of technical terms such as determinatio, see M. P. Hubert, 'Quelques aspects du Latin 
philosophique aux XII' et XIIV si6cles', Revite des itudes latines, 27 (1949), 211-33. 
9 These are examined in detail in Ch. 4. 
10 On this development see Catto, 'Wyclif and Wycliffism', pp. 179-80. 
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Though both the Sunniza de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae Scriptilrae were in some 
way concerned with the problems of meaning and interpretation, and though they clearly 
occupy a place in the history of exegetical debate and discussion, the problem remains as 
to where exactly they should be situated within the broader histories of textual and literary 
theory. In terms of the latter, of course, this depends very much upon the interpretation of 
'literary'. Though it has often been desirable, for the sake of historical continuity, to 
include medieval grammatical and scholastic writings within the history of literary theory, 
the term 'literary' is clearly unsatisfactory for the present purpose, both in terms of its 
modem and its medieval significations. It is certainly true that scholastic discourse about 
textual meaning continued to rely upon the foundations laid by grannnatica, and that the 
canon of texts valorized by the Latin tradition remained largely unchanged throughout the 
later Middle Ages. This would possibly justify our referring to such discourse as 'literary 
theoretical', especially if the texts discussed within it were confined to non-biblical 
writings. Wyclif's Stannia de Ente and De Veritate S(icrae Scriptitrae, however, belong to 
a tradition which, as we have observed, took the explication of the texts of the Bible as its 
primary object. There is a sense, therefore, in which this form of theoretical discourse, even 
though it strives to answer some of the questions which had arisen in the context of texts 
conventionalýv described as 'literary', and though concepts developed within it naturally 
had consequences for views of literary language, is quite different from literary-theoretical 
writing. To speak of 'textual', rather than 'literary' theory would go some way towards 
solving the problem, supplying, as it does, an inclusive, relatively neutral label. This term, 
however, clearly fails to identify the kinds of question with which scholastic scriptural 
theory was primarily concerned, or the historical tradition to which it belongs. The most 
satisfactory solution is perhaps provided by the much older term, 'hermeneutics'. To speak 
of Wyclif's writings as texts belonging to the field of hermeneutics, rather than to that of 
literary or textual theory, is to locate them within a very specific historical and ideological 
narrative. Such a narrative is very different from that implied by 'literary theory', but has 
the advantage of including particular branches of literary theory within the course of its 
development. Many of the problems which are today narrowly categorized as 'literary', or 
as 'literary-theoretical' - problems relating to the nature of the text, the author, and the 
reader, to the meaning of intention, authority, and tradition, and to the uses of figurative or 
rhetorically elaborate language - are properly speaking henneneutic issues, in whose 
10 
exploration literary theory has played only a relatively small part. 
" 
In its most general sense, the term 'hen-neneutics' applies to the science - or sciences 
- of interpretation (Greek tpgijvs-6Fiv, 'to interpret'). Though the 
English word dates from 
the eighteenth century, when it was applied to the philosophy of biblical interpretation, the 
problems of interpretation more generally have preoccupied philosophers - including 
English men and women - since the earliest times. 
12 Recent discussions of the meaning 
of 'hermeneutics' have focused on the three semantic traits of 6pluIvEl5civ isolated by 
Gerhard Ebeling, whose influential essay on the hermeneutic sciences set the parameters 
for much of the subsequent analysis and debate. 13 According to Ebeling, 9pptTjv&f)Ftv 
conveys the senses 'to express', 'to explain' and 'to translate'. 14 These three meanings 
highlight themes and problems running through the hermeneutic enterprise from its 
beginnings in ancient philosophy to its applications in the disciplines of philosophy, 
theology and literary interpretation today. 15 They are clearly as relevant, therefore, to 
inedieval theories of scriptural interpretation as they are to modem, or to the literary or 
philosophical hermeneutic systems of the last century. The prominent r6le played by 
philosophy in all forms of hermeneutic investigation, moreover, would appear to give 
Wyclif and his contemporaries a very significant position in its history. 
This inclusion of Wyclif and his contemporaries within the hermeneutic tradition 
brings with it a number of other significant advantages. Among the most obvious of these 
11 It is no accident that within the field of modern literary studies, much of the most significant and influential 
research on issues of authorship, intentionality and the process of reading has been undertaken by 
'hermeneutic' critics such as E. D. Hirsch, Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, Paul de Man, etc. 
12 Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. T. F. Hoad (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p. 215. The 
Latin word henneneutica has a longer history, though even this did not enter into common usage until the 
seventeenth century. See the discussion in Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hernieneutics (Yale: 
Yale University Press, 1994), p. 2 1. 
13 'Hermeneutik', in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenivart: Handiv, drterbitch ffir Theologie und 
Religionsivissenschaft, vol. 3 (1959), col. 243-262. See Grodin, Introduction, pp. 20-28. 
14 'Die etymologische Herkunft von tplillv, -ücü samt Derivaten ist umstritten, weist aber auf Wurzeln nüt der 
Bedeutung 'sprechen', 'sagen' (zusammenhängend mit lat. 'verbum' oder 'sermo'). Die Vokabel hat drei 
Bedeutungs richtungen: aussagen (ausdrüken), auslegen (erklären) und übersetzen (dolmetschen). ' Ebling, 
'Hermencutik', col. 243. 
15 On the relevance of Ebeling's three senses to ancient and modern hermeneutic theory, see Richard E. 
Palmer, Henneneutics: Interpretation 7heory in Schleirtnacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 12-32. 
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is the possibility of identifying points of continuity between medieval and post-medieval 
hen-neneutic discourse. One of the most enduring problems of the interpretative sciences, 
for example, has been the fundamentally dialectical nature of textual interpretation. 
Modem 'philosophical' ('general' or 'universal') hermeneutics, following the work of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey in the nineteenth century, and of Hans- 
Georg Gadamer in the twentieth, has embraced this idea of dialectical meaning. 16 For 
Gadamer, whose Trath and Method (1960) has possibly been the most influential modem 
treatise on general hermeneutics, 'truth' is seen to lie not in any sense with the text itself, 
but with the coincidence of interpretative 'horizons' of reader and text. 
17 This was 
certainly not the case in the earlier history of philosophical hermeneutics, nor in that of the 
specifically theological interpretative projects which preceded it. It was less true, still, of 
patristic or medieval methods. Though for the most part, both patristic and medieval 
theorists acknowledged the importance of the interpretative community, the emphasis was 
on disciplining the mind to see the text as an object, static and unchanging, rather than as 
a product of an historical or social dialectic. 18 Wyclif's philosophical realism greatly 
strengthened this emphasis in his own writings, though it also highlighted his paradoxical 
dependence oil the dialectical processes he sought to see beyond. Indeed, the opposition 
between dialectical and objective conceptions of meaning can be seen to lie at the heart of 
the hermeneutic debate which grew out of Wyclif's philosophical disputations with his anti- 
realist contemporaries. 
16 The terins 'general', 'philosophical' and 'universal' are usually applied to hermeneutic theories which, like 
those of Dilthey, Schleiermacher, and Gadamer, take the process of understanding itself, rather than the 
interpretative rules of a specific community of readers (e. g. theologians, exegetes, literary theorists), as their 
object. For definitions of 'general' and 'local' in respect of the hermeneutic enterprise, see Francis Watson, 
'The Scope of Hermeneutics' in C. E. Gunton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 65-80. 
17 A concise history of the development of Gadamer's hermeneutic method is provided in Georgia Warnke, 
Gadatner., Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 5-42. On the 
relationship between Gadamer and his predecessors in the interpretative tradition, Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, see Palmer, Hermenettrics. 
18 Ancient and early Christian hermencutic thought has correspondingly been identified by Jean Grondin as 
the prehistory of hermeneutics. '[WIhat distinguishes the modern world-picture' from that of the ancients 
and medievals, he argues, is its 'consciousness of being perspectival. ' (Introduction, p. 16) Such 
consciousness entails a fundamental awareness of the dialectical nature of meaning highlighted above. 
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2. NOMINALISM AND REALISM: CONTEXTS AND 
DEFINITIONS 
The concepts of nominalism and realism have been invoked in very broad terms so 
far, and we have done little more than hint at the problems that existing definitions might 
present for the student of literary and non-literary hen-neneuties. Like other names that 
share philosophical and literary currency, the terms 'nominalism' and 'realism' have been 
used to denote a vast range of extremely varied, often mutually inconsistent ideas and 
perspectives. 19 Within the context of medieval philosophy and theology alone, there are 
multiple definitions associated with each of the major historical disciplines. Though any 
attempt to isolate significant points of convergence is bound to be artificial, it is 
nevertheless possible to identify a small number of shared ideological characteristics. Most 
important among these is the underlying distinction between realist and anti-realist theories 
of knowledge and being. This is described in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy as 'the 
standard opposition between those who affirm, and those who deny, the real existence of 
some kind of thing, or some kind of fact or state of affairs. ' The external world, the past 
and future, other minds, mathematical objects, possibilities, universals, and moral or 
aesthetic properties are listed as examples . 
20 In the context of medieval philosophy in 
general, and of Wyclif's writings in particular, 'realism' is familiar as a term applied to a 
belief in the reality of universal categories (genera and species), usually understood in 
opposition to nominalism or conceptualism. 21 For Wyclif and a number of his 
contemporaries, however, this forrn of metaphysical realism also entailed a commitment 
to the reality of other, related categories such as possibilities ('hypotheticals') and past and 
future instants. More importantly, it became inextricably bound up with Wyclif's 
19 A useful illustration of the diversity of definiticns associated with these terms in contemporary culture is 
provided by Raymond Williams in his Kqwords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Societv, revised ed. (London: 
Fontana, 1983), pp. 257-262. 
20 The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 
319-20. 
21 On the distinction between 'nominalism' and 'conceptualism', see section 2.2, below. 
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convictions about the nature of good and evil (and hence, with his understanding of heresy 
and untruth), leading him to a form of inoral realism. 
Beyond their basic metaphysical disagreements, medieval nominalists and realists 
were habitually divided over a range of key theological issues. The most important of 
these was the problem of the relationship between God and his creatures. Though views 
about this were developed essentially independently of ideas about the logic of universals, 
the two were fundamentally compatible, and are almost invariably associated in histories 
of late scholasticism. Among the issues most frequently discussed were those of the 
relationship between the created mind and God - and hence between human and divine 
ideas - and the nature of divine power. Closely related to the general problem of the 
relationship between God and his creatures is that of the meaning of salvation and merit. 
Here, the central concepts were those of the r6le of the individual will and its relation to 
the supernatural habit. Though not all of these theological ideas have such a significant r6le 
in Wyclif's henneneutic theory as the basic metaphysical concepts listed above, they do, 
as we shall argue, play an important part. 
Both the theological and the metaphysical aspects of the nominalist-realist 
controversy have been subjected to intense academic scrutiny in recent years. This has been 
the result of a growing recognition of the heterogeneity of late-medieval nominalist 
thinking, and of the dangers of reductive distinctions between 'nominalist' and 'realist' 
values. Such a recognition has been long overdue, and possibly owes something to the 
recent renewal of interest in medieval nominalism (both as a philosophical and a 'literary' 
phenomenon) within the academy. Richard Utz, in a recent essay on nominalist 
historiography, attributes this in turn to a shift away from the predominantly Thomistic 
research paradigm established by Catholic scholars in the first half of this century. 
22 In 
recent decades, he argues, nominalism has been recognised increasingly as a central, rather 
than as a marginal or 'supplementary' intellectual phenomenon. No longer regarded as a 
perverse departure from the 'norms' established by medieval Thorriism, nor as a chaotic 
outgrowth from a more structured and disciplined system, it has finally begun to attract the 
22 , Negotiating the Paradigm: Literary Nominalism and the Theory of Rereading Late Medieval Texts', in 
Richard J. Utz, ed., Literary Nominalism and the Theory ofRereading Late Medieval Texts: A New Research 
Paradigin (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), pp. 1-31 (pp. 3- 10). 
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scholarly attention it deserves. 
in spite of these encouraging developments in historical scholarship, there has not 
been a significant change in the traditional assessment of the philosophy of Wyclif and his 
opponents. Though recent historians have recognized the need to exercise caution in 
applying labels such as 'extreme realist', the tendency to oppose Wyclif the realist to a 
group of scholars who, in spite of the diversity of their logical and metaphysical beliefs, are 
described simply as 'nominalists', has remained. The diversity within this group has 
consequently gone largely unnoticed, and has yet to be analysed in a way which does full 
justice to the ideological richness of Wyclif's philosophical surroundings. Though there 
is certainly good reason to see Wyclif as a self-conscious objector to the nominalist ideas 
of William of Ockham and his followers, it would be grossly reductive to assume that all, 
or even most, of the targets of Wyclif's regular philosophical invectives were Ockhamists. 
The revised assessment of medieval nominalism will be considered in detail below 
(sections 2.1 and 2.2), and the case will be made for a new approach to the forms of 
nominalism current in Wyclif's Oxford (section 2.2). 
2.1. Nominalism in Early Scholastic Philosophy: Vocales and Nominales 
The most extreme form of anti-realism in the earlY scholastic period was that which 
associated universal categories with spoken words merely. Such a view has been connected 
with the philosopher and theologian Roscelin of Compi6gne (c. 1050-1125), who has 
traditionally been regarded as the earliest nominaliSt. 23 It is almost certainly true that 
Roscelin's views on the status of universals had no significant precedents in the Middle 
Ages, though he is now known to have derived the basic principles of his logic from his 
master, a mysterious character known only as 'John'. Other students of this same teacher 
include Robert of Paris and Arnulf Laudunensis. All three, according to contemporary 
sources, taught that logic takes voces, rather than res, as its object. They were thus 
23 A concise account of Roscelin's nominalism (and its theological implications) is provided in Eike-Henner 
W. Kluge, 'Roscelin and the Medieval Problem of Universals', Jounial of tile History of Philosophy 14 
(1976), 405-414. For a recent reassessment of Roscelin's contribution to philosophy, see Constant J. Mews, 
'Non-dnalism and Theology before Abaelard: New Light on Roscelin of Compiýgne% Vivarium 30,1 (1992), 
4-33. 
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identified originally not as 'nominalists' (nondnales), but as 'vocalists' (vocales). 
24 Recent 
research has shown that Roscelin is unlikely to have been the earliest of these vocalists, 
though he is the first to have applied the techniques of vocalism to the study of universals. 
25 
Only a single letter to Peter Abelard (1079-c. 1142) survives from Roscelin's writings, 
26 
and much of what we know of his ideas (and their contemporary reception) derives from 
the secondary accounts of Abelard and John of Salisbury (c. 1 120-1180). Abelard's own 
nominalism (or vocalism), less extreme than that of Roscelin, possibly owes something to 
him, and it seems likely that he was taught by him at some point in his career. 
27 The ideas 
of the two men were certainly closely associated by their contemporary, John of Salisbury, 
who provides a usefully concise account of their respective doctrines in his educational 
treatise, the Metalogicon: 
... All are here... declaiming on the nature of universals, and attempting to 
explain, contrary to the intention of the Author, what is really the most 
profound question, and a matter [that should be reserved] for more 
advanced studies. One holds that universals are merely word-sounds, 
although this opinion, along with its author Roscelin, has already almost 
passed into oblivion. Another maintains that universals are word concepts, 
and twists to support his thesis everything that he can ever remember to 
have been written on the subject. Our peripatetic of pallet, Abelard, was 
ensnared in this opinion. He left many, and still has, some followers and 
proponents of his doctrine. 28 
Philosophical systems which denied reality to universal categories were clearly viewed 
with some degree of suspicion in the twelfth century. As John of Salisbury's description 
2*1 This brief account of the development of 'vocalistic' teaching in the eleventh and twelfth centuries is 
heavily indebted to Iwakuma Yukio's article, ' "Vocales" or Early Nominalists', Traditio 47 (1992), 37-111. 
See also John Marenbon, 'Vocalism, Nominalism and the Commentaries on the Categories from the Earlier 
Twelfth Century', Vivaritint 30/1 (1992), 51-61 
25 Yukio, ' "Vocales" ', pp. 40-47. 
26 pL, 178, col. 357-372. 
27 The most recent comprehensive survey of Abelard's philosophical system is John Marenbon's The 
Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See esp. pp. 174-202. On the 
relationship between Abelard and Roscelin, see M. T. Clanchy, Abelard., A Medieval Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997), pp. 105-107; pp. 292-295. 
28 'Naturam... univeraliurn hic omnes expediunt, et altissimurn negotiurn ct maioris inquisitionis contra 
mentern auctoris explicare nituntur. Alius ergo consistit in uocibus; licet haec opinio cum Roscelino suo fere 
omnino iarn euanuefit. Alius sermones intuetur et ad illos detorquet quicquid alicubi de uniuersalibus meminit 
scriptum; in hac autern opinione deprachensus est Peripateticus Palatinus Abaelardus noster, qui multos 
reliquit et adhuc quidem. aliquos habet professionis huius sectatores et testes. ' Metalogicon, 17 (ed. Clemens 
C. 1. Webb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), pp. 91-2; trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: California University Press, 1955), p. 112. ) 
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testifies, this was largely on account of the perceived departure from the norms and 
conventions found in Aristotle (the 'Author' mentioned at the beginning of the passage). 
Any such departure was bound to have been perceived as extreme at a time when the last 
four books of the Organon (the Topics, the Sophistici Elenchi and the Prior and Posterior 
Analytics) had only recently become available. 29 This 'modem' tendency in philosophical 
methodology, however, was part of a more general movement towards an autonomous 
logical system, which by the fourteenth century had become highly sophisticated . 
30 The 
name of Roscelin was also associated with a controversial understanding of the nature of 
the Trinity. Though clearly a corollary of his nominalist logic, his individualistic 
conception of the Trinity, which viewed it essentially as three separate persons, is likely to 
have provoked more widespread debate than his philosophical pronouncements had done 
alone. 31 Early medieval nominalism has also been connected with the heretical doctrine of 
Sabellianism, according to which the three divine persons were held to be only notionally 
distinct. 32 The close relationship between nominalism and particular Trinitarian doctrines 
has recently been emphasized by Calvin Normore, who attempts to redefine medieval 
nominalism in theological, rather than in strictly logical ternis. 
33 As I shall argue, debate 
about the nature of the Trinity provides a valuable link between twelfth- and fourteenth- 
century nominalist thinking. Theories of identity and distinction, which had become highly 
sophisticated by the thirteenth century, were often invoked in attempts to explain the 
relationship between the persons of the Trinity and the unitary divine nature, and typically 
divided nominalists and realists. 
29 The discovery of the last texts of the Organon is usually seen as heralding the beginning of the second 
major phase in the history of medieval logic. During the earliest phase, which extends to the early twelfth 
century, the most important philosophical authorities were the first two books of the Organon, the Categories 
and De Interpretatione. These were supplemented by Boethius's commentary on Porphyry's Isagogue. 
30 See L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modenzortan: A Contribution to the History of Early Tertninist Logic (Assen: 
H. J. & H. M. G. Prakke, 1962-1967); Alfonso Maier6, Terminologia Logica della Tarda Scolastica (Rome: 
Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1972), pp. 9-46. 
31 On the treatment of Roscelin's Trinitarian doctrine by Anselm and Abelard, see Michael Haren, Medieval 
Thought. The lVestent Intellectual Traditionfrom Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century. 2nd ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1992), pp. 91 -110. 
32 Charges of Sabellianism were also made against Roscelin. See the discussion in Ch. 2 (section 2), below. 
33 Calvin Normore, 'The Tradition of Medieval Nominalism', in John F. Wippel, ed., Studies in Medieval 
Philosophy (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), pp. 201-217. 
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2.2. Nominalism in Wyclif's Oxford 
The form of extreme nominalism (or vocalism) which characterized Roscelin and 
Abelard's thinking did not survive into the fourteenth century. 34 Nominalism of a different 
kind, nevertheless, was exerting an influence in the universities of England and Europe 
from the early part of the century onwards. This has been associated in particular with the 
teachings of the Franciscan friar William of Ockham (c. 1285 - 1347), who lectured on the 
Sentences in Oxford between 1317 and 1319. The extent, nature, and repercussions of this 
influence have been variously estimated, and it has been here, in particular, that the older 
studies of nominalist philosophy have recently been found to be wanting. The main ideas 
to come under scrutiny, particularly in the revisionist work of the 1970s, have been those 
which have associated nominalism with a particularised, atornistic view of reality, with a 
radically sceptical theory of knowledge, and with a theology which focused on an 
omnipotent and unknowable God. Many of the most widely used historical accounts 
written before 1965, including those of David Knowles, Gordon Leff and Meyrick Carr6, 
rely heavily on such ideas, and have tended to emphasize the discontinuities between late- 
medieval nominalism and the older scholastic tradition (which was seen to have been 
rooted in the 'Thomistic' system described by UtZ). 35 Though the ideas themselves had 
begun to lose their hold on historians long before the accounts of Knowles, Leff and Carr6 
were being written, their influence is still visible in writings of the present day. This is in 
spite of the appearance of three major studies of Ockham's work since 1970: Gordon 
Leff's William of Ockham: The Metainorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (published in 1975 
as a corrective to Leff s earlier and much shorter account), Marilyn McCord Adams's two- 
volume philosophical study, Williain Ockhant (1987), and Katherine Tachau's Vision and 
Certitude in the Age of Ockhain (1988). 36 This response appears even slower when we 
34 On the relationship between the first- and second-generation nominales, see William Courtenay, Tate- 
Medieval Nominalism Revisited: 1972-1982', Journal of the History of Ideas, 44/1 (1983), 159-164 (pp. 
160-1). 
35 See David Knowles, The Evoltition of Medieval Thought (London: Longman, 1962), pp. 291-337; Gordon 
Leff, Medieval Thought: St Augustine to Ockhant (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959), pp. 255-305; Meyrick 
H. Carrd, Realists and Nominalists (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 120-25. 
36 Gordon Leff, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1975). See especially the introductory section, pp. xiii-xxiv. Marilyn McCord Adams, 
William Ockhain (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987). Katherine Tachau, Vision and 
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consider William Courtenay's claim, in a survey of nominalist literature from the beginning 
of this century until 1972, that the 'traditional' interpretation of late-medieval nominalism 
had begun to be challenged as early as the 1930s. Courtenay attributes the delayed response 
of contemporary scholars in part to a reluctance to reinterpret the primary teXtS. 
37 Many 
of the mistakes that have been made, he suggests, are mistakes of interpretation, which are 
not obvious from the words of the medieval thinkers themselves. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the 'traditional' view of nominalism has survived very conspicuously in literary histories 
of the later Middle Ages. 38 Even since the publication of Courtenay's survey, and of his 
later Schools and Scholars in Medieval England (1987) - both of which address the 
problem of the literary reception of nominalist ideas - the historical interpretations of the 
first half of this century have exerted a powerful influence over critical readings of Chaucer, 
Langland, and the Gaivain-poet. These have often relied heavily - or even exclusively - 
on secondary nominalist literature (not always with an awareness of its chronology), and 
have tended to perceive parallels very readily between philosophical and vernacular literary 
discourses. 39 Though the most recent studies to appear have often been more cautious, 
there are at least as many that continue to rely on the older and more misleading - if often 
the most appealing - prejudices of historical scholarship. The basic tenets of medieval 
nominalism have been further distorted by a willingness to construe them in naYve 
6precursorist' terms. Nominalism, for more than a minority of literary commentators, has 
been regarded essentially as a form of proto-structuraliSM. 40 
Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345 
(Leiden: Brill, 1988). 
37 Some changes were in progress, Courtenay suggests, even before the 1930s. The revised picture which 
has emerged in the work produced since the 1930s, however, 'has not made the impact it deserves'. See 
'Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion', in Charles Trinkaus and Heiko A. Oberman, eds., The Pursuit of 
Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 26-58 (p. 32). 
38 Courtenay lists literature, art and religion as the primary discourses in which the 'traditional' view of 
nominalism has survived. See 'Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion', p. 31. 
39 For a sceptical assessment of the relevance of developments in late-medieval nominalism to the study of 
vernacular literature see Robert Myles, Chaticerian Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
Ch. 1. See also my 'Literary Nominalism and Medieval Sign Theory: Problems and Perspectives', in Hugo 
Keiper, Christoph Bode and Richard J. Utz, eds., Nominalism and Literary Discourse: New Perspectives 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), pp. 157-189. 
40 This tendency has been conspicuous in literary analyses of nominalist serniotic theories. For a detailed 
critique of this approach, see my 'Literary Nominalism and Medieval Sign Theory', esp. pp. 167-173. 
19 
The revised view of nominalism is still developing, and represents a complex and 
often tentative group of assumptions. It has been summarized conveniently by Courtenay 
in terms of a three-school system of ideas. Following Heiko Oberman, he designates the 
respective schools 'conservative', 'moderate' and 'radical' .41 For the purposes of the 
present study, the 'moderate' (or 'Ockhamist') school, in which are placed William of 
Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly and Gabriel Biel '42 is the most significant. From an explicit 
reference to Ockham's Sentences-commentary in De Universalibus (and an anonymous 
citation from the same section of this work in the earlier De Ideis 
43), We know that the ideas 
of the Venerabilis Inceptor were familiar to Wyclif. Though it may indeed be true, as 
recent scholarship suggests, that Ockham was a less influential figure in Oxford than had 
once been thought, there can be no doubt that Wyclif perceived his ideas to be a threat, 
even if he did not associate them exclusively with Ockham himself (or with a distinct 
'Ockhamist' school). 44 This much is clear from his frequent dismissal of metaphysical 
arguments which were consistent with Ockham's assumptions. As we suggest in Chapter 
2, moreover, Wyclif's perception of Ockham must have been conditioned in part by the 
teachings of Walter Burley, a notorious opponent of Ockhamist thinking. Though it would 
be naYve to assume that Burley's pronouncements on logic and metaphysics were followed 
by Wyclif to the letter, he nevertheless exerted a powerful influence (as we demonstrate in 
Chapter 3) over his student's metaphysical orientation. Ideas which were inherited from 
Burley, though not often used by Wyclif explicitly to undermine Ockham, can therefore 
41 'Norninalism and Medieval Religion', p. 34. Cf. Oberman, 'Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism, 
with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance', Harvard Theological Review, 53 (1960), 47-76 (esp. pp. 
54-6, in which the respective 'schools' are described). 
42 , Nominalism and Medieval Religion', p. 34. 
43 The reference is to book 1, dist. 35, q. 5. See De Universalibits, Ch. 15,11.150-57. The text of De 
Universalibits is edited by Ivan Mfiller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), and translated by Anthony 
Kenny as On Universals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). An abbreviated form of the same passage 
is also cited (anonymously, but with a marginal ascription to Ockham) in De Universalibits, Ch. 15,11.231- 
33. My attention was drawn to the identity of the passages cited in De Universalibus and De Ideis by Dr 
Vil6m Herold. The relationship between the two texts is analysed in detail in his article, 'Wyclifs Polemik 
gegen Ockhams Auffassung der platonischen Ideen und ihr Nachklang in der tschechischen hussitischen 
Philosophie', Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 5 (1985), 185-215 (pp. 191-192). 
44 See Courtenay, 'Ile Reception of Ockham's Thought in Fourteenth-century England', Studies in Church 
History, Subsidia, 5 (1987), pp. 89-108. Courtenay questions the extent to which two figures traditionally 
regarded as Ockhan-dsts, Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeharn, can realistically be regarded as such. Cf. His 
later observation that there was 'a relatively weak ideological tie between a master and those who attended 
his lectures', making the identification of particular schools of thought problematic. Courtenay, 'Theology 
and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif, in Catto and Evans, eds., pp. 1-34 (pp. 10-11). 
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be seen to have had their origins, at the very least, in a system which was consciously 
opposed to Ockhamism. 
The 'key' principles of Ockham's philosophy would be difficult to isolate, and it is 
unlikely that any two scholars would be in full agreement as to what these should be. I will 
therefore concentrate on those aspects which are likely to have been known by Wyclif, or 
which had significant consequences for the development of his hermeneutic theory. These 
will be considered in turn, and will be related to the revisions to the 'traditional' 
conception of Ockham's nominalism outlined by Courtenay. First among them is the 
problem of universals (and the related issue of the reality of divine ideas). Though this is 
no longer regarded as the chief concern of Ockham's philosophy, it was arguably the single 
aspect of nominalist teaching which caused Wyclif greatest anxiety. Ockham, moreover, 
is the only thinker to be identified explicitly with 'nominalist' responses to this fundamental 
metaphysical problem. Ockham. saw the 'reality' attributed to universals as a mere fiction, 
the result of the mental process of 'abstractive' cognition (notitia abstractiva). This process 
derived in turn from individual acts of intuitive cognition (notitia intititiva), through which 4P 
singulars in the world were represented as 'natural' (non-arbitrary) concepts in the mind. 
The perception of singulars therefore preceded the formation of universal concepts in the 
mind. As concepts, Ockham suggested, universals are themselves singulars, leading him 
to the conclusion that 'every universal... is-only a universal by signification, by being a sign 
of several things' ('quodlibet universale... non est universale nisi per significationem, quia 
est signum plurimum' ). 45 Though universals for Ockham did not represent realities, 
therefore, genera (animal, plant, etc. ) and species (dog, cat, huntan; tree, flower, bitsh, etc. ) 
were ultimately non-arbitrary concepts (usually described as ficta orfigmenta), and only 
secondarily conventional (ad placitunt) signs. Herein lies the most significant difference 
between Ockharn's nominalism, which was strictly a form of conceptualism, 
46 and the more 
extreme teachings of first-generation nominalists (the vocales) such as Roscelin. The 
distinction between these two perspectives, especially among literary scholars, has often 
45 Suninia Totius Logicae, I, c. xiv. Text ed. and trans. Philotheus Bochner, Ockham: Philosophical Writings 
(Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957), p. 33. 
46 'Conceptualism' denotes a philosophical system in which universal categories are held to exist as concepts 
in the mind. The term is gaining currency among historians of the later Middle Ages. See, for example, 
Marilyn McCord Adams, 'Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century', in The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy, pp. 411-439 (p. 434). 
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been overlooked. 47 
Closely related to the problem of universals, though less often the focus of scholarly 
attention, is the theory of identity and distinction. In the context of Wyclif's anti- 
nominalism, this undoubtedly played as significant a r6le (albeit often a less conspicuous 
one) as any other issue in contemporary logic and metaphysics. Like the problem of 
universals, the theory of identity and distinction was fundamentally concerned with the 
nature of being. What was it that made things distinct from each other, and how could it 
be proved that they were not, in fact, the same? What constituted a real, as opposed to a 
conceptual, distinction? These were far from trivial questions, and had particularly 
important implications for the perceived relationship between universals and their 
particulars. Debate between nominalists and realists throughout the fourteenth century 
centred on the notion of fonnal distinction (distinctio fonnalis) and identity, which 
received its most famous formulation in the philosophy of the moderate realist, John Duns 
Scotus (c. 1265-1308). According to Scotus, something of a single nature (something 
which is in real terms the same as itself) could consist of elements which were fonnally 
distinct from each other (as opposed to essentially distinct, as in the case of two different 
entities). This kind of distinction, Scotus insisted, was itself real, and preceded any act of 
the intellect which could introduce distinctions on a conceptual level. 48 For conceptualists 
like Ockharn, such a position could not be defended. The limited ontology of the Ockham's 
philosophy, as Marilyn McCord Adams has argued, would not allow for real identity and 
distinction to co-exist within a single entity. 49 This, as we shall see, separated him from 
Wyclif not only in respect of his understanding of universals, but also (in Wyclif's own 
eyes, at least) in respect of his conception of the Trinity. A failure to understand the true 
nature of identity and distinction therefore represented not merely a philosophical error, but 
47 But see the discussion in Hugo Keiper's recent essay, 'A Literary 'Debate over Universals'? New 
Perspectives on the Relationships between Nominalism, Realism, and Literary Discourse', in Kciper, Bode 
and Utz, eds., Nominalism and Literary Discourse, pp. 1-87 (p. 5). 
48 This brief overview of Scotus's theory is heavily indebted to the account provided by Marilyn McCord 
Adams, 'Universals in the Fourteenth Century', pp. 412-416. 
49 For Ockham, 'real things and beings of reason or concepts are the only beings there are, and there are no 
real beings that are not real things. But Scotus'... formal distinction is premised on a wider ontology that 
allows for distinct formalities within one and the same thing. ' Adams, 'Universals', pp. 417-419. 
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also a potential source of Christological heresy. 
50 
Among the most significant changes to the received understanding of nominalist 
philosophy were made in the area of the theological problem of the relationship between 
God and his creatures. Ockham's insistence on preserving an absolute distinction between 
divine and human natures had led in many of the earlier accounts to an exaggerated 
emphasis on the futility of thought and rational enquiry. 5 1 This was frequently reinforced 
by a misunderstanding of Ockharn's use of the scholastic concepts of potentia dei absohita 
and potentia dei ordinata. Rather than seeing the absolute power of God in terms of 
possibilities once available but now excluded, commentators perceived a threat of 
supernatural intervention in the created order. 52 According to Courtenay, this represented 
not only a misrepresentation of the nature of divine power itself, but of the main purpose 
behind the distinction: 
The distinction is deceptive for the modem reader because it seems to be 
talking about possibilities and avenues for divine action when in fact it is 
making a statement about the non-necessity of the created order. Both parts 
of the dialectic, which must be taken together to be meaningful, face in the 
direction of creation, not God. Together they declare the contingent, 
conventional character of the created world. 53 
50 See Ch. 2 (section 2) and Ch. 5 (section 4.1). 
51 See Courtenay, 'Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion', pp. 27-8 
52 This view of divine power has exerted a conspicuous influence on literary interpretations of nominalist 
theology. Seeking allegories of nominalism in fourteen th-ce ntury vernacular literature, numerous 
commentators have sought fictional analogues to the image of mankind at the mercy of an omnipotent and 
capricious creator. Robert Stepsis, for example, finds just such an analogue in the figures of Walter and 
Griselda in Chaucer's Clerk's Tale. Nominalism, he argues, provides the only way of reconciling the 'vain, 
capricious and unfeeling' behaviour of Walter with his 'anagogic' significance as the God of Christian 
theology. Focusing on the divine contravention of ordained laws (parallelled in Walter's capricious 
behaviour), and on the futility of human reason (exemplified in Griselda's response), Stepsis reveals very 
clearly his indebtedness to the older conception of nominalist philosophy. See 'Polenlia Absoluta and the 
Clerk's Tale', Chaticer Review, 10 (1975), 129-46. David Steinmetz makes a less extreme attempt to read 
the tale as a nominalist allegory, interpreting divine power not in terms of the supremacy of the potentia 
absoluta but as a dialectical relationship between absolute and ordained powers. Walter's self-imposed 
contract of marriage, like the potentia ordinata of God, means that possibilities once open to him (analogous 
to those available to God through his potentia absolitta) are now closed off. This reading, though more 
persuasive than that of Stepsis, leaves the obvious problem of Walter's cruelty unresolved. See 'Late 
Medieval Nominalism and the Clerk's Tale', Chaticer Review, 12 (1977), 38-54. A recent attempt to revive 
and develop Steinmetz's interpretation can be found in Rodney Delasanta's article, 'Nominalism and the 
Clerk's Tale Revisited', The Chaticer Review, 31/3 (1997), 209-23 1. 
53 'Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion, ' p. 39. Courtenay discusses the importance of the distinction 
in the later non-drialist tradition in 'Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly, ' Speculum, 46 (1971), 94-119. 
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A possible cause of the misunderstanding Courtenay describes is Ockham's doctrine of 
primary and secondary causes. According to the principle of primary causation, God, 
though he would never behave in a way which was unnecessary, could still produce 
supernatural effects, provided only that they were analogous to the effects produced by 
natural agency: ZD 
'Whatever God can produce by means of secondary causes, he can directly 
produce and preserve without them. ' From this maxim I argue thus. Every 
effect which God can produce by means of a secondary cause, he can 
produce directly on his own account. He can produce intuitive sense 
cognition by means of an object; hence he can produce it directly on his 
own account. 54 
Ockham's suggestion that God would be capable, if he chose to do so, of producing 
an intuitive cognition of a non-existent, has often been taken as a further affirmation of his 
sceptical epistemology. Reason, it is argued, incapable of distinguishing between natural 
and supernatural, would be rendered futile as a means of enquiry. Again, however, the 
assumption that God can produce such effects miraculously is merely a guarantee of his 
omnipotence, and not an indication of the likelihood of their being brought into being. 55 
For Ockham, as for the earlier scholastics, reason was a sacred faculty, and remained an 
authority for Christian and philosopher alike. 56 God's existence, for faith and reason alike, 
could never be doubted, despite the charges of agnosticism which have been made against 
54 ' 'Quidquid Deus producit mediantibus causis secundis potest immediate sine illis producere et conservare. ' 
Ex ista propositione arguo sic: Omnem effecturn quem potest Deus mediante causa secunda immediate per 
se; sed in notitiam intuitivam, corporalem potest mediante obiecto; ergo potest in cam immediate per se. ' 
Quodlibcta, VI, q. vi. ed. and trans. Philotheus Boehner, IVilliant Ockhain: Philosophical IVrilings 
(Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957), pp. 25-26. 
55 On the problem of interpreting Ockham's idea of intuitive cognition of non-existents, see Philotheus 
Boehner, 'The Notitia Intidtiva of Non-Existents according to William of Ockham, ' in Collected Articles, 
pp. 268-300. Boehner argues against the many sceptical interpretations, suggesting that for Ockham, as for 
the other scholastics, intuitive knowledge was infallible. The idea of intuitive cognition of non-existents was 
developed in response to a specific theological problem, and was not a general epistemological principle. (p. 
275) 
56 On Ockham's use of the scholastic concept of recta ratio ('right reason'), see David Clark, 'William of 
Ockham on Right Reason, ' Speculum, 48 (1978), 13-36. Clark discusses the implication of the ordinata- 
absoluta distinction for the moral sense of the individual, concluding with an optimistic assessment of the 
function of reason. He points out, in particular, the error of seeing 'the contingent decrees of God [as] the sole 
basis of moral value and obligation' (p. 19). 
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Ockham and the later nominalists. 
Interpretations of divine power, whether those of nornýinalists or realists, were linked 
inextricably to the question of grace and salvation. A conspicuous feature of older histories 
of later medieval theology, and (somewhat predictably) of literary studies of nominalist 
influence, has been the association of nominalism with voluntarist or Pelagian positions. 57 
The doctrine of facere quod in se est, doing what is in oneself in order to merit grace, has 
often been associated with Ockham, despite its widespread acceptance (among nominalists 
and anti-nominalists alike). Ockham, it is true, took a good deal of trouble to emphasise 
the importance of the will over the supernatural habit, but this is no reason to suppose that 
he was in any way extraordinary. 58 Not only Robert Holcot, whose status as a nominalist 
(if not as an Ockhamist) is not in doubt, but also Thomas Aquinas, Richard Fitzralph and 
even Wcylif himself have been found to invoke this Pelagian (or semi-Pelagian) principle. 
There is, it would seem, no secure philosophical ground on which to found a distinction 
between realist and anti-realist versions of the Pelagian doctrine. Realists such as 
Bradwardine and Wyclif, nevertheless, have traditionally been associated with an extreme 
determinism, according to which the supernatural habit is necessarily prior to the individual 
will (and hence to human freedom) in respect of the question of grace. For these thinkers 
(however different the particulars of their teaching may have been), it was thought, all 
things were seen to happen of necessity. This interpretation has recently been placed in 
question by Anthony Kenny, who seeks to reinstate human freedom as a vital component 
in Wyclif's theology. Even if Wyclif could be regarded as determinist, he argues, we must 
avoid the temptation to regard this either as an extreme position, or as a necessary 
57 Notable examples of literary studies influcnced by the assumption of a necessary relationship between 
nominalism and semi-Pelagianism in the later Middle Ages include Janet Coleman, Piers Plowman and the 
'Moderni' (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1981) and Philip F. O'Mara, 'Robert Holcot's 
"Ecumenism" and the Green Knight', Chaucer Review, 26-27 (1992), 329-342; 97-106. More tentative links 
between the two are suggested by Robert Adams, 'Piers's Pardon and Langland's Semi-Pelagianism', 
Traditio, 39 (1983), 367-418, and by Katherine Lynch, 'The Parliament of FoWs and Late Medieval 
Voluntarism, ' Chaticer Review, 25 (nos. 1-2) (1990), 1-16 and 85-95. See also Adams's later article, 
'Langland's Theology', in John A. Alford, ed., A Companion to Piers Plowman (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), pp. 107-09. For a sceptical assessment of the relationship between serni-Pelagianism, 
nominalism, and literary practice, see A. J. Minnis, 'Looking for a Sign: The Quest for Nominalism in 
Chaucer and Langland', in A. J. Minnis, Charlotte C. Morse and Thorlac Turville-Petre, cds., Essays on 
Ricardian Literature in Honour ofJ. A. Burrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 142-178. 
58 According to Ockharnist ethics, only an act of will can be necessarily virtuous. The love of God is such an 
act since, de potentia dei ordinata, it cannot be vicious. Nor can it be performed against the will. The value 
of all contingently virtuous acts is this dependent on this necessary act of virtue. See Quodlibeta, 111, q. xxx. 
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consequence of his philosophical realism-59 Wyclif and Ockham, it would seem, are likely 
to have had more in common in respect of the questions of freedom, necessity, grace, and 
salvation, than has generally been allowed. This assumption is supported by our analysis 
of Wyclif's treatment of freedom and necessity in Chapter 5.60 
3. ANTi-NomiNALisM AND ANTI-MODERNISM IN WYCLIF's HERMENEUTIC WRITINGS 
That Wyclif was opposed to the basic principles of nominalist teaching in general, 
and of Ockharnism in particular, has never been seriously in doubt. His philosophical 
pronouncements alone, quite apart from any explicit criticism of nominalism he may have 
voiced, are sufficient to establish this. There are, however, within the texts of the Sunzina 
de Ente and the Stunina Theologica, relatively few unambiguous references to the practices 
of contemporary or near-contemporary nominalists. It is undoubtedly true that much of 
what Wyclif had to say on the subject of 'sophistical' and heretical philosophies would 
have been directed very deliberately towards fourteenth-ccntury Ockhamist thinkers, but 
there were nevertheless a large number of other potential targets, none of whom need 
necessarily be regarded - at least as regards their basic ontological views - as nominalists. 
Even in the age of Abelard and Roscelin, when the opponents of nominalist thinking were 
at least willing to identify its adherents as nominales or (more usually) vocales, there was 
ample room for uncertainty as to exactly who was being targeted. 
61 In Wyclif, the term 
62 
nondnalis is never used , and although there are many examples 
in which reference is 
clearly being made to anti-universalist thinkers (Ockham himself, as we have suggested, 
is even named in a small number of cases), there are as many in which the philosophical 
allegiances of the person or group in question remain obscure. The term sophista, for 
59 Anthony Kenny, 'Realism and Determinism in the Early Wyclif, Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 5 
(1987), 165-177. 
60 See Ch. 5 (section 4.1), below. 
61 Calvin Normore has cast doubt on the traditional assumption that the term nontinales was used to identify 
opponents of philosophical realism. See 'The Tradition of Medieval Nominalism', pp. 201-217. On Roscelin 
and Abelard see section 2.2, above. 
62 As a pejorative term, norninalis had disappeared from use by the end of the twelfth century. See MLIV, 
p. 314, 
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example, is used in an essentially neutral sense 
in both the Simillia de Elite and De Veritate 
Sacrae Scripturae, often simply as a means of identifying a scholar with an interest in 
properties of propositional terms (proprietates tenninortun). 
Other labels which were 
frequently used by Wyclif to identify philosophical wrongdoers, including, most notably, 
piteri ('children') and niodenzi ('modems'), are likely to have been applied 
in an equally 
general way. 
The theory of properties of terms, which occupied a fundamental place in late- 
medieval logical discourse, 
63 can certainly be seen to have been complementary to 
nominalist assumptions about the nature of propositional truth, but was by no means the 
sole preserve of nominalist logicians. 
64 It attracted bitter and derisive criticism, moreover, 
from nominalists and realists alike. 65 Disputations over the properties of terms are likely 
to have been what Wyclif had in mind when, in a famous passage from Logicae 
Continuatio, he described the 'sophistical disagreements' (dissensiones sophisticae) of 
scholars in the faculty of Arts, contrasting them with the lighter and less burdensome 
pursuits of the Theology faculty. 66 Though it is possible that such disagreements might 
easily have arisen within the framework of nominalist logic, and though it is almost certain 
that Wyclif himself first encountered nominalist philosophy as a young Arts student, 67 we 
cannot assume that the reference here is to nominalists exclusively. This is equally true of 
Wyclif's frequent remarks on the 'doctors of signs' (doctores signoriall), which have often 
been treated uncritically as covert references to contemporary nominalists. Here, once 
63 On the origins, development, and applications of the medieval theory of properties of terms, see L. M. de 
Rijk, 'Origins of the Theory of Properties of Terms', in The Cambridge History qf Later Medieval 
Philosophy, pp. 161-173. A useful study of the relationship between nominalism and terminism is provided 
by William Courtenay in his 'Antiqui and Moderni in Late Medieval Thought', Jounial of the Histoly of 
Ideas, 48/1(1987), 3-10 (pp. 6-10). 
64 Marcia Colish has recently remarked that, 'so pervasive was terminism. that it could transcend the debate 
between realists and non-dnalists, enlisting thinkers from both camps. ' Medieval Foundations of the lVestenz 
Intellectual Tradition, 400-1100 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), p. 302. For a contrasting 
view see Normore, 'The Tradition of Medieval Nomýinalism% p. 211. Courtenay lists termýinist logic among 
the features traditionally associated with 'the English school of nominalism', though makes no attempt to 
identify terminism exclusively with non-Linalist philosophy. See 'Reception of Ockham's Thought', p. 89. 
65 See Ch. 4, below. 
66 Logicae Continuatio, p. 144. 
67 See M. J. Wilks, 'The Early Oxford Wyclif. Papalist or Nominalist T, Studies in Church History, 5 (1969), 
69-98. 
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again, the targets would certainly have included nominalists (if by 'nominalist' we mean 
simply one who denies the reality of universals exparte rei), but are unlikely to have been 
nominalists exclusively. Ockham himself is not associated explicitly with the doctors of 
signs, though Wyclif does draw a connection between nominalists and the doctores in his 
De Universalibits and De Ente in Conzintini. 68 In the context of his Latin writings as a 
whole, however, the range of potential referents is far broader, and includes figures whose 
perceived shortcomings have little or nothing to do with either nominalism or terminism. 
The later theological writings, in particular, use signitin primarily as a synonym for 'icon', 
usually in the context of Eucharistic theology. The secta signortan or doctores signorlan 
of which Wyclif speaks in this context are therefore - for the most part - theologians who 
opposed him on the issue of Eucharistic presence. These, again, may have included 
nominalists, but need not necessarily have done so. By the time Wyclif composed the 
Trialogus, a fictional acadernic dialogue in which his mature theological views were 
presented, the term signum was being applied exclusively in this sense. The fourth and 
longest book of the treatise, entitled De Signis, is devoted entirely to issues of sacramental 
theology. 69 
These problems of identification are made worse by the fact that there were, 
throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, thinkers who were not nominalists, but 
who nevertheless held some of the views with which the nominalists have been associated. 
A good example would be the Franciscan John Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308), whose ideas 
on predication and theological language were broadly consistent with those of Ockham, 
70 
but whose philosophy is more generally characterized as a form of 'moderate' realism. 
Scotus also shared Ockharn's philosophical views on the nature of the Eucharist, which 
were antithetically opposed to Wyclif's controversial theory of 'remanence' (according to 
which the bread and wine remained substantially the same after the consecration of the 
host), and which were fundamentally inconsistent with a strong realist metaphysic. The 
68 De Universalibus, Ch. 7,11.301-306; De Ente in Communi, pp. 46,57. 
69 The Eucharist, which is described by the character of Alithia (Gk. 'ctXfl0Etct, 'truth'), the mediator between 
the other two participants in the dialogue, as 'magis venerabile inter alia', is analysed at the greatest length. 
See Joannis Wiclif Trialogus cum Supplemento Trialogi, ed. G. Lechler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), 
pp. 244-407. 
70 See the discussion of 'univocal' predication in Ch. 2 (section 4), below. 
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relationship between Scotus and Ockham. has more often been regarded as antagonistic than 
harmonious, though we cannot ignore the fact that there were many ideas shared between 
them. Scotus is certainly mentioned in Wyclif's writings, though not within the same 
passages or contexts as Ockharn. himself. As a fellow realist, Wyclif is unlikely to have 
felt inclined to criticise him on specific metaphysical points. In De Universalibils, he is 
even spoken of as a constans universalhan explanator. 
71 This does not fundamentally alter 
the fact, nevertheless, that those ideas which he shared with Ockham (particularly those 
relating to predication) would have been incompatible with Wyclif's metaphysics. What 
this demonstrates, once again, is the need for caution in identifying Wyclif's frequent 
anonymous references to philosophical opponents as references to nominalists exclusively. 
We must be aware, too, that late fourteenth-century Oxford, as Courtenay has argued, is 
unlikely to have been dominated by philosophical nominalists. 
72 This makes it less likely 
still that Wyclif would have associated erroneous metaphysical assumptions with 
nominalists alone. 
Despite these unfavourable conditions, there were certainly figures among Wyclif's 
Oxford contemporaries who held views which would not have seemed out of place in a 
nominalist treatise. The best known of these is the Carmelite friar John Kenningham, 
whose often protracted debates with Wyclif are known to us - albeit in an incomplete form 
- from the Fasciculi Zizaniorian. 
73 Kenningham, though not traditionally numbered 
amongst fourteenth-century nominalists, appears to have held metaphysical views which 
were often similar to, and always broadly consistent with, those of Ockharrýist philosophy. 
His views on time and intelligible being have much in common, too, with those of earlier 
anti-realist thinkers of the fourteenth century such as William of Alnwick (a disciple of 
Scotus), whose controversial opinions on the nature of predication had attracted criticism 
71 De Universalibus, Ch. 7,1.238. 
72 The influence of nominalism in late-medieval Oxford, Courtenay suggests, has often been exaggerated. 
Though Ockham's opinions would clearly not have passed unnoticed, there was never such a thing, he argues, 
as an equivalent to Parisian Ockhamism in England. See William Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in 
Fourteenth-century England, Ockham's influence in Oxford is analysed further in Courtenay's more recent 
article, 'The Reception of Ockham's Thought', pp. 106-107. 
73 Tbomas Netter of Walden, Fasciculi Zizanionim Magistri Johannis IVyclif cum Tritico, ed. W. W. Shirley 
(London: Rolls Series, 1858). All subsequent references to this text will be abbreviated thus: FZ. 
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from contemporary Oxford realists. 
74 One of the few contemporary critics of Wyclif whose 
ideas are known to us in any detail, Kenningharn. thus provides a valuable link between 
anti-realist theory and the realities of late fourteenth-century academic and theological 
debate. 75 Whether he was familiar with the works of either Ockham or Alnwick must 
remain a matter for speculation, though there can be no serious doubt of his acquaintance 
with the broad principles of their teaching. This is not to say, of course, that we should 
therefore regard Kenningham as a nominalist; as in the case of Scotus, there were clearly 
76 
elements in his philosophical system which ran contrary to Ockhamist assumptions. The 
context of the academic detenninatio, moreover, often makes the application of such labels 
difficult. It is clear that both Kenningham and Wyclif, for example, were ready to 
exaggerate the errors of their opponents, or even to attribute to them ideas which they 
cannot have held. The adversarial nature of the detenninatio, moreover, meant that those 
arguments which were put forward - especially by the respondent - need not necessarily 
have been expressions of personal conviction. There is, nevertheless, a high degree of 
consistency in Kenningham's philosophical arguments against Wyclif, whose responses 
(which are analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 below) reveal how potentially damaging such 
arguments would have been. The relationship between philosophical and hermeneutic 
theory, moreover, remains explicit throughout much of his analysis of Wyclif's work. His 
critique of Wyclif's understanding of the 'literal' sense of Scripture, for example, was 
grounded very firmly in his rejection of the concept of intelligible being (the subject of his 
last determination). If intelligible being was inadmissible as a metaphysical principle, then 
so, too, were the fundamental realist notions of analogy, 'real' predication and temporal 
amplification (ampliatio temporis). These principles, as we illustrate in Chapters 2 and 3, 
formed the philosophical superstructure of Wyclif's theory of scriptural truth and textuality. 
74 See Ch. 2, below 
75 The most important contemporary critic of Wyclif's exegetical system, beside Kenningham, is the 
Franciscan biblical scholar William Woodford. Unlike Kenningham, Woodford cannot easily be identified 
with a distinct philosophical position, and his metaphysical views must remain largely a matter for speculation. 
He did pose a significant challenge, nevertheless, to Wyclif's literalistic exegesis, as well as to his 
understanding of the basis of scriptural authority. On Woodford's critique of Wyclif, see Michael Hurley, 
' 'Scriptura Sola': Wyclif and his Critics', Traditio, 16 (1960), 275-352; Eric Doyle, 'William Woodford on 
Scripture and Tradition', in Studia Historico-Ecclesiastica: Festgabefir Prof. Luchesitis G. Spdlling, a F. M. 
ed. Isaac VAzquez, O. F. M. (Rome: Pontificum Athenaeum Antonianum, 1977. ) 
76 A good example would be Kenningham's views on subsequent necessity. See the discussion in Ch. 4, 
below. 
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The last is the only one which is likely to have been considered truly idiosyncratic, though 
all three were equally vulnerable to assault from contemporary anti-realists. As was the 
case with other aspects of Wyclif's philosophical realism, the three interrelated principles 
- and the concept of intelligible being which informed them - became most controversial 
when they had been applied to concepts and practices outside the strict confines of 
speculative thelogy. 77 They were most problematic, that is, when the authority of 
competing texts and interpretative communities (whether defined politically or doctrinally) 
was at stake. 
77 Cf. The philosophical principles underlying Wyclif's theory of Eucharistic remanence, which nowhere 
provoked serious controversy on their own account. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PHILOSOPHY AND SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION 1: ANALOGY 
The philosophical principles underlying Wyclif's De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae and the 
other tractates of the Summa Theologica have their immediate origins, for the most part, 
in his logical and metaphysical writings. Many of the key principles of his realist exegetical 
theory had been tried and tested, if not always in a strictly theological context, long before 
they appeared in his principal work on the nature of hermeneutics. Indeed, the 
philosophical underpinnings of many of the arguments of De Veritate might now seem 
obscure if it were not for the survival of these earlier writings. The same is undoubtedly 
true of Wyclif's anti-nominalist rhetoric, some of whose main characteristics are clearly 
traceable in the writings of the first half of his career. The philosophical material itself was 
presented in two treatises on logic, De Logica and the Logicae Contilulatio, and up to a 
further three sianinae of writings (only two of which survive in their entirety) devoted to 
subjects of a metaphysical nature. ' The longest and most important of these, which was 
also composed later than the other two, is the Suninia de Elite. This is split into two books 
of seven and six tractates, respectively. The first book is concerned primarily with the 
question of being, and with the relationship between created and uncreated being, and the 
second with the nature of God (his knowledge, will, understanding, the Trinity, divine 
2 ideas, etc). The second stannia is now mostly lost, though is thought to have contained 
eight books, including De Actibits Aninzae (the only book which now survives). 3 The third 
(and earliest) suninia is the work now normally referred to as De Elite Praedicallientali, a 
collection of five texts concerned, as the name suggests, with the 'predicaments' or 
categories of Aristotle. Each of the texts covers a different category or group of categories: 
substance and quality, quantity, relation, action and passion, and time. The remaining 
three categories of position, place and state are thought to have been included in missing 
portions of the sitinina. It has been conjectured that this stunina may later have formed the 
fifth tractate of book I of the Stanina de Elite, as the nature of its subject matter appears to 
1 See Ivan Miffler's introduction to his edition of De Universalibus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
pp. xxxiv-xxxviii. 
2 For details of the composition of the Summa de Ente, and of the uncertainty surrounding its intended 
structure, see Williell R. Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif. ý An Annotated Catalog (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983), pp. 14-17. 
3 On the evidence for the existence of this stanina, and its most likely structure, see Mfiller, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. 
Thomson makes no mention of the possibility that this tract may have belonged to a suninta of writings. See 
Latin Writings, pp. 8-9. 
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suggeSt. 4 Wyclif's major treatise on logic, the Logicae Continuatio is thought to have been 
composed some time between the completion of the second sunnna and the beginning of 
the Sianina de Ente. 5 The material it contains certainly has more in common with that of 
the Suninza de Ente than it does with that of the relatively early De Logica. It is with the 
Logicae Continitatio and the Suninza de Ente (including De Ente Praedicanientali), 
therefore, that the present chapter will be principally concerned. 
The principle of analogy, as we suggested in Chapter 1, was one of the defining 
features of Wyclif's hermeneutic theory. It lay at the heart not only of his understanding 
of scriptural symbolism (in its diverse forms), but also, as we shall argue in Chapter 5, of 
his conception of the fundamental components of the hermeneutic process itself (the book, 
the author, and the author's intention). 6 As such, it acted as the principal means of 
preserving the uniqueness and the authority of the sacred text. On a philosophical level, 
it divided Wyclif from nominalist logicians as decisively as the theory of universals itself, 
and engendered further, very distinctive divisions in respect of hermeneutic and theological 
issues. The most significant of these, from the broad perspective of Wyclif's development 
as a hermeneutic theorist, were the questions of the meaning of theological terms, the 
significance of literal and metaphorical uses of language, the nature of the Trinity, and 
lastly, the meaning of knowledge and the use or validity of its various kinds. These will be 
considered in turn below. 
i., rHE CONCEPT OF ANALOGY: WYCLIF, AQUINAS AND THE REALIST TRADITION 
Analogy, as a hermeneutic and dialectical principle, was among the most distinctive 
features of medieval realist philosophy. It occupied a fundamental place in Wyclif's logical 
and metaphysical writings, and played a vital role in his understanding of the scriptures and 
the liturgy. He defended its principles vigorously, and was highly contemptuous of any 
philosopher, grammarian or logician who sought to contradict them. Those who, like 
William of Ockharn and his followers, denied the possibility of analogy, were blind, he 
believed, to the true nature of things. The analogical method which characterizes much of 
4 According to Thomson, there can be little doubt that De Ente Praedicamentali formed part of the Sunima 
de Ente, though the assumption that it formed the fifth tractate of the first book is less secure. See Latin 
Writings pp. 26-27. 
5 This short chronology is based on that given by MOller, De Universalibus, pp xxxiii-xxxviii . 
6 See especially sections 1 and 2. 
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Wyclif's thinking locates him within a tradition dating back to Pre-Socratic philosophy. 7 
The most conspicuous influences from the earlier part of this tradition are those of the 
Church Fathers, whose exegetical writings rested on a form of Christianized analogy 
introduced by Philo and his students in the first century. Among the Fathers, Origen, 
Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius (the latter two in particular) figure very prominently in 
Wyclif's work. Less obvious influences are St Anselm and St Bonaventure, whose writings 
were frequently cited by Wyclif, but whose distinctive views on analogy (or on theological 
principles derived from analogical reasoning) are seldom appealed to directly. 
8 The most 
important influence of all, however, comes late in the history of analogy, with Thomas 
Aquinas. The late-medieval philosophical preoccupation with the semantics of terms, and 
in particular those terms which were used to describe God, had given renewed impetus to 
the study of analogy, which until the time of Aquinas had lacked a truly systematic 
definition. It is according to Aquinas' definition, and the logical metalanguage which 
accompanied it, that Wyclif's arguments about the nature of analogy are framed. Drawing 
on the analogical principles expounded by Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine and Aquinas, 
Wyclif was able not only to demonstrate the necessity of analogy, but also to legitimate his 
own philosophical claims about the nature and reality of universals. In both cases, this 
amounted to a disproof of assumptions surviving from Ockharnist and Scotist philosophy 
of the early fourteenth century. 
For Aquinas and Wyclif alike, analogy provided the most adequate means of 
accounting for the fact that both God and man, though distinct in their natures, could be 
described in terms of a group of shared words: 'good', 'merciful', 'powerful', 'kind', etc. 
Though a term such as 'good' could apply to God or to man, Aquinas argued, there was 
no sense in which man was good in the same way that God was good. If this were the case, 
then the term 'good' would refer univocally to a goodness shared equally by God and His 
creatures. At the opposite extreme, however, it was felt to be equally unsatisfactory to deny 
any relationship between human good and divine good, since the perfect goodness of God 
was the final cause of all that was good in mankind. This would be to suggest that the terni 
'good' referred equivocally to two different things. The solution was to posit a relationship 
of proportional likeness or analogy between the two natures: 
7 On the history of analogy in the Greek and Christian traditions see Hampus Lyttkens, Vie Analogy BeAveen 
God and the World. An Investigation of the Background and Interpreiation of its Use by Thontas ofAquino 
(Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1952), pp. 15-110. See also the entries by G. E. R. Lloyd and 
Armand Maurer in DMA, vol. 1, pp. 60-63,64-67. On theological applications of the principle of analogy, 
see Frederick Ferr6, 'Analogy in Theology', in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York 
and London: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 94-7. 
8 For a discussion of the contribution of Augustine, Anselm and Bonaventure to the history of analogical 
reasoning, see Lyttkens, The Analogy Between Godand the World, pp. 110-163. 
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It is impossible to predicate anything univocally of God and creatures. Every 
effect that falls short of what is typical of the power of its cause represents it 
inadequately, for it is not the same kind of thing as the cause. Thus what exists 
simply and in a unified way in the cause will be divided up and take various 
different forms in such effects - as the simple power of the sun produces many 
kinds of lesser things. In the same way, ... the perfections which 
in creatures are 
many and various pre-exist in God as one... Yet although we never use words 
in exactly the same sense of creatures and God we are not merely equivocating 
when we use the same word... for if this were so we could never argue from 
statements about creatures to statements about God... That this does not happen 
we know not merely from the teachings of the philosophers... but also from the 
teaching of St Paul, for he says, The invisible things of God are nzade k7iolvil 
by the things that are made (Romans 1,20). 9 
The assumption that analogy could lead the mind from the created world to an 
understanding of God was a convenient medium between extreme scepticism and the belief 
that man could know God in His perfection. Not all forms of analogy, however, were 
equally significant. Both man and urine, to take the standard medieval example, could be 
described as 'healthy', but not on account of any real continuity between them. Rather, 
urine was called 'healthy' by a process of attribution, because it was a sign of health in 
man. The relations of man and urine to the common term (the analogoll), in other words, 
were of distinct kinds. In the case of God and man, on the other hand, the common term 
was a guarantee of the proportional likeness between the two. God, in His perfection, 
represented goodness, wisdom, power, mercy par excellence: His relation to the analogon, 
whatever it might be, was complete. The creature, on the othe r hand, could only be good, 
wise, 1)owerful, merciful insofar as he or she 'partook' of goodness, wisdom, power or 
mercy (possessing them as- accidental properties). Though by definition 'partial', therefore, 
the resemblance between God and His creation was real, and human language applied 
analogically to the divinity could be seen to be meaningful in more than a purely 
conventional (adplacituni) or logical sense. 
God, as the first being, was the cause of all other beings, whose various accidental 
qualities found perfection and unity in the divine essence. As the text from Aquinas shows, 
9 '... impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non aedequans 
virtutem causae agentis recipit similitudem agentis, non secundurn eadern rationem, sed deficienter. Ita ut 
quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus in causa est simpliciter et eodern modo; sicut sol secundurn unam. 
suam virtutem multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ... omnes rerum 
perfectiones quac sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter... Sed 
nec etiam pure aequivoce... Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari... 
Et hoc est tam contra philosophos... quam etiam contra Apostolurn dicentem, Invisibilia Dei, per ea qtlae 
facta sunt, intellecta conspichintur. ' Thomas Aquinas, Sumnia Theologiae I a, q. 13.5 (extract). Text ed. 
and trans. Herbert McCabe, vol. 3 in the Blackfriars edition (London: Blackfriars, 1964). 
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this second form of analogy (usually referred to as analogy of proper proportionality) was 
intimately tied up with the problem of the meaning of theological language. It is in this 
context primarily that we encounter it in Wyclif, though it often assumes a more general 
explicatory function. The first and weaker form of analogy (analogy of attribution 
10 ) is also 
used, but only in a purely negative context. 
" In the second chapter of De Logica (c. 
1360), 12 Wyclif s early work on the nature of logic, he introduces analogy of proportionality 
as one of the four basic principles of identity, the others being generic, specific and 
numeric. Though his definition is brief, the theological implications of this fundamental 
philosophical principle are already quite clear: 
Analogical identity is between a primary cause and the thing caused, between 
a substance and its accident; for although God, substance and accident are not 
common in any genus, they come together in transcendent being and its 
analogue. For all things which exist are entities by analogy, and so all things 
are the same in terms of entity. 13 
God and the created world can be considered together only in terms of analogy. To this 
extent, analogy serves not merely as a tool of the speculative theologian, but also as an 
instrument of the exegete, who (as we learn from De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae) must 
discipline his mind to see beyond the accidental proper-ties of the first analogate, to the 
essential properties of the divine. This, as we shall see, applies in the case of exegetical 
practice (especially in the interpretation of 'mystical' propositions) and hermeneutic theory 
(in the apprehension of the nature of the sacred text, its senses and its authority). 
14 Other 
10 The terms analogy of attribution and analogy ofproportionality, date from the fifteenth-century Thomistic 
writer Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, whose treatise De Nonunum Analogia (1498) was the f irst serious 
attempt to systematize Aquinas's ideas on analogy. Cajetan lists a third form of analogy, analogy of 
inequality, which he applies to terms denoting disparate entities which are not related in proportional terms 
(e. g. 'body' as applied to celestial and earthly bodies). See De Nominum Analogia, Ch. I (trans. by Edward 
Bushinski as The Analogy of Names (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1959). Cajetan's third category, 
though not found in Aquinas, has a precedent in Aristotle's asymmetric 7rpb; 'tv relations. See the discussion 
in Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, pp. 54-8 (on apb; 'tv relations); p. 206 (on their 
relation to Cajetan's third category). Analogy of inequality is construed by Wyclif as a form of equivocation. 
For a comprehensive study of the theory of analogy as it was inherited from Aquinas and Cajetan, see Ralph 
C. McInerny, The Logic ofAnalogy: An Interpretation of St Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 196 1). 
11 Certain nominalist categories, Wyclif argues, receive their names only by analogy of attribution, and are 
therefore not properly categories at all. See n. 5 1, below. 
12 On the dating of this treatise, see Thomson, Latin Writings, p. 4. 
13 'Identitas analogica est inter primarn causam et causaturn, est inter substanciarn et accidens; quia quamvis 
Deus, substancia et accidens non communicant in aliquo genere, tamen conveniunt in ente transcendente et 
analogo, quia omnia quac sunt, sunt encia analogice; et sic omnia sunt idem in entitate. ' De Logica, Ch. 2 
(Tractatus de Logica, ed. M. H. Dziewicki (London: WS, 1893), vol. 1, p. 10). Cf. De Universalibus, Ch. 4, 
11.126-30, in which Wyclif discusses the three modes of essential identity. 
14 See Ch. 5 (sections I and 3). 
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forms of identity are simply irrelevant, since, as Wyclif points out, there is no genus (much 
less any species) which includes both God and creatures. Generic and specific identity, 
such as apply respectively, for example, to all animals and all human beings, can only apply 
to elements of the created order. Numeric identity is similarly inapplicable, since God and 
his creatures are not parts of a unitary essence in the same way as Christ and his humanity 
are numerically identical, or as memory, reason and will are identical with the individual 
SOUI. 15 For Wyclif, as for Aquinas, this view of analogy and identity has consequences for 
the theory of predication, since analogical predication is neither univocal (as generic or 
specific predication), nor equivocal according to the definitions supplied earlier in De 
Logica: 
A term is univocal if by the same meaning of a name it signifies different 
things, as the name 'man' signifies every man by the meaning 'rational animal', 
and the term 'animal' signifies every animal by the meaning 'animate sensible 
substance'. For every man is a rational animal, and every animal is an animate 
sensible substance. A term is equivocal if, according to different meanings it 
signifies different things, whether they are of diverse species (as 'barking 
animal', 'sea monster' and 'heavenly constellation', any of which may be [the 
referent] of the term 'dog', according to diverse specific meanings), or of the 
same species. 16 
Analogical predication sat between the two extremes Wyclif describes. The definitions of 
equivocity and univocity, as in Aquinas, are realist definitions, since the categories and 
headings ('rational animal', 'animate sensible substance', etc), as Wyclif is often at pains 
to point out, were realities, and not merely conceptual categories (rationes). To predicate 
4entity' off God and creatures was to posit a real, if distant, relationship between them. 
Being itself represented the most primitive form of analogical relationship, since every 
analogy presupposed being in its analogates. All of the various forms of analogy, therefore, 
were ultimately reducible to relationships between modes of being. 
In the Siannia de Elite, the implications of the analogy of being for metaphysics and C) 
hermeneutics are examined in detail. In the tractate on being in general (De Elite ill 
Communi), Wyclif presents God as the prime and transcendent being, final cause of all 
15 De Logica, 11.19-24. 
16 . Terminus univocus est qui per eandern nominis rationern significat res diversas; sicut iste terminus, honzo, 
significat omnern hominem. sub ista ratione quae est animal racionale. Et iste terminus, aninial, significat 
onine animal sub ista racione qua[e] est substancia aniniala sensibilis; quia omnis homo est animal racionale, 
et omne animal est substancia animata sensibilis. Terminus aequivocus est, qui propter raciones diversas 
significat res diversas, sive ipsa sint diversarum specierurn (sicut animal latrabile, nwrina bellita, et celeste 
sidus, quorum quodlibet sit iste terminus canis, secundurn diversas raciones specificas), sive sint eiusdem 
specici. ' De Logica, Ch. I (Dziewicki, vol. 1, p. 4,11.33-44). 
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other beings. For the realist, the participatory relationship between the being of creatures 
and prime Being, was a guarantee of the proportional relationship between them. Since 
knowledge of the existence of creatures entailed knowledge of the existence of Being, any 
act of knowing was proof of the existence of the transcendent. 
17 Participation, nevertheless, 
was not a direct participation of human essence (ens) in the pure existence (esse) of the 
divine. Rather, every creature participated in being in general (ens or esse comI711111e), 
which was itself an imperfect reflection of the first being (prinuan ens), or divine nature. 
As John F. Wippel has convincingly argued, Aquinas, despite some terminological 
confusion, generally distinguishes the first being (which he terms esse subsistens) from the 
esse conzinune in which created beings participate. Not to do so would be to leave himself 
open to charges of pantheism, which any scholastic would certainly have been anxious to 
avoid. 18 Wyclif likewise distinguishes between created being (ens ciannume) and the 
perfect uncreated being of God, though he is often less than explicit about the true nature 
of this distinction. 19 
Analogical relationships, by definition, implied unequal degrees of participation 
between analogates. Univocal relationships, on the other hand, entailed equality between 
participants: no member of a species could be regarded as being more perfectly a member 
of that species (as participating more fully in its nature) than any other. This important 
distinction between equal and unequal participation is articulated most clearly by Wyclif 
in De Ente Praedicamentali: 
It seems to me that it is sufficient, in terrns of logical genus, that there be a 
positive nature communicated to many species without participation in its 
essence according to greater or lesser degrees... For all substances come 
together in that none of them is to a greater degree its own genus than any other 
of the same genus, because no nature or essence receives in that sense greater 
orless. But just as God is more perfectly a being than substance, so substance 
is more perfectly a being than an accident, and one such accident is more 
perfectly a being than another. But the same does not apply to [even] the 
highest logical genus. 20 
17 De Ente in Coinnizini, Ch. I (Suninza de Ente: Libri Prind Tractalus Prinuts et Secundus, ed. S. Harrison 
Thomson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930). See esp. pp. 1-3) 
'a 'Thomas Aquinas and Participation', in John F. Wippel, ed., Studies in Medieval Philosophy, pp. 117-158. 
19 In the second chapter of De Ideis, nevertheless, he is careful to distance himself from any form of 
theological pantheism: 'Et si dicatur, quod male sonat concedere asinum et quodlibet aliud esse Deum, 
conceditur apud aegre intelligentes. ' (ed. Herold: fo. 43rb. ) 
20 , ... videtur mihi, quod sufficit ad racionern generis logici, quod sit natura positiva multis speciebus 
communicata sine participacione sue essencie secundurn magis et minus... eciarn omnes substancie conveniunt 
in hoc, quod nullum illorurn est reliquo magis suum genus, quam quodlibet eiusdem, quia nulla essencia vel 
natura suscipit ad isturn sensurn magis aut minus. Sed sicut Deus cst magis ens, quarn substancia, sic 
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In terms of predication, degrees of similarity or difference could only be meaningful in 
relation to things of different genera, or to things on a different level of being (and hence 
perfection) altogether. This idea lay at the heart of the realist's vertical conception of the 
universe, in which the relationship between higher and lower forms of being was habitually 
expressed in terins of degrees of perfection. The relevance of being to the notion of 
analogy becomes clearer as Wyclif turns his attention explicitly to the nature of the first 
being (ens prinzion), the subject of the second tractate of the Sunillia de Elite (De Elite 
Prinzo in Communi). As the first being, God was also the first truth and the first good, the 
unitary principle from which the diverse lesser goods receive their cause: 
Since, therefore, many [things] are good in common, it appears that there is a 
common good in which each of their [particular] goods shares. And since this 
common good foui. ded in singulars cannot exist without a superior extrinsic 
cause, it appears that there is a more distant exemplar of goodness for 
everything which is itself good. For in this way [Holy] Scripture attributes 
substance to God: greatness, strength, paternal generation, creation and 
immensity, eternity, the acts of resting and possession, in accordance with the 
ten categories. For whatever there is of perfection in those things, God has, 
according to what the external thing exemplifies. 21 
Here, Wyclif is explicit about the participatory relationship between God and His creation. 
To say that a creature is 'good' was for him, as for Aquinas, to say something of its 
proximity to God, since goodness in the two is analogous. More significantly, it was also 
to establish a symbolic relationship between them, to make creation a sign of the creator. 
The possibility of discovering God in the Book of Nature. had been taken for granted by 
Christian Platonists like St Augustine, for whom God was the final referent of all earthly 
signs. Pseudo-Dionysius, likewise, saw the created world as a dim shadow of the real. The 
difficulty, for all three philosophers, was disciplining the mind to see beyond the accidents 
of nature. For Dionysius, the distance between human and divine nature meant that God, 
transcending all that was known, was better contemplated by negation than by affirmative 
analogy. To say what God was not, according to this negative theology, had a far greater 
substancia est magis ens, quarn accidens, et unum tale reliquo magis accidens; non sic autem de supremo 
genere loyico. ' De Ente Praedicamentali, Ch.. 3 (De Ente Praedicamentali et Quaestiones XIII Logicae et 
Philosophicae, ed. Rudolf Beer (London: WS, 189 1), p. 27) 
21 'Cum igitur multa sunt communicancia in bonitate, patet ex secundo quod est dare bonitatem communern 
que inest cuilibet eorum. Et cum communis bonitas fundata in singularibus non potest esse sine superiori 
extrinseco causante, patet quod illud habet bonitatern exemplarem eminenciorern in quolibet quod ipsa per 
se facit. Et isto modo attribuit scriptura substantiam deo magnitudinem, virtutem, paternitatern gencrativurn, 
produccionern et inmensitatem, eternitatem, sessionern et possessionern, correspondenter ad decem 
predicamenta. Illud enim quod est perfeccionis simpliciter in illis generibus habet deus secundum quod 
exemplat res ad extra... ' John Wyclif, De Ente Prinzo in Communi, Ch. 3 (Thomson, ed., Sunitna de Ente, 
pp. 86-7) 
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claim to certainty than saying what He was. Wyclif was less sceptical than Dionysius, but 
could not avoid the paradox inherent in analogical thought. In a passage at the end of De 
Ente Prinio in Communi, he articulates the Dionysian view in very explicit terms: 
... 
We see now how the meaning of the saints is to be interpreted, who say that 
on account of its immensity, the nature of God is not properly definable. For 
everything that is properly definable has a genus and differentiae, the prior 
causes and limits of its being, as it is distinguished from others. This we learn 
from the seventh book of [Aristotle's] Metaphysics. But since these things 
cannot apply to God, it is clear that neither can the concept of definition. For 
He is above and beyond every genus, and is consequently defined by no genus. 
And it is clear that we cannot know what He is, since he is not a 'what', unless 
this term is used equivocally. Nevertheless, we can know, if imperfectly, what 
kind of thing He is, as when it is supposed that he is good, wise, indivisible, 
incorruptible, etc. But no substantive nouns apply formally to His nature unless 
understood figuratively, as the property of a thing which is found analogically 
in God... And thus it appears that it is easier to know what God is not than to 
know what He is. 22 
By denying God a definition, Wyclif was effectively placing Him outside the reach 
of language or thought altogether. Nothing in the world could be contemplated if, like 
God, it could not be assigned to a genus or species. As the 'prior causes' of a creature's 
being, genera and species were the basis of knowledge of its shared nature. To know a man 
was to know humanity, and hence to understand what it was to be human. Knowledge of 
any number of genera, however, could not reveal what it was to be the creator and cause 
of such natures. Negative analogy could bring the mind closer, but any knowledge was 
bound to be imperfect. It was for this reason, in part, that faith played such an important 
role in Wyclif's theology; it was only by virtue of faith that the mind was able to be raised 
beyond the lowest level of knowing. There were, Wyclif suggested, different degrees of 
knowledge, just as there were different levels of being between pure being and existence. 
Knowledge of genera and species, though it did not amount to knowledge of truth, was 
nevertheless closer to an understanding of the divinity than a knowledge of particular 
natures or attributes. This hierarchical conception of thought and being was one of the most 
characteristically Dionysian aspects of Wyclif's philosophy. It receives its most detailed 
22 , 
... patet quomodo intelligenda est sentencia sanctorum 
dicencium quod natura divina non est proprie 
diffinibilis propter ejus inmensitatem, quia onme proprie diffinibile habet genus et differencias ipso priores 
causancia vel limitancia ejus esse, ut distinguitur ab aliis, ut patet septimo Metaphisice. Set cum haec non 
possunt competere deo, patet quod nee diffinicio. lpse enim est supra et extra omne genus, et per consequens 
nullo genere diffinitus. Et patet quod non possumus cognoscere quid est, quia non est quid si non cquivocetur 
in loquendo. Bene tamen cognoscimus licet inperfecte qualis est, ut puta, quod est bonus, sapiens, 
indivisibilis, incorruptibilis et cetera. Sed nulla nomina substantiva competunt formaliter illi nature nisi 
figurative intelligendo proprietatem rei que analogice reperitur in deo... Et sic patet quod facilius est 
cognoscere que res non est deus quam est cognoscere que res est deus. ' De Ente Prinlo in Coninillni, Ch. 3 
(Thomson, ed., Suninta de Ente, p. 90) 
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formulation in the sixth tract of the Suinnia de Ente, De Universalibits, in which Wyclif 
lists the four different kinds of being which belong to every creature. The first and most 
elevated is the eternal intelligible being ('esse intelligibile') which every creature has in 
God. This kind of being, Wyclif suggests, is an 'item of divine life' ('ratio vitalis', literally 
'living idea'), and is in real terms God Himself. He cites the passage from the first chapter 
of St John's Gospel in support of his argument: 'What was made, in him was life. ' (1: 3- 
4)23 In the second place, creatures have being in their universal or particular causes ('in 
suis causis sive universalibus sive particularibus'). This kind of being, which in its 
universal aspect is closest to the divine, is explained at length. Every creature has being in 
its universal causes from the point of creation, leading Wyclif to Ecclesiasticus 18, in 
which we learn that all things were created 'together' (shnul). Creatures likewise have 
being in their particular causes from the beginning of time. It is for this reason, we are told, 
that the saints spoke of the whole human race being the first Adam: 
The first subdivision of this kind of being is being in their universal 
causes; it is thus that every particular creature has being in its species or its 
genus once that is created at the beginning of the world. And this is how to 
take the text of Ecclesiasticus 18, 'He that liveth for ever created all things 
together. ' 
Every creature which was at any time to be is said to be in its particular 
causes at the beginning of the world. In this sense the saints say that the whole 
human race was the first Adam. As will be explained elsewhere, there are 
many degrees of this kind of being, depending on the proximity or remoteness 
of the causes. 24 
The third kind of being is individual existence, which begins and ends in time. This, 4D 0 
Wyclif claims, is the only kind of being which the 'modem doctors' recognize-25 The 
reference here is unambiguously to the nominalists, whose very identity, in the 
philosophical world at least, clearly rested on the rejection of the second category of being 
(being in respect of universal causes). For thinkers like Ockham, the distinction between 
essence and existence (the basis of realist theories of analogy and participation) was 
likewise seen as a superfluous one, so that neither the first nor the second categories could 
23 See De Universalibus, Ch. 7,11.35-8.1 have departed here from the Douay-Rheims; translation. 
2A , Primurn.. membrum illius esse est esse in suis causis universalibus, ut omnis creatura singularis habet esse 
in sua specie vel suo genere creato in mundi principio. Et sic intelligitur illud, Ecclesiastici 18: 'Qui vivit in 
aeternum creavit ornnia simul'. (18: 1) H In causis autern particularibus dicitur creatura quantumcumque futura 
esse in mundi principio. Ad quern sensurn dicunt sancti ornne genus hominum fuisse primurn Adam. Et in 
tali esse sunt quotlibct gradus secundurn propinquitatern et rernotionern causarum, ut declarabitur alibi. ' De 
Universalibus, Ch. 7,11.43-53. 
25 . Tertio habet creatura esse existere individuum, secundum quod esse incipit et corrumpitur pro suo tempore. 
Et solum illud esse acceptant moderni doctores. ' De Universalibus, Ch.. 7,11.54-7. 
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strictly be accepted. 26 Wyclif addresses nominalist objections in the second part of the 
passage, concluding that essence and existence must be seen as separate things in reality: 
... even recent writers grant, with respect 
to the second being, that even when 
there are no roses in existence a rose is a flower. And similarly with other 
predications of genera of their species, since the genus contains the species in 
itself, and the species in turn contains the species in respect of its potential 
being in secondary causes, even though none of those individuals may have 
actual existence. For it is one thing to be [i. e. to have essence], and another to 
exiSt. 27 
The distinction between 'potential being' and 'actual existence', usually referred to simply 
as potency and act (potentia and actits), was often mentioned alongside that of essence and 
existence. God, for the realists, represented Pure Act, 28 in the same way as He was the first 
Being (pure existence) on which all others depended. The doctrine of potency and act was 
an important element in Wyclif's (and Aquinas's) theory of participation, but also played 
a very significant role in detem-iining the status of future propositions (the classic example 
being 'Antichrist will come', which according to Wyclif had being as a potential reality in 
the mind of God. ) For the nominalists, potential being was meaningful only as a conceptual 
category. This meant that not only Wyclif's theory of participation, but also many aspects 
of his understanding of time and futurity (which was to have important implications for his 
exegetical theo 9) were beyond the reach of these 'less subtle' doctors. 
30 
The last mode of being mentioned by Wyclif is the accidental being of a substance. 
This kind of being, he suggests, is consequent upon the other three, since it presupposes 
the existence of a substance. It is also furthest removed from the essence of God, and is 
hence of the least concern to the true philosopher. All four modes of being played a 
26 In response to the question of whether essence and existence are distinct in re, Ockharn writes, 'inihi 
videtur, quod non sunt talia duo, nee 'esse existere' significat aliquid distinctum a re. ' Stunnia Logicae, III, 
ii, Ch. 27. 
27 'Vero etiam recentes concedunt iuxta secundum esse quod nulla rosa existente, rosa est flos! Et ita de aliis 
praedicationibus gencrurn de suis speciebus cum genus continet in se speciern et ipsa continet in se individua 
secundum praedicturn esse potentiale in causis secundis, licet nullum illorum individuorum habeat existentiarn 
actualem. Aliud enim est esse et aliud existere. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 7,11.57-64. 
28 In Ch. 6 of De Universalibus God is described as 'Actus Purus sunune beatus' (11.169-70). 
29 See the section on ampliatio temporis in Ch. 3 (section 2), below. 
30 Ockharn presents the following statement in relation to potency and act: '... dividitur 'ens' in ens in potentia 
et in ens in actu. Quod non est intelligendum, quod aliquid, quod non est in rerurn natura, sed potest esse 
sit vere ens, et aliquid aliud, quod est in rerum natura, sit etiam, ens. ' Sununa Logicae, I, Ch.. 38. He goes 
on to consider propositions denoting things which might be, including 'Antichristus potest esse in ens', 
concluding that these, like individuals, only have real being in one sense, namely in the event. 
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significant role in Wyclif's philosophy and theology, and in particular in his hierarchical 
understanding of the structures of the book of nature and the Bible. An understanding of 
the book of nature was an important precondition to an understanding of the text of the 
divine author, and there are some important parallels in Wyclif's writing between his 
interpretation of the two. In the second chapter of De Universalibits, for example, the 
different kinds of universal nature are considered in relation to his fourfold definition of 
being. The resulting five-level hierarchical system of modes of knowing and modes of 
being, which is later mirrored in the context of scriptural being in De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, is summarized in the passage below: 
... one can list five types of universals, as 
Grosseteste explains in the seventh 
chapter of his commentary on the first book of the Posterior Analytics. The 
first and foremost kind is the eternal notion or exemplar in the mind of God. 
The second kind is the common created notion in the superior causes, like the 
intelligences and the heavenly spheres. The third kind of universal is the 
common form rooted in its individuals. This, says Grosseteste, is what 
Aristotle's genera and species are. Fourthly, there is the universal which is the 
common form in its accidents, apprehended by the lowest form of the intellect. 
There is a fifth kind of universal - signs and mental acts - which Grosseteste 
sets aside as irrelevant to his concerns. 31 
The connection between knowing and being is here made very explicit: just as universals 
apprehended through accidents represented the lowest form of being, so they were 
apprehended by the lowest form of the intellect. The progression of the mind from one 
level to another thus depended on a sequence of progressive denials or reinterpretations. 
To dwell too long on the material and accidental aspects of c'reation, or to confuse these 
for a higher order of truth, was to strand the intellect in the world of the finite and 
transitory. Even the beasts, as Wyclif argues at the beginning of De Elite in ColiIIIIIIIii, were 
32 
capable of this form of knowledge, and thus had a knowledge of being in general . What 
distinguished man from the beasts was his capacity to apprehend universal natures (rather 
31 , 
... est 
dare quinque manieres universalium, ut declarat Lincolniensis, I Posteriorum, capitulo 7. Primurn 
et supremurn genus est ratio vel idea exemplaris aeterna in Deo. Secundurn genus est ratio communis creata 
in causis superioribus, ut intelligentfis et orbibus caelestibus. Tertium genus universalium. est forma 
communis fundata in suis individuis. Et ilia, inquit Lincolniensis, sunt genera et species de quibus loquitur 
Aristoteles. Quarto: forma communis in suis accidentibus, apprehensa ab intellectu infimo, est universale. 
Sed quinturn modurn universalium, - pro signis vel actibus intelligendi - dimittit Lincolniensis ut sibi 
impertinens. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 2,11.165-77. 
32 Wyclif illustrates the point with the example of a dog and its master, the former knowing the latter, and 
hence knowing him (and being in general) to be: 'Et ita conceditur, quod sicut quaclibet bestia aliquid 
cognoscit distincte ita cognoscit ens esse in communi. Supposito namque pro praesenti quod bestiae 
conponunt et dividunt et per consequens sillogizant discurrendo de particularibus et accidentalibus 
communibus, patet quod cognoscunt ens esse in conummi, cum sequitur: canis cognoscit magistrurn suum, 
ergo cognoscit ad minimum illurn esse... Et per consequens cognoscit ens esse, et certurn est, quod in 
communi... ' De Ente in Communi, p. 7,11.6-15. 
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than to understand things merely in terms of their accidents), and hence to form some 
conception of the transcendent. 33 With the particular, described by Wyclif as the first in the 
ascending order of being, the mind understood Being in the transcendent, the first in the 
descending order of being. 34 The apprehension of accidents , though 
it represented the 
lowest form of knowledge, led the disciplined mind to the apprehension of substances in 
their universal aspect, since substances and accidents were inseparable in nature. The 
norninalists, by confining their attention to individual and accidental being, and by denying 
the reality of universal natures, were effectively removing a link from the chain of being 
connecting man and the world to the higher forms of created being (the 'intelligences' or 
angels) and the uncreated essence of God. Though they possessed the faculty to conceive 
of universal natures (what Wyclif called the agent intellect), they were little better than the 
beasts who lacked such a faculty, as Wyclif tells us in De Ente in Conzinuni: 
The most general word for an animal is not synonymous with our transcendent, 
just as the most general word of the modems is not synonymous. Some of 
[these modems] say that all being is substance, others that all being is a 
substance or a quality, and [they speak] similarly of the other parsimonious 
divisions of today's philosophers. Such would not rather concede that the 
truths beyond the genus are entities than that a man is an ass. 35 
The nominalists' position is not unlike that of the materialistic scholars traditionally 
scomed in Platonic-Alexandrian exegetical and mystical writings. Though the particular 
nature of their failings is specific to the fourteenth century, the results are very much the 
same-: a failure to achieve a proper understanding of the truth underlying the natural 
symbols of the created world. Such a failure led inevitably to a blindness to the mysteries 
of the Bible, whose text, for realist exegetes like Wyclif and Grosseteste before him, 
contained the whole of the book of nature. 36 Much of Wyclif's anti-nominalist rhetoric, in 
both the philosophical and the theological sunnnae, is thus conspicuously shaped by the 
33 'intenciones universales substanciarum et raciones universalium cum actibus reflexis deficiunt brutis, et sie 
cognoscunt substancias in suis accidentibus, et ita conceditur quod omnis anima bruti est multiplicata quamvis 
corruptibilis. ' De Etzte in Communi, p. 8,11.11-15. 
3-1 Ibid., p. 14. 
35 , 
... verbum communissimum bruti non est synonomum cum transcendente nostro, sicut nec verburn 
communissimum modernorum, quorum aliqui dicunt onme ens esse substanciam, aliqui quod onme ens est 
substancia vel qualitas, et sic de. quotlibet divisionibus avaris hodie philosophancium. Tales autem non pocius 
concederent veritates extra genus esse encia quam hominem esse asinum. ' De Ente in Communi, p. 9,11.5- 
13. 
36 See James McEvoy, "Me Sun as res and signunt: Grosseteste's Commentary on Ecclesiasticus Ch. 43, vv. 
1-5', Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, 41 (1974), pp. 38-9 1. McEvoy cites a passage form 
Grosseteste's Hexameron which makes precisely this point: 'Continet igitur in se haec scriptura totum quod 
continet natura, quia post mundi creationern non est nove speciei seu nature adieccio. ' (p. 51 n. 39) 
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language of the broader (and older) tradition of 'otherworldly' philosophy and biblical 
secrecy. 37 Dionysius' warning to the readers of his Mystical Theology to turn their minds 
away from the particulars of material existence, and to guard their own knowledge from 
those who dwell on such particulars, is a useful illustration of this influence. Though 
written many centuries earlier, it is apparently directed against precisely the same kind of 
theologian as the 'modem' philosopher so often targeted by Wyclif: 
But see to it that none of this comes to the hearing of the uninformed, that is to 
say, to those caught up with the things of the world, who imagine that there is 
nothing beyond instances of individual being and who think that by their own 
intellectual resources they can have a direct knowledge of him who has made 
the shadows his hiding place. 38 
2. ANALOGY AND TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE: THE ARGUMENT OF DE TRiNiTATE 
Among the earliest applications of the principles of analogy in Wyclif's writings is 
to the concept of the Trinity, a concept, he claims, which finds its analogue in the nature 
of universals. This idea, which is among the most pervasive and consistent of any in 
Wyclif's writings, formed the bedrock of his defence of analogical interpretation of the 
Scriptures and the liturgy. It also provided Wyclif with the opportunity to paint the 
nominalists in blacker colours still, by associating them implicitly with recognized 
christological heresies. The topic is introduced in the fourth chapter of De Ente Prinio in 
Coninuini, in which he chastises philosophers who abuse the concept of analogy to refute 
his own arguments about the nature of God. The counter-arguments he presents set the 
parameters for his later and more detailed discussions of the subject in De Universalibils 
and De Trinitate. Philosophers, he suggests, mistake the nature of the Trinity by tracing ZD 
a parallel too closely between created and the uncreated being. They suggest that God is 
Himself a universal, and the three divine persons its singulars, implicitly denying the unity 
of the prime being, They also misunderstand the nature of the Incarnation, arguing that 4D 
God, in becoming man, would become subject to the laws of genera and species, which is 
impossible. Neither of these arguments are tenable, Wyclif argues, since God is a unity. 
371 have borrowed this very apt term from A. 0. Lovejoy's classic study of realist philosophy, The Great 
Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 26. 
38 'Tobuov 5E '6pa, '6mo; piqftiq TCov 'apl)ýUOV 'MICIK699- TOýTOU; ft (Pqpt TOI')q 'E: V TOT; 01)'GIV 
7 EvtoXqp&oi);, Kalt o'u8& ýntp TZE6vTa 'i)7tEp01)(F! O)q &'t vat (pavaTaýoptvouq, 'aXX' ol optvoug z6tvat -Erl 
KaO' CCUTOZ); YV(bG&t T*OV UJISVOV WYOTO; 'a71OKpIUqI`lV 6To6. ' De Mystica Theologica, 1.2 (Corpus 
Dionysiacum, vol. 2, ed. GUnter Heil and Adolf Ritter (New York, 1991); English translation by Colum 
Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 1987)). 
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The persons of the Trinity share the same substance; they are not the subjective parts of a 
more general category 'divinity'. Similarly, God does not inherit human nature as a 
consequence of the Incarnation. Rather, a single person, Christ, has two natures, human 
and divine. Only the former is subject to the rules of genus and species. 39 None of these 
arguments is apparently being directed against nominalist scholars, though the view that the 
three divine persons are singulars has close parallels with the tritheistic heresy begun in the 
twelfth century by Roscelin. Though Wyclif nowhere mentions Roscelin, elsewhere he 
does speak disparagingly of tritheistic theories of the nature of the Trinity. 
Some similar misconceptions are considered in De Universalibits. Once again, the 
dangers of misunderstanding the function of analogy are carefully explained, with detailed 
reference to Trinitarian teaching. Particular emphasis is placed on the negative aspect of 
the analogical method, this time with an explicit gesture towards Dionysius. We are 
warned of the dangers of tracing parallels too closely between created and uncreated 
natures. Only with a proper understanding of universals, Wyclif suggests, can we avoid 
mistaken conclusions about the nature of their analogy with the Trinity: 
... if it is said that postulating universals misleads on the topic of the Trinity, 
and takes away the merit of faith, we must reply by denying both. 
Thus, first of all, we must take note of the rule of Blessed Augustine, in 
Against Simpliciant(s, about tropic and symbolic utterances, which guide us to 
whatever speculative knowledge we can have of God. The gist of his rule is 
that in such cases we are to take whatever there is in the analogue of perfection 
and propriety - as Blessed Denys says in the Divine Nanies - and refrain from 
attributing to God whatever there is of imperfection and impropriety. And 
Augustine gives as an example those figurative locutions which are called 
anthropomorphisms. 
Thus, in On the Trinity, VH, he guards against the error of any heretic 
ignorant of the truth abaout universals, who might think that there was an entire 
parallel between the divine nature and the nature of universals so that the divine 
nature was a genus or species. Such a person would fall into errors unless 
assisted by the truth about universals. 40 
39 See De Ente Prinio in Communi, pp. 91-5. 
40 , Et, si dicatur quod positio universalium abducit a materia de Trinitate et tollit, meriturn Fidei, dicitur 
negando utrumque. H Unde, pro primo notanda est regula Beati Augustini, Conta Simplicialliall, do 
locutioibus tropicis et symbolicis quibus manducuntur ad Deum utcumque speculariter cognoscendurn. Et 
est sententia regulae ista quod in talibus capiendurn est illud quod perfectionis et convenientiae est in suo 
analogo - ad modum loquendi Beati Dionysii in De Divinis Nominibus - ct dimittendurn est illud quod est imperfectionis vel disconvenientiae Deo tribuere. Et ponit Augustinus exemplum do figurativis locutionibus 
figura quae 'antropospatos' dicitur. fl Ideo, VII Tfinitale, satis provide evacuat crrores haeretici vel ignorantis 
veritates universalium, qui, credendo quod esset omnimoda convenientia inter naturam divinam et naturam 
universalem - et sic natura divina esset, genus vel species - incideret, sine occasione data a veritate 
universalium, in errores. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 5,11.158-177. 
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The parallel Wyclif draws between analogical interpretation of the Trinity and the 
analogical basis of figurative language is an important indication of the pervasiveness of 
this simple logical principle. It also highlights the importance of the concept of symbolism 
to Wyclif's understanding of the universe. The doctrine of universals, like scriptural 
metaphors, acted as a bridge between the known properties of the created world and the 
ineffable simplicity of divine nature. The process of ascent was not purely negative, 
however. As Wyclif goes on to explain, the process of negative contemplation of the nature 
of universals freed the mind to consider its positive resemblance to the nature of the Trinity: 
There is however a parallel between the divine nature and a specific nature on 
the supposition that, for example, the species of man had only three supposits, 
namely Peter, Paul and John. This is clear from three things. 
First, just as tlýe , pecific nature is what each one of these supposits is, and 
none of them is any other, similarly the divine nature is what each of its 
supposits is, and none of them is any other. 
Secondly, just as there is not more than one human species, even though 
there are many supposits each of which belongs to the same species, similarly 
there is not more than one divine nature, though there are several supposits 
each of which has the same nature. 
Thirdly all sophistic difficulties on the topic of universals fail in a similar 
manner on the topic of the Trinity, as is clear if you put the parallels side by 
side. 41 
The doctrinal and political advantages of Wyclif's defence of analogical reasoning begin 
to become clear in this passage. Though it is by no means clear whether nominalists in 
particular are being considered in the concluding remark, it is certain that such a remark 
would have done nothing to enhance their credibility. To deny or misunderstand the reality 
of universals in any way was to run the risk, if the priniciples of analogy were correct, of 
making a similar mistake in respect of the Trinity. Wyclif goes as far as to claim, in De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae that an understanding of the latter was impossible without a 
belief in the former. 42 The implications of these suggestions would appear to be that any 
philosopher who was not a committed realist was also by extension a heretic. His own 
philosophical beliefs, on the other hand, because necessary to the understanding of 
41 'Convenientia autem est inter naturarn divinarn et naturarn specificam, verbi gratia, specie hominis habente, 
exempli gratia, tanturn tria supposita, scilicet Petrum, Paulurn et Iohannem, ut patet ex tribus: H Primo in hoc 
quod sicut natura specifica est singulurn horum. suppositorum et nullurn illorurn est reliquum, sic natura divina 
est singulurn suorurn suppositorurn et nullurn illorurn est reliquum. H Secundo in hoc quod sicut non sunt 
multae species humanae, licet sint multa supposita quorum quodlibet est eadern species, sic non sunt multae 
naturae divinae, licet multa sint supposita quorum quodlibet est eadern natura. // Tertio in hoc quod onmes 
argutiae sophisticae in materia de universalibus deficiunt proportional i ter in materia de Trinitate, ut patet 
iuxtaponendo quascumque consimiles. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 5,11.178-194. 
42 See Ch. 5 (section 4.1), below. 
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orthodox Trinitarian and christological doctrine, had the benefit of divine sanction. 
Because the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation could be defended from the 
Scriptures, so, he believed, could the necessity of universals. 
The analogical relationship between the nature of universals and the nature of the 
Trinity is analysed in greatest detail in the final tract of the Siannia de Elite, De Trillitate. 
The comparatively large number of references to De Universalibils in this work (eleven out 
of the twenty-seven references to earlier and later works) is perhaps the best testimony to 
the truly analogical nature of Wyclif's own thinking. In the first chapter, he urges upon his 
readers the necessity of seeking analogues to the Trinity in the created world. He begins 
by mentioning Augustine and other distinguished (predominantly realist) philosophers 
(Anselm, Dionysius, Richard and Hugh of St ViCtoA) who claim that the human soul (in 
which may be found intelligence, memory, and will) is an image of the triune divine nature: 
It is assumed by the blessed Augustine, the venerable Anselm, master 
Lincolniensis, Richard and Hugh of St Victor and other philosophers and 
theologians who have considered the matter, that God is proved to be triune by 
the image of the Trinity shining forth from the soul ... 
44 
Knowledge arrived at analogically is clearly a form of knowledge which attains to certainty 
in Wyclif's eyes. Earlier in the same chapter, he explains how natural knowledge and faith 
must work together to arrive at the desired proof. This insistence on the necessity of faith 
is a key element in the theory of knowledge as it is presented in both the philosophical and 
the theological writings, whether that knowledge be natural knowledge or knowledge 
arrived at from a reading of the Scriptures. Wyclif's perception ofharmony in the workings 
of reason and faith was traditionally understood as proof of his place among the antiqui. 
The philosophy of the modend, by contrast, and of William of Ockha-m. in particular, was 
portrayed by mainstream intellectual historians as a threat to this ancient synthesis. Though 
recent accounts have insisted on a less absolute divide between the two, it remains the case 
that the relationship between reason and faith for the nominalists was less straightforward 
than it had been for Augustinian thinkers like Wyclif. Though reason could still be 
appealed to as proof of matters of faith (such as the existence of God), its scope was 
43 Richard and Hugh studied at the school of St Victor in Paris, which was founded by the realist William of 
Champeaux (1070-1121), a student of St Anselm. Both discussed the nature of the Trinity (and its analogy 
with the mind/soul) at length, Richard in De Sacranzentis Christianae Fidei, and Hugh in his six-volume 
treatise on the subject (De Dinitate). See Haren, Medieval Thought, pp. 111-14. See also Smalley, 77ze Study 
of the Bible, pp. 83-97, on the origins and early development of the Victorine school. 
44 , Assumpturn patet de beato Augustino, venerabili Anselmo, domino Lincolniensi, Ricardo et Hugone de 
Sancto Victore et multis aliis philosophis et theologis qui putaverunt se probare deurn. esse trinum per 
imaginem trinitatis relucentem in anima... ' De Trinitate, ed. Allen du Pont Breck (Colorado: University of 
Colorado Press, 1962), p. 2. 
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certainly narrower. The discourses of logic and exegesis, moreover, had become relatively 
isolated from one another in the age of Ockham, leaving less room for rational analysis of 
questions of belief . 
45 Wyclif's appeal to faith in his discussions of analogical hen-neneutics 
in De Trinitate and elsewhere, therefore, has tended to highlight further the inconsistencies 
of realist and nominalist theories of knowledge. 
Wyclif lists numerous other natural analogues to the Trinity, some of which, he 
suggests, are better able to lead the mind to knowledge than others. 
46 In the ninth chapter 
of De Trinitate, in a discussion of the properties of analogical terms applied to God, he 
broaches the issue of the relationship between terms and things. There is a danger amongst 
modem thinkers, he argues, of taking properties of terms as a point of departure, rather 
than the things which they signify, which are prior in nature. Such thinkers would certainly ZD 
have included the noininalists, for whom terms, and not things, were considered to be the 
primary objects of knowledge. Wyclif goes on to mention the heretical doctrine of 
Sabellianism, according to which the three persons of the Trinity were seen to be only 
notionally distinct. Sabellianism. had its origins in the early Christian church, but has been 
47 
associated with the twelfth-century nominalist thinkers Roscelin and Abelard . Though 
neither of the latter are mentioned, there is clearly an attempt being made to associate their 
fourteenth-century counterparts with the same idea. Both, as we learn in the following 
passage, seek to privilege the sign itself above the reality which it signifies, confusing the 
order of signification: 
In truth, [a man] does not understand diversity of signification unless he first 
has an understanding of the thing. For this reason lie should first learn to 
believe in the sense imposed upon the sign before he begins to distinguish the 
signification of the terms. Those disregarding that order impose upon 
catholics [the fact] that they [themselves] only baptize terms using a diversity 
of names in that matter, while nevertheless there is no diversity in the things 
signified, as the Sabellians have said, positing a Trinity solely in relation to 
signs. 48 
45 On the isolation of exegesis from logical analysis, see Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 368-369. 
46 See esp. p. 68ff. 
47 See especially Normore, 'Tradition of Medieval Nominalism', p. 204. Normore highlights the fact that both 
Roscelin and Abelard were accused of Sabellianism in their own time. For a discussion of Roscelin's 
Trinitarian teaching and its relation to his philosophical nominalism, see Constant C. Mews, 'Nominalism and 
Theology before AbeIard: New Light on Roscelin of Compi6gne', Vivarizan 30,1 (1992), 4-33 (esp. pp. 6- 
12). 
48 'Sed revera non intelliget illam diversitatern significacionis nisi primarie habuerit noticiarn rei. Ideo oportet 
addiscentern primo credere sensum suprapositurn antequam concipiat distinccionem significaciones 
terminorum. Unde deficientes in isto ordine imponunt catholicis, quod solum baptizant terminos utentes 
nominibus in illa materia pro diversis, dum tamen non sit diversitas in signatis sicut dixerunt Sabelliani, 
ponentes trinitatern solum per relacionem ad signa. ' De Trinitate, p. 100,11.5-12. 
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The connection between the Sabellian heresy and nominalism is made clearer as Wyclif 
goes on to discuss the nature of the identity between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The view 
of the Sabellians, he suggests, is the most dangerous of all the heresies concerning the 
Trinity, given the ideas of the modems, who deny truths and universals. 
49 
Wyclif's attempt to link Sabellianism with nominalism (or at least, with anti- 
universalism) is one of the numerous examples of his reliance upon older fonris of anti- 
heretical rhetoric to further his modem philosophical - and ultimately political - cause. 
It is made the more interesting by Calvin Normore's recent attempt to redefine early 
medieval nominalism in terms which relate more closely to the problem of the Trinity than 
they do to the problem of universals with which it is traditionally associated. 
50 Whether 
or not Wyclif's claims had any legitimacy within the context of his nominalist 
contemporaries must remain open to question. There would certainly be no possibility of 
bringing charges of Sabellianism against Ockham, whose views on the three persons of the 
Trinity appear to have been quite orthodox (he maintained, that is, that the three, whilst 
representing a single essence, were really distinct). He would nevertheless have rejected 
Wyclif's suggestion that there could be any form of analogy (and hence, of ontological 
continuity) between the soul and the divine essence. The basis of such a rejection will be 
considered in detail in section 4, below. 51 Before presenting the main divisions between 
Ockham and WYClif in respect of analogy, however, we must explore more fully the nature 
of the analogical terms themselves. This will be the purpose of the following section, in 
which the distinction between 'proper' and metaphorical analogy will be introduced. This 
distinction, as we shall see, had a fundamental bearing on the question - so important to 
Wyclif - of the relationship between language (or signs) and reality. 
3. 'PROPER' AND METAPHORICAL ANALOGY 
As a linguistic, as well as a metaphysical phenomenon, analogy brought with it some 
familiar linguistic problems. Among the most important of these was the question of 
whether the terms 'literal' and 'metaphorical' could be applied to analogical expressions, 
49 See De Trinitate, p. 100,11.18-22. 
50 'Tradition of Medieval Non-ýinalisrn', p. 204. 
51 See esp. n. 72, below. 
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and if so, in what contexts. The answer to this question, for Wyclif, was certainly 'yes', an 
answer which was to have important consequences both for his understanding of the 
scriptural senses and his attitude towards the nominalists. In the ninth chapter of De 
Trinitate, he lists the principal ways in which terms can denote a comparison or relationship 
between God and creatures: 
Some [terms are consistent with God) necessarily and absolutely, such as 
'omnipotent', 'omniscient', etc; some eternally but contingently, such as 
'knowing', 'pitying', 'willing', 'ordering', 'caring'; and some contingently in 
time, such as 'causing', 'creating' or 'governing Lord. ' And it is certain that 
these terms describe God primarily and directly, since otherwise they would not 
be predicated truly of God. They describe nothing other than God, and 
therefore they describe Him precisely. 52 
Such terms are not, Wyclif claims, like many analogical expressions, applicable to God 
metaphorically, but are literally ('most properly') true. If they were metaphorical, then we 
would have to concede, counter-intuitively, that they were not more properly attributes of 
God than wrath, anger, and jealousy: 
It is not valid to say that such locutions are figurative, as when grammarians 
suggest anthropomorphism, a figure of speech, when a human attribute such 
as austerity, severity, regret, anger, rage, etc. is assigned to God. For if all 
things which are not per se consistent with God are thus attributed figuratively 
to Him, then it should no more be conceded that God knows, wills, ordains, 
causes, etc. something outside himself than it is conceded that He rages or is 
angry. The consequence is impossible, since [God] knows, wills, causes and 
ordains things outside Himself most properly, but He does not properly become 
angry, because then He would properly be mad; or rather, if these things were 
properly and de virtitte sennonis to be attributed to God, there is no reason why 
in the same way any positive denomination of a creature should not properly 
and de virtitle sennonis be attributed to God. 53 
52 , 
... quedam [nomines conveniuntur 
deo] necessario et absolute ut ornnipotens, omniintelligens et cetera; 
quedam vero eternitaliter contingenter, ut onmem creaturarn noscens, misericors, omnem creaturam volens, 
ordinans, diligens; quedarn ex tempore contingenter, ut dominus, causans, creans, gubernans, etc. De omnibus 
ergo terminis certum est quod dicunt deum directe et primarie, quia aliter non vere predicarentur de deo, et 
nihil aliud a deo dicunt, ergo precise illum dicunt. ' De Trinitafe, pp. 97-8. Cf. ibid., p. 118. 
53 'Nee valet dicere quod huiusmodi locuciones sunt figurative ut grammatici ponunt antropospatos figuram 
locucionis quando humana passio attribuitur deo ut austeritas, severitas, penitudo, irasci, furere, et similia. 
Si enim omnia que non per se competunt deo sunt sic figurative sibi attributa, tune non magis de virtute 
sermonis concedendum esset deurn. scire, velle, ordinare, causare, et cetera, rem adextra quam conceditur 
ipsum furere vel irasci. Cosequens impossibile cum propriisime scit, vult, vel causat et ordinat res adextra 
sed non proprie furit, quia tune proprie esset furibundus, ymo si proprie et de virtute sermonis talia cssent deo 
tribuenda, non est racio quin per idern. quelibet denorrýnacio positiva creature esset deo proprie, et de virtute 
sermonis tribuenda. ' De Trinitate, p. 98. 
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The criterion Wyclif employs for determining whether a given linguistic expression is 
metaphorical or literal is not a rigid one. What is clear, however, is that the distinction is 
applied to analogical usages, ruling out the possibility that metaphor is being conceived as 
a category distinct from analogy. There is no correspondence, either, between literal and 
metaphorical and the division Wyclif draws between intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of 
God in De Intellectione Dei. Though all intrinsic attributes (Immensity', 'eternity', 
tomnipotence', 'omniscience', etc. ) are literally predicated, the examples of extrinsic 
attributes are also among those elsewhere identified as literal: 'perfection', 'goodness', 
'knowledge', 'power', 'intelligence', 'will', 'ordination'. 54 Metaphorical attributes such 
as 'severity', 'anger', 'regret' and 'rage' would presumably also be classified as extrinsic. 
Perhaps the most important clue to the meaning of metaphor and figuration is 
provided in the tenth chapter of De Trinitate. Following a general discussion of the 
different modes of predication (univocal, equivocal, analogical), Wyclif claims that no term 
which signifies primarily and principally the being of the ten primary genera (namely the 
categories) can be predicated of God unless it is predicated figuratively. 
55 He goes on to 
describe the nature of literal predication: 
Other terms signifying primarily analogues which encompass every genus are 
predicated without figuration, such as 'essence', 'goodness', 'unity', etc. Thus 
figuration ends in such locutions, so that that which is signified of perfection 
is abstracted by intellection and attributed to God; but that which is signified 
of imperfection by the sign is cast aside and distanced from God. And thus 
whenever we use this method, we use a figure either with the name 'substance', 
or with the name 'justice', 'goodness', 'strength', 'form' and similar kinds. For 
all such terms can principally signify something which cannot be consistent 
with God. They can, however, by frequency of use, principally signify God, as 
can the terms 'to know', 'to understand', 'to will', 'justice', 'power' and 
similar terms signifying perfection in creatures. If terms work in the first way, 
then we are using a figure in abstracting perfection simply; if they work in the 
second, then there is no use of figures. 56 
54 De Infellectione Dei, Ch. I (De Ente, ed. M. H. Dzwiecki (London: WS, 1909), pp. 48-9). 
55 'Ulterius quo ad locuciones figurativas scripture, videtur mihi quod quicumque terminus primo et 
principaliter significat ens decern primorurn generurn non predicatur nisi forte figurative de deo. ' De Trinitate, 
p. 120 
56 'Alii autem termini significantes primarie analoga que circumveniunt omne genus praedicantur sine figura 
tali ut essencia, bonitas, unitas, etc. Ad hoc desinit figura in talibus locucionibus ut abstrahatur apud 
intelleccionern illud quod est perfeccionis simpliciter significaturn per tale signurn et attribuatur deo; illud 
vero signaturn signi quod est imperfectionis abiciatur et removeatur a deo. Et sic quandocumque utimur ista 
arte utimur figura sive cum hoc nomine substancia vel cum hoc nornýinc iusticia, bonitas, virtus, forma, cum 
quibuscumque similibus. Omnes enim tales termini possunt principaliter significare quod non potest deo 
competere; et possunt ex frequencia usus principalitcr significare deum, et communiter eciarn isti termini 
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The three examples of terms which are not used figuratively are recognizable as members 
of the class of transcendentals. Such terms were held to be unique by scholastic 
philosophers in that their signata were not confined to one category or another (hence 
Wyclif's suggestion that they 'encompass every genus'). 57 To use such a term was 
therefore a partial solution to the problem of the divine nature being beyond the ten 
categories. Because such terms were transcendent, they were by their very nature more 
closely consistent with God, whose essence represented the unifying principle to which all 
of the ten categories could ultimately be reduced . 
58 The terms were, nevertheless, not 
restricted in their predication to God alone, as the passage from De Trinitate makes clear. 
As with all terms predicated of God, they had to be carefully divested of their human 
associations. At the end of the passage, Wyclif seems to be su gesting that such terms, 4D 9 
together with any of the terms signifying perfection in creatures ('knowing', 
'understanding', 4willing', justice', 'power'), have the potential to signify God without 
figuration. There is an apparent distinction, therefore, between the signata of such terms 
and the ways in which they signify (or are understood). A similar distinction is made by 
Thomas Aquinas, who, in his responsio to the question of whether we can say anything 
literally about God, distinguishes between signified perfections and the way in which their 
signs signify (niodus significandi): 
We have to consider two things... in the words we use to attribute perfections 
to God, firstly the perfections themselves that are signified - goodness, life and 
the like - and secondly the way in which they are signified. So far as the 
perfections signified are concerned the words are used literally of God, and in 
fact more appropriately than they are used of creatures, for these perfections 
belong primarily to God and only secondarily to others. But so far as the way 
of signifying these perfections is concerned the words are used inappropriately, 
for they have a way of signifying that is appropriate to creatures. 59 
scire, intelligere, velle, ista iustitia, potentia et similes termini significantes perfeccionem in creaturis. Si 
primo modo faciunt tunc abstrahendo perfeccionem simpliciter utimur figura, si secundo modo faciunt, tunc 
non est hoc usus figurarum. ' De Trinitate, pp. 120- 1. 
57 NV YClif lists the three most common examples of transcendentals, to which many others were often added. 
On the nature of transcendental terms see Ralph McInerny, A History of Western Philosophy: Philosophy 
front St Augustine to Ockhanz, vol. 2 in the series (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1970), Pp. 356-w-i. 
58 Itota multitudo predicamentorum reducibilis est ad Deum. Nam omnia novem predicamenta accidencium 
reducuntur ad cathenam substancie ut suum principium, et totum genus substancie oportet causari a quadam 
natura extra ipsum, ut patet ex dictis; ergo conclusio. ' De Ente Praedicarrien tali, p. 14,11.16-20. Cf. p. 3, 
1.26ff., in which Wyclif argues that God is the 'simple prime of each genus'. 
59 1 In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare, scilicet perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut 
bonitatem, vitam, et huiusmodi, et modurn, significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant huiusmodi 
nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum 
vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuritur de Deo; habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis 
53 
The problems inherent in any attempt to see beyond the ten categories of being are never 
adequately resolved by Wyclif, who, like Dionysius and Aquinas before him, returns to 
them with a lingering scepticism. In the tenth chapter of De Trinitate, he goes as far as to 
claim that no term can ever signify God primarily, since every common name signifies 
many things beyond its primary significate, and every individual name signifies 
individuating properties alongside the primary thing signified. Only by a process of 
abstraction - and hence not in primary or 'pure' terms - is it possible 
for creatures to arrive 
at a knowledge of God . 
60 Transcendental terms, which minimalize any connotation of 
categorical properties, are a close approximation to primary signification, but are not 
perfect. 
Transcendentals are not the only terms which resist identification with a single 
category. In the first chapter of De Ente Praedicanzen tali, Wyclif considers the nature of 
categorical ('predicamental') being in general, and lists a number of entities which cannot 
be defined in categorical terms. The first of these are God and the transcendentals (unity 
and an indivisible point 61 are given as examples of the latter), which exist, he suggests, 
beyond the ten categories. The second are privations ('uncaused', 'without a beginning', 
etc. ), which are not formally any of the ten categories, though they do, Wyclif concedes, 
have accidental being in substances. The third are what are termed 'accidental aggregates' 
('aggregata per accidens'), of which no examples are given (though which must be assumed 
to be complexes of accidental properties, considered together). The fourth represent the 
familiar class of negations, things past, things to come, and thi ngs which exist potentially. 
These, it is suggested, can be said to belong to a subject (and hence to be accidents) 
according to intelligible being ('esse intelligibile'), but not according to existential being 
('esse existere'). 62 In De Trinitate, privations alone are listed alongside transcendentals as 
competit. ' Suninza Theologiae, I a, q. 13, art 3. 
60 , icans ... videtur rnihi probabile pro nunc quod non sit nobis possibile 
habere aliquod nomen primarie signifi 
deum, quia omne nomen commune appellat multa et ita non solum significat seipsum et significaturn primo 
sed et communia et inferiora contenta sub communi, et quodlibet nomen singulare significat proprietates 
individuantes et seipsum cum re principaliter significata, ymo cum non contingit nos cognoscere deum hie 
nisi abstractive, et per nullam noticiam nostram abstractivarn potest pure cognosci. ' De Trinitate, p. 115 
61 Wyclif elsewhere excludes the indivisible point from the class of transcendentals. Cf. De Ente in Coninzitni, 
P. 88 
62 , 
... patet quod restringendo ens predicamentale ad 
illud, quod per se est in aliquo decem praedicamentorum, 
sunt quotlibet encia, quorum nullum est formaliter ens predicamentale, ut patet de Deo, unitate et puncto, cum 
aliis principiis extra genus. Secundo patet idem de quotlibet privacionibus, que, quamvis non sint aliquod 10 
generum formaliter, tamen omnia sunt accidencia substancie, cui nata est forma in esse, cuius est privacio. 
Tercio patet idem de aggregatis per accidens, de multitudinibus et multis similibus, quac oportet omnem 
loquentern ponere, ut patet tam de artificialibus quam naturalibus. Quarto patet idem de pretericionibus, 
futuricionibus, potenciis et negacionibus, que, quamvis dicerentur accidencia vel posteriora ipsis subiectis 
secundum esse intelligibile, tamen non possunt dici accidere alicui substancie secundum esse existere. ' De 
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terms adequate to describe God primarily (and hence most literally). Other simple terrns, 
including the name 'God' and even the Tetragrammaton, Wyclif claims, fall short in their 
attempt to signify the divine nature primarily. Like more obviously figurative expressions 
('rock', 'lamb', 'lion', etc. ), these can signify God only secondarily, and by a process of 
careful negation and abstraction: 63 
Elsewhere I have said that the term 'God' signifies God primarily, but it seems 
to me now that it is probably possible to say that it does not primarily signify 
uncreated nature or being... Any terms which connote simple things in 
signifying God... and ten-ns such as 'first of beings', 'best of beings', etc., do 
not signify Him primarily. Indeed, if any [terms] primarily signify, the most 
likely are expressions composed out of transcendental and privative terrns, such 
as the following: 'being without cause', 'being without a better', etc. For God 
is analogically and not purely univocally a being, but is nevertheless most 
properly a being, as it appears from Exodus 111,14. Other things, by attribution 
to Him, are entities. For this reason it seems that the term tetragranimaton is 
not maximally consistent with God. 64 
This is an extreme view, though it does not seem significantly to diminish the r6le of 
metaphorical analogy as a theological tool. This form of analogy, after all, was 
indispensable for an understanding of scriptural language, so often shrouded in earthly 
images. In the eleventh chapter of De Trinitate, Wyclif presents a defence of metaphorical 
analogy which appears to bring it closer to its literal counterpart: 
I do not see why any positive denomination cannot be figuratively consistent 
with God. Hence God is called 'mighty' and 'jealous' in Exodus 20: 5, and the 
same is true of many other names which are metaphorically consistent with 
God, as is clear from consideration of the Scriptures. We should, nevertheless, 
understand a term in one way when its primary significate is consistent with 
Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 5,11.1-16. 
63 De Tritzitate, p. 115,1.17ff. 
64 'Utterius dico quod iste terminus deus significat primarie deum, et videtur mihi pro mine probabiliter dici 
posse quod non primo significat naturam vel ens increatum... Termini... quicumque simplices connotant in 
significando deum et termini tales, primum encium, optimum encium, etc., non significant primarie ipsum, 
ymmo si aliqui primarie sic significant potissime sunt termini coinpositi ex transcendente, et termini privatiui 
ut sunt tales termini, ens incausaturn, ens carens meliori, etc. Deus enim analogice et non pure univoce est 
ens, propriissime tamen est ens, ut patet Exodi 111,14 et quaecumque alia per attribucionem ad ipsum sunt 
encia. Ideo videtur mihi quod iste terminus tetragrammaton non esset deo maxime conveniens. ' De Ttinitate, 
pp. 115-16. Earlier in the same chapter, Wyclif makes a similar point: no term can primarily and precisely 
(i. e. without further connotations) signify God, since any term such as 'being' or 'good', by virtue of its 
generality, signifies more than God, and the terms 'God' and the Tetragrammaton connote things consistent 
with God in a posterior sense. (De Trinitate, p. 109J. 15ff. ) 
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God analogically, and in another when its primary significate cannot be 
consistent with God, but there are analogous properties found in such a sign, 
as in a lion there is regal and invincible dominion over all the other beasts. 
That analogue is therefore antonomastically consistent with God. Therefore 
God is called 'lion' in Scripture, and it is clear what is figurative in the 
expression and what is not. 65 
The two modes of understanding highlighted here have their origins in Aquinas, who in 
the Stannia Theologiae distinguishes very clearly between analogates signified literally, and 
those arrived at metaphorically. 66 The distinction is fundamentally a linguistic, rather than 
a metaphysical one, applying to modes of signification rather than to the analogates 
themselves. To this extent, as Paul Ricoeur has argued, metaphor and analogy can be 
regarded as opposing, rather than as complementary systems in Thomistic philosophy, the 
one being proper to poetry and the other to theology. 67 The effects of this opposition are 
perceptible throughout Wyclif's philosophical and exegetical writings, though are more 
obvious in the former than in the latter. Whether literal or metaphorical, all Scriptural uses 
of analogy were, of course, being used in accordance with divine intention (ultimately). 
Wyclif is here apparently attempting to reconcile the two on another level by 
demonstrating the rationale behind such divinely-sanctioned metaphors. This is a 
significant point to note, since there was no place in nominalist logic for metaphors of this 
kind. Such metaphors existed, the nominalists could hardly deny, but were of no use in 
bringing the mind closer to God. The difference between univocal and analogical theories 
of meaning, therefore, was also a difference between a mode of understanding which 
tolerated metaphor and one which did not. The consequences for their understanding of 
the Scriptures (or rather, Wyclif's interpretation of their understanding of the Scriptures) 
were profound, as will become clear from what follows. 
65 'Nec video quare non quelibet denominacio positiva posset deo figurative competere, unde deus vocatur 
fortis, zelotes, Exod. XX, 5, et sic de multis nominibus que translative deo conveniunt, ut patet respicienti 
scripturam. Aliter tamen oportet nos intelligere terminum quando primarie significatum eius competit deo 
analogice et aliter quando primarium significatum non potest deo competere sed proprietas analoga reperta 
in tali signato ut in leone est regale et invincibile dominium super alias bestias. Illud ergo analogum 
anthonomastice competit deo. Ideo deus vocatur leo in scriptura, et patet que locucio est figurativa et que 
non. ' De Trinitare, pp. 124-5. 
66 Summa Theologiae Ia. 13,3. See McInerny, Logic ofAnalogy, p. 146. 
67 The Rule of Metaphor. Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, tr. Robert 
Czerny (London: Routledge, 1977), pp. 272-80. 
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4. 'SED CONTRA ILLUD sic': NOMINALIST OBJECTIONS To ANALOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
The nominalists, as we have seen, were the automatic victims of the carefully drawn 
analogy between the nature of universals and the nature of the Trinity. But who were the 
philosophers Wyclif attacked for misunderstanding the nature of analogy itself? It is less 
easy to assume that these were predominantly nominalists, particularly given the very 
general terms in which Wyclif describes them. It would be tempting to suggest that they 
need not have been nominalists at all, nor even representatives of a specific school of 
thought. It did not take a nominalist, after all, to misconstrue or deny the theory of analogy. 
Some of the misguided thinkers mentioned by Wyclif, such as those who drew an exact 
parallel between universals and the Trinity, are no less likely to have been over-zealous 
realists than stumbling nominalists. What, then, is to be gained from assuming that it was, 
in a good number of cases, the noirýnalists Wyclif had in mind, and how is their approach, 
as Wyclif presents it, to be seen as distinctively 'nominalistic'? 
First, we should be aware that for Ockham and the nominalists, the principles of 
analogy were simply untenable. As well as conferring a false harmony on elements of the 
created order, they were seen to dissolve the absolute and necessary divide between the 
natural and divine realms. Accordingly, nothing could be characterized as 'analogous' in 
nominalist philosophy, even in a purely logical sense. To suggest that terms such as 'being' 
were applied to God and man in an equivocal sense, however, was felt to be equally 
unsatisfactory, since human and divine being were clearly understood in terms of a 
common concept. The terms were therefore, they claimed, being used univocally, but not 
in a way which implied any real identity or continuity between referents. 68 Ockham 
accordingly characterizes such terms as univocal in the third degree. Second degree 
univocity implied identity on a generic level, as when diverse species of animal were 
designated by a com-nion name. This form of univocity was similar to the univocity of the 
realists, except that for the latter, of course, the generic referent was a real, rather than 
merely a conceptual category. Terms which were univocal in the first degree designated 
substances or accidents which were the same essentially, and hence implied the closest 
correspondence between referents. The main differences between non-iinalist and realist 
views are summarized diagrammatically below: 
68 The assumption that 'being' was predicated univocally of God and creatures was not peculiar to Ockham 
and his followers. Like a number of Ockham's ideas, it originated with Scotus, and was adopted by Scotists 
throughout the fourteenth century. See Stephen D. Dumont, 'The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the 
Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick', Mediaeval Sudies, 49 (1987), 1-75. See 
also Timotheus Barth, 'De Argumentis et Univocationis Entis Natura apud Joannern Duns Scotum', 
Collectaneana Franciscana, 14 (1944), 5-56. 
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Wyclif Ock-ham Gloss 
Univocity Univocity, essential likeness 
Univocity2 generic likeness: 'animal' as applied 
to all species 
[no counterpart] -4 Univocith conceptual likeness 
Analogy -> [no counterpart] proportional likeness between things 
Equivocity Equivocity single term applied to different concepts 
(nominalism) or things (realism) 
mooes oi rrewcauon in ucKnarn ana Nyycui 
In the absence of analogy, the concept of participation was simply redundant. The 
unity and plenitude represented by the divine was simply of a different order from the 
generic and accidental properties of created beings. To describe God as anything at all was 
therefore meaningless unless the terms were understood to be univocal on a conceptual 
level only: 
The first and second univocation the saints deny of God, the first because 
nothing essential in God and in creatures comes under the same concept, the 
second because nothing accidental comes under the same concept in God and 
creatures. Just as the essence of God is dissimilar to that of creatures, so 
likewise are the wisdom of God and the goodness of God... However, the third 
univocation is admitted even by the saints, and both by those who hold 
univocation and those who deny it. Even the philosophers admitted such 
69 univocation in God... 
The difficulty with this idea would appear to be that no term can be more applicable to God 
than any other, making all predication pointless. Ockham solves the problem by arguing 
that, though all created beings are equally dissimilar to their'creator, nevertheless certain 
beings, by a process of abstraction, can lead the mind towards cognition of the divine: 
... to abstract from the imperfection 
in the wisdom of the creature is nothing else 
than to abstract from an imperfect creature a concept which does not refer more 
to creatures than to what is not a creature, and then the result is attributable to 
God by way of predication... For if such a concept could not be abstracted from 
69 Trimam univocationem et secundam negant Sancti a Deo. Primam, quia nihil accidentale est eiusdem 
rationis; secundarn, quia nihil accidentale est eiusdem rationis in Deo et creatura. Sicut enim essentia Dei est 
dissimilis essentiae creaturae, ita sapientia Dei et bonitas sua... Tertiam univocationem ponunt etiam. Sancti 
et tenentes univocationem et negantes earn, et ctiam. posuerunt talem in Deo. ' William of Ockham, 
Reportatio, III, q. viii (Boehner, ed. and trans., Philosophical lVritings, pp. 107-8). 
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a creature, then in this life we could not arrive at a cognition of God's wisdom 
- e. g. that God is wisdom - through the wisdom of a creature any more than, 
through the cognition of a stone, we obtain a cognition that God is a stone... 
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the distinction between the wisdom 
of a creature and the wisdom of God is as great as the distinction between God 
and a stone, and though in neither case do we have things of the same kind, 
nevertheless from created wisdom we can get by abstraction a concept common 
[to God and creature], but not from a stone. 70 
This brief account of the nominalists' alternative to analogy does not amount to a proof that 
the erroneous claims and propositions cited by Wyclif were intended as parodies of 
nominalist arguments. It does, however, have some important implications for our 
understanding of those claims. Since, for example, the nominalist theory of univocity 
depended on a process of abstraction beyond specifically human (beyond the so-called 
'intrinsic modes' of being proper to a given concept), 71 it ruled out a whole series of 
propositions which equated an aspect of creation with God symbolically. 
72 Within the 
Ockhamist scheme, therefore, there was no place for a metaphorical understanding of the 
universe of the kind Augustine, Dionysius and Wyclif were suggesting. Any proposition 
which drew an analogy between God and a creature had to be read as a mistaken application 
of the principles of second degree univocity, or as a case of equivocity. Propositions of the 
latter kind, of course, were as good as meaningless, and could even be construed as 
70 4 ... abstrahere imperfectionern a sapientia creaturae non est nisi abstrahere concepturn sapientiae a creatura imperfecta, qui non plus respicit creaturam quam non creaturam, et tune illud quod resultat attribuendum est 
Deo per praedicationern... Nisi enim posset talis abstrahi a creatura, modo non plus per sapientiam creaturae 
deveniretur in cognitionern sapientiae divinae, puta quod Deus sit sapientia, quam per cognitionern lapidis 
devenitur quod Deus sit lapis... Unde non obstante quod tanta sit distinctio inter sapientiam creaturae et 
sapientiam Dei sicut inter Deum et lapidem nee sunt plus eiusdem rationis ex parte una quam alia, tamen a 
sapientia creaturae potest abstrahi conceptus communis, a lapide non. ' Reportatio, III, q. viii (Philosophical 
Writings, p. 112). 
71 The intrinsic modes of being proper to a concept were any of those modes which qualified it in some way 
without altering its nature in a quidditative sense. Human wisdom and divine wisdom, for example, entailed 
different modes of being, but were not understood to impart any generic or quidditative difference to wisdom 
in itself. To arrive at a concept common to the two required that they be considered according to their 
extrinsic modes, beyond any of the potential differences or peculiarities implied by the intrinsic modes of 
being. It was impossible, however, to consider substances such as stones in these terms, whose intrinsic 
modes were inseparable from their fundamental definitions. Hence Ockham's remark that it would be 
impossible to abstract a concept common to God and creature from a stone. See the discussion in Matthew 
C. Menges, The Concept of Univociiy Regarding the Predication of God and Creature according to William 
Ockham (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1952), pp. 8 1-111. 
72 An important exception is the proposition which likens the Trinity to the three aspects of the soul. Ockharn 
rejected the popular argument about the soul being an image of the Trinity on the basis that the distinction 
between intelligence, memory and will was merely a distinction beween accidents (rather than aspects of a 
single essence). It was, nevertheless, possible to assign a concept univocally to the divine and human natures 
in respect of each of the three. Unlike the argument based on analogy, this presupposed no real continuity 
between the two natures. See Ordinatio, bk 1, dist. 3, q. 10. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarzinz: 
Ordinatio, ed. Stephen Brown and Gideon GO (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 
1970), pp. 555-56. 
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examples of contradiction (one reason, perhaps, why Wyclif is so keen to deny the 
possibility of real contradiction). 
73 Only literal analogies were allowable, since only these 
could be rewritten in tenns of third degree univocity. 
Any philosopher, therefore, who complained of equivocation or contradiction (as 
many, according to Wyclif, did) was only doing what was most consistent with nominalist 
logic. So, too, it would appear, were the 'grammatical' exegetes Wyclif chastises later in 
De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae for refusing to see beyond the verbal sense of certain 
scriptural passages. Wyclif's insistence, throughout De Trinitate in particular, on the need 
to construe theological language in analogical, rather than univocal terms, can only have 
been targeted only at the nominalists, since univocal predication of a single term of God 
and man was impossible from a realist perspective (since God and man do not share the 
same real essence). Conceptual univocity as the nominalists understood it was equally 
implausible, since any conceptual category presupposed a real one. TWs latter point, almost 
certainly directed against nominalist arguments, is made particularly clearly in the ninth 
chapter of De Trinitate, in which Wyclif considers whether it is ever appropriate to use 
figurative language of God. It cannot be said, he argues, that terms must always be used 
properly of God, much less that they can ever be used univocally of both God and creatures. 
This is so because 'the sign is not univocal in any case [of language being applied to God], 
unless on account of univocation in the significate' (signum non est univocian aliquibits nisi 
propter univocationein in signato), which is impossible in realist terms. Equivocity, the 
nominalists' solution, is equally inappropriate, since then there would be no degree of 
similarity or continuity between God and creature, making all enquiry pointless. 74 This, 
Wyclif claims, would make all Scripture false and grammatically insoluble. 75 This latter 
remark is a strong indication that the norninalists are indeed likely to have been in Wyclif's 
mind when he ridiculed exegetes and grammarians for rejecting metaphorical expressions. 
In the light of this evidence, there is reason to suppose that the nominalists were 
indeed among those Wyclif was criticising for misconstruing or simply neglecting the 
principles of analogy. It is quite likely, too, that they were either the direct or the indirect Zý 
targets of derisive remarks in De Veritate Sacrae Scripti(rae about exegetes who refused 
73 Hence his logical maxim 'in aequivocis non est contradictio'. The expression is used in various places. 
See Ch. 3 (section 1), in which Wyclif's interpretation of the concept of contradiction is examined in detail. 
See also Ch. 5 (section 4.1), in which the principle of non-contradictory equivocation is applied explicitly 
to the procedures of scriptural interpretation. 
74 'Nec est verum, quod aliquod signandurn equivoce illis conveniat, quia nihil potest aliquo modo illis esse 
conunune, ergo non equivoce. ' De Trinitate, p. 99,11.18-20. 
75 Talsa ergo foret scriptura et insalvabilis per grammaticam, ymo cum quelibet conveniunt deo et creaturis, 
equivoce illis conveniunt... ' Ibid., 11.20-22. 
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to accept the metaphorical language of the Scriptures. The application of the principles of 
analogy to Bible interpretation of was in many ways the natural conclusion of Wyclif's 
philosophical and theological project. By claiming to interpret them analogically, he was 
placing not only scriptural truth but also the truths of his own readings beyond the realm 
of doubt. The readings of the nominalists, on the other hand - if indeed they applied their 
logic consistently to the study of the Bible - could claim no authority beyond the literal 
world of particulars and the contingent truths of language. There was, that is, no natural 
truth behind any of the claims they were making. Whilst on the one hand, therefore, the 
advent of nominalism may have posed a serious threat to realist views of natural and 
biblical authority, on the other it provided thinkers like Wyclif with the best means of 
defending themselves. 
5. FROM THE BOOK OF NATURE TO THE BOOK OFLEFE: Six KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE 
The theory of analogy, and the hierarchical conception of being on which it rested, 
brought into play specific presuppositions about the nature of knowledge. The goal of 
analogical reasoning, after all, was to bring the mind closer to an apprehension of the 
divine. In the final chapter of De Ente Prinzo in Conuntud, Wyclif presents a detailed 
restatement of his basic theory of knowledge. The being of God, he argues, is the first One C) 
and hence the first knowable. There is, however, as we were told in the first chapter of De 
Ente in Coininuni, a multiplicity of difffrent forms of knowledge. He lists six different 
kinds, in a rough hierarchy, all of whose primary objects are God himself. 76 God, that is, 
is the 'principal known' in each case. Not all forms, nevertheless, gives an equally clear 
understanding of the divine nature, and it is no surprise to discover that noiriinalistic modes 
of cognition are not rated highly in this respect. Just as Wyclif sought to marginalise any 
truth which was not 'natural' (as we saw in the preceding section), so he paid little attention 
to forms of knowledge based on the experience of particulars. In either case, he effectively 
rendered impotent modes of enquiry which failed to privilege (or to recognise) realist 
metaphysical values. 
Lowest in the hierarchy of knowledge is notitia confusa, by which things beneath the 
transcendent are known. From this, Wyclif argues, it is clear that the being of God is truly 
known before any other thing, since if anything else is known by this form of knowledge, 
76 Cf. Wyclif's discussion in the third chapter of De Ideis (written probably slightly later than De Ente Pfinio 
in Coninium), in which he considers the six ways in which we may know creatures. (fo. 45rb-45va. ) 
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God's being is also known in the same way. And since God's being, like knowledge of 
God's being, is the cause of all other forms of knowledge, this forna of knowledge is also 
prior (in its effect) to all others. 77 Notitia Confusa, though Wyclif makes no mention of 
the fact here, is the same as the nominalists' 'confused' understanding of particulars. 
Second is notitia distincta, by which the viator knows God distinctly in this life, and which 
is perfected in the ultimate blessedness towards which he is directed. Real universals 
(though not their nominal equivalents), as Wyclif argues elsewhere, can be known 
distinctly. Particulars, transitory and changeable, cannot. Since the primary end of 
blessedness is prior in the intention of nature to the means to that end, a distinct knowledge 
of God is prior to all other kinds. 78 The third form of knowledge is cognitio secundum 
intentiones innatas. This, Wyclif argues, is communicable to nature insofar as nature 
intends or points towards ('appetit', literally 'craves') it. God is the first known in this 
form of knowing, too, since He is intended principally. Animals and all corruptible things 
therefore know God by natural knowledge ('notitia naturalis'), but only the blessed can 
know God by elicitation or notitia elicta. There are, then, two possible ways of 
understanding nature: 
It is... either to be denied that nature acts in accordance with some end, and 
therefore intends nothing, or is passive, or it is to be conceded [that nature acts 
thus], so that we should speak analogically of natural knowledge, as the 
philosophers speak. For it is certain that Aristotle, in the first [book] of the 
Physics, did not understand a single nature, which is God, but some nature in 
common. 79 
From this familiar realist view of nature and 'intention' (a view which infonns, as we have 
seen, Wyclif's understanding of analogy and predication) Wyclif draws three conclusions. 
First, that universals exist; secondly, that it is necessary for a complex expression to have 
a signatian; and thirdly, that every natural active thing requires an end. He goes on to 
consider the fourth form of knowledge, which takes the name notitia in its most proper 
sense. This is knowledge of a thing per causain, whose primary object (the final cause of 
the thing) is God. It is not possible, Wyclif argues, for any person to have a more perfect 
77 '... loquendo de cognicione confusa qua cognoscuntur res sub transcendente, patet quod deum esse est vere 
prius cognitum quam aliquod reliquorum, quia si aliquod reliquorum noscitur illa noticia deum esse noscitur 
illa noticia. Et cum hoc tam deum esse quam quam ejus noticia est causa cujuscunque alterius noticie, ergo 
est prius naturaliter quam alterius notitia. 'De Eitte Prinio in Cortinziiiii, p. 103. 
78 De Ente Pritno in Communi, p. 104. 
79 TO igitur negandum cst naturarn agere propter finem et sic nichil intendere, vel appetereaut a se inclinari, 
vcl niti, vel hoc concesso, oportet racionaliter analogice loqui de noticia nature ut loquntur philosophi, quia 
cer-tum est quod Aristoteles in primo Phisicortim non solum intellexit naturam, que est deus, set in conununi 
quamlibet naturam. ' De Ente Primo in Communi, pp. 105-06 
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kind of knowledge than this ('qua notitiam non est possibile perfectiorem in genere inesse 
homini'). Citing Aristotle in support of his claim, he goes on to suggest that knowledge of 
the thing caused presupposes an understanding of its primary causative principle: 
It appears that in this kind of knowing it is not possible to have knowledge of 
a thing caused without a precognition of its primary origin, as nobody has a 
perfect knowledge by understanding the cause of man's being unless he 
understands why or on account of what end man is. Thus, among other subtle 
arguments of the philosophers, this is the more ingenious: to know of what 
thing the cause is to be determined, and to know to resolve any caused thing 
into its causes and the whole multitude of causes into one simple final cause 
which is the first and the ultimate cause. 80 
Wyclif does not conclude from this that an understanding of ally sequence of causes is 
ultimately to be resolvcU inio an understanding of divine causality: in certain cases, such 
as one man's murder of another to satisfy an appetite for revenge, it is erroneous to ask 
'what is the causeT and then to name God as the final cause of individual human action. 81 
Wyclif lists four problems arising from a consideration of causality: the problem of the 
ordering of cause and effect into a sequence of 'proximate' causes; the question of whether 
there is a finite or an infinite sequence of causes separating man and God; the difficulty 
surrounding the 'completeness' of causality (is it ever true to say that a thing caused has 
a complete cause which, once in place, allows the thing itself to come into effect? ); and 
lastly, whether anything caused, however modest or ugly, is reducible to the beneficence 
of God as a final cause. 82 
The fifth kind of knowledge, which Wyclif labels notitia intuitiva, is one means by 
which the viator has an understanding of God as the final cause of the book of nature. God, 
he argues, is the principal thing known by notitia intititiva, since He is the end in 
accordance with which we learn anything in this life ('notitia intuitiva deurn esse est 
principalissime cogniturn, cum illa notitia sit finis gratia cuius quiquid addiscimus hic in 
via' ). 83 This form of cognition is among the most primitive, and involves no discursive 
80 1 Patet... quod illo genere cognoscendi non est possibile cognoscere principiaturn nisi precognito primo 
principio, ut nemo perfecte cognoscit noticia propter causarn quod homo est, nisi cognoscat quare vel gratia 
cuius finis homo est. Unde inter alias subtilitates philosophorum est hee artificiosior: scire cujus est causa 
querenda et scire resolvere quodlibet causaturn in ejus causas et totarn multitudinem causarum in unarn 
simplicern finatern que est prima et ultima. ' De Ente Prinzo in Conununi, pp. 106-7. 
81 De Ente Prinzo in Conzinuni, p. 107,11.5-11 
82 Ibid., p. 107,11.11-19. 
83 De Ente Prinio in Communi, p. 108,11.2-4. 
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reasoning; it is hence of a relatively indistinct kind. 
84 It is divided into three categories, 
corresponding to the body, the spirit, and the intellect. Wyclif does not elaborate further 
on its nature, but goes on to consider the final, and in many ways the most important form 
of knowledge, notitia fidei. This is described as deriving 'from authority or internal 
instinct, without intuition or natural deduction' ('de autoritate vel instinctu interno sine 
intuitione vel naturali deductione' ). 85 By notiflafidei, as by all other forms of knowledge, 
God's being is the principal thing known. It is clear, Wyclif goes on to explain, that God's 
existence is the most easily knowable thing, since every predestinate person from the 
beginning has elicited the 'transcendent intention', and knows after knowing anything that 
he will have learnt of his God. Continuing the theme of notitia fidei, he follows this 
explanation with an important passage on the Book of Life, the truths of whose pages are 
a source of illumination to every man: 
God is the immense Book of Life in which all truths are included. 
Accordingly, just as one person learns a book by sight alone, insofar as he 
recognises the object itself, [so] another [studies it] by learning distinct letters 
and syllables, another by learning to read, another by understanding the 
meaning of the text according to its literal sense or another [sense], of which 
the modes of learning vary by degrees. Thus how much more properly is the 
Book of Life learned, since it does not sustain inked letters accidentally as an 
animal hide does, but bears all truths beneath the word essentially, which is its 
great strength. None of these can be seen unless [the book] has been seen 
itself, not only objectively, but by the force of its illuminating light, for in this 
respect it illuminates every man coming into this world, as it is said in John 1.86 
This is among the most explicit anticipations of the ideas Wyclif's later views on the Book 
of Life (identified with the intelligible form of the Bible, and hence with divine intention 
in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae) and the process of reading. As in the S11111111a 77leologiae, 
he draws a careful distinction between reading as it was taught in primers or alphabets 
(through which the student was taught to identify - though not to understand - letters and 
syllables), grammars (whose focus was the reading process itself), and exegetical and 
84 Tocatur... noticia intuitiva noticia sensus de veritate objective sibi presenti sine distincciori noticia prius 
cogniti a qua sensus elicit illam noticiam discursive. ' lbid, 11.5-8. 
85 Ibid., 11.21-22. 
86 'Deus... est inmensus liber vite in quo sunt omnes veritates incluse. Ideo sicut unus discit librum solo visu 
in quantum ipsum cognoscit, alius discendo distincte literas et silibas, alius discendo legere, alius cognoscendo 
signaturn scripture secundum sensum literalem aut alium que discencie possunt secundum gradus quotlibet 
variari. Sic longe proprius addiscitur liber vitae, cum non sustentat accidentaliter litteras linitas ut pellis, set 
essencialiter portat omnes veritates secundas verbo que est virtus sua quarum nulla potest videri nisi ipso viso 
non solum objective set virtute sui luminis illustrantis, quia quantum ad hoc illuminat omnem hominem 
venientem in hune mundum, ut dicitur Johannis primo. ' De Ente Primo in Coninumi, p. 109. 
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interpreative writings (which dealt with the various senses of the text), 87 and the reading 
of the Book of Life, which transcends the physical text. Though there is a vast difference 
between recognizing a book as an object and reading it according to a set of interpretative 
rules, or even between learning to identify letters and syllables and learning to read with 
reference to some form of intention, these were all - at least implicitly - equally inadequate, 
by themselves, to an understanding of divine intention. The act of reading, therefore, like 
the act of knowing, should be directed away from the particulars and accidents of the 
material world. Though such objects could certainly lead the mind towards God, as 
Wyclif's hierarchical understanding of being and universal natures illustrates, they were 
insufficient in themselves to allow the viator access to the supreme book of truths: 
Therefore may God witness that I do not see why the material book, composed 
out of hide and tablets, with other things irrelevant to leaming is any longer 
studied; indeed, far more properly and generally are truths de vi vocis learned 
from the Book of Life- 88 
This relegation of the 'material' book to the realms of theological irrelevance is a 
distinctive Wycliffian move. A similar gesture is made in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. 89 
In the context of Wyclif's theory of knowledge as a whole, it is entirely consistent with his 
Dionysian repudiation of the finite and the transitory, and serves as a very explicit 
affirmation of his understanding of the necessity of faith and divine illumination. It also 
brings into focus the nature of the divine being to which all the other forms of knowledge 
direct themselves. Each of these latter forms, as Wyclif suggests, can bring the individual 
towards an understanding of God. Some of them, however, such as the distinct knowledge 
one can have of universals, are clearly more highly valued than others. These forms of 
knowledge, as is to be expected, are generally those which take a primary analogate as their 
object. The relative values of the different kinds of knowledge, as they are established in 
the Stunina de Ente, are emphasized throughout Wyclif's later theological writings, and play 
a particularly significant r6le in his understanding of the reading of the Scriptures. The 
progression from the material pages of the Bible to the infinite and immaterial ideas of the 
divine mind in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae very clearly mirrors the progression towards 
an understanding of the Book of Life as it is presented here. 
87 On the teaching of reading in the later Middle Ages, see Nicholas Orme, English Schools in the Middle 
Ages (London: Methuen, 1973), esp. Chs. 2 and 3 on elementary and grammatical education. See also the 
excellent recent study by Suzanne Reynolds, Medieval Reading: Grammar, Rhetoric and the Classical Text 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 7-44, 
88 'ldeo deum, contestor, non videro, quare liber materialis integratus ex pelle et tabulis cum aliis 
inpertinentibus ad doctrinam addiscitur quin longe proprius de vi vocis discuntur veritates et generaliter liber 
vite. ' De Etzte Pritno in Coninzuni, p. 109,11.20-24. 
89 See Ch. 5 (section 1.1) below. 
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The analogical principles of being and knowledge outlined in the Siallina de Elite 
supplied the basic hermeneutic paradigm of Wyclif's philosophy of Scripture. The 
application of analogy to the interpretation of Trinitarian doctrine, moreover, and the 
distinction which is drawn between literal and metaphorical analogy, highlight issues which 
have a prominent place in theological and hermeneutic debates of De Veritate Sacrae 
Scriptitrae. Though Wyclif is not specific about the nature of those who ignore or 
misapply the rules of analogy, there are good reasons to suppose that they would have 
included philosophical nominalists. Failure to observe these rules, as we have suggested, 
by no means presupposed a commitment to nominalist metaphysics, but nominalists 
represented the only group of thinkers whose philosophy made such a failure inevitable. 
It is surely no accident, moreover, that Wyclif chooses to examine at such length the 
analogy between the Trinity and real universal natures. This analogy, as we have seen, 
enabled him to hold nominalism implicitly to account for known Trinitarian heresies. The 
relationship between analogy and Wyclif's theory of knowledge, which was summarised 
in the preceding section, brings the wider significance of analogical reasoning more sharply 
into focus. Though not all forms of knowledge rely on analogical reasoning, the 
relationship between human known and divine known, between natural truths and truths 
inscribed in the Book of Life, between things known through 'confused' and through 
'distinct' knowledge, is ftindamentally an analogical one. The theory of knowledge and the 
theory of analogy are in effect mutually dependent: higher and lower forms of knowledge 
are related analogically, but it is the theory of knowledge itself which gives value to the 
analogical process (primary analogates, knowledge of which is the goal of analogical 
reasoning, are known on the basis of a higher form of cognition). 
The pervasiveness of the principle of analogy, both in the Sialinla de Elite and De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, is testimony to its significance in Wyclif's philosophical and 
exegetical programmes. In De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae, as we suggested in the 
Introduction, analogy was to become an invaluable tool not only in exegetical practice, but 
also in the analysis of three fundamental textual concepts: the book, the author, and 
authority. On both levels, it served to reinforce Wyclif's distinctive conception of truth 
and textuality, and to marginalise materialistic and nominalistic approaches to 
interpretation. The relationship between truth and textuality will be considered further in 
the next chapter, in which Wyclif's theories of propositional meaning and temporal 
reference - as presented in the Stininza de Elite - will be introduced. These controversial 
theories, like the concept of analogy itself, were to become fundamental to Wyclif's 
exegetical programme. Unlike analogy, however, they were much criticised within the 
academy (as We shall see in Chapter 4), providing us with positive evidence of active 
nominalist (or anti-realist) opposition to Wyclif's hermeneutic teachings. 
66 
CHAPTER 3 
PHILOSOPHY AND SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION 2: 
THE TRUTH OF PROPOSITIONS 
1. MODES OF PREDICATION AND THE LOGIC OF HOLY SCRIMRE 
The principles of analogy and participation formed the framework of Wyclif's realist theory 
of scriptural signification. They are not adequate in themselves, however, to explain the 
philosophy of his hermeneutics, which rested on an elaborate and distinctive theory of 
predication. The analogy of names, as we have shown, necessarily presupposed an analogy 
between modes of being: the logic of terms was always secondary to the logic of things in 
themselves. The implications of this idea, one of the hallmarks of Wyclif's realism, do not 
become clear until his theory of predication has been taken into account. Only then can 
his views on truth, falsity and logical fallacy - those views, he would have us believe, 
which were so frequently misapprehended or denied by his opponents - be fully 
understood. 
The most comprehensive and systematic account of the theory of predication is 
offered in De Universalibits, composed when the basic tenets and idiosyncrasies of his 
philosophical position were relatively well established. ' In the first chapter, he presents a 
threefold definition of the nature of universals and of the nature of predication. The two 
definitions are complementary, and are presented, Wyclif claims, for the sake of eliminating 
errors relating to universals. Each is divided between a nominal and a real definition, the 
former being strictly a derivative of the latter, which is the proper object of study. Thus, 
in the case of universals, there are universals by causality, by coninuillity and by 
representation. Universals of the first kind are causes in the sense elaborated in De Elite 
in Coninund and De Elite Prinio in Coninitud, and hence refer to a common cause of several 
effects. The most universal cause is God, beneath which there is a hierarchy of created 
Many of the views it presents are thus anticipated in his earliest writings, but are not always fully elaborated. 
It is possibly for this reason that De Logica (unquestionably a very early work) is often, despite its distinctive 
realist leanings, overlooked. For the sake of completeness, therefore, significant points of continuity or 
discontinuity between the theory of predication presented in De Universalibits and that of the earlier 
philosophical works will be noted briefly. 
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causes (e. g. genera and species, the immediate causes of created natures). 
2 The second kind 
are the natures 'shared by their supposits'. These are generic and specific natures, the 
'forms' in which all creatures participate. This presumably includes forms ante rein (as 
real causes), and in re (as common natures abstracted mentally from partiCUlarS). 
3 The 
definitions, Wyclif concedes, must allow for some overlap. The third category contains 
conceptual universals, signs of the first and second kind only. These, Wyclif suggests, are 
universals only equivocally (as the name 'man' applies equivocally to a man and his 
portrait), and are hence of no real concern to the philosopher. 4 For the corresponding 
modes of predication, Wyclif supplies definitions based on the two etymological senses of 
praedicare, namely 'to declare' or 'to preach', and 'to predicate' (as in logic). Our 
attention is carefully drawn to the ambiguity of the term when used in its second sense, 
which can refer either to linguistic or to real forms of logical predication: 
The Latin word for 'predication' has three different meanings. In the first 
place it is equivalent to 'preaching', meaning the discourse of those who 
exhort to good; it is in this sense that the apostle Paul, in Galatians 2, says 
'The faith of Christ is preached among the Gentiles'. In the second place 
it means the predication of one terrn of another. This is the sense much 
talked about by modem writers, who think that there is no other. But in fact 
this kind of predication is modelled on real predication, the third kind of 
predication which is being [participated in] or is said of many things in 
common. It is in this manner that every actual universal is predicated of its 
5 inferiors in nature. 
2 Trimum est universale causatione, ut Deus est causa universalissima et post eum res universales creatae 
secundum ordinem, quo originatur a Deo. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 1,11.9-11. 
3. Secundum est universaIe communicatione, ut puta res communicata multis suppositis, ut natura humana 
et aliae naturac generales et specificae. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 1,11.12-14. 
4, Tertium est universale repraesentatione, ut signa priorum universalium, quac aequivoce dicuntur universalia, 
sicut homo pictus acquivoce dicitur homo. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 1,11.15-18. Cf. De Ente in Communi, in 
which this latter kind of universal is said to be universal by the secondary analogy according to which urine 
is said to be 'healthy': 'Est... triplex universale, scilicet universale causacione, ut quelibet causa multorum, 
universale communicacione, ut commune quod est multorum singulum, et universale signacione ut terminus 
signans universale secundo modo dictum. Set istud magis remote dicitur universale quam urina dicitur sana. 
' (pp. 54-5). 
5 'praedicari aequivocum ad tria, scilicet ad sermocinari exhortantium ad bonum, et sic Fides Christi 
praedicatur in gentibus, ut dicit Apostolus, Ad Galatas 2. Secundo ad praedicationem termini de termino. 
Et ista est famosa modernis, qui putant nuflam aliarn esse, licet secundum veritatem ista exemplata sit a 
praedicatione reali, quae est tertium genus praedicandi et est participari vel dici communicative de multis. 
Et illo modo omne universale in actu praedicatur de suis inferioribus in natura. ' De Universalibus, Ch. 1, 
11.27-37 (1 have slightly modified Kenny's translation of this passage). 
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The 'modem' writers Wyclif refers to here would certainly have included Ockham and 
other anti-realists, for whom the form of participation of which he speaks, as we have seen, 
would have seemed a nonsense. Several key nominalist assumptions are clearly 
contradicted by the concept of real predication, which presupposes the existence of real 
universals ante rent. There is also the problem of the object of knowledge, which, both 
here and in the preceding discussion of the nature of universals, is very explicitly located 
with truths beyond the realm of logical discourse, and upon which such discourse is 
founded. Wyclif's view that propositions exist in the things themselves is an extreme form 
of what is usually referred to as a res theory. A similar theory was held by Walter Burley, 
the distinguished Oxford schoolman and follower of Robert Grosseteste, whose views are 
known to have had an influence on many aspects of Wyclif's philosophy. Burley is actually 
mentioned by Wyclif later in the first chapter of De Universalibits, in reply to an objection 
about the nature of real predication and real propositions. 6 Many of the 'modem' thinkers, 
William of Ockham and Robert Holcot among them, defended a form of coniplextan theory, 
according to which the act of knowing or believing something (a proposition or 'complex') 
was itself the object of knowledge, and coterminous with the truth or falsity of that act. 7 
The philosopher was thus not required to look beyond the mental proposition to the reality 
underlying it. As Ockham explains in the Prologue to his Expositio super viff Libros 
Physicortan, 'the object of knowledge is the whole proposition that is known' (objection 
scientiae est tota propositio nota). 8 Burley is known to have opposed Ockham on issues 
relating to predication (most famously, on the question of 'simple' supposition), and it is 
6 'Ille autem, qui sciret fundare quod veritas ex parte rei, quarn Deus componit ex subiecto et praedicato, sit 
realis propositio, ut ponit Magister Walterus Burleigh, negaret n-linorem. argumenti. ' (the n-dnor being that 'res 
extra non sunt partes propositionis. ') De Universalibits, ch. 1,11.88-92. On Wyclif's connection with Burley 
and the latter's influence in Oxford see Robson, IVyclif and the Oxford Schools, pp. 24-5,98-9; Herbert 
Workman, John Wyclif, vol. 1, p. 117. On Burley's theory of propositiones in re see Kretzmann et al., cds., 
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 207. 
71 am indebted here to the account of theories of objects of knowledge given in the Cambridge History, p. 
205. 
8 Philosophical Writings, p. 9. Cf. Ockham's argument in the Sumnia Logicae that propositions cannot be 
composed of substances: 'Propositio non est nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; ergo partes eius non sunt 
nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; huiusmodi autem non sunt substantiae particulares. Constat igitur, 
quod nulla propositio ex substantfis componi potest; componitur autem propositio ex universalibus; 
universalia igitur non sunt substantiae ullo modo. ' Sitintita Logicae Pars Ptima, ed. Philotheus B oelmer (New 
York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1951-54), Ch. 15,11.107-112. 
9 Simple supposition occurs when a term in a logical proposition supposits for a general significate (rather 
than an individual entity). For Burley (and Wyclif), this significate was a real universal; for Ockham, it was 
a common concept. See Stephen F. Brown, 'Walter Burleigh's Treatise De Suppositionibus and its Influence 
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unlikely that they would have remained silent over the issue of real predication. Wyclif 
himself must certainly have been conscious that this theory of predication would have 
found few adherents among contemporary anti-realists. 
Wyclif divides predication into two principal categories: predication per se, in which 
the subject per se 'speaks' or 'says' its predicate (as a man or a woman 'speaks' his or her 
humanity by virtue of being human), and predication per accidens, in which each of the 
nine categories of accidents speaks its subject. 10 The latter is passed over very briefly, 
though it occupies an important position in Wyclif's hierarchical theory of knowledge (in 
which knowledge of accidents leads to knowledge of subjects and hence to knowledge of 
their universal natures, etc. ) Predication per se, which was to serve as a key principle in 
Wyclif's exegetical theory, and which was vigorously defended, is explained in detail. 
Every created thing, he argues, 'speaks' its per se cause (i. e. its species), and hence every 
inferior speaks its superior. He divides this form of predication into quidditative and 
qualitative predication, the former predicating a thing's quiddity ('thisness', namely its 
genus and species), and the latter a thing's differences and properties. " These real forms 
of predication, Wyclif concludes, are those which the 'more subtle grammarians accept', 
but which are still overlooked by many. In the passage which follows, he reiterates the 
main points of his argument about individual subjects 'speaking' their universal natures, 
this time making a more clearly directed attack against the nominalists: 
Philosophers... are agreed that just as everything says itself, so also every 
inferior foresays its own superior, that is says it as subjectively precedent. 
So it attaches the real name of its superior alongside itself as subject, since 
every inferior has its superior attached to itself as a form. It is clear 
therefore that it is not a case of a term predicated inhering in a subject term; 
rather the form or universal characterisation, such as being a man, inheres 
in every single supposit of the human species. And this, according to the 
more subtle grammarians, is what being predicated is. 12 
on William of Ockham', Franciscan Studies, 32/10 (1972), 15-65 (pp. 24-25). 
10 'Praedicatio per se est quando subiecturn per se dicit praedicatum, ut quilibet homo per se dicit naturam 
humanam specificam, quae est quidditas cuiuslibet homigis. ' De Universaliblis, Ch. 1,11.41-44. 
11 See De Universalibits, Ch. 1,11.50-4. 
12 , Constat nainque philosophis quod, sicut quaelibet res dicit se, sic omne inferius praedicit, id est subiective 
prius dicit, suum superius, et per conscqucns praecopulat nomen reale sui superioris sibi tamquam subiecto, 
cum omne inferius habet suum superius sibi copulaturn ut formarn. Constat itaque quod terminus praedictus 
non inhaeret termino subiecto. Sed forma vel denominatio universalis, ut hominem esse, inest cuicumque 
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Wyclif's objection that a predicated term cannot inhere in its subject provides a very clear 
allusion to nominalist logic. The reference to the 'more subtle' grammarians seems once 
again to associate contemporary anti-realists with a naYve and materialistic understanding 
of the verbal arts. The problem of 'inherence' is one which Ockharn explicitly addresses 
in the first book of the Sunnna Logicae, in terms which shed some important light on 
Wyclif's remarks. When we are told that predicates inhere in their subjects, he suggests 
here, we must assume that they are predicated of them in a strictly logical sense: We say that 
predicates are predicated of their subjects; but we also say that predicates are in, belong to, 
and inhere in their subjects. Such locutions should not be understood to imply that 
predicates really inhere in their subjects in the way that whiteness inheres in a wall. On the 
contrary these locutions are synonymous with 'predicated of. They should not be taken 
in any other way. 13 
By 'subject' and 'predicate', Ockham. is clearly referring to terms, as his earlier 
definitions in the Stannia Logicae confirm. Wyclif is taking the nominalists at their word, 
just as Ockharn suggests that one should not, when they suggest that a predicate term 
inheres in a subject term. Earlier in the Sunzina Logicae, Ockham. is careful to distinguish 
between a real subject (subiection ad existentiant), in which accidents may actually inhere 
(as whiteness may inhere in milk, for example), and a propositional subject (subiectilln ad 
of 14 praedicationenz), which a predicate term is predicated Crucially, only the latter could 
form part of a proposition. As is often the case in the Sunzyna de Ente, Wyclif seems to be 
consciously mistaking opponents in this passage, or at the very least presenting half-truths 
about them. 15 This is not to say, of course, that the nominalists were above criticism as 
supposito humanae specei. Et hoc, secundurn subtiles grammaticos, est praedicari. ' De Universalibits, Ch. 
1,11.102-112. 
13 'Sicut autern praedicaturn praedicatur de subiecto, ita dicimus praedicaturn esse in subiecto et praedicaturn 
convenire subiecto, et praedicaturn inesse subiecto et praedicaturn inhaerere subiecto. Quae non sunt 
intelligenda, ac si praedicaturn poneretur realiter inhaerere subiecto illo modo, quo albedo inest parieti, sed 
omnia talia idem significant quod 'praedicari', nec aliter accipienda sunt nisi pro praedicari. ' Sununa Logicae 
Pars Prinia, Ch. 32,11.1-7 (translated by Michael J. Loux as Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the 
Stinzina Logicae (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974)). 
14 Ch. 30,11.7-12. 
15 It seems unlikely that any terminist or nominalist would have supposed that one term in a proposition 
literally inhered in another. Ockham would clearly have regarded such a supposition with as much contempt 
as Wyclif did, if for different reasons. 
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logicians: the fundamental difference between nominalist and realist theories of predication 
would have been difficult to reconcile even for the least partial scholastic thinker. Wyclif 
appeals to the writings of the Aristotle and Averroes to authenticate his claims. Modem 
philosophers would be in no danger of erring, he suggests, if they could perceive the true 
meaning of the expression 'to be predicated' (praedicari). Once again, we are reminded 
of the fundamental division between real and nominal predication (praedicari is interpreted 
as 'to be said of' and 'to be common toTto be participated in'): 
... the ternis used by the Commentator, on Metaphysics X111, section 15, to 
explain 'to be predicated' are as follows: 'to be said', 'to be common', or 
['to be participated in']. These terms are also used by the doctors of 
metaphysics, although there are some who never leave the first stages of 
grammar, never turning the gaze of their minds away from signs. This is an 
attitude which arises from corrupt custom, and causes many errors in 
philosophy. These terms 'to be predicated', 'to be common', 'to be shared', 
in Aristotle, the Conu-nentator, Porphyry and other theologians who follow 
them, were very aptly invented and very fully packed with meaning. It is a 
disgrace that people who profess to know their philosophy should let them 
slip from their memories just like children. ' 16 
The notion of a predicate 'being said' of its subject, or of a subject 'speaking' its predicate 
is an important one in Wyclif's writings. It is given a sightly more theological flavour in 
De Trinitate (one of the last tracts of the Sunniza de Ente), a treatise which borrows 
extensively from De Universalibus, and is thought to have been written at about the same 
time 17 '. The relationship beween predication and Wyclif's doctrine of analogy also becomes 
clear here, as the Platonic and Dionysian view of the world as a sign of the transcendent 
merges with the idea of the world 'speaking' its ideal and universal existence. As 
elsewhere, we are reminded of those who, failing to interpret speech analogically (as a 
metaphysical, rather than purely as a verbal process), confine themselves to the world of 
the material and the transitory. The reference is apparently a general one, though the 
16 'Termini... Commentatoris, XII Metaphysicae, commento 15, quibus exprimit 'praedicari', sunt tales: 'dici', 
'communicari', vel 'participari', quibus etiam utuntur doctores metaphysicae, licet aliqui maneant continue 
in rudimentis grammaticae, dirigentes aciem mentis pure ad signa, quod, ex infecta consuetudine, causat 
multos errores in philosophia. Cum igitur isti termini: praedicari, conimunicari et participari, apud 
Aristotelem, Commentatorem, Porphyrium et alios theologos eos sequentes, fuerunt tam signanter inventi et 
tam compendiose onusti sententia, turpe est quod decidant tam pueriliter a memoriis philosophiam eorum 
profitientium. ' De Universalibits, Ch. 1,11.113-125. (1 have modified Kenny's translation. ) 
17 Thomson suggests that the De Trinitate was composed c. 1370, only slightly later than the De Universalibus 
(c. 1368-69). See Latin Writings, pp. 20-23; 30-32. On the relationship between the De Trinitate and the 
earlier tracts of the Suninta de Ente, see Thomson, Latin Writings, p. 3 1. 
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emphasis on failure of analogical understanding, and on childish modes of enquiry 
(associated quite consistently, as we have seen, with anti-realism), makes contemporary 
nominalists, once again, into very natural targets: 
Unless I am mistaken, nothing is more valid than that passage from the Blessed 
John, in the first of his gospels: In the beginning, he says, was tile word, and 
the word was with God, and the word was God. And by this utterance, it is 
shown that it is not possible for anything to be unless it speaks, intends, shows 
and knows itself. But because many, understanding grossly and childishly, 
deny this supposition, restricting [instead] all speech to a verbal and sensible 
locution, it remains to urge upon their minds that there is another kind of 
speech, ... thus: the speech of a man 
is not ended with sensible signs, but with 
the insensible signifieds of those signs. And that speech cannot be spoken as 
a stringing together of words without afterwards being an assertion in the 
SOUI. 18 
Wyclif goes on to explain how the different levels of creation, from accidents upwards, 
'speak' or reflect each other, ultimately stopping at the divine nature in which they all 
participate. The Dionysian idea of procession and return (of God 'proceeding' into His 
creation, which then 'returns' to God), hinted at in the metaphors of ascent in the earlier 
parts of De Ente, is used quite explicitly towards the end of this chapter, following a short 
quotation from Grosseteste's Hexanieron. All aspects of creation, like the effects of an 
efficient or 'motive' cause, make their cause known (albeit imperfectly) by 'speaking' it: 
... speech does not refer 
in a purely equivocal way to signification of the 
mouth, the deed, and the mind, but in a certain way analogically, applying 
firstly to God and consequently to His creatures who speak Him, as 
Lincolniensis says: All the world is inade as an artifilcial word, speaking the 
art, the word and the intention intrinsic to God, froin Mionz it proceeds. 
Thus it appears that just as every efficient cause per se speaks what it 
causes, insofar as this is what it intends, so in the opposite sense all that is 
caused speaks its imperfection, and speaking its cause to this extent shows 
how far in this respect it proceeds from its cause. 19 
18 'Et si non fallor, nulla est validior quarn illa capta a beato Johanne in principio evangelii sui: 1,1. In 
principio, inquid, erat verbum et verbitni erat apud deunt et deus erat verbum. Pro quo declarando, 
supponitur quod non sit possibile quidquam esse nisi dicat, intendat, ostendat, et noscat scipsum. Sed quia 
multi grosse et pueriliter concipientes negant supposicionern restringentes avare omne dicere ad vocalem et 
sensibilern locucionem, ideo restat suadere racionibus quod sit aliud dicere, primo sic: dicere hominis non 
solurn terminatur ad voces sensibiles sed ad significata insensibilia vocum, sed illud dicere non potest poni 
vocum prolacio scd assertio post in anima. ' De Trinitate, p. 39. 
19 'Non est dicere pure equivocum ad ostensionem oris, operis et mentis, sed quodammodo analogicum primo 
competens deo et consequenter suis creaturis ipsum dicentibus, ut dicit Lincolniensis quod tota mundifabrica 
est ununt artificiosum verbunt dicens arlem, verbuni, vel intentionent deo intrinsecam a quo processit. Unde 
patet quod sicut omnis causa per se efficiens dicit suum causaturn, de quanto ostendit quantum in eo est quod 
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Wyclif's analogical understanding of the concept of speech reveals not only his 
indebtedness to Robert Grosseteste ('Lincolniensis'), but also his place in the Augustinian 
hermeneutic tradition. For Augustine, Grosseteste and Wyclif alike, God or divine 
intention is the ultimate end of all human knowledge or scientific endeavour. The book of 
nature, through analogical interpretation, is a sign of the divine. The divine, according to 
Augustine, is the only thing which signifies nothing beyond itself and which is strictly not 
a sign at all. Correspondingly for Wyclif, creatures signify their own natures (their genera 
and species), but also reflect the divine nature, which signifies or 'speaks' itself. In his 
definition of per se predication in De Universalibits, he argues that 'every thing necessarily 
says itself, as is clear in the case of God, whose word or eternal interior saying is the divine 
essence. ' ('quaelibet res necessario dicit se, ut patet de Deo, cuius verbum vel dictio 
aetema ad intra est divina essentia' ). 20 It is in this sense that creatures are said to speak God 
analogically: God speaks His own essence only, and He speaks it perfectly. The creature 
speaks Him imperfectly and secondarily, by virtue of its participation in a qualities which 
imitate the divine essence. 
Speech, according to the broader interpretation, is the outward manifestation of divine 
intention. Only God, as the author or final cause of creation, can use speech in this way, 
as Wyclif's arguments about proportional analogy and real predication illustrate. This 
broad interpretation of speech is thus for Wyclif, as for Aquinas and Augustine, a key 
element in the understanding of Scripture, whose mysteries remain concealed to those who 
neglect the true meaning of speech, predication and analogy. Scripture is the best evidence, 
and indeed the only evidence needed, for the necessity of real predication. In response to 
an objection about this kind of interpretation in De Trinitate, according to which it is 
argued that if all creation speaks then many absurdities, such as stones shouting and dumb 
things talking, would follow, Wyclif presents a justification based on his own analysis of 
the texts of Scripture. Within the pages of the Bible itself, we learn, 'speech' is used 
ab eius causa procedit. ' De Trinitate, p. 45. 
20 Ch. 1,11.44-46. 
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analogically to lead us beyond its basic verbal associations: 
To [this objection] it is said that speech is [here] being restricted to speech 
of the mouth. But often in Scripture 'speech' is used to mean speech simply 
[i. e. in its fundamental, non-verbal form], since the principle is the same as 
that of [verbal] speech. Thus all those things which Scripture figuratively 
attributes to God... are attributed fully to God, according to that part of the 
meaning which speaks imperfection simply, and to the creature according 
to anything proportional to itself, as when it is said that God has a face, 
fingers, or a hand. 21 
The notion of intention, and of intention underlying speech (implicit in the general 
observations about verbal and non-verbal speech in this passage) is one to which Wyclif 
returned throughout his writings, and which was fundamental to his understanding of all 
forms of natural and biblical symbolism. In his tacit appeal to intention as a means of 
resolving apparent verbal anomalies, Wyclif here anticipates very clearly the analytical 
procedures of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. Intention was important, in particular, to his 
ideas about the nature of truth and falsehood, ideas which progressed naturally from his 
views on the meaning of predication. It was thus to become an indispensable weapon 
against the nominalists and others who located truth and falsity with mental or verbal 
propositions, and against those who (according to Wyclif) applied the criteria of the new 
logic to the interpretation of Scripture. 22 In the third section of his discussion of 
predication in De Universalibus, he argues that truth and falsity of verbal propositions are 
21 , ad [hanc obiectionern] dicit quod loqui restringitur ad oris dicere; sepe tamen in scriptura dicitur locucio 
pro dicere simpliciter, quia idem est principium in locucione. Unde omnia quecumque scriptura figurative 
attribuit deo... plene attribuuntur deo, secundum illarn partern racionis que sonat imperfeccionem simpIiciter 
et creature secundum aliquid sibi proportionate ut quando dicitur deum habere faciem, digitos, vel dexteram. ' 
De Trinitate, p. 48. 
22 WYC, ifS views on intention separated him from the nominalists in a more obvious way, since universal 
essences, as truths, could also be seen in terms of intention. For the nominalists, such essences were 
intentions of the human soul; for Wyclif, they were ultimately intentions in the mind of God (ideas). See 
Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, pp. 171-176. 
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of no relevance to an understanding of predication in the real world. This latter kind of 
predication, we are told, is the true object of philosophical enquiry. By implication, once 
again, Wyclif here excludes nominalism from the realms of serious philosophical enquiry. 
Predication in the real world, he suggests, may be either 'formal' (fonnalis), 'essential' 
(sectindian essentiam), or 'habitudinal' (sectindian habitudinein). It is to these that the 
studies of the true philosopher (necessarily a realist) should be devoted: 
[W]e must note carefully the three different kinds of predication, namely 
formal predication, essential predication and habitudinal predication. All 
such predication is principally in the real world. And this is why 
philosophers do not speak of false predication of signs, nor of negative 
predication, nor of predication about the past or the future, because that is 
not in the real world: only true predication is in the real, though truly in the 
real world one thing is denied or removed from another, as man from 
donkey and similarly with other negative truths. But only that which is 
formal is really predicated of a subject. 23 
The differences between the three kinds of predication are examined at length, though are 
less important, at least in the context of Wyclif's hermeneutics, than the general principle 
of necessary truth underlying all of them. Formal predication is of the kind Wyclif 
introduces at the beginning of De Universalibits, in which a subject 'speaks' its genus and 
species, or an accident its subject. Essential predication is used to explain propositions 
such as 'God is man', 'fire is water' or 'the universal is particular', in which there is no 
fonnal identity or inherence, but which imply identity according to a different principle of 
being (God and man, Wyclif explains later, are the ultimate form and the supreme form of 
the same supposit, the Son). 24 Habitudinal predication is used to account for real 
relationships between subject and predicate which do not imply identity between them. 
Any such relationship, Wyclif explains, 'attaches to a subject without making it ýs such 
strictly changeable' ('ex qua adveniente subiecto non oportet ipsum ut sic esse proprie 
23 , 
... diligenter est notandurn de triplici praedicandi manerie, scilicet 
de praedicatione formali, de 
praedicatione secundum essentiam et de praedicatione secundum habitudinem. Talis autern praedicatio 
principaliter est ex parte rei. Et hinc philosophi non loquuntur de falsa praedicatione signorum nec de 
praedicatione negativa, nec de praedicatione de praeterito vel de futuro, quia talis non est ex parte rei, sed 
solum vera praedicatio, licct vcre ex parte rei una res negatur vel removeatur a reliqua, ut homo ab asino et 
sic de aliis veritatibus negativis. Solum autem illud quod est forma praedicatur realiter de subiecto. ' De 
Universalibus, Ch. 1,11.157-169. 
24 De Universalibits, Ch. 1,11.280-7. For an explanation of the suppositional identity of God and man (in the 
Son), see Paul Spade's Introduction to Kenny's translation of the De Universalibus, pp. xli-xliii. 
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mobile' ). 25 He gives examples of something being thought of, loved or acting as a cause 
of various effects, as in the case of God, who 'is known and loved by many creatures, and 
brings about, as efficient exemplar and final cause, many good effects' ('Deus intelligitur 
et diligitur a quitlibet creaturis et facit efficienter, exemplariter et finaliter multa bona' ). 26 
Truth in things is more important than the contingent linguistic truths with which 
modem philosophers concern themselves. Wyclif cites numerous instances in De 
Universalibits of philosophers going astray by attending to the truth conditions of verbal 
propositions. It is just these errors, Wyclif argues, which lead to misunderstandings of the 
Scriptures, or to misguided perceptions of ambiguity, contradiction or falsity within its 
pages. None of the latter, if the philosopher attends to the principles of real predication, 
are to be understood as realities. In his treatise on eliminating errors about truths (Purgans 
Errores circa Veritates in Conuniazt), written shortly before De Universalibus, Wyclif lists 
three ways in which a sign may be true. For Wyclif, truth was principally a property of 
being itself, or of a relationship between cause and effect. 27 Here, as elsewhere, the truth 
of linguistic signs and propositions - the province of logicians and grammarians - is placed 
last in the order of priority: 
Now a sign is said to be true in three ways, corresponding to the three 
modes of signifying, and false in three ways. In the first way, every being, 
insofar as it is such [i. e. a being], is true, as appears from the second book 
of the Metaphysics, Chapter 4. For it has being from truth as much as from 
entity... In the second way, it [is true insofar as] it represents its extrinsic 
cause, as smoke represents fire; and thus every creature represents God 
primarily; and so anything is- naturally true on account of its being and its 
double primary representation. In the third way a sign signifies by human 
imposition, to which mode of signifying grammarians and logicians 
principally attend. And thus a proposition is true if its most primary 
significate has being in some way. And this happens in three ways in 
general: either because it has being, at the very least, intelligibly; or because 
it has actual being [i. e. existence in the temporal world], or thirdly because 
it has actual being beyond the sign, independent of it. 28 
25 De Universalibus, Ch. 1,1.236. 
26 De Universalibus, Ch. 1,11.242-4. 
27 Cf. Wyclif's remark in De Trinitate (cited above) about every cause 'speaking' its effect (causatum), which 
in turn speaks (as a truth) its cause. 
28 'Signurn autem tripliciter dicitur verum, correspondenter ad triplicem modum significandi, et tripliciter esse 
falsum. Primo modo, omne ens in quantum huiusmodi est verum, ut patet 2 Metaphisice 4; tanturn habet ens 
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Earlier in Purgans Errores, Wyclif defines truth broadly in terms of a corresepondence 
between a proposition (propositio) and its significate (signatitin). Falsehood is the lack of 
any such correspondence ('privatio veritatis signatae'), and as such is described as being 
privatively opposed ('privative opposita') to truth . 
29 A proposition may be either true or 
false, therefore, but not both. In the case of the first two categories, however, falsehood 
cannot arise (since everything must be, and is likewise a sign of its cause). The only 
exception to this rule, Wyclif suggests, is if being is extended to include intelligible being, 
in which case a thing may be false because it lacks existence (though it is still true in the 
sense that it has intelligible being) . 
30 This has the immediate consequence of locating all 
falsehood or potential falsehood with human language, and with artificially imposed 
signification. As such, it is of concern only to grammarians and logicians, and not, as 
Wyclif is at pains to make clear in De Universalibits, to the philosopher. Wyclirs 
insistence here on considering all forms of being as truth conditions of propositions, rather 
than 'actual' being or existence alone, sheds some important light on his claim in De 
Universalibus that philosophers are not concerned with false, negative or tensed 
predication, since this is not in the real world. It also explains his sceptical attitude 
towards any philosopher who would suggest that tensed propositions in the Bible were 
false. From the narrow perspective of actual being, such propositions might easily appear 
false. No proposition, however, can be false in the broadest sense of the word, since no 
referent can be absent in both actual and intelligible terms. Wyclif lists these two opposing 
forms of falsity - which embody the principles of nominalist and realist metaphysics, 
respectively - alongside a third, less controversial category: 
de veritate sicut de entitate... In secunda manerie representat quan-flibet eius causam extrinseeam, ut fumus 
ignem; et sie quelibet creatura representat primarie deum, et sie quidlibet est naturaliter verum propter suum 
esse et suam duplicem primariam representanciam. Tertio modo significat signum ex inpositione humana, 
cui modo significandi grammatici et logici principaliter attendunt. Et sie est proposicio vera, si primarium 
significatum suum quomodolibet habet esse. Quod contingit tripliciter in genere: vel quod habeat esse ad 
minimum intelligibile, vel quod habet esse actuale, vel tertio quod habet esse actuale extra signum, 
independens ab eo. ' Purgans Errores circa Veritates in Conziiiiiiii, p. 12,11.13-17; 20-32. 
29 '... falsitas iste veritati opposita est privacio veritatis signate; et neutra illarum potest esse reliqua, nec simul 
inesse eidem singulari, cum sint privative opposita. ' Purgans Errores circa Veritales in Coninutni, p. 12,11. 
3-6. 
30 ý Veritati vero, prirno et secundo modo dicte, nichil opponitur, nisi forte, ampliando esse ad esse intelligibile, 
dicatur quod falsitas sit privacio existencie non date rei. ' Purgans Errores circa Veritates in Coninzuni, p. 12, 
11.6-9. 
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And a proposition is false in three ways. In the first way, if it signifies in 
some way primarily and there is no primary significate corresponding to it, 
even according to intelligible being; and to be false in this way is simply 
impossible. In the second way, when a proposition lacks a primary 
significate according to actual being, although not according to potential 
being, as in 'here is my son'. And in the third way, if the proposition lacks 
a primary significate outside the proposition and its causes; and such 
propositions are called insolubles. 31 
If the distinction between intelligible and actual falsity is accepted, we must also admit that 
sign and signattan always correspond to some degree, even in 'false' propositions. This 
attenuated view of falsity, Wyclif claims, which makes all being necessarily true, is more 
real and more consistent with Scripture and the holy doctors than any other. 32 Those 
'children' who suppose that only propositions 'of the kind used in arguing' are true (which 
would include, presumably, the nominalists) are given a very unfavourable assessment. 
The daughters of Lot, Wyclif tells us, did not suppose there to be a man beyond their 
father, so were prepared to commit incest for the preservation of the species (Genesis 19. 
30-38). 33 Presumably their failure is seen to lie in their neglect of the intelligible being of 
the human race, a failure which, if it does not make nominalism a direct cause of sin, at 
least presents it as a mode of understanding which might countenance the commission of 
sin. The use of the story of Lot is typical of Wyclif's appeal to biblical history to support 
his own anti-nominalist views, as well as to claim scriptural authority for the principles of 
realist logic. It also draws attention to the close parallel Wyclif draws between truth as a 
symbolic and a moral phenomenon, and between falsehood and sin. 34 There is, however, 
even in a true proposition, an element of falsehood and vanity, since God, as first being and 
first truth, is the only perfectly true being. This idea of perfect truth is expressed later in the 
same chapter in terms of the relationship between a sign and its referent (the signation). 
31 , Et sic contingit proposicionem tripliciter in genere esse falsam. Primo modo, si representat aliquo modo 
primarie, et non est signaturn primarium sibi correspondens, eciam sccundum esse intelligibile; et esse sic 
falsum est simpliciter inpossibile. 2 modo, quando proposicioni deficit primarie signaturn secundum esse 
actuale, licet non secundum esse possibile; ut: hic filius meus est. Et 3 modo, si deficit proposicioni signaturn 
primarium extra proposicionern et eius causancium, ut vocata insolubilia. ' Purgans Errores circa Veritates 
it, Communi, p. 13,11.1-10 
32 Purgans Errores circa Veritates in Coninumi, p. 13,11.25-7 
33 Purgans Errores circa Veritates in Coinnumi, p. 13,11.27-31 
34 Cf. Purgans Errores circa Veritates in Coninumi, p. 12,11.11-12, in which Wyclif claims that 'cum omnis 
carencia vel privacio sit falsitas, patet quod omnis peccator est falsus. ' 
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The truth of verbal utterances, we are told here, is inferior to that of mental words or ideas, 
since verbal signs are less adequate to their signata than things spoken 'internally'. The 
Word of God, being the only utterance which is completely consistent with its signatI1121, 
represents the highest and most universal truth: 
But from an understanding of Scripture it is to be noted, according to 
Lincolniensis in his book On Truth, that all truth is an adequacy or 
conformity of the word to the thing it signifies; and since that thing, word, 
utterance, or expression is truer, which is held silently within, than that 
which is spoken on the outside, the adequacy of a mental word or 
expression to truth is more proper than the adequacy of a sensible sign to 
the thing signified by it. Since therefore God necessarily and eternally 
speaks himself, it appears that his word, utterance or expression, by which 
he speaks himself is not only the most adequate and consistent, but is itself 
the highest adequacy or consistency in the abstract; and consequently it is 
the first truth. 35 
The distinction between internal and external is one to which Wyclif returns throughout his 
philosophical and theological works. The notion of the internal utterance or text, as we 
shall see from the analysis of De Veriatae Sacrae Scripturae in Chapter 5, was crucial to 
his conception of sacred writing, textuality and intention. 36 Wyclif goes on to explain how 
the Word of God, coextensive with His nature and not accidental to Him, is itself an 
internal utterance, and hence the greatest truth. All other truths are true only insofar as they 
are consistent with (or analogous to) this first truth, a point Wyclif illustrates with the very 
characteristic realist image of multiple reflections of a single face in a mirror. 37 All truth 
has as its basis the notion of intention, since no word, utterance or vocal expression can be 
such an expression unless it is the reflection of an internal word ('verbum, dictio, vel 
locutio vocalis, non est huiusmodi, nisi quia similitudo vere locutionis vel verbi 
35 . Sed pro intellectu Scripture notandum secundurn Lycolniensem, in libro suo De Veritate, quod omnis 
veritas est adequacio vel conformitas sermonis ad rem quarn significat; et cum verior sit illa res, verbum, 
sermo, diccio, vel locucio, que intus silet, quam que foris sonat, verius crit adequacio verbi vel diccionis 
mentis ad rem veritas quarn adequacio signi sensibilis ad rem signatam. Cum ergo Deus necessario eternaliter 
dicit. se, patet quod verburn suum, diccio vel locucio qua dicit se, sit non solum adequaturn vel conforme, set 
ipsa summa adequacio vel confbrn-ýtas in abstracto; et per consequens prima veritas. ' Purgans Errores circa 
Veritates in Communi, p. 19,11.16-28. 
36 See the discussion of the processes of reading and writing in Ch. 5 (section 2), below. 
37 , sicut ab una facie resultant multe similitudines, sic ab una prima veritate resultant multe veritates', Purgans 
Errores circa Veritates in Conintuni, p. 20,11.10-11. 
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intrinsici' ). 38 Moral rectitude thus consists both in conformity with divine intention, and 
in speaking in conformity with individual intention. Failure in either case (failure in the 
latter, of course, presupposing failure in the former), amounts to mendacity. This idea 
becomes particularly important in Wyclif's consideration of heresy in De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae. 
The connection between truth and intention lay at the heart of Wyclif's conception 
of scriptural logic (logica Scriptitrae), which itself played a central role in his defence of 
the 'literal' truth of Scripture in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. 39 The rule of scriptural 
logic, according to which the word should always be consistent with intention, is 
anticipated in a passage in the fifth chapter of De Trinitate. Though Wyclif makes no 
mention of scriptural logic here, he draws on a passage from St Matthew's gospel which 
is said in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae to embody the principle of the logic of holy 
Scripture: 'Let your speech be yea, yea: no, no' (Matthew 5: 37). Through this passage, 
Wyclif suggests, we learn of the primacy of the internal utterance (intention), and are 
reminded of the need to look beyond the physical word (the verbitin oris): 
It is often said that one person does not understand what the other is saying, 
and that if he hears the words he is ignorant of their signification. Thus our 
Saviour puts forward the following sentence in Matthew 5: 37: 'Let your 
words be yea, yea: no, no', by which we are taught many things, but three 
notably. Firstly, to avoid duplicity in speech, by which he means lying, 
since he teaches that the word of the mouth should be consistent with the 
word of the mind. Secondly we are taught speculatively that every assertion 
is affirmative or negative... And thirdly we are taught that an expression, 
and consequently an utterance extends not only to the word of the mouth, 
but primarily and principally to the word of the mind. 40 
The view of intention expressed here, and the conception of truth and ('real') predication 
38 Purgans Errores circa Veritates in Communi, p. 22,11.2-4. 
39 WyClif lists scriptural logic among five key principles which lead the mind to truth. See the discussion in 
Ch. 5 (section 4.2), below. 
40 , Sic eciam communiter dicitur quod unus non intelligit quod alius dicit, et si voces audiat ignorata ipsarurn 
significacione. Unde salvator approbans isturn sensurn Matt. V, 37: Sit sertno vester est, est, non, non, ubi 
docemur summe compendiose notabiIia tria. Primo, fugere duplicitatern in loqucndo que ponit mendacium 
cum precipitur verbum oris concordare cum verbo mentis. Secundo docemur speculative quod omnis assercio 
est affirmativa vel negativa... Et tercio docemur quod sermo et per consequens diccio non solum se extendit 
ad verbum oris sed prius et principalius ad verburn mentis. ' De Trinitate, pp. 40-41. 
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which depended upon it, changed little between the time of Wyclif's completing the Sianina 
de Ente and his writing of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. Indeed, the various charges he 
brings against contemporary philosophers in the earlier text, are often found repeated 
(sometimes with the same scriptural passages) in the later work. The distinctiveness of 
Wyclif's theory of real predication should also leave us doubt about the identity of the 
'sophists', 'children' and 'modems' who opposed, or simply misunderstood him. It is 
therefore highly significant that many of the examples of Scripture being misread in terms 
of logical falsehood or ambiguity, both in the Sionina de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, are corrected with a very explicit gesture towards the principles of real 
predication. The intimate relationship between the theories of real predication, scriptural 
logic and intention strengthens the case further for regarding Wyclif's hermeneutic 
adversaries as nonýiinalists, at least as far as their metaphysical convictions are concerned. 
For the nominalist, after all, it was human, rather than divine intention which ultimately 
determined the structure of universal ideas (and truths). 41 Failure to see beyond the 
properties of human signs (both verbal and mental) had effectively blinded the nominalists, 
to the primacy of divine intention. Their world, in philosophical terms, was one in which 
the 'literal' truth of Scripture, as Wyclif understood it, could not necessarily be taken for 
granted. Wyclif's literalism, as we suggested in the Introduction, held that every part of 
Scripture, insofar as it was consistent with divine intention, was true. All parts were true, 
that is, de virtittelvi sennonis ('by the force of discourse'). 42 This expression is borrowed 
from the logical and rhetorical traditions, and has a long history; as is to be expected, 
Wyclif interprets it rather freely. Much of the controversy which surrounds his claims 
about the truth of Scripture could doubtless be interpreted in terms of the conflict between 
nominalist and realist conceptions of the virtushis sennonis. No nominalist, for certain, 
would have accepted Wyclif's intention-based interpretation. 43 
41 See n. 22 (above). 
42 Earlier, WycIif had used the expression de vi vocis, thus claiming that literal truth existed at the level of 
individual words (voces), rather than higher discursive units (serniones). In response to criticism from John 
Kenningham, he modified this controversial claim. See Ch. 4 (section 2.3). 
43 The term 'literal' is a potentially misleading one. In the present context it refers to the meaning intended 
by the divine author, whether the expression is literal or figurative in terms of the actual language used. The 
expressions de virture sernionis and de vi vocis, often used by Wyclif to describe true expressions taken from 
Scripture ('x is de virtute sernionis true'), has often been glossed as 'literal' in the sense 'intended by the 
divine author'. (See, for example, G. R. Evans, 'Wyclif on Literal and Metaphorical', p. 263. ) It would 
appear to be more appropriate, however, to say that divine intention is a condition of a particular kind of 
literal (de virtitte sernionis) truth, as the expression is also used to identify the basic sense of a word or 
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In De Intellectione Dei, the eighth tract of the Siannia de Ente, Wyclif presents a very 
concise defence of scriptural truth which echoes many of the ideas expressed in Purgans 
Errores. It is fitting summary of the position developed in De Universalibits and Purgans 
Errores, and provides a valuable indication of the direction of his thinking inu-nediately 
preceding his work on the Sunzina Theologica. Here, we learn of those who seek to find 
falsity in Scripture. Wyclif attributes this lack of understanding - in a characteristic move 
- to a confusion between signs and their signata. Though contradiction may indeed occur 
in signs, he suggests, there can be no contradiction in things (and therefore, presumably, no 
real contradiction). We cannot say, therefore, that either Scripture or its expositors are 
literally (de virtute sennonis) false: 
Nor should we fear the sophistical examples with which some people set out 
to prove that Scripture and the doctors are false de virtitte sennonis. 
Trusting their actions in such cases, certain of them equivocate and 
disagree, confusedly and imperfectly understanding those things which are 
signified. For nobody can possibly understand contradiction in things, even 
if we can understand each part of a proposition in terms of contradiction. 
Contradiction in signs, however, is possible, as when one sign is said in 
two ways of the same thing ... 
44 
Misunderstanding of the nature of Wyclif's conception of truth and falsity, as this passage 
illustrates, was held to have arisen principally out of confusion over objects of knowledge 
(the very issue which, as we have seen, separated Holcot and Ockham from Burley and 
Wyclif). The true objects of the exegete's knowledge, as we are reminded throughout De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, are not signs but the things (ultimately, the intention) which 
they signify. The question of the possibility of false propositions occurring in Scripture 
is addressed with a greater sense of urgency in this later work, possibly as a result (at least 
in part) of the determinations presented against Wyclif's hermeneutic teachings by John 
expression. In the passage cited here, for example, it seems likely that nominalist and realist interpretations 
of 'false de virtute sernionis' would be quite different. On the history of the expression de virtitte sernionis, 
see William Courtenay, 'Force of Words and Figures of Speech: The Crisis over Virtus Sennonis in the 
Fourteenth Century', Franciscan Studies, 44 (1984) , 107-128. 
44 , Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas quibus aliqui putant se probare quod verba scripture et doctorurn 
sunt falsa de virtute sermonis. Credencium igitur actibus suis in talibus, quidam equivocant et desipiunt, 
confuse et imperfecte intelligentes significata, quia contradiccionern ex parte rei nerno potest intelligere, licet 
utramque partem posset intelligere in materia contradiccionis. Contradiccio autern. in signis potest esse: ut 
puta, quando unum signum dicitur dupliciter de eodern. eodem secundurn, idem... ' De Intellectione Dei, p. 103, 
11.20-28. The text is edited by ed. M. H. Dziewicki in Johannis WyclifDe Ente Librorum Duonim (London: 
WS, 1909), pp. 49-112. 
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Kenningham. 45 By this time, it would seem, the basic principles of Wyclif's literalism (and 
his related conception of textuality) were well known throughout Oxford. It was almost 
certainly in response to Kenningham that Wyclif included within De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae a series of metaphysical principles (together constituting a five-fold annatura) 
to be used against those who seek to discover falsity in Scripture. Listed among them, as 
we shall see in Chapter 5, was the maxim 'in equivocation there is no contradiction', which 
rested on the same principles of logic as the argument cited here from Purgans Errores 
circa Veritates in Coininuni. These metaphysical guidelines can be read, as it will be 
argued in the final chapter, as veiled responses to Kenningham's critique of Wyclif's 
conception of being and truth. 
Kenningham was also to challenge another key principle in Wyclif's defence against 
those who were claiming to have found falsehoods in Scripture: his theory of time. This 
was among the most distinctive products of Wyclif's realism, and was linked inextricably 
to his views about the nature of predication, truth and intention. Like these, it rested on a 
belief in the necessary reality of intelligible being, and played a central r6le in the defence 
of his literalistic theory of scriptural interpretation. In De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, he 
places it among the metaphysical principles to be used against contemporary hermeneutic 
opponents (describing it as the 'safest shield'). For Wyclif, every moment in time, whether 
past, present, or future, represented a reality. This view followed from his interpretation 
of the nature of accidental properties and states, and from his fin-n belief that time should 
be treated as an accident inhering in a subject. Only if subjects of past and future 
propositions were treated as realities could such a belief be sustained, a problem which 
Wyclif overcame by declaring them to be intelligible realities. It was this association 
between time and intelligible being which Kenningham felt to be fundamentally mistaken. 
Wyclif's distinction between intelligible and real time was reinforced by his conception 
of the relationship between time and eternity, both of which were held to be visible to the 
divine author of Scripture. The modes of predication within the pages of Scripture, Wyclif 
believed, were consistent with his extended view of time, which thus provided an 
indispensable tool for any serious exegete. The development of the theory of time in the 
Stannia de Ente and the logical works, from its status as an accident to its reality as an 
45 On Kenningharn's objections to Wyclif's metaphysical and hermeneutic theories, see Ch. 4, below. 
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intelligible, will be examined in the following section. 
2. TIME AND TEMPORAL PROPOSMONS 
The view of time which Wyclif defends in the Sunzyna de Ente and the Logicae 
Continitatio, as we have suggested, is essentially an extension of his theory of intelligible 
being. The theory itself is introduced and developed within three tracts of the Logicae and 
the Stannia de Ente. These are De Tenipore, which offers the most detailed treatment of 
time (though remains unedited 46) , De Ente Naedicanzentali, which 
includes a substantial 
section on the nature of time, and the Logicae Continuatio (which includes a chapter on 
temporal and 'hypothetical' propositions). All three texts draw heavily on material from 
Aristotle's Physics, and it now seems likely that Wyclif produced a collection of ditbia on 
this text early in his career. 47 The text of the Physics itself had only become available to 
Latin scholars in the twelfth century (together with the last four texts of the Organon 48 ), and 
its influence - whether as an authority or as a major work of natural philosophy with which 
to disagree - is conspicuous in virtually all late-medieval writings on the nature of time. 
Wyclif's commentary, which would certainly shed valuable light on the early development 
of his ideas on time, has yet to be edited in its entirety, though many of the ideas contained 
within it must have been carried into the Sunnna de Ente with little change. 49 The other 
major direct influence, as elsewhere in Wyclif's work, is Augustine. The fourteenth 
chapter of the eleventh book of the Confessions, another locus classicits for discussion of 
problems relating to the nature of time, is cited frequently in the three main tracts on time. 
It is through the Augustinian tradition, of course, that Wyclif's theory of time inherits its 
46 The De Tempore survives in two British manuscripts, Trinity College, Cambridge B. 16.2 (fo. 46ra-57ra), 
and Lincoln Cathedral C. 1.15 (fo. 325ra-339va). There are numerous - mostly later - continental copies. 
See Thomson, Latin Writings, pp. 24-26. Prof. Allen Breck of the University of Denver undertook to 
produce an edition of the De Tempore some years ago, though it would appear that this project has since been 0 
abandoned. 
47 A surviving collection of this kind has been ascribed with reasonable certainty to Wyclif. The text, which 
is untitled in the manuscript (Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana lat. VI. 173 fo. Ira-58vb), is given the 
conjectural heading Questiones et dubia super viff libros physicorum by Williell Thomson. See Latin 
Writings, pp. 12-14. 
48 See Ch. I (section 2.2), above. 
4' Thomson remarks on the compatibility of the material contained within the commentary with Wyclif's 
'thoroughgoing realism', and expresses surprise that, as a work on Aristotle - beloved, we are told, of 
contemporary nominalists - it has played such a minor role in modern studies of WycIiPs philosophy. See 
Latin Wrinings, p. 13. 
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strong neoplatonic element, though as Beryl Smalley has pointed out, some of the strongest 
elements of realism in the theory can be traced back as far as Plotinus. 50 The 
interdependency of Wyclif's theories of time and intelligible being, moreover, place his 
ideas about time within the wider realist tradition descending from Pseudo-Dionysius (a 
figure who Wyclif knew well through the commentaries and translations of Robert 
Grosseteste). 
2.1 Time as Accident: The Arguynent of De Ente Praedicamentali 
The ontological status of time is a recurrent theme of Wyclif's treatise on the 
Aristotelian categories, De Ente Praedicanten tali. His chief concern in this work is to 
establish whether any part of time, and in particular past and future times, can strictly be 
classified according to categorical definitions. The simple solution, by Wyclif's reckoning 
at least, would be to say that it cannot. Indeed, it is the problematic status of past and 
future, like that of other 'hypothetical truths' (possibilities and negations being the most 
important), that supplies the chief objection in De Ente Praedicatnen tali to the supposition 
that every being ('ens') is subject to the categories (i. e. that it is a 'predicamental' being). 
According to the standard Aristotelian definition, Wyclif reminds us, every predicamental 
being must be either a substance or an accident (the first category being substance and the 
remaining nine accidents). If time is not strictly an accident (as certain of Wyclif's 
contemporaries were arguing), then it is strictly not a predicamental being either, and the 
supposition that all beings are predicamental beings is disproved. Wyclif cites two 
important objections to this conclusion. The first draws on the claim made by Aristotle, in 
the Categories, that a single element in an incomplex expression signifies a substance or 
a quality ('singulum incomplexorum significat substantiam, qualitatem, etc. ý ). 5 1 The 
second, and the only one Wyclif unequivocally endorses, is based on his own extended 
theory of the nature of being: 
Every intelligible thing exists, as is shown in the second book of my tract 
On Ideas. Therefore every intelligible has necessary and eternal being, and 
So See 'The Bible and Eternity', pp. 73-4. Smalley goes as far as to suggest that 'Wyclif resembles Plotinus 
more cloesely than he does Augustine' (p. 74). 
51 De Ente Praedicatizentali, p. 1. 
86 
consequently every future or past is the accident of a thing, of which it is 
the past or the future, and from which it can be absent. Thus the author of 
the Six Principles divides 'when' into present, past, and future. 52 
The first objection Wyclif rejects, arguing that it does not follow that an incomplex 
expression signifies a substance, quality or quantity, or that its primary significate is one 
of the ten categories. Privations, multitudes, accidental aggregates and other such things, 
all of which are signified by incomplex categorematic expressions or terms (categoreniata), 
are not themselves any of the ten categories. It is not the case therefore, that all incomplex 
categorematic expressions signify primarily one of the ten categories. Nevertheless, Wyclif 
suggests, they do signify the categories secondarily, since every privation, negation, 
preteration, futurity, potency or passion is in one of the ten categories. Therefore any term 
subordinated to a simple act of apprehending something signifies one of the categories. 
The second objection is conceded: every past, futurity or possibility, and any positive 
signifiable is an accident of its subject according to its ratio intelligibilis, though not 
according to its existential being. This is true of all of the hypothetical truths, none of 
which can inhere in their subjects in the temporal world of existence. An important 
consequence of this limitation, and one which Wyclif is at pains to make clear, is that the 
52 , 
... omne 
intelligibile est, ut probandum est secundo libro, tractu de Ydeis, ergo ornne intelligibile habet esse 
necessarium et eternum, et per consequens omnis futuricio vel praetericio est accidens rei, cuius est praeteritio 
vel futuritio, cum praesupponit subiecturn, cuius est futuricio vel practericio, et posset sibi deesse. Sic enim 
dividit autor Sex Principiorum quando in praesens, praeteritum et faturum. ' De Ente Praedicamentali, p. 1. 
Cf. De Tempore, fo. 37ra (describing time as it is experienced in the world): 'In tractando de tempore sunt 
aliqua ex dictis superius capienda. Primum quod tempus est de genere accidentium. Sicut enim philosophi 
supponunt motum esse tamquam notorium, - cum desint illis probatio a priori et notiori qua concluderent 
motum esse sic - consequenter accipit totum genus hon-dnum ex motus cuiuscumque notitia tempus esse, cum 
tam homines quarn bruta et innata sollertia nosciunt tempus . 
Patet ex famosa confessione vulgarius quam 
etiam ex rationibus factis superius de distinctione accidentium quod tempus non est substsantia sensibilis vel 
insensibilis assignanda, sed quedam mora ab ymaginativa concepta ex sensatione motus etiam ymaginationis 
nullo alio motu in particulari sentito'. (In preparing this transcription, I was fortunate in being able to consult C, 
J. A. Robson's rendering of sections of the same passage. CC Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, p. 157, n. 1. ) 
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accidents themselves also have only intelligible being: 
Nor is it inconsistent to concede that such accidents are eternal, just as 
proper attributes of eternal subjects. For just as subjects have eternal 
intelligible being, so do their accidents. It follows, then, from an inferior to 
its superior without impediment: this pastness or futurity is an accident of 
that intelligible being, therefore it is an accident. 53 
The relationship between time and the subject in which it inheres (whether eternal or 
temporal) is a more complicated matter. In De Ente Praedicanzen tali, it is assumed that 
as an accident, albeit one with some unique properties, time behaves as any other accident. 
Wyclif lists three ways in which 'accident' can be defined. According to the first, and 
most general, everything which is added to or inheres in another thing can be called an 
accident ('omne quod a posteriori adiacet vel inest alteri, potest dici sibi accidens. ' 54 ) 
Wyclif gives the example, cited from Augustine, of the distinction between the Son, who 
is incarnate, and the Father, who is not. The two are different (in this particular respect), 
because a property inheres accidentally in the former, but not in the latter. 55 WyClif9S 
second definition states that an accident inheres in its subject as one thing contingently 
existing in another, either eternally or temporally. Such an accident may either be in its 
subject, or absent from it (and hence not be an accident of that particular subject). The third 
definition, which is clearly perceived to be the most important by Wyclif, concerns the 
notion of change: 
Thirdly, and most properly and strictly, a forin. inhering in a substance, 
through whose loss or acquisition [the substance] is changed, is called [an 
accident]. And the philosophers speak in this way, as is said at the end of 
the first tract. And this distinction appears in the [25th] chapter of the 
M011010gion. 56 
53 'Nec est inconveniens concedere accidencia talia esse eterna, sicut et proprias passiones subiectorurn 
eternorum. Sicut enim subiecta habent esse intelligibile etcrnum, sic et eorum accidencia. Sequitur eciam 
ab inferiori ad suum superius sine impedimento: hec preteritio aut futuricio est accidens isti intelligibili, ergo 
est accidens. ' De Ente Praedicamentali, p. 6. 
54 De Ente Praedicamentali, p. 7. 
55 Tatet ista significacio per beatum Augustinum in Dyalogo ad Felicianum; declarando quomodo filius est 
incarnatus, et non pater, sic scribit: 'Illud proprium est filio, quod per accidens sue noscitur evenisse persone. ' 
De Ente Praedicamentali, p. 7. 
56 , Tercio strictissime et propriisime quelibet forma inherens substanciac, per cuius adquisicionern vel 
deperdicionem est ipsa mobilis, dicitur; et isto modo locuntur philosophi, ut dictum est in fine tractatus primi. 
Patet ista distinctio Monologion 27. ' De Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 8. 
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By Wyclif's three definitions, any moment in time can apparently be described as an 
accident, since the inherence of presence, pastness or futurity in a subject represents at once 
something added, something existing contingently and something which brings about 
change in its subject. Futurity, for example, is not something which naturally or 
permanently inheres in its intelligible subject. As such, it is presumably consistent with the 
first two definitions. Since a future subject is not the same as, for instance, a past subject, 
it also satisfies the third definition by bringing about, through its addition, an obvious 
change in its subject. There is clearly a difference, however, between intelligible and 
existential accidents. It is for this reason that Wyclif describes past and future accidents as 
inhering in an 'analogous' sense in their subjects: 
Thus by understanding 'accident' analogically, nothing stands against our 
conceding that past and future are accidents of a thing according to 
intelligible being. For future and past being ['fore', Tuisse], and hence 
pastness and futurity contingently inhere in every idea, just as in God, who 
is essentially every idea. Therefore there are some such non-existents which 
can, in turn, at any time now inhere, or privatively be lacking formally and 
contingently: and these are properly accidents. 57 
Wyclif goes on to describe accidents 'which can inhere after they have become absent, or 
be absent after they have inhered [in their subjects]' . 
58 These accidents are 'inconsistent' 
with their subjects ('repugnant suis subiectis'), since they either acquire them (in the first 
case) or lose them (in the second). As examples, he suggests praeteritiones andfitturtiones, 
and other entities which 'can be called accidents in the second, extended way'. 59 There are 
also accidents which contingently inhere in their subjects, but whose subjects 'cannot begin 
or cease to be informed by them'. These include any non-existent which inheres in God, 
such as knowledge, will, ordination (as well as past and future instants, which are 
mentioned in this connection later in the text). What becomes clear from this is that 
Wyclif's definition of accident, if it is to encompass both existential and intelligible 
57 'Sic ergo intelligendo accidens analoyce nichil obest concedere pretericionern et futuricionem esse 
accidencia rei secundum esse intclligibilc. Nam omni ydee, sicut et Deo, qui essencialiter est omnis ydea, 
contingenter inest fore aut fuisse, et. per consequens futuricio ct pretericio; ergo est dare talium conting enter 
inexistencium formaliter aliqua, que possunt vicissim, quociens libuerit, nunc inesse, et alias privative deesse: 
et. ilia sunt proprie accidencia. ' De Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 8. 
59 De Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 8. 
59 De Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 8. 
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accidents (and hence all possible moments of time), clearly has to extend beyond the nine 
Aristotelian categories. To restrict it to the latter, as he goes on to explain, would 
effectively render meaningless his views on the nature of past and future instants. 
According to the philosophers, there are therefore two different kinds of accident. The first 
corresponds to the standard definition inherited from Aristotle, according to which there 
are nine accidental categories. This, Wyclif suggests, is sufficient to describe any actual 
entity. The second is used to characterise subjects which exist beyond the created world. 
This, we are told, applies to any property which is predicated of God, but also describes 
past and future moments, which are likewise predicated only of uncreated entities (namely, 
intelligible beings of the past and the future): 
An accident restricted to the nine genera of accident [i. e. the accidental 
categories] is an accidental form extending to a substance, and thus does not 
apply to anything which formally inheres in God, such as divine knowledge, 
past events, future events or any other such things which do not presuppose 
the existence of a created substance, but only to an accidental form which 
is present in or absent from a subject beyond its corruption. And it is in this 
way that the philosophers speak of accidents. Thus in the fifth book of the 
Metaphysics, Chapters thirteen and fourteen, the Philosopher divides being 
['ens'] into being secundian se, as are the ten figura or categories, and 
being secundtan accidens, which includes truths outside the categories. 60 
Wyclif follows this short exposition by explaining how every genus, whether a per se 
category or a per accidens category, is ultimately subject to the 'intention' of nature. 
Privations and negations, he explains, are per accidens categories, 'since they are not 
positive natures, as every category should be. ' 61 As such, they neither constitute, nor are 
contained by, a category. 
Wyclif's belief that time is an accident is by no means a peculiarity of his own 
metaphysical system alone. It stems, nevertheless, from a distinctly realist understanding 
of the universe, and clearly serves to bolster the basic assumptions of his Platonic- 
60 , Accidens ergo contracturn ad novern genera accidentalia est forma accidentalis substancie extenta, et sic 
non contingit alicui, quod Deo inest formaliter, ut sciencie divine, pretericioni, futuricioni vel alicui 
huiusmodi, quod non presupponit existenciarn substancie create, sed soIum forme accidentali, que adest et 
abest substancie preter eius corrupcionem; et isto modo locuntur philosophi de accidente. Unde 5 
Metaphysice 13 et 14 dividit Philosophus ens in ens secundurn. se, ut sunt decem figurae veI praedicamenta, 
et ens secundurn accidens, cuiusmodi sunt veritates extra genus. ' De Ente Praedicamentali, pp. 8-9. 
61 De Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 9. 
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Augustinian view of the universe. It is a view, moreover, which can strictly only be 
countenanced by a philosophy which admits an extended interpretation of the concept of 
being. Wyclif's four-level system, as we have seen, is one which required an absolute 
distinction between essence (ens) and existence (esse). For many of the 111odenli, this 
distinction was seen as an untenable one. William of Ockham had assumed that essence 
and existence were identical, and that positing two distinct modes of being was both 
extravagant and unnecessary. Though Ockham's exact views on the nature of time remain 
unclear, he is known to have been steadfastly opposed to the view that time could be treated 
as an accident. Exactly how real present and future times were to him is likely to remain 
a mystery, but it seems more likely than not that Ockham and his followers would have 
been included among those who are condemned by Wyclif for failing to see beyond the 
known reality of the present instant. 
2.2 The Reality of Tinze Beyond the Present Instant 
The time-as-accident argument rests on the assumption that all time, whether a 
present instant, past event, or future possibility, is a reality, and moreover that the reality 
of future and past instants is no less distinct than that of the present. In the final four 
chapters of De Ente Praedicanzen tali (grouped together under the heading De 
Tenipore 62) Wyclif addresses in detail the problem of non-present instants. No theory of 
time is adequate, according to the argument he presents here, unless it extends beyond the 
reality of the present moment. This is among the earliest anticipations of the notion of 
temporal 'amplification' (anipliatio teniporis), an idea which assumes a key role in the 
scriptural theory of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. According to the definition supplied 
in the second chapter of the time tract in De Ente Praedicanzen tali, the very possibility of 
successive moments rests entirely on the existence (or rather, on the being) of non-present 
instants. Since any period of time or motion is divisible (a claim with which none would 
have disagreed), and since individual divisions cannot exist in the same instant, there must 
be instants outside the present: 
62 See Ivan Miller's introduction to his edition of the De Universalibus, p. xxxiv. 
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From the same mode of speaking which we should employ concerning time 
and other successives, the amplification of the word beyond the present is 
known. For otherwise we should have to deny that any such successive 
could be, which is impossible for preordained things; and the consequence 
is clear from this. For if it is supposed that A is hourly motion, it appears 
that it should be successively divisible, and have all of its successive parts, 
but not in the same instant; therefore it should be the case that there are 
many [times] outside the present instant. For if anything is successive, it is 
successive according to its singular successive parts, which cannot be in the 
same instant. Therefore it remains the case that many of its parts reside 
outside the present instant. 63 
Wyclif illustrates his point about time and motion with an allusion to Aristotle's 
demonstration that it is not possible for successive motion to take place within the confines 
of an instant. 64 If motion were in an instant, he suggests, then the instant would act as its 
measure (since, according to Aristotle, time is the measure or 'number' of motion 65) . This, 
however, is impossible, since a successive divisible cannot be measured by a successive 
indivisible. 66 A similar impossiblity results from the consideration of the beginning and 
end of a successive, which, if the successive were contained within an instant, would also 
have to be included. This would result in any presence or changed thing ceasing to be a 
successive in the same instant, which Wyclif suggests is imposssible. The final reason he 
supplies is more obscure, and concerns the notion of quantification. If motion were 
contained in one instant alone, he argues, then we should have to concede for any 
successive that it loses an infinite number of parts, so that none of these can contribute to 
its quantification. The result is that the whole 'would not be a quantilln in any degree' 
('non esset actualiter quantum sub aliquo gradu')67. 
63 'Item ex modo loquendi, quem oportet habere de tempore et affis successivis, patet ampliacio verbi de 
praesenti. Nam aliter negandurn esset aliquod tale successivurn posse esse, quod est impossibile iuxta 
preordinata; et consequencia patet. Nam posito, quod A motus horalis sit, patet, quod oportet ipsum esse 
successive divisibile, et habere omnes partes eius successivas, sed non pro eodem instanti; ergo oportet, quod 
extra instans praesens sint multa. Nam si aliquod successivurn est, isum est secundum singulas eius partes 
successivas, quod non potest esse in eodem instanti; ergo relinquitur, quod mule eius partes hospitentur extra 
instans. ' De Ente Praedicamentali, p. 189. 
64 Physics, 234a, 24 - 234b, 10. 
65 Physics, 219b, 3. 
66 , Si motus esset in instanti, tunc esset in eo, ut mensurante, quia alius modus inessendi esset impertinens; 
sed nullum successive divisibile potest mensurari indivisibili succesivo; ergo nulIus motus successivus est in 
instanti. ' De Ente Praedicantentali, p. 189. 
67 De Eitte Praedicametztali, p. 190. 
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Few of Wyclif's arguments on instants and successives are likely to have proved 
controversial, though tellingly, none strictly provides Wyclif with proof of his central claim 
about the reality of non-present instants either. Equally inconclusive - within the present 
context - is an argument cited from Augustine's influential exposition on time in the 
Confessions, through which Wyclif seeks to justify his contention that temporal words 
should be extended beyond the present moment. 68 Augustine, we are told, had himself 
suggested that words should be amplified beyond the present, and had made the significant 
observation that past and future instants were everywhere where present instants were: 
From this consideration of the successive extension of time and its 
composition out of its parts, Augustine argues in the eleventh book of the 
Confessions for the amplification of words beyond the present. Thus, after 
a long dispute concerning the existence of the present time, the past and the 
future, he concedes correctly that if time is neither long nor measurable nor 
visible, this nevertheless is as much as to say that past and future times are 
everywhere where presents are. 69 
In literal terms, Wyclif does not misrepresent Augustine here. We should be aware, 
however, that he remains silent about the most revealing aspects of his teaching. Words, 
for Augustine, could indeed be amplified beyond the present. This had to be the case, since 
time was spoken of as though it were extended ffor a long time', 'a long time ago', etc). 70 
Such amplification, however, rested on the purely psychological processes of anticipation 
and recollection. 71 The only time which had any reality, Augustine believed, was the 
indivisible present instant, which could not itself be extended. This conception of time has 
little in common with Wyclif's own, and highlights the difficulties inherent in the 
68 A detailed commentary on Book II of the Confessions, which highlights the significant properties of 
Augustine's theory of time, can be found in John. F. Callahan, Four Views of Thne in Ancient Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 149-187. 
69 'Et ista consideracio de extensione succesiva temporis et composicione eius ex suis partibus movebat 
Augustinum II Confessionum ad ampliandum verbi de praesenti. Unde post longam disputacionem de 
existencia temporis presentis, preteriti et futuri concedit bene, quod si tempus non est longum vel mensurabile 
nee visibile, hoc tarnen dicit se scire, quod tempus practeritum et futurum, ubicumque sunt, ibi presentia sunt. ' 
De Ente Praedicanientali, p. 19 1. 
70 Confessions, Ch. 22.28. 
71 See esp. Confessions, Ch. 23.36, in which Augustine concludes that time is measured in the mind alone. 
He had earlier reasoned that time was a form of distentio (Ch. 26.33), but remained uncertain (until this 
point) as to exactly what was being distended. 
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assumption that temporal expressions must be matched by an objective (rather than a 
psychological) reality. 
Throughout the remainder of Wyclif's exposition on the reality of non-present 
instants, this tension between properties of signiflicatio and reality (namely, the real, rather 
than merely the verbal extension of time) manifests itself very clearly. Though he directs 
us towards the extension of temporal reality, it is consistently at the expense of an explicit 
acknowledgement of the linguistic context of the argument. We are urged not to follow the 
mistaken assumption, for example, that the verb 'to be' is restricted to the present. Indeed, 
it is only the weakness of the human intellect, Wyclif suggests, that leads us to interpret it 
in this very limited way. In both De Ente Praedicanzen tali we are told that by itself, and 
according to the literal force of the words (the vis vocis), 'to be' signifies no time at all. 
In the majority of temporal clauses containing this verb, tense is introduced adverbially; 
only through the working of our minds is it associated with the meaning of the verb itself. 72 
Few, presumably, would have sought to deny this argument, though fewer still would have 
subscribed to the theory of intelligible past and future instants on which it rests. It is for 
this reason, presumably, that Wyclif is so selective in his use of grammatical and logical 
authorities. Priscian's views on the signification of esse, for example, are presented in such 
a way as to lend apparent support to his conception of higher, non-successive modes of 
being. We learn nothing, nevertheless, of the metaphysical premises of these views: 
There is no reason why the substantive 'being' ['esse'] should connote time. 
Therefore if it connotes [time] this is beyond the vis vocis and is a 
voluntary application of the intellect. Since therefore the intellect can 
indifferently elicit universal and singular intentions respecting the 
connotation of time , but 
is more inclined to elicit universal intentions, it 
follows that we should not take the verb 'is', signifying the present, to 
connote a single time. And this assumption appears from Priscian, in his 
eighth great book [of the Institittiones Grannnaticae], Chapter 22, where he 
says: 'The present time is said, since in part it has passed and in part it is in 
the future. For time elapses in the manner of an unstable river, and can 
hardly have a point in the present, that is, in an instant, and its maximum 
part has passed or is in the future, with the exception of the substantive verb 
72 See De Ente Predicamentali, p. 212 (cited below) 
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I am', which is the most perfect of all, from which nothing lacks. M 
This passage supplies the clearest indication of the perceived connection between ampliatio 
temporis and a philosophy which privileges the universal, abstractive habit over the 
perception of the particular. Wyclif's complaint here is very typical, both in terms of its 
content and the manner in which it is presented. As in the case of his discussion of 
universal categories and intelligible beings elsewhere, the object of his assault is the human 
intellect itself, or rather, the perversity of its voluntary operations. The distinction between 
meaning perceived ininediate, by the vis vocis, and meaning apprehended through the 
distorting lens of the individual mind, is precisely the same as that which he applies to the 
senses of scriptural language. In both cases, it is a resistance to the natural inclinations of 
the mind, as much as the mind's own inherent weakness, which is to blame for failure to 
arrive at truth. As elsewhere, difficulties are seen to arise not primarily as a consequence 
of verbal confusion, but rather out of the misapplication of established ideas. Wyclif's 
insistence on amplifying the sense of the verb 'to be' beyond the present time, therefore, 
does not constitute a defence of the principle of anipliatio (which was well known), but 
rather of a particular kind of ampliatio. Ampliatio, in the logical sense in which it was 
normally understood, referred simply to an extension of the verbal sense of an expression 
(which was usually, though not invariably, temporal). 74 In Wyclif, however, as we have 
suggested, it entailed a commitment to an extended ontology. It is for this reason, 
presumably, that he insists always on using the expression ampliatio temporis, rather than 
simply anipliatio or anipliatio verbildictionisItennini. Failure to apply the principle of 
73 'Item non est de racione huius verbi substantivi "esse" connotare aliquod tempus; ergo si connotat, hoc est 
preter vim vocis ex applicacione voluntaria intellectus; cum ergo intelIectus indifferenter potest elicere 
intenciones universales et singulares de connotacione tcmporis, sitque pronior ad eliciendurn intenciones 
universales, sequitur, quod non oportet hoc verbum "esC' de praesenti significans primarie connotare 
singulariter tempus. Assumpturn patet per Priscianum in magno libro octavo capitulo 22, ubi sic: "Presens 
tempus dicitur, cum pars preterfit. parsque futura est, cum tempus fluvii more instabili volvatur cursu, vix 
punctum habere potest in presenti, hoc est in instanti, et. maxime cius pars preteriit vel futura est, excepto 
"sum" verbo substantivo, quod est omnium perfectissimum, cui nichil deest. "' De Ente Praedicamentali, p. 
212. 
74 The concept of ampliatio would have been familiar to any scholastic logician, who would have used it 
alongside restrictio to describe the suppositional charcteristics of terms in propositions. A term could be said 
to be 'extended' or 'restricted' to particular supposits (times or entities), depending on the context of its 
application. See Alfonso Maieri), Tenninologia Logica della Tarda Scolastica (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 
1972), pp. 139-194; De Rijk, Logica Modentortim, vol. 2i, pp. 584-87. It seems likely that ampliatio and 
restrictio were being used by logicians long before the scholastic period. Both are found, for example, in the 
Sententiae ex Arisotele Collectae attributed to Bede (PL, 90, col. 10 l7b). Neither in its early nor its later 
history, however, is the term ampliatio used in the extended metaphysical sense in which it is found in Wyclif 
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ampliatio in the extended metaphysical sense, Wyclif believed, typified the tendency among 
contemporary logicians to privilege conventional meanings (or suppositional properties) 
of terms above their natural signata. As we have suggested, however, he was able to give 
no systematic proof that the amplification of a term was motivated by an extended 
conception of the metaphysics of time itself. 
2.3 'Tenipits'and 'Ditratio': Wyclifs Distinction benveen Finite and Infinite 
In attempting to justify his arguments about the necessary reality of non-present 
instants, Wyclif draws attention to the key distinction on which his theory of time rests: the 
distinction between teinpits, or time as it is experienced successively by creatures, and 
duratio, everlasting or 'eternal' time. This is treated most fully in De Tempore, 75 though 
the brief discussion in De Ente Praedicanientali offers a coherent and revealing justification 
of this basic categorical division. In the nineteenth chapter, which forms the first section 
of the treatise on time, we are presented for the first time with the question of the reality of 
non-present instants. Wyclif cites two objections to the supposition that there are many 
things outside the present instant (multa sunt extra instans praesans), responding to each 
in turn. The first denies that successive being is possible, and likewise that anything can 
always be. Wyclif dismisses this at once - on the strength, we are told, of copious 
disproofs used elsewhere - as 'improbable'. 
76 The second, which leads him into a 
protracted discussion of the relationship between time and eternity, suggests that if anything 
is that thing at any particular time, then it is always that same thing in all time. 77 By this 
mode of arguing, Wyclif reasons, it is conceded that all time is, but it is nevertheless 
unsatisfactory. First, because all temporal periods would be equal and infinite, so that any 
'permanent' thing would be infinitely old. This contradicts Scripture, which measures the 
duration of temporal things according to degrees of greater and lesser magnitude. Likewise, 
75 See the discussion in Robson, TVyclif and the Oxford Schools, pp. 156-161; also Allen Breck, 'John 
Wyclyf on Time', in Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, eds., Cosmology, History and Theology (New 
York: Plenum Press, 1977), pp. 211-217. 
76 'Prima [via] dicit quod non est possibile sucessivurn esse, et sic nichil semper est. Sed quia alibi diffuse 
improbata est dicta evasio, ideo renuo illud modo tanquam improbabile. ' De Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 179. 
77 'Secunda via concedit consequenciam, quod si aliquid aliquando est illud, semper est qoud in omni 
tempore. ' De Etzte Praedicainentali, p. 179. 
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in the second place, any single successive instant would be infinitely long lasting, and any 
part of time would be equal to its whole. 78 By implication, such an argument effectively 
confuses the distinction between finite and infinite time. Wyclif illustrates this point with 
reference to God, whose eternal presence is nevertheless different from being present in any 
particular instant of time. Moments of past and future time - being intelligible, but not 
actual - are likewise different from any present moment: 
God always was, is and will be, and nevertheless in no part of time always 
is, but in the whole of eternal time. Nor is it possible to end or begin always 
to be, as it seems, nor does it follow: in every instant, God is not always, 
therefore always he is not. For we should know that in every instant or time 
God is not always, which is false for the unique eternal time. 79 
If non-present moments are to be understood as realities, then the distinction between 
successive and eternal time must be carefully observed. But how are we to understand the 
nature of successive time itself? In the Logicae Continitatio, time (tellipils) is defined 
(following Aristotle) as the successive quantity that measures motion ('quantitas successiva 
mensurans motum'). Elsewhere, Wyclif tells us, he has described it as the duration of the 
world in mutable being ('duratio mundi in esse transmutabili'), which had its origins with 
the creation of the world itself. 8) This important relationship between time and the 
existence of the world is one which Wyclif, like the majority of his philosophical 
contemporaries, was keen to emphasize: 
... time begins with the world and endures eternally with the world. Nevertheless, it is posterior by nature to the world or its motion. For 
although time pre-existed the creation of the world, as place [precedes] the 
inception of its location, it did not pre-exist the being of the world, but 
rather the contrary. And thus I believe that it is not possible for the world 
78 , 
... sic cuiuslibet temporanei etas vel periodus esset par cuilibet periodo, quia quelibet 
infinita, et sic quelibet 
res permanens esset infiniturn senex vel antiqua, quod satis contradicit scripture mensuranti etates hominum 
et duraciones temporaliurn secundum pIus et minus. Similiter per idem sequitur, quod omne tempus vel 
aliquod successivurn esset infiniturn diuturnum, et per consequens, cum tempus non habet aliarn 
magnitudinem, omne tempus foret infiniturn magnum, et sic quelibet pars quantitativa temporis esset equalis 
suo toto simpliciter. ' De Ente Praedicantentali, pp. 179-80. 
79 'Deus enim semper fuit, est et erit, et tamen in nulla parte temporis semper est, sed in toto tempore eterno. 
Nec potest desinere vel incipere semper esse, ut videtur, nec sequitur: in omni instanti, Deus non semper est, 
ergo semper non est, quia oportet capere, quod in omni instanti vel tempore Deus non semper est, quod est 
falsurn pro unico tempore eterno. ' De Ente Praedicanzentali, p. 18 1. 
80 Logicae Continuatio, p. 161. 
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to be without time, and consequently it is possible for any motion 
indifferently to follow that time. For a creature cannot be [in] the world, 
unless it has its duration in mutable being, which its time. 81 
Implicit in this argument is the rejection of the Aristotelian view of time, which denies the 
necessity of an originary instant or an act of creation. Wyclif makes numerous more 
explicit and highly scathing references to this doctrine in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae 
and other later theological writings. 82 His insistence on the created nature of time also 
gives some important indications of the perceived relationship between successive time 
(tenipits) and eternity (ditratio). Though the two are often presented as being fundamentally 
incompatible (this being a major source of confusion, if Wyclif is to be believed, among 
certain of his Oxford contemporaries), they do, nevertheless, come together at the 
beginning of the created universe. Earlier in the Logicae Continitatio, we are told that the 
first instant of the world follows inunediately the instant of eternity, to which it is naturally 
posterior ('primurn... instants mundi est post instans aeternitas, quia naturaliter 
posterius'). 83 
Alongside the other key strands in Wyclif s defence of the extended theory of time 
(namely, the arguments relating to temporal accidents and the reality of past and future 
instants), the fundamental distinction between time and eternity was invoked in a wide 
range of hermeneutic contexts in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. Not to observe the 
distinction rigidly, Wyclif believed, was to leave oneself open to philosophical assault. 
81 , 
... tempus incipit cum mundo et manebit aeternaliter cum mundo; posterius tamen est naturaliter quarn 
mundus vel motus iugis. Licet enim praeexigebatur tempus ad creationern mundi, sicut locus ad inceptionern 
suae locationis, neutrurn tamen praeexigebatur ad esse mundi , sed econtra. Et sic credo quod non est 
possibile mundum esse sine tempore, et per consequens quemcunque motum indifferenter potest consequi 
illud tempus. Non enim potest creatura esse mundus, nisi fuerit duratio eius in esse transmutabili: quod est 
tempus. 'Logicae Continuatio, pp. 161-62. 
82 See the discussion in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, i. 29-31. 
83 Logicae Continuatio, p. 158. 
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Most significantly, however, it also led to confusion over a fundamental exegetical 
principle: that of ampliatio temporis. 
2.4 'Ampliatio Temporis' and the Study of Scripture 
The relevance of temporal extension to the study of Scripture emerges most clearly 
in Wyclif's discussion of temporal propositions in the Logicae Continuatio. The extended 
conception of time, he claims here, is the only way of reconciling the meaning of scriptural 
utterances and sacramental language with a logical understanding of truth ('logical' being 
used here, of course, according to its wider, analogical meaning, rather than in the narrow 
sense of contemporary logic). It is introduced following the dismissal of two classical 
views of time (here described as fabitlae), the one identifying it with substance, and the 
other, f amiliar from Aristotle, denying its reality altogether (since the present strictly either 
was or will be, but never is). The extended version of time, we are told here, is that which 
the philosophers and theologians use, and is supported by Aristotle in both the Physics and 
the Metaphysics. In the absence of such a theory, Wyclif argues, past and future instants 
would simply be at one with the present, and the idea of successive instants would have to 
be denied: 
On account of such pieces of evidence I was first moved to amplify time, 
because I do not see how either a philosopher or a theologian could deny 
such successives. Nor do I see how they are continua, unless they are 
composed from existing parts. Therefore, just as the middle instant of an 
hour joins all middle instants in turn, so they are joined, causing time, 
continuation, priority, corruption, and knowledge, as the philosophers truly 
say. And otherwise not one instant or another could be superior or posterior 
to any other in terms of time, and thus the instant begins, marries and unites 
the parts of time which are in its measure. 84 
94 , Est... modus loquendi philosophorum et theologorum loqui non sic arcte, sed extensive, ut patet 4 
Physicorum, commento 88. Et ideo, 4 et 5 Metaphysice, de priori, 8 Metaphysice et commento 5, dicitur quod 
cena differt a prandio secundum partes, et conformis est applicatio, libro 9 et 14 et libro 12. Immo omnes 
scientiae sic locuntur. Unde propter tales evidentias fui primo motus ad ampliandurn tempus, quia. non vidi 
quomodo philosophus vel theologus posset negare huiusmodi succesiva. Nee capit ingenium meum quod 
sint continua, nisi componantur ex partibus existentibus. Sicut ergo medium instans illius hore copulat 
medientates omnes ad invicem, sic illa. copulantur, causantes tempus, continuationem, prioritatem, 
corruptionem, scientiam, ut philosophi vere dicunt. Nec aliter aliquod instans vel aliquod aliud posset sees 
reliquo superius vel posterius quo ad tempus, et sic instans initiat, copulat, et unit partes temporis quae sunt 
suis mensuris. ' Logicae Continitatio, 167-68. 
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Wyclif's rejection of the idea of temporal instants being continuous, rather than discrete 
entities, is revealing. Here, as elsewhere, he is clearly anxious to maintain an absolute 
distinction between the properties of eternal ditratio and the passage of time in the created 
world. If instants were continuous, then they would have to be parts of the present, since 
there would be nothing to divide them from it. If priority and posteriority were thus to 
disappear, then time (tentpus) would lose the very properties which distinguished it from 
etemity; all things would simply become part of an unchanging present. This is the view 
of time which Wyclif associates with contemporary 'continuist' philosophers. Until 
recently, the significance of his opposition to such philosophers - which would certainly 
go some way towards explaining the widespread hostility towards his theory of anipliatio 
- has gone largely unnoticed. Norman Kretzmann, in a revealing article on Wyclif's logic, 
seeks to rectify this situation by highlighting the extent to which Wyclif, as a defender of 
a view of time in which instants were discrete, minimal constituents, was in 'a tiny, 
embattled minority'. 85 It is certainly significant that among those who would have opposed 
him on this issue, many were also doctrinally opposed to his views on being, universals, 
and predication. John Duns Scotus, William Alnwick, William of Ockharn and Adam 
Wodeham are among the most notable examples, all of whom, as we have argued, would 
certainly qualify as anti-realists, if not necessarily as nominalists. 86 
Scriptural motivation for Wyclif's indivisibilism is not difficult to find within the 
pages of the logical writings and the Sunnna de Ente. Wyclif, as we have seen, insists that 
the Bible itself measures worldly things according to degrees of greater and less, implicitly 
lending support to the theory of indivisibilism and anipliatio teinporis. A different example 
is provided by Kretzmann, who relates indivisibilism in Wyclif ultimately to his 
supposition that God must know all aspects of the created universe. This, Kretzmann 
argues, would be impossible, even for God, if time were continuous (and hence infinitely 
divisible), and would run contrary to the sense of Genesis, in which we learn that 'God saw 
85 Norman Kretzmann, 'Continua, IndivisibIcs and Change in Wyclif's Logic of Scripture', in Anthony Kenny, 
ed., IVyclif in his Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 31-65 (p. 34). 
86 It should be noted that Kretzmann also lists the realists Walter Burley and Thomas Bradwardine among the 
opponents of indivisibilism. They were, however, in a conspicuous minority. See 'Continua, Indivisibles 
and Change', p. 35. 
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all the things that he had made. ' (1: 3 1)87 Ultimately, of course, indivisibilism is defended 
only as a means of upholding Wyclif's contested views on the amplification of time. 
These views, by their very nature, found scriptural justification, since it was only through 
them that the literal truth of certain temporal passages could be upheld. In their absence, 
as Wyclif explains, any commitment to scriptural truth would be seriously compromised: 
Otherwise [i. e. without the theory of ampliatio teniporis] I do not see how 
the meaning of Scripture can be logically sustained and defended, when it 
says that we are all sons of Adam, [and] that Christ is the son of David and 
the son of Abraham, together with his children. For whenever one of us 
ignores a genealogy, and particularly typically a generation of this kind, it 
should be conceded finally that those said men, the patriarchs, in magno 
teinpore would mediatelY generate those sons. Consequently, if anyone is 
the son of such a father, then he has such a father, and the [father] has such 
a son. From which it follows that relative things are convertible in time. 88 
All that has to be remembered, as Wyclif concludes by suggesting, is that all things that 
were, or will be, are (in the amplified sense of the term). This dictum, repeated frequently 
throughout Wyclif's metaphysical and exegetical writings, became effectively synonymous 
with the theory of anipliatio temporis. Wyclif's theories of truth and temporal 
amplification, like the related principle of analogy, serve to highlight (and to preserve) the 
unique status of the Bible as a sacred text. Both rest on the assumption that the text is 
principally an intelligible entity, removed from the realms of human discourse. The 
intelligible nature of the Bible, as we have seen, had also been emphasised in Wyclif's 
analysis of the Book of Life in De Ente Prinzo in Communi. 89 The metaphysical 
significance of these ideas, and their vulnerability to philosophical assault by anti-realists, 
first begins to become clear in Wyclif's disputations with Kenningham, which took place 
shortly before De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae was composed. In the course of two 
87 This passage, according to Kretzmann, is used on numerous occasions by Wyclif. See Kretzmann, 
'Continua, Indivisibles and Change', n. 54. 
88 'Nec aliter video quomodo potest logice sustineri vel defendi sensus scripturae, dicentis nos omnes esse 
filios Adam, Cristurn. esse filium David et filium Abrahe, cum eius seminibus; quia cum quilibet nostrum 
ignorat geneloyam particulariter exemplative generationern huiusmodi, oportet ad ultimurn concedere quod 
dicti patriarchae in magno tempore mediate generar[e]nt illos filios; et per consequens, si aliquis sit filius talis 
patris, tune habet talem patrem et alius habet ipsurn filium. ex quo sequitur quod relativa. sunt convertibifia 
in tempore. ' Logicae Confinuatio, p. 169 
89 See Ch. 2 (section 5), above. 
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determinations, Kenningharn seeks to undermine both the theory of ampliatio temporis, and 
the metaphysics of intelligible being on which this and Wyclif's theory of propositional 
truth depended. He is especially critical of the literalistic conception of scriptural meaning 
which the theories of real predication, truth to divine intention, and temporal amplification 
served to reinforce. The determinations provide us with the best surviving example of an 
anti-realist critique of Wyclif's hermeneutic theory. They were clearly perceived to pose 
a significant threat, both to the philosophy of the Siannia de Ente itself and (more crucially) 
to the conceptions of textual meaning and authority which depended upon it. The 
relationship between the determinations and textual theory will be analysed in detail in 
Chapter 4, with particular reference to the definitions of truth and time highlighted above. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM OF WYCLIF'S PHELOSOPHY OF SCRIPTURE: 
JOHN KENNINGHAM, OC 
Though there can be little doubt that Wyclif would have encountered opposition to his 
philosophical opinions during his time as a master in the Arts faculty, and certainly by the 
time he incepted in theology, the effect of such opposition, and its philosophical 
consequences, are difficult to gauge. The impact of philosophical disputation on exegetical 
practice is similarly obscure. It has been suggested that the 'sophists' and sign doctors so 
frequently disparaged in the Sionnia de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, whose broad 
ideas consistently loom larger than any individual intellectual failing, might as easily have 
been men of straw as real people! As Gillian Evans has pointed out, moreover, there is none 
of the logical casuistry of which Wyclif complains in commentaries surviving from the 
period. 2 Records of Wyclif's disputations in the Theology faculty, however, supply some 
important missing evidence. His protracted exchanges with John Kenningham, which raise 
some fundamental questions about the nature of scriptural meaning, provide perhaps the best 
indication that contemporary logic and its perceived abuses may well have posed as great a 
threat to his own exegetical ideas as his later writings suggest. Kenningham's ideas, 
moreover, though they were not influenced conspicuously by any single philosophical school, 
and though they were not always presented consistently, nevertheless bear a close 
resemblance to views traditionally associated with fourteenth-century nominalism 
(Courtenay's 'moderate' school). 
The focal points of debate between Kenningham and Wyclif are three of the key 
philosophical themes of the Sianina de Ente and the Logicae Continuatio: being, truth, and 
time. The realist interpretation of these ideas, as we have seen, fon-ned the mainstay of 
Wyclif's exegetical theory, and supplied his basic means of defending the truth of Scripture 
de virtute sennonis. Kenningham's critical interpretation of Wyclif's ideas, as it is presented 
1 See, for example, Kenny, Wyclif, Ch. 1. 
2 G. R. Evans, 'Wyclif's Logic and Wyclif's Exegesis: the Context', Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 4 
(1985), 287-300 (p. 287). 
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in the three surviving determinations against him, predictably led him to an exegetical 
method whose emphases were - for the most part - markedly different from those of 
Wyclif's 
own. Among the most outstanding features of his approach are an emphasis on the primacy 
of human authorial intention, a privileging of literal meanings over their metaphorical 
equivalents, and a general acknowledgement of the importance of language as a determinant 
of scriptural meaning. Though we should obviously be cautious about identifying any of 
these features, or all of them together, as the minimal elements of a 'nominalist' hermeneutic, 
they were, nevertheless, widespread in anti-realist exegetical writings throughout the 
fourteenth century. There were, of course, many reasons for this which had little or nothing 
to do with nominalism. Literalistic interpretation and the intention of the human author 
(consideration of the latter typically informing the former) had been emphasised increasingly 
by exegetes since the beginning of the scholastic period .3 
Aquinas - himself a realist - had 
explained that the literal sense, being prior to all other senses, was strictly the only sense from 
which arguments could be drawn. 
4 His reasoning, and that of the literalists who followed 
him, was primarily logical, and would have been accepted or rejected on grounds essentially 
unrelated to the nominalist-realist debate. There are clear indications from Kenningham's 
arguments, nevertheless, that his own literalism had a firm basis in ontological assumptions 
specific to nominalist philosophy. This is also true, as will be argued below, in the case of 
William of Ockham and a number of other anti-realist thinkers whose exegetical methods 
5 are known. 
1. KENNINGHAM As AN-n-REAUST 
The clearest indication of Kenningham's likely philosophical allegiances is provided 
in the opening passages of Wyclif's first deterniination against him (1372). 
6 Here we are 
3 See G. R. Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: the Road to Refornzation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). On the relationship between literalistic exegesis and the growth of Aristotelianism in 
the twelfth century, see Smalley, The Study of the Bible, pp. 292-308. 
4, 
... omnes sensus fundentur super unum, scilicet 
litteralem. Ex quo solo potest trahi argumenturn, non autem ex 
his quae secundurn allegoriarn dicuntur... ' Stannia Theologiae, ia. 1,10, res. ad. 1. 
5 Though Ockharnism and the name of William of Ockharn are often associated with literalism, there has as yet 
been no comprehensive attempt to link nominalism with literalism on philosophical grounds. 
6 This is the first of three determinations, the second of which is not extant. Thomson conjectures that the third 
is itself probably less than half complete. The three determinations, he suggests, were prepared as a response to 
Kenningham's brief Ingressus (discussed in section 3, below), and are likely to have been preceded by an initial 
determination and a response (to Kenningliam's lost critique of this same determination). None of these earlier 
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introduced to the image of three philosophical nests, one logical, one natural, and one 
metaphysical. These, Wyclif explains, are the nests by which he and the other pulli Christi 
- 'chickens of Christ' - are nourished, and according to which, as we soon 
discover, his 
7 
views on the nature of being, truth and time are to be defended . Each of the three nests 
embodies a familiar realist supposition, and each, as Wyclif later points out, 
8 has attracted 
criticism from Kenningham. The logical nest, he tells us, is that by which we know the 
reality of the universal categories of genits and species. It is through these that 'Scripture 
frequently verifies its meaning. '9 This is the lowest of the three nests, and serves - as its 
nature would suggest - as the foundation. The natural nest, which is higher, is 'that by which 
we know every substantial material form to be an accidental disposition of the said [divine] 
essence or nature' ('quo noscimus quan-flibet formarn substantialern. materialem... esse 
dispositionemaccidetalemdictaeessentiae, velnaturae'). lo Wyclif presumably refers here 
to knowledge of the relationship between the eternal essence of an entity and its existential 
nature in the temporal world. Through this, he suggests, 'we know that Scripture is literally 
true when it proposes that the body of a particular species is not converted into another, but 
in its own time it is, or will be, the body of a different species". Essence and existence, if 
this proposition is accepted, may be seen to have a scriptural basis (insofar as its literal 
interpretation - on Wyclif's reading - presupposes such a relationship), as well as to be 
necessary to a proper understanding of biblical language. In the wider context of Wyclif's 
hermeneutics, it was also essential, as we have seen, to his theory of analogical predication, 
and to his views on the nature of time. 12 
works survives, but Thomson finds reference to Kenningham's critique in the Ingressits itselL See Latin 
Writings, pp. 227-29. 
7 FZ' p. 453. (Where more than one reference to the Fascicidi is given, the authors of the respective sections are 
supplied in parentheses. ) 
8 FZ, p. 454. For the text of Kenningham's response to the ideas embodied in three philosophical nests, see FZ, 
pp. 1442. 
9.... primus nidus in parte logicus est, quomodo cognoscimus universalia ex parte rei; ut genus et speciern, de 
quibus Scriptura verificat crebrius sensum. suum. ' FZ, p. 453. 
'OFZ, p. 453. 
11 1 ... sic intelligimus Scripturam esse veram et 
de virtute sermonis, quo poni corpus unius speciei nedum. converti 
in aliud, sed fore vel esse pro suo tempore corpus disparis specici. ' FZ, p. 453. 
12 See ch. 2, above; on the significance of the essence-existence distinction for Wyclif's theory of time, see ch. 
3 (section 2.1). 
105 
The highest of the three nests, and the one to which most attention is devoted by Wyclif 
and Kenningham, is the metaphysical. Through this, Wyclif explains, 'we know the eternity 
of God by his immensity, which stands at once in all past and future time' ('cognoscimus 
aetemitatern Dei ex eius immensitate coasistente omni tempore praeterito, vel futuro'). 13 As 
a consequence of this, we know that all things which were, or will be, are present to God, 14 
a point to which Wyclif returns repeatedly, and which, as we have seen, was a key postulate 
in his theory of ainpliatio temporis . Its potential significance in the wider 
debate between 
nominalists and realists becomes clear when he explains that 'through this truth we resolve 
the confused questions relating to freedom of choice, necessity, and future contingents, and 
we are able to maintain that holy Scripture is true de vi sennonis, against the pompous 
subtleties of the sophists'. 15 Each of these questions, which are examined in detail in 
Kenningham's third determination against Wyclif, is recognisable as one over which 
nominalists and realists were habitually divided. It is cer-tainly significant that Wyclif places 
alongside them the arguments of 'sophists' who were denying the truth of Scripture de vi 
sennonis. It is fair to assume, moreover, that these are the same logicians who were 
castigated by Wyclif in the Stanina de Ente and the Logicae Continuatio for their 
philosophical and exegetical errors. 
If the literal truth of scripture is to be respected, Wyclif contends, all three nests must 
be preserved from corruption. Anyone who does damage to any one of them, does damage, 
we are told, both to Wyclif himself, and to every professor of the sacred page. 16 In his acta 
against Wyclif's teachings, Kenningham declares his desire to follow his master's ideas, but 
finds himself ultimately unable to accept the principles embodied in the hierarchy of nests: 
... it seems to me that my master builds nests on high, which I desire to 
follow, 
but cannot grasp, because neither is the house of Herod my guide in curious 
and subtle inventions, nor are the high mountains passable to me, with the 
deer, in arduous sentences and deductions, but rather my refuge is with the 
13 FZ, p. 453. 
14 Ibid. 
15 'per illam veritatern solvimus perplexa dubia de libertate arbitrii, de necessitate, et de contingentia. futurorum, 
et sustinemus Scripturarn sacram esse veram de A sermonis, contra pomposas argutias sophistarum. ' FZ, pp. 
453454. 
16 Quicunque ... diruperit aliquern horum trium nidorum, injuriatur nedurn n-tihi, sed cuicunque sacrae paginae 
professori, quia indubie si aliquis istorum trium nidorum diruptus fuerit, consequens est Scripturarn esse 
falsissimam de A vocis. ' FZ, p. 454. 
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hedgehogs, [on] the humble rock of solid truth. 17 
The logical and the natural nests are put to one side in the discussion which follows this 
evaluation, and it is unfortunate that they are considered only indirectly in Kenningham's two 
main determinations. Nevertheless, his very deliberate and unequivocal rejection of each of 
them is in itself a testimony to his own anti-realism, and has a strong bearing on many of the 
exegetical issues he later debates with Wyclif. The metaphysical nest, Kenningham. suggests, 
is one that he would rather discover and understand, than destroy. The tone of his initial 
rejection soon returns, however, when he suggests that, were he to touch this nest, he would 
always be fearful of falling, since he can neither see its foundation, nor perceive any support 
for it in the text of the Scriptures. 18 The ideas which the nest represents - the eternity of God 
and the eternal 'presence' of all things to God - brought with them a range of fundamental 
metaphysical assumptions, all of which highlight key divisions between realist and anti-realist 
scholars in the fourteenth century. The three key themes isolated above - being, truth, and 
time - are all considered in the context of this nest, whose nature and reality is the 
overarching issue in the two determinations which are to be considered here. 
The themes of Kenningham's two determinations - the reality of intelligible beings and 
the amplification of time - are closely interrelated. The latter in an important way 
presupposed the former, since past and future instants, as we illustrated in the previous 
chapter, were held by Wyclif to be intelligible realities. Wyclif's defence of the theory of 
intelligible being in the latter half of the fourteenth century was less unique or extreme than 
it is often held to be, standing as it does at the end of a long history of such defences. Thomas 
Aquinas, William of Auvergne, and Henry of Ghent are among Wyclif's most notable 
predecessors in this respect. 19 Before Kenningham, William of Ockham was among the best 
known opponents of the theory of intelligible being, though a strong tradition of similar 
opposition had also developed among the followers of Duns Scotus in the late thirteenth and 
17 '... rnihi videtur, Magister meus nidificat in excelsis, quem sequi cupio sed apprehendere nequeo, quia nec 
Herodis domus dux rnihi est in curiosis et subtilibus adinventionibus, ncque cum cervis montes excelsi rnihi pervii 
sunt, in arduis sentenfiis et deductionibus, sed cum herinaciis refugium rnihi est humilis petra solidae veritatis. ' 
FZ, pp. 14-15. 
18 , Tertium... nidum non quaero, dirumpcre, sed potius invenire, et materiam eius agnoscere; quia alias si cum C, 
attingerem, ibi tamen quiescere non auderem , timens mihi de casu, quia non video fundamenturn 
illius, nec 
aliquarn in Scripturis suspicor esse materiarn fortem, ipsum ex integro vere supportantem. ' FZ, p. 15. 
19 The most comprehensive survey of late-medieval thinking on intelligible natures is to be found in John 
Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 93-187. 
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early fourteenth century. Though these were not strictly nominalists, many, such as William 
of Alnwick, opposed a significant number of the same philosophical doctrines. 20 
Kenningham's arguments, though not strictly those of a nominalist, must therefore be seen 
to have had significant nominalist precedents. His contempt for philosophical extravagance, 
which is made manifest in his analyses of certain of Wyclif's metaphysical assumptions, 
would likewise have won him the support of any dedicated Ockhamist. Kenningham's 
response to Wyclif's realism in the two determinations will be considered in the sections 
following. The first analyses his treatment of the broad metaphysical notions of intelligible 
being and real (as opposed to linguistic) truth. It then examines the ways in which these two 
concepts informed Wyclif's controversial views on the literal truth of Scripture. The second 
isolates the principal philosophical objections which Kenningharn brought against the theory 
of anipliatio teniporis. 
2. BEING AND TRuTH: RESPONSES To PJH[ILOSOPHICAL REALISM IN THE DETERMINATIONES 
Though being was the subject of the last of Kenningham's three determinations (De 
21 Esse Intelligibili Creaturae) , it arguably represented the most 
fundamental philosophical 
issue he confronted. Its close relation to philosophical ideas about the nature of truth (with 
which, of course, Wyclif supposed it to be identical) meant that it was also among the most 
controversial, especially within the context of biblical hermeneutics. Kenningharn's critical 
readings of Wyclif s teachings in both of these areas were clearly perceived as a significant 
challenge, as Wyclif's own determinations against him make clear . 
22 The hierarchically- 
structured conception of being, after all, lay at the heart not only of Wyclif's theory of 
ampliatio temporis, but also of many of the other metaphysical and hermeneutic principles 
described in the Summa de Ente. Most importantly, as we have shown, it served to anchor 
the text of Scripture beyond the confines of conventional human language and sign systems, 
and to free it from the normal rules of truth and falsity. 
20 Alnwick, for example, is known chiefly for his rejection of analogical predication, and for his opposition to 
the teachings of Henry of Ghent, many of whose ideas were also explicitly opposed by Ockham. 
21 FZ, pp. 73-104.1 have assumed that the scribal designations 'secunda determinatio' and 'tertia determinatio' 
reflect accurately the order of delivery. 
22 See especially Wyclif's first detennination, FZ, pp. 453-476 
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2.1 Tize Problein of Being: Kenninghanz's Deternünatio de Esse Intelligibili Creaturae 
The nature of created being, if Kenningharn's remarks in his final determination are to 
be believed, had been a frequent topic of discussion between Wyclif and himself during their 
debates in the Oxford theology faculty. 23 At the beginning of the determination, Kenningharn 
declares (with characteristic humility) his intention to respond to the valida argillnenta and 
efficaces testimonia sanctorum (arguments from reason and authority, respectively) presented 
by Wyclif in defence of his own theory of being. 24 It soon becomes clear that his main target 
is the theory of intelligible being (esse intelligibilelesse cognitum), by which, we are told, 
Wyclif strives to prove that all that was, is. 25 For the sake of clarity, Kenningham. suggests, 
and so that his own responses may be made plain to his academic audience, he will repeat 
Wyclif s arguments in the form in which they arose. 26 The eight responses which follow thus 
fall roughly into two sections, beginning with glosses on Wyclif's explanations of the nature 
of intelligible being, and proceeding to problems which - according to Kenningham - arise 
from arguments based upon it. The arguments of this latter section relate primarily to the 
problems of contingency and necessity, both of which, on Wyclif's interpretation, relied 
heavily on an extended understanding of the nature of time and being. 27 
The first of Kenningham's responses confronts the basic premises of Wyclif's argument 
about intelligible being. At the beginning of his argument, Kenningham tells us, Wyclif seeks 
to establish that the intelligible being of every creature is essentialiter the divine essence. 
There is nothing particularly controversial or idiosyncratic about this idea, though it is 
important to note that, in common with many of Wyclif s theories, it had its origins in the 
realist tradition of the preceding century. 28 Its premises are familiar from De Universalibits 
23 FZ, p. 73 (opening paragraph). 
24 'Nuper autem in ultima detern-linatione sua fortificavit partem suarn validis argumentis, et efficacibus 
sanctorum testimoniis, ad quae rogat Doctor quod clare respondeam. Et libenter volo, sed forte non suff icio. ' 
Ibid. 
25 'Arguit Magister mcus primo de esse intelligibili sive cognito, nitens per hoc probare principalem intenturn 
suum in hae materia, scilicet quod omne quod fuit est, et e contra. ' FZ, p. 73. 
26 
Ibid. 
27 See Ch. 5 (section 5.1), below, in which the relationship between theories of future contingency and anipliatio 
teniporis is considered in detail. 
28 Marilyn McCord Adams associates it, in particular, with Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, St Bonaventure 
and Henry of Ghent. Their theories of divine ideas, significantly, are regarded by Adams as being fundamentally 
opposed to those of their contemporary, William of Ockham. See Adams, lVillianz Ockham, pp. 1037-1042. 
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and De Ideis, and there are some important correspondences between these earlier tracts and 
the account supplied here by Kenningham. 29 The focus of Kenningham's criticism, however, 
is Wyclif s elaborate justification of his argument. The argument itself follows the standard 
syllogistic pattern, proceeding from the assumption that all things which are absolutely 
necessary are the divine essence, which forms the major premise, to the required conclusion: 
Everything which is absolutely necessary is essentially the divine essence. 
Every intelligible being is absolutely necessary; therefore, every intelligible 
being of a creature is essentially the divine essence. The major premise, as 
the Doctor says, is well known among philosophers and theologians who 
oppose the theory of essential predication. The minor is proved thus: If God 
is, He apprehends intelligible being; but it is absolutely necessary that God 
is; therefore it is absolutely necessary that God apprehends every intelligible 
[being]. And if God apprehends every intelligible, then that intelligible being 
is. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that every intelligible being is... But 
it is simply the same thing to be an intelligible being and to be intelligible, 
and so it is absolutely necessary that every intelligible is. 
30 
Kenningham argues that neither the major nor the minor premise of Wyclif's rational 
justification can be sustained. The major premise fails because the fact that God is, is not 
itself identical with God, since it is a truth which is caused by God . 
31 The minor fails, we are 
told, because Kenningharn makes no distinction between a creature and its being, so that the 
intelligible being of a creature is the intelligible creature itself . 
32 Both of these arguments, 
though they do not draw conspicuously on any contemporary nominalist sources, are strongly 
suggestive of a nominalist metaphysic. The latter, in particular, recalls the nominalist 
position regarding essence and existence (ens and esse), which, as we have shown, were not 
29 De Universalibits, Ch. 7,11.35-38. Cf. De Ideis, Ch. 2: ' "Deus est quaelibet creatura in esse intelligibili-, 
quod est necessarium. convertibile cum priori <sc. propositione "omnis creatura est Deus">' (Ed. Herold, fo. 43 
va) See Ch. 2 (section 1), above. 
30 'Omne absolute necessarium est essentialiter divina essentia; [omne esse intelligibile absolute necessarium est; 
ergo] onine esse intelligibile creaturae est essentialiter divina essentia. Major, ut dicit Doctor, est famosa apud 
philosophos, et theologos; advertentes praedicationem secundum essentiam; et minor probantur sic. Si Deus est, 
Ipse intelligit esse intelligibile, sed absolue necessario Deus est; ergo absolute necessario Deus intelligit ornne 
intelligibile. Et si Deus intelligit aliquod intelligibile, illud esse intelligibile est; ergo absolute necessarium est 
quod omne esse intelligibile est; ... sed simpliciter 
idem est esse intelligibile esse, et esse intelligibile; ergo omne 
esse intelligibile absolute necessario est. ' FZ, pp. 73-4. 
31 '[Potest responderi] uno modo negando majorem, scilicet quod omne absolute necessarium est essentialiter 
essentia divina. Probatur, quia Deum esse non est Deus, cum sit una veritas a Deo causata; ergo non est 
essentialiter divina essentia. ' FZ, p. 74. 
32 , 
... nego minorem; scilicet quod omne esse 
intelligibile creaturae est absolute necessarium. Et ratio est: ego 
non distinguo inter creaturam et suum esse, et ideo voco esse intelligibile creaturae ipsarn creaturarn 
intelligibilem, ut sit constructio intransitiva, esse ita, esse intelligibile, quod est creatura. ' FZ, p. 74. 
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regarded as being really distinct. 33 Kenningham's other objection relates to the two levels 
of being below the intelligible, which are described here as potential being (identical, 
presumably, with Wyclif's concept of being in universal and particular causes 
34 ) and actual 
being. These, he suggests, create problems if Wyclif's argument is accepted, since both, like 
intelligible being, are absolutely necessary by the criterion of necessary divine apprehension. 
This must mean that they, like intelligible beings, are essentially the divine essence, an idea 
which Wyclif himself, as Kenningham points out, would certainly have been reluctant to 
accept. 35 Kenningham's objection is revealing, since it undermines not only the theory of 
intelligible being itself (which, as we have argued, had no place in nominalist philosophy), 
but also the most significant distinction between this form of being and simple existence. 
In doing so, it possibly lends justification to Wyclif's earlier assertion that existence was the 
only kind of being which the nominalists appeared to recognize. 
36 For Kenningham, at least, 
it was clearly a category which brought with it more problems than it solved. His objection, 
nevertheless, is possibly less sound than it first appears, as becomes clear when another of his 
responses - the third of the eight - is examined. Here, Kenningliam cites a passage 
from 
Wyclif which appears to entail a denial of the assumption that every kind of being is 
absolutely necessary. God's necessary and immediate apprehension of the intelligible being 
of a creature - the basis of its absolute necessity - is simply not matched by an 
immediate 
apprehension of its existential and potential natures. Rather, it is precisely the function of 
the creature's intelligible being to make its other kinds of being accessible - in a secondary 
sense - to the divine intellect. It is in this sense that intelligible being 'ten-ninates' - namely, 
provides an object or an end point for - divine knowledge: 
Since it is impossible for any power to have distinct cognition of something 
unless there is a subjective known terminating its knowledge, it is clear that, 
since God knows all things, there are knowns which, in the idea of the object, 
terminate his knowledge. But this cannot be a creature [perceived] 
33 See ch. 2 (section 1), above. Ockharn's position is conveniently summarized in the Suninza Totitts Logicae: 
'... aliquantulum disgrediendo considerandurn est, qualiter esse existere se habet ad rem: Utrurn esse rei et 
essentia rei sint duo extra animarn distincta inter se. Et rnihi videtur, quod non sunt talia duo, nec 'esse existere' 
significat aliquid distincturn a re. ' (I, c. xxxviii) Boehner, ed., Ockham: Philosophical Writings, p. 92. 
34 See De Universalibus, Ch. 7,11.43-53 (discussed in Ch. 2 (section 1), above). 
35, nIiS is the case, Kenningharn explains, because Wyclif would not allow that any creature could have necessary 
being outside God. See FZ, p. 76. 
36 De Universalibus, Ch. 7,11.54-6. See Ch. 2, above. 
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immediately according to its generic kind. Therefore there should be, internal 
to God, knowns which immediately terminate divine knowledge. 
37 
This passage can leave us in little doubt of Wyclif's intention to maintain an absolute 
distinction between intelligible being and the two inferior fonris which Kenningham 
mentions (the being of a creature 'according to its generic kind' is quite clearly the same as 
Kenningham's potential being). Here, moreover, Wyclif is explicit about intelligibles being 
uniquely part of the divine essence (they are 'internal to God'). Whether Kenningharn is 
deliberately overlooking this point - which he later rejects - is unclear. What is certain, 
however, is that to acknowledge earlier that Wyclif had made it would have made his first 
objection more difficult to sustain. It would also have lent far greater coherence to Wyclif's 
argument about the real identity of intelligible beings and the divine essence. That such a 
point does go unnoticed, moreover, has important implications for our understanding of 
Kenningham's philosophy. Superficially, it could be seen to strengthen the case for treating 
Kenningharn as a nominalist, since for Ockhamist thinkers, existential natures ivere 
immediately apprehensible by the divine intellect. 38 There was, in other words, nothing 
corresponding to Wyclif's intelligible beings intervening between the divine intellect and its 
temporal objects. Kenningliam himself, however, is clearly being less radical than this. 
Wyclifs point about intelligible beings is inadmissible, he suggests, simply because there 
cannot be a plurality of divine ideas -in an essence which is by definition simple: 
I believe... that by such unmediated objects of divine cognition, [Wyclif] 
understands ideas or ideal concepts, whose multitude in God I do not admit, 
since God himself is one idea of all things, and [their] perfect similitude... 
We should not ask, however, in relation to that idea, whether it is or not; for 
it is certain most truly that it is. For if it were not possible for God know 
distinct things specifically without there being distinct ideas within him, 
equally it would not be possible for him to know those ideas perfectly, except 
through other ideas, since specific ideas are only distinguished as the species 
themselves. And thus there would be an infinite progression of ideas of ideas, 
which it is not proper to suppose. It remains therefore that in God, knower 
and known are in real terms the same, as are essence and idea, potency and 
37 'Cum impossibile sit virtutem aliquam quicquarn quornodolibet distinctum cognoscere, nisi sit dare cogniturn 
subjective terminans ejus notitiam; patet, cum Deus cognoscit omnia, quod est dare cognita quac in ratione 
objecti terminent eius notitiam. Sed hoc non potest aliqua creatura immediate in proprio genere; ergo oportet 
ad intra in Deo dare sic cognita quac immediate terminent divinam notitiam. ' FZ, p. 78. 
38 For Ockham, divine ideas were identical with existential natures, which thus became the immediate objects 
of divine intuition. They were, however, absolutely distinct from the divine essence itself, a fact which would 
clearly lead any Ockharr: iist to reject unequivocally Wyclif's first argument. On the identity of existential natures 
and divine ideas in Ockbam, see Adams, Williant Ockhanz, pp. 1050-1056. 
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object, and so on. For there is not within him a real multitude or distinction, 
but only [a distinction] of suppositiones. 39 
The basis of this rejection - that the notions of divine simplicity and multiple ideas in the 
mind of are irreconcilable - is one with which few of Kenningham's contemporaries would 
have disagreed. His solution, moreover, and variations upon it, had been in common use - 
primarily among realist theologians - since the thirteenth century. Though Ockham. draws 
upon the same objection in his own argument against the identification of divine ideas with 
the divine essence, there is nothing distinctively nominalistic about it. Indeed, Kenningharn 
is using it for a purpose precisely opposite to Ockham's: to preserve the identity of divine 
essence and divine idea. There would appear, then, to be very little separating Wyclif and 
Kenningharn on this issue, and certainly less than Kenningharn would like to suggest. It is 
significant, furthermore, that the idea which Kenningharn attributes to Wyclif - that 
intelligible beings are really distinct from each other - seems not to have originated in 
Wyclif's work at all. There is certainly no suggestion in the Suninza de Ente that intelligible 
beings are to be construed in real terms as a plurality. What Kenningham appears to be doing 
here is a further example of the kind of reductio ad absurdiall strategy which both he and 
Wyclif employ in their depiction of the philosophical enemy. 40 Though no realist is likely 
ever to have supposed that divine ideas - as identified with the divine essence - represented 
a multitude of distinct elements, Wyclif's insistence on seeing intelligibles as a kind of being 
might easily invite this exaggerated interpretation. It has to be remembered, after all, that 
although Kenningham clearly identifies God's single idea with the divine essence, this idea 
is a reflection of created natures (their 'perfect similitude'), rather than an aspect of their 
being. Though both Wyclif and Kenningham are opposed to Ockham in their understanding 
of the divine nature, therefore, Kenningham's anti-realism - and his fundamental opposition 
to Wyclif's metaphysical system - is in no sense compromised. 
39 'Credo... quod per hujusmodi obiecta immediata cognitionis divinae intelligit ideas sive rationes ideales, 
quarum multitudinem in Deo non admitto; cum ipse Deus sit ornnium una idea, et perfecta similitudo... Sed tune 
de illa idea quaerere non oportet, numquid sit vel non; quia certum est quod verissime: si enim non possit Deus 
res specifice distinctas cognoscere sine rationibus distinctis a parte sui, a pari nee posset illas rationes perfecte 
cognoscere nisi per rationes alias, cum tanturn distinguantur rationes specificae sicut ipsae species; et ita esset 
processus in infiniturn de ideis idcarum, quod non est convenienter ponendum. Relinquitur ergo quod in Deo 
sit realiter idem cognoscens et cogniturn, essentia et idea, potentia et objecturn, et ita de caeteris; quia non est in 
eo multitudo realis, vel distinctio, nisi suppositionum. ' FZ, pp. 78-79. 
40 See my remarks on Wyclif's apparent exaggerations, Ch. I (section 4), above. 
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Kenningharn addresses the problem of the relationship between knowledge and being 
in his fifth response. Here, he presents in explicit terms Wyclif's argument that God's 
intuitive cognition entails the 'presence' of the thing known: 
Fifthly, the reverend Doctor argues thus: Everything which God knows 
intuitively is present, just as something which has actual being [is present], as 
Saint'fbomas says. But God has intuitive cognition of everything which was 
or will be, as the united opinion of catholics suggests. Therefore, everything 
which was, or will be, is thus present. And consequently everything which 
was, or will be, is. 41 
Wyclif proves this argument, we are told, by suggesting that God sees Antichrist deceive 
many men, even though Antichrist is not now existing. He sees this deception in the present 
because the notions of beginning to know or beginning to see (which inevitably apply to 
human intuitive knowledge of things which have not yet happened) are contradictory to the 
necessary idea of divine simplicity. In Wyclif's own words (at least, as we have them from 
Kenningham), 'God sees Antichrist deceive many men because he will see in this way'. 42 
Since God knows only the truth, it follows that Antichrist is, as are other beings and events 
which he knows. 43 Kenningham's response to Wyclif's argument is again of a fundamentally 
anti-realist nature. He begins by rejecting its major premise (namely, Wyclif's basic idea that 
everything intuitively known by God, is), and thus renders the conclusion (that A that was, 
or will be, is), on which the whole of the theory of ampliatio tempits rests, invalid. Wyclif's 
appeal to Aquinas is rejected on rather dubious interpretative grounds. When Aquinas speaks 
of being ('esse') in relation to non-existents, Kenningham suggests, he must certainly mean 
being Mown ('cognosci'). It is for this reason, he concludes, that everything which is intuited 
by God is seen to have actual being, since it is actually and truly known. 44 It is certainly true 
th at in the section of the Sunzina Theologiae under scrutiny (Ia. 14. a9, resp. ), the emphasis 
41 'Quinto arguit Doctor reverendus sic. Onine quod Deus intuitive cognoscit est praesens, sic quod habet esse 
actuale, ut dicit S. Thomas (Sununa Theologiae I, q. 14, art. 9); sed omne quod fuit vel erit Deus intuitive 
cognoscit, ut dicit concors catholicorum sententia; ergo omne quod fuit vel efit, est sic praesens; et per 
consequens omne quod fuit vel erit, est. ' Fasciculi Zizaniontin, p. 94. 
42 See n. 43, below. 
43 'Deus videt Antichristurn decipere multos homines, eo quod videbit sic, et nihil nec: aliqualiter potest incipere 
scire et videre; sed Deus non videt ipsum decipere homines nisi sic, cum nihil scitur nisi verum, secundurn 
catholicos: ergo Antichristurn est, et sic de quolibet. ' FZ, pp. 94-95. 
44 'Quia... S. Thomas hoc videtur affirmare, dico, sicut prius, quod per esse intelligit cognosci; et ideo concedit 
omne intuitum a Deo esse actualiter, i. e. actualiter et vere cognosi. ' FZ, p. 95. The reference here is confusing, 
since Aquinas nowhere suggests that non-existents have actual being (though they do, he realises, have being 
in the mind of God). On the status of non-existents in Aquinas' philosophy, see John F. Wippel, Metaphysical 
Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), pp. 164-173. 
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is primarily on knowledge, rather than on being. Aquinas does, nevertheless, make the 
specific point that things which are known by the divine intellect, even though they may not 
exist, always have some kind of being. 45 It is all the more striking, then, that Kenningham 
should insist here on a rigid conceptualism in his interpretation. His response to the idea that 
God cannot begin to see, or begin to know, something, is equally revealing. Rejecting the 
thesis that God sees everything from eternity (as Wyclif would have argued), he suggests that 
such eternal knowledge would require that everything actually existed from etemity (since 
God knows only truth). Such an inference, of course, which is traced in the following 
passage, would only be possible within the context of a restricted metaphysic of the kind we 
find in Ockharn (for whom, as we have seen, things in a state of actual existence, provided 
the objects of divine knowledge of the created world): 
God cannot begin to know or begin to see anything in any way. But God 
knows now that I am now actually outside God, so it follows that he does not 
begin to know tWs. But just as God knows and does not begin to know, so he 
knew that same thing in such a way from eternity. Therefore from eternity 
God knew me now to be actually outside God. But God did not know me to 
be actually outside God, except when I was actually outside God, since 
nothing is known except the truth, according to catholics. Therefore, it was 
eternally true that I am now actually outside God. And so it can be proved of 
every creature that that creature, according to its existential being, is eternal, 
which I know that my master wishes to deny. 46 
Though the primary target of this argument is the thesis that God sees everything in the 
eternal present, Kenningharn is also implicitly challenging Wyclif's distinctions between 
being and existence, on the one hand, and time and eternity, on the other. These, as we have 
seen, were the elements in Wyclif's philosophy on which most of the others in some way 
depended, and without which his exegetical theory would have been rendered unworkable. 
Once again, and in keeping with the dialectical conventions of the detenninatio, the argument 
amounts to a reductio ad absurdinn critique, rather than a coherent philosophical point. 
Though this must inevitably frustrate our own attempts to bring Kenningharn any closer to 
45 '... Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. MIX autem prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, 
aliquo modo esse. ' Suninia Theologiae, Ia. 14.9, resp. (my italics). 
46 'Nihil nec aliqualiter potest Deus incipere scire vel videre; sed Deus nunc scit quod ego nunc sum actualiter 
extra Deum, ergo Deus non incipit hoc scire; sed quicquarn ct qualitercunque Deus scit et non incepit scire, istud 
et taliter ab aetemo scivit: ergo Deus ab actemo scivit me nunc esse actualiter extra Deum; sed Deus non scivit 
me esse actualiter extra Deum, nisi quando fui actualiter extra Deum; eo quod nihil scitur nisi verum, secundum 
catholicos; ergo aeternaliter verum, fuit quod ego nune sum actualiter extra Deum. Et ita probari potest de omni 
creatura quod ipsa secundurn esse existere sit aeterna, quod Magistrum meum scio velle negare. ' FZ, pp. 95-96. 
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a particular group, school, or ideology, the basic element of anti-realism here, as elsewhere, 
would be difficult to ignore. 
This is equally true of the arguments about contingency and necessity presented at the 
end of the detenninatio. The points against wl-iich Kenningharn argues here had been debated 
throughout the fourteenth century, and were not solely associated with forms of philosophical 
realism. It soon becomes clear, nevertheless, that Wyclif's temporal realism, and the theory 
of intelligibles on which it rested, are to be the exclusive objects of Kenningham's critique. 
The first argument he considers relates to the problem of prophecy, and - specifically - to 
biblical acts of prophecy. In it, Wyclif suggests that any being which exists completely in the 
past (which is 'complete p: aetcritum'), and whose truth does not depend on the future (by 
which he means, 'whose truth is contingent'), was necessatily. Otherwise, it would not have 
being.. 47 Superficially, this view is relatively uncontroversial. The necessity of past events, 
according to what Anselm had called subsequent necessity (namely, the necessity of events 
considered retrospectively), had been accepted by thinkers throughout the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, including William of Ockham. 48 It has important consequences, on 
Wyclif's particular interpretation, for the relationship between a prophetic act and a future 
contingent event. According to the examples cited by Kenningham, Wyclif maintains that 
prophetic acts performed by Christ relate to events which are, will be, or have been, or else 
he has asserted a falsehood. In this sense, they are contingent, since their occurrence or non- 
occurrence is independent of the act of prophecy itself. The act of prophecy, nevertheless, 
remains - paradoxically, as Kenningham suggests -a necessity. 
The reasons for this, as they emerge, at least, from Kenningham's own interpretation 
of Wyclif's philosophical system, resided inextricably with the theory of temporal realism 
itself. The basic assumptions against which Kenningham objected in the first part of the 
detenninatio - that God intuits all past and future times, that necessary divine intuition 
entails necessary being, that past, present and future are all 'present' to God - are once again 
47 Trimo [Doctor] supponit tanquarn datum ab adversario quod esse complete praeteritum, cujus veritas non 
dependet a futuro, necessario fuit, sic quod non potest esse quin fuit. ' FZ, p. 96. 
49 On Ockham's interpretation of the notions of antecedent and subsequent necessity (necessity according to the 
antecedent and consequent disposing will of God, to use Ockham's own terms), see the introductory essay in 
Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann, trs., William Ockham: Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, 
and Future Contingents, pp. 17-20 
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encountered, as Wyclif's theory of the necessary past is explained in terms of its putative 
philosophical underpinnings: 
God necessarily intuits every past or future [instant]. Everything which is 
completely in the past, whose truth does not depend on the future, is one of 
either past or future. Therefore, God necessarily intuits everything which is 
completely in the past, whose truth is not dependent on the future. And if 
God intuits anything, then that - thing is, in the opinion of my Master. 
Therefore, something which is completely in the past, whose truth does not 
depend on the future, necessarily is. And it follows that therefore it was, 
because according to my Master, to be, to have been, and to be about to be are 
the same thing. Therefore every such past thing necessarily was, because it 
cannot be in any other way. 49 
As it soon becomes clear, it is these underlying assumptions, rather than the thesis of the 
necessary past itself, which are the primary objects of Kenningham's criticism. Taking the 
example of Peter's denial of Christ - much discussed in scholastic analyses of foreknowledge 
and contingency - Kenningham demonstrates that Wyclif's system leads to an apparently 
impossible conclusion. Christ, he explains, predicted Peter's denial of him (Matthew, 
26: 34), but before the denial itself took place (Matthew, 26: 70-74), the assertion of Christ 
was completely in the past, and did not depend on a future effect. Following Wyclif's logic, 
as Kenningham describes it, we have to conclude that Christ necessarily made this assertion. 
The denial itself, therefore, once the assertion had been made, either was or would be, and 
hence it was necessary, according to Kenningham, either for Peter to deny Christ, or to have 
been on the point of denying him. The difficulty with this, however, is that if divine 
knowledge of every ftiture contingent is considered, the same can be argued in respect of any 
future event whatever, so that it becomes necessary that every such event happens. Wyclif's 
temporal realism is thus reduced by Kenningham, in a characteristic move, to a form of 
deterministic theology in which contingency - which it purportedly accommodates 
50 can 
have no place. 
49 'Omne praeteriturn vel ftitururn necessario Deus intuetur; omne complete praeteriturn, cujus veritas non 
dependet a futuro, est practeriturn vel ftiturum; ergo omne complete praeteritum, cujus veritas non dependet a 
futuro, necessario Deus intuetur: et si Deus aliquid intuetur ipsurn est, per opinionern Magistri mei; ergo complete 
praeteriturn, cujus veritas non dependet a futuro, necessario est; et sequitur, ergo fuit, quia secundurn Magistrurn 
meum, idem est esse, fuisse, et fore. Ergo omne tale praeteriturn necessario fuit, sic quod non potest esse quin 
fuit., Fz' P. 99. 
50 See, for example, the arguments to this effect cited in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae (discussed in Ch. 5 
(section 5.1), below). 
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The issue of necessary past instants brings with it another problem, this time relating 
to the perfection of the divine nature itself Given Wyclif's supposition that the past is 
necessary, we are told, it must follow, with the passage of time, that possibilities initially open 
to God are successively foreclosed. This, however, entails a continuous diminution of God's 
potentia or posse, which as Kenningharn explains, is rejected by Wyclif as an impossibility. 
The premise about possibilities being successively reduced through time must therefore also 
be rejected. 51 Posse is treated by Wyclif as a set of true propositions of the form, God can 
produce tinze a or b. When Wyclif uses the term posse, however, he claims to be using it 
fonnally (Ion-naliter' ). 52 Though Kenningharn is not explicit about what is meant here, the 
termfonnaliter - as in the Scotistic theory of distinctiones - presumably occupies the middle 
ground between realiter and per suppositionem. 53 When Wyclif speaks slightly later of 
certain truths being destroyed in this way, therefore, he consciously - and predictably - avoids 
making any concessions to a theory of real destruction (annihilation). The thesis of absolute 
divine omnipotence is in this way apparently preserved: if God could at some time in the past 
produce a particular instant, then this remains a real possibility. Kenningharn's opposition 
to the familiar premises of temporal realism, however, lead him in precisely the opposite 
direction. Wyclif, he suggests, is simply avoiding a necessary conclusion about the 
progressive destruction of posse. This conclusion, we learn, represents the opinio communis, 
according to which the past has neither being (since it lacks existence) nor potential being 
(since the reality of past possibilities would have been denied by all but the most committed 
realists): 
If God can now produce the past instant a, then [he can] produce that instant; 
and if he can produce the instant itself, then it can be. In the same way, every 
past instant can be. This conclusion goes against the common opinion, as the 
Master says, because if any instant ivas, according to that [opinion], it is not. 
But for any instant designated 'past', it cannot be unless it is not. 
Consequently, it is impossible for it to be. And beyond this it follows that 
God cannot produce it, as once he could. But this my Master does not dare 
to say, namely that God destroys one intrinsic posse eternally, independent of 
the extrinsic. 54 
51 ' "Data, " inquit [Magister], "ista positione de necessitate rerum praeteritarum, sequitur quod continue 
secundurn processurn temporis Deus excidit a potentia vel a posse; et cum nullwn posse potest acquirere, sequitur 
quod continue minorabitur in potentia vel posse; consequens impossibile; ergo antecedens. " ' FZ, pp. 99-100. 
52, Loquitur... Magister, ut dicit, de posse fortnaliter, ut est veritas talis, Deum posse producere a tempus vel b, 
vel aliarn hujusmodi creaturam. ' FZ, p. 100. 
53 On the concept of distinctions in Scotus and elsewhere, see Ch. I (section 4), above. 
54 s 
... si Deus nunc potest producere a instans practeritum, tune producere 
illud instans; et si potest producere istud 
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The argument presented here - if a tortuous one - can leave us in little doubt that 
Kenningham is himself one of those who, unlike Wyclif, regards past instants neither as 
beings nor potential beings. This would clearly be consistent with what his preceding 
arguments reveal, as well as with what can be gleaned more generally about his metaphysical 
system from the detenninationes. It is supported later in the text by Kenningham's open 
refusal to deny that if an instant was, then it is not. Wyclif's own denial of this idea, we are 
told, is among many notable points presented in his own argument, but one of the few which 
55 is actually directed against Kenningham. This would clearly suggest that Kenningham was 
not simply anzong those who regarded past inst ants as non-beings, but wished consciously 
to be identified with this philosophical position. His point is followed by a series of 
justificatory statements, which, though relatively brief, supply some significant further 
insights into the relationship between Kenningham's views on time and metaphysics. 
Neither time nor the instant, he argues firstly, is in real terms a creation of God, since neither 
is an absolute, positive being. This is proved, we are told, because God can annihilate and 
re-create any positive created thing, but he cannot re-create a past instant. It would be 
contradictory, moreover, for anything to be when it was, or to be about to be when it is. 
It is within the context of his arguments about creation and annihilation that 
Kenningham's opposition to temporal realism receives its, clearest expression as a 
philosophical position. His affirmation of the possibility of annihilation and re-creation very 
clearly has its basis in a fundamental anti-realism, and would certainly have been among those 
points to which his opponent was most sensitive. A belief in the possibility of annihilation 
has often been associated with late-medieval nominalism, particularly in the context of 
Eucharistic theology, though the reductivism of such an exclusive association is now quite 
generally acknowledged. 56 It would certainly be difficult to claim that Kenningham's views 
instans, tunc: illud potest esse; et per idem omne instans praeteriturn potest esse. [Conclusio est] contra opinionem 
[communem], ut dicit Magister, quiajuxta illarn si aliquod instans fbit, ipsum non est; sed quocunque instanti 
praeterito signato non potest esse quin ipsum non est; et per consequens impossibile est ipsum esse. Et ultra 
sequitur quod Deus non potest ipsum producere, ut quondam potuit; quod non audet Magister meus dicere; 
scilicet, quod Deus depardat unum posse aeternaliter intrinsecum independens ab extrinseco, propter lapsum 
unius instantis. ' FZ, p. 100. 
55. 
... plura. alia notabilia ponit Magister in hoc argumento, quae omnia non recito, quia nullum corurn 
facit contra 
me. Arguit enim contra tenentem oPinionem quod si instans fuit, ipsum non est, cum hoc quod instans fuit 
creatura realiter a Deo producta; cujusmodi positionern. non admitto de tempore vel instanti... ' FZ, p. 100. 
56 A useful critique of such an association is to be found in William Courtenay's article, 'Cranmer as a 
Nominalist: Sed contra', Harvard 7heologicalReview, 57 (1964), 367-380; reproduced in Courtenay, Covenant 
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on annihilation - whether associated with his own understanding of the nature of the 
Eucharist or not - in any way strengthen the case for treating him as a nominalist. These 
views do, nevertheless, associate him with a broader group of thinkers - many of them 
Scotists 57 _ whose ideas were certainly opposed to the form of realist ontology we find in 
Wyclif. The origins of Kenningham's suggestion that time is not in real terms a creation of 
God are more obscure, though the suggestion itself is less controversial than it appears. 58 its 
close connection with his views on annihilation and re-creation, moreover, would appear to 
place it within an established tradition of thinking. 
Though Kenningham's perspective on contemporary metaphysics can furnish us with 
few certainties regarding local philosophical sources, mentorship or allegiances, his status 
as an opponent of late fourteenth-century realism (whether a 'nominalist' in the narrower 
sense or not) is not in question. His critique of Wyclif's position on intelligible being placed 
in doubt philosophical premises which, as we saw in Chapter 3, lay at the heart of Wyclif's 
understanding of the nature of truth. In the absence of intelligible being, 'real' truth (as 
Wyclif describes it in the Stanina de Ente and Logicae Continuatio) could have no place in 
philosophical or hermeneutic discourse, and the authority of the intelligible text itself (which 
for Wyclif, as we have seen, was identified with the Book of Life) could not be defended. 
The hermeneutic consequences of Kenningham's rejection of intelligible being are 
made clearer in his second determination (De Ampliatione Temporis), in which the principles 
of predication and truth ex parte rei are held up to scrutiny. This will be examined in the 
following section. 
and Causality in Medieval Thought: Studies in Philosophy, Theology and Economic Practice (London: 
Variorum Reprints, 1984). 
57 This, at least, is Courtenay's assessment of the tradition of scholastics who supported annihilation as a theory 
of transubstantiation. See 'Cranmer as Nominalist', pp. 371-72. 
58 Kenningham's notion of uncreated time, for example, clearly has no connection with the Aristotelian 
conception of the history of the universe. Whereas Aristotle denies the necessity of an ofiginary moment or point 
of creation, Kenningharn simply excludes time from the act of creation itself. Time is still clearly seen to begin 
with the creation of the universe. 
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2.2 Is Truth in Signs or Things? Kenningham's Second Deten-ninatio 
The most revealing of Kenningham's statements on the nature and truth of propositions 
is to be found in his analysis of the relationship between signs and reality. In the eighth 
response against him, Kenningham tells us in the second of his major determinations, 59 
Wyclif draws a distinction between sign (signum) and signified /significate (signatinn). This 
in itself, of course, would not have been controversial. Kenningham's critique, however, 
centres around the assumption that any complex expression (a subject and its predicate, for 
example) has a corresponding truth underlying it. For any nominalist or tern-tinist, as we have 
suggested, truth of this kind represented a logical or linguistic property, but not a reality: 
The master distinguishes between sign and signified, as between the image 
[of a saint] and the saint [himself]; and justifiably, insofar as [such a 
distinction] relates to incomplex expressions, because the signified, or 
significautin, of the term 'God' is the highest good, and the origin of all 
sacredness. But in the case of complex truths, I have not been taught that 
their adequate significata are to be venerated, since the said propositions are 
themselves of greater value and truth than the complex truths which are 
signified by them; for God or a creature is no such truth. 60 
Though Kenningham's position in this passage leaves some room for ambiguity, there can 
be little doubt that the theories of real predication and propositiones hi re, the most 
distinctively realist aspects of Wyclif's philosophy (and essential to his theory of scriptural 
truth 61 ), are the primary targets. It would be wrong, however, to assume that Kenningham's 
own beliefs about the objects of knowledge and belief were as extreme as those of Ockham, 
Holcot and Wodeharn. At the end of the passage, he is careful to qualify his statements. Like 
Wyclif his master, he suggests, he himself distinguishes sign from signation, though is 
unwilling to dismiss the sign so completely from his considerations. He clearly has little 
respect for the theory of the complex signified (the proposition in re), but is nevertheless 
59 FZ, pp. 43-72. 
60 , ... distinguit Magister inter signum et signaturn, sicut inter imaginem, et sanctum; et merito, quantum ad incomplexa, quia signatum vel significaturn hujus termini Deus, est summum bonum, et omnis sanctitatis 
principiun-L Sed in veritatibus complexis aedequata corurn significata non didici esse veneranda, cum sint majoris 
dignitatis et virtutis ipsac propositiones prolatae, quam complexae veritates signatae; quia nulla talis veritas est 
Deus vel creatura. ' FZ, p. 65. 
61 See Ch. 3 (section 1), above. 
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willing to concede that in certain contexts it may be worthy of attention. 62 There is evidence 
elsewhere in the Fasciculi, moreover, that Kenningharn. was anxious to distance himself from 
the more extreme forms of coniplextun-theory (according to which signifiables, but not 
signifieds, could be complex) of the kind defended by Ockham. and Holcot. In his third 
determination against Wyclif, for example, he speaks disparagingly of those 'who do not 
suppose there to be truths a parte rei, beyond signs' ('qui non ponunt veritates a parte rei, 
praeter signa'). 63 There is, nevertheless, a fundamental inconsistency between Kenningharn's 
understanding of the nature of truth and that which Wyclif defends in the Sulluna de Elite. 
The nature of this inconsistency becomes clear when Kenningham turns his attention to 
metaphorical language, 'which, if Wyclif's thesis about the priority of propositions in re were 
to be trusted, he suggests, would generate intractable interpretative problems: 
Elsewhere I have argued that if every... figurative utterance were to entail 
confom-tity ex parte rei, then it would be said truly that a man is a tree, that 
flesh is grass, and so on in the case of similar examples, which properly 
speaking, cannot be verified. 64 
Kenningharn goes on to demonstrate his conclusions with reference to metaphorical passages 
taken from the Bible. In Isaiah, he explains, it is said that 'All flesh is grass' (40: 6), and that 
'the people is grass' (40: 7). From Nicholas of Lyre, we learn that man living carnally is 
metaphorically called grass. 65 Likewise in Matthew, it is said that 'the axe is laid to the root 
of the [tree]' (3: 10). 66 The tree, Kenningham suggests, is taken to be man, as we learn from 
Gregory, Jerome, John Chrysostorn and Rabanus Maurus. 67 If Wyclif is willing to conclude 
that the blind see (Matthew, 11: 5), and that therefore all that was, is (as he does, we are told, 
in his defence of the principle of ampliatio temporis), then why should he not concede that 
62 'Distinguo ergo et ego, cum Magistro meo, inter signum et signaturn; non tamen ita contemno signum, ut 4- 
credam illud esse superfluum; nec ita extoIlo complexum signaturn, ut putem illud esse quovismodo 
venerandum. ' FZ, P. 65. 
63 FZ, p. 75. 
64 'Ulterius allegavi quod si omnis... figurativa locutio inferret conformitatem ex parte rei; tune vere diceretur 
quod homo est arbor, quod caro est fenum, et ita de similibus, quae proprie loquendo verificari non possunt. 
Fasciculi Zizaniontni, p. 65. 
65 'Nam Isiae XL [6,7] scribitur, Oinnis carofenum et Verefenuin estpopithis; quod exponit doctor de Lyra de 
homine carnaliter vivente, qui fenum dicitur per metaphoram. ' FZ, p. 65. 
66 Kenningham here substitutes 'ad radicem arboris' for the 'ad radicem arborum' of the Vulgate. I have 
modified the translation accordingly. 
67 F7, pp. 65-6. 
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the axe is laid against the root of the tree, and therefore that every man is a tree? If the first 
consequence holds, Kenningham reasons, then so too should the second. Since the first 
cannot be made to hold, then neither can the second . 
68 Though there is no surviving rejoinder 
to these objections, they do shed some important light on Wyclif s arguments about real 
predication in the Sunnna de Ente. Kenningham's refusal to accept that metaphorical 
propositions are necessarily motivated by truths in the real world, despite his willingness to 
make some concessions to the theory of real predication, would certainly place him among 
those logicians and philosophers disparaged for their dismissal of real truths in De 
Universalibits, De Trinitate and Purgans Errores circa Veritates in C01111111illi. 69 
2.3 Literalism and Intention: Some Problems with the Realist Theory 
In his rejection of the notion of real predication and of the philosophical premises 
underlying it, Kenningham. was also implicitly denying Wyclif's controversial opinions 
concerning the literal truth of Scripture. Such a denial, of course, did not necessarily entail 
a rejection of Wyclif's claim that every part of Scripture was literally (de vi vocis) true. 70 
Rather, it placed in question the foundations of Wyclif's literalism, and of the many 
arguments based upon it. Earlier in Kenningharn's second determination, the nature of these 
foundations is considered in detail .71 For Wyclif, we are told here, every creature is true by 
virtue of the truth of its essence, and every being is a true thing. From this, it naturally 
follows that every part of Scripture is also true. 72 Kenningharn is apparently referring here 
to the basic premises of the theory of real predication, according to which, as we have seen, 
every creature 'speaks' its essence truly. 73 In this sense, Kenningharn concedes, Scripture 
is obviously true, since every scriptural proposition has its being through God. To conclude 
68 'Si ergo sequatur, cacci vident, ergo omne quod fuit est, quia in illa auctoritate sit ampliatio temporis, quare 
non sequitur a pari, Securis ponitur ad radicern arboris, ergo omnis homo est arbor? quia ibi ad hominern refertur 
significatio arboris. Certum est, quod si prima consequentia teneat, tenebit et secunda; et dato quod secunda non 
valeal, nec prima valebit. ' Fasciculi Zizaniontm, p. 66. 
69 See Ch. 3 (section 1), above. 
70 See the discussion of this claim in Ch. 3 (section 1), above. 
71 FZ, pp. 53-6. 
72 Ibid. 
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from this, however, that every impossible proposition is literally true, is mere sophistry, as 
he goes on to explain: 
I wonder how my master, since he so often puts it to me that I argue 
sophistically, himself persists in such a strict sophism, as to say that every 
impossible proposition is true de virtute sennonis, because it has being 
through God. For from this way of thinking, many things follow which speak 
directly against the faith, such as that the Jews, when they blasphemed 
against Christ, spoke nothing but the truth of him; that the following 
proposition is verified of Christ: 'every man is most wicked and damnable'; 
[and] that everything false, and falsely attributed to any creature, is true of the 
son of God. The same applies to many other conclusions whose spoken 
sound is abhorrent to pious ears. 74 
The truth of any of these passages would necessarily depend, for Kenningham, on some form 
of symbolic correspondence. It is for this reason, presumably, that he suggests that none of 
them is true of Christ ('de Christo'), even though their literal truth may depend on Christ. 
Wyclif's response to Kenningham's criticisms on this point was to urge that he himself, and 
other logicians like him, consider the meaning of Scripture ex integro, rather than according 
to its isolated parts. Scripture is true, in other words, not de vi vocis, but de vi sennonis: 
... the Doctor claims that 
I have said that every part of holy Scripture is true: 
which I concede, but with a variation in the terms [used]. For where he says 
de vi vocis, 1, using the term of Scripture, say that every part of Scripture is 
true de vi sennonis. And in respect of the passage 'You have a demon', I 
concede that it is true de vi sennonis. We should, though, bring together the 
parts of Scripture in turn, so that its sense is taken ex integro. The part 'You 
have a demon' signifies by being brought to the sense, 'The Jews spoke thus: 
You have a denzon'. And this sense is sweet to pious ears, since they hear 
that Christ suffers many reproaches for us. 75 
73 See Ch. 3 (section 1), above. 
74 , 
... cum toties Magister niihi imponat quod arguo sophistice, miror quomodo 
ipse stat in tam stricto sophismate, 
ut dicat omnem propositionern impossibilem esse veram de virtute sermonis, quia est ens a Deo. Ex hoc enim 
modo ponendi sequuntur multa quac sonant directe contra fidem, scilicet quod Judaei quando blasphernabant 
Christurn non dicebant nisi verum de eo: quod ista propositio verificatur de Christo, Aliquis homo est pessimus 
et damnabilis: quod omne falsum, et false impositurn alicui creaturae est verum de filio Dei; et ita de multis 
conclusionibus , quarum vocalem soniturn aures piae vehementer abhorrent. 
' FZ, p. 53. 
75 1 ... capit Doctor quod dixi quamlibet partern Scripturae sacrae esse veram: quod concedo, sed vario 
in tem-dno. 
Nam ubi ipse dicit de vi vocis; ego utens terrnino Scripturae, dico quod quaelibet pars Scripturae sacrae est vem 
de A sermonis. Et ad illud Daenwnium habes, concedo quod est verum de A sermonis; tamen oportet conferre 
partes Scripturae ad invicem, ad hoe quod capiatur sensus cius [ex] integro: ita quod haec pars Daemoniunt habes 
signat, conferendo ad isturn sensum, Judaei dixerunt sic, Daemonium habes, qui sensus piis auribus dulcescit, 
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This response has not been regarded favourably by Wyclif scholars, who have tended to 
perceive it as a rather clumsy attempt to retract an earlier, over-ambitious claim for Scriptural 
truth. 76 Kenningham seems to have regarded it in much the same way, suggesting that for 
him, the distinction between senno and vox is meaningless in this context. 77 Once again, 
Wyclif's argument is reduced to little more than verbal trickery by Kenningham - something 
which, by definition, ran contrary to any divinely ordained system of logic of the kind Wyclif 
was claiming to have followed. 
3. KENNINGHAMS CRMQUE OFAmpLiATio TEmPORIS 
Though real predication can properly be seen to have provided the foundation for 
Wyclif's literalist hermeneutic, it is not sufficient in itself to explain his most controversial 
pronouncements on scriptural truth. These, if Kenningham's reactions are a reliable gauge, 
were more often seen to have arisen from his extended conception of the nature of time. 
Though by its very nature, academic disputation in practice left little room for concession or 
reconciliation, there can be no issue which divided Wyclif and Kenningharn so absolutely as 
the amplification of time (ainpliatio teinporis). In the Fascicidi Zizaniorwn, temporal 
amplification is placed at the top of a list of thirteen early heresies propagated by Wyclif . 
78 
The extension of time beyond the present instant is also the nominal subject, as we have seen, 
of one of John Kenningharn's four detenninationes against Wyclif's teaching. Kenningham's 
objections - here and elsewhere in the detenninations - tie in closely with his views on the 
theory of intelligible being. This fundamental realist theory, as we suggested above, 79 
supplied the metaphysical framework for Wyclif's theory of ainpliatio. As elsewhere, 
Kenningham's objections were broadly consistent with Ockhamist thinking. 
cum audiunt Christum pro nobis pati tot opprobria. ' FZ, pp. 456-57. 
76 Smalley, for example, suggests that Wyclif 'withdrew, ungraciously' from his earlier claim regarding the vis 
vocis. See 'The Bible and Eternity', p. 86. 
77 'Et accipio ibi isturn terminum, de virtute sermonis, sicut communiter accipi solet iste terminus de A vocis, non 
enim pono ibi a parte significationis aliquam differentiam, quamvis Magister meus discrepare videatur a me in 
hoc modo loquendi. ' FZ, p. 20. 
78 FZ, p. 2. 
79 See opening section and Ch. 3 (section 2), above. 
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Wyclif s ideas about time are first explicitly challenged by Kenningharn in the opening 
tract of the Fascicith Zizaniorinn, in which he seeks to refute the claim, familiar from the 
lectures and sianinae of his master, that anything which was, or ivill be, iS. 
80 Such a precept, 
he suggests, is incompatible with the statements of Scripture itself. The prophet Jererniah, 
for example, speaks the words, 'Our fathers sinned, and are not' (Lamentations, 5: 7). If such 
a proposition is true, then it follows that some things were, and are no longer. This being the 
case, Kenningham concludes, it is impossible to maintain that all things which were, are. 
Our fathers sinned, and are not; therefore not aU things which were, are .81 There 
is, therefore, 
a Scriptural basis for the fori-nal rejection of temporal amplification. This is a carefully 
calculated assault, since Wyclif's views on the literal truth of every part of Scripture would 
have been well known by this time (as Kenningham's testimonies alone are sufficient to 
remind us). According to Wyclif himself, however, there need be no contradiction between 
the assumption that all things are (regardless of their particular relation to the present instant) 
and the statement of the prophet Jeremiah. In his later determination, Kenningham. cites 
Wyclif's seemingly casuistic distinction between a denial of the latter - which would 
presumably entail a denial of the literal truth of Scripture - and a denial that it is in fact the 
case that our fathers sinned, and are not. Such a distinction, though entailing, according to 
Kenningham, numerous contradictions in itself, 82 can only have been intended to resolve the 
apparent inconsistency between the principles of temporal amplification and the literal truth 
of the Bible. A further means of resolution is offered by Wyclif in the course of his other 
disputations with Kenningham. When Jeremiah states that 'Our fathers sinned, and are not', 
we are told, it is to be understood that they are not participating with us in our [worldly] 
imprisonment ('captivatio' ). 83 Kenningham. replies that by the same evidence, it could then 
be said that God and the angels are not, because they, by definition, do not suffer with us 
('non tribulantur nobiscum' ). 84 Though the latter proposition is true, the inference, according 
to Wyclif, is invalid. If it were not, then parallel inferences could be drawn to support it, 
which clearly they cannot. When Peter denies that he is a disciple of Christ, for example, he 
80 FZ, pp. 8-14 
81 FZ, pp. 8-9. 
82 FZ, pp. 52-3. 
83 FZ, p. 460 (Wyclio; p. 25 (Kenningham). 
84 Ibid. 
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says 'I am not' (John, 18: 25); it is impossible to infer from this, however, that God the Father, 
because he is not a disciple of Christ, is not. 85 
The debate between Wyclif and Kenningham. over the passage from Lamentations 
highlights the fundamental incompatibility of their respective views of time. What such a 
debate ultimately centred on, for Wyclif, was two very different perceptions of the nature of 
being. In Kenningham's philosophy, as we have seen, the distinction between essence and 
existence, which lay at the heart of Wyclif's particular form of temporal realism, was elided, 
and intelligible being, according to which past and ftiture instants had their reality, was 
reduced to a conceptual category. The contrast between these two perceptions is made clearer 
when Wyclif attempts to validate the theory of temporal amplification with his own selection 
of eight scriptural passages. Each of these, like those analysed in the Logicae Continuatio, 
86 
can be glossed appropriately, Wyclif suggests, only if time is understood in an amplified 
sense. The first five are taken from St Matthew's gospel, and present similar problems of 
interpretation: 'The blind see', 'the larne walk', 'the deaf hear', 'the lepers are cleansed', 'the 
poor have the gospel preached to them' (11: 5). 87 The first passage is the only one which 
receives detailed attention from either Wyclif or Kenningham, and Wyclif's interpretation is 
obscure. Earlier in time the blind see, he tells us, but afterwards with a vision opposed to 
their prior blindness. 88 Kenningham declares that neither from this, nor from any of the other 
four passages, either individually or collectively, does it follow that all that was, or will be, 
is. The amplification of time, he suggests, ultimately amounts to little more than a verbal 
operation: 
It does not follow that the blind see, therefore all that was, is, even if the 
opinion of my Master is admitted (namely that earlier in time the blind see, 
but later with a vision opposed to their prior blindness). Indeed, from such 
authorities no further conclusion follows, except that Scripture extends the 
signification of terms to connote past and future times. 89 
85 FZ, pp. 460-6 1 (NVyclif); p. 25 (Kenninghain). 
86 See Ch. 3 (section 2.4), above. 
87 FZ, p. 26. 
88 'prius tempore caeci vident postreme, visione opposita priori caccitati', FZ, p. 466. Cf. p. 27 (Kenningham's 
citation of the same passage, Nvith minor grammatical and orthographic variations). 
89 'Non enim sequitur caeci vident, ergo onme quod fuit cst; etiarn si admitatur opinio Magistri mei, scificet quod 
prius tempore caeci vident, posterius visione opposita, illi caccitati. Ex talibus enim auctoritatibus non plus 
sequitur conclusio.... nisi quod Scriptura extendit significationern tern-tinorum, ad connotandurn tempus 
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The sixth scriptural passage is taken from the Book of Amos, in which Amos declares, 'I am 
not a prophet, nor am I the son of a prophet, ' and then adds, 'but I am a herdsman plucking 
wild figs. ' (Amos, 7: 14). 90 According to Wyclif, Amos cannot have meant by these words 
that he was not a prophet, since we read in the same chapter that he later performs an act of 
prophecy. 91 When he claims to be plucking wild figs, moreover, 'nobody would dream that 
he was then plucking wild figS., 92 The two statements, rather, on Wyclif's reading, are to be 
interpreted according to specific senses, each of which, we are told, has the support of those 
exegetes who consider the text of Scripture in its entirety (with respect to senno, rather than 
isolated vox): 
It is taught that the [passage] from Amos, I am not a prophet, should be 
restricted to the sense, 'I am not a false prophet, as you, Amasias, ' or to the 
sense, 'I am not naturally, in myself, by species or genus, a prophet. ' For 
according to the proposition it is to be understood that he is not a prophet by 
his immediate father. Although it is certain, according to the scriptural inodus 
loquendi, that Amos is the son of Abraham and the son of Adam, both of 
whom, just as his other fathers, are great prophets in their time. And lest it is 
thought that Scripture thus restricts [lit. 'imprisons'] words in this way 
everywhere, a third is added, which is to be amplified by an elegant 
alternation: I anz a herdsinan plucking ivildfigs. 93 
Though only the last part of Amos's statement is said to depend on the amplification of time, 
the supposition that both Abraham and Adam are fathers, albeit not immediate fathers, of 
Amos, is crucially reliant on precisely the same principle. Wyclif's explanation recalls his 
practeritum vel futurum. ' FZ, p. 27. 
90 The most detailed analysis of Wyclif's treatment of this passage remains that of Beryl Smalley, 'The Bible and 
Eternity', pp. 85-6. 
91 'Ideo quando allegavi auctoritatem Amos prophetae libri sui cap. vii, 14, ubi ait Non stint propheta, necfilitis 
prophetae; per quarn innuere videtur se pro tunc non fuisse prophetarn, quia sensit sibi non adesse spiritum 
prophetiae; respondet Magister, et negat isturn, faisse sensum dicti sui; immo nititur adducere eundem textum 
contra me, co quod immediate post illud dictum legitur prophetasse, sicut patet in eodem capitulo... ' FZ, p. 7. 
92 'Sexta auctoritas quam Magister adducit pro positione sua est ilia de Amos, qui cum dixisset, Non stint 
propheta nec filius prophetae, statim subdidit sed stint annentaritts, inquit, vellicans sicomoros, ubi nemo 
somniat [quod tunc evulsit sicomoros]. ' FZ, p. 28. 
93 , 
... patet conferentibus 
Scripturam in sua integritate... quod Scripturajuvat seipsam pro sensibus postillandis: 
ut illud Amos Non stint propheta docetur restrictum ad ilium sensum, Non sum falsus propheta, ut tu Amasias, 
vel ad hunc sensum, Non sum naturaliter per me ex specie vel genere propheta; quia secunda propositio est 
intelligenda quod non est filius prophetae ex patre camali immediate : cum certum est, ad modum loquendi 
Scripturae, quod Amos est filius Abrahae, et filius Adam, quorum uterque, sicut et aiii patres sui, sunt prophetae 
magni pro tempore suo, et ne credatur Scripturam sacram utrobique sic incarcerare verba, addit tertio, pulchra 
alternatione amplificando, Sed annentarius stint vellicans sicontoros. ' FZ, p. 46 1. 
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statement in the Logicae Continuatio, concerning the paternal relation of David and Abraham 
to Christ, and of Adam. to all men, that all relatives are convertible in thne ('relativa [omnia] 
sunt covertibilia in tempore'). 94 Kenningham, following the Glossa Ordinaria, predictably 
argues for a very different interpretation. What Amos meant when he said that he was not a 
prophet was that the spirit of prophecy was lacking from him at that nzoinent. It is therefore 
valid to infer, suggests Kenningham, that he was indeed not a prophet. 95 As to his claim to 
have been plucking wild figs, he might well have been using the present tense improperly, 
since the common people, through ignorance, we are told, often used the present tense in 
relation to frequent and habitual acts. He could have been simply recollecting his foriner 
occupation as a cattle-herd, with the expectation that he would return to it. It was never 
assumed, after A, that he had perfon-ned an act of prophecy, and his prophecy had, after all, 
been condemned. 96 The amplification of time here, therefore, as in the five passages from 
Matthew, can be reduced to a verbal process which strictly entails no real temporal 
amplification at all. 
Implicit in Kenningham's treatment of all of the eight passages used by Wyclif is the 
assumption that past and future instants are not real categories. The amplification of being 
is reduced to an essentially logical or conceptual operation which, as in the case of 
propositional truth, is centred on the signification of ten-ns rather than their signiflcata. The 
philosophical underpinnings of this reduction are made explicit at the beginning of 
Kenningham's introductory treatise (Ingressits), following his initial rejection of the thesis 
that all things that were, or will be, are. It is suggested here that those authorities who support 
Wyclif, saying that all past and future things are present to God ('omnia praeterita et futura 
[sunt] praesentia Deo'), use the word 'present' equivocally. 97 There are, Kenningham argues, 
two distinct modes of predication associated with this term, the one objective and the other 
subjective. If 'present' is used objectively, in relation to the act of cognition ('in ratione 
cognoscendi'), then it is applied to something known immediately, by intuitive rather than by 
94Logicae Continuatio, p. 169 (the passage is cited and translated in full in Ch. 3 (section 2.4), above). 
95 Ticit enim glossa ibidem sic: "Spiritus non semper administrat prophetiarn prophetis, sed ad tempus; et tune 
recte vocantur prophetae cum illuminantur. Quod ergo ait, Non sunt propheta; intelligit modo. "' FZ, p. 7. 
9' '... quia Amos nunquam fuit assumptus ad praedicandum, crat armentarius et solebat vellere sicomoros, et 
verisimile sibi erat quod ad idem officium, rediret, co quod prophetia ejus contemnebatur: ideo pristinum staturn 
recolens, et forte propinquum credens, dixit se esse armentarium vellicantern sicomoros. ' FZ, pp. 28-9. 
97 Fz, P. ii 
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abstractive cognition. It is accordingly to be characterized as a 'respective' term, signifying 
the apprehension of an intellective power-98 Subjective presence, by contrast, refers to what 
is present at this instant, without any 'respective' connotation. 
" It is for this reason, 
Kenningharn claims, that doctors do not speak of all things being simply present to us, but 
only to God, since all things are known perfectly to him alone. According to Kenningham's 
two definitions, then, the human intellect intuitively perceives only what already occurs 
subjectively in the present instant, and can know the past or the future only by a process of 
abstraction. Its objective perceptions are therefore confined to the present instant. The 
divine intellect, however, perceives all instants intuitively. There is apparently nothing 
exceptional in any of these ideas, which would have been accepted by the majority of 
contemporary philosophers. 100 Where Kenningharn adopts a distinctively nominalistic 
stance, however, is in his refusal to admit that the past and future instants known to God have 
any proper degree of being, or 'subjective' presence, to him: 
According to this mode of speaking, it does not follow that a is present to 
God, therefore a is, any more than it follows that a is known to God, 
therefore a is. The exception is if the word 'being' is taken to refer to 
objective being, which would be an improper mode of speaking, and would 
be far removed from our proposition. ' 0' 
This argument, as Kenningharn suggests earlier in the same tract, can be proved in three ways. 
Firstly, by the necessary assumption that j3od knows all thingS'equally perfectly, and hence 
that present and possible things are both perfectly known by him. This perfect knowledge 0 
of possible things, Kenningham. argues, does not imply that those things actually are. It 
follows, therefore, that if something is possible but does not exist ('si a sit possibile non 
existens'), then God has intuitive knowledge of that thing, but without the thing itself having 
any kind of being ('esse' ). 102 Here, as elsewhere, Kenningham's argument relies on the 
98 Traesens vero obiective, sive in ratione cognoscendi, dicitur illud quod clare cognoscitur et immediate, non 
cognitione abstractiva sed intuitiva. Et sic iste terminus praesens est terminus respectivus connotans 
apprehensionern alicujus potentiae intellectivae. ' FZ, p. 11. 
99 'Subjective... praesens dicitur quod none est, vel in tempore praesenti, non includens respecturn, nisi solam 
coexistentiam secundum tempus vel instans. ' FZ, p. 11. 
100 See, for example, Wyclif's own comments on God's intuitive cognition of A past, present and future things. 
FZ, p. 463. 
101 'Et juxta istum modum loquendi non sequitur a est praesens Deo, ergo a est, plus quam sequitur, a est 
cogniturn a Deo, ergo a est: nisi forte accipiatur ly esse pro esse obiectivo, quod improprie diceretur, et multurn 
distaret a proposito nostro. ' FZ, p. 11. 
102 p- , Z, P. to. 
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assumption that any distinction between essence and existence (or potency and act) is, in real 
terms at least, meaningless. To this extent, the validity of the argument, for a realist thinker 
like Wyclif, would presumably be confined to a verbal level (the assumption being that 'esse' 
and 'existere' were being treated as synonyms). 
4. ANTiQuiTy, ETERN= AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AuTiioRiTy 
Temporal amplification, as Wyclif's numerous exegetical examples illustrate, provided 
a convenient solution to the difficult problem of relating the finite and the worldly to the 
infinite and eternal. Only with a proper understanding of this relationship, according to the 
realist hermeneutic of the Suninza de Ente, could the truth of Scripture be properly understood. 
Scripture was itself, however, in its ultimate form, eternal, and hence both anterior to, and 
older than, all worldly texts Oust as eternity, according to the theory of time contained in the 
Siannia de Ente, 'preceded' the first instant of time (tempits). 103) . As such, 
it also represented 
the supreme textual authority, whose every part was literally true. Wyclif perceived this 
relationship between antiquity, truth and authority as one of simple causation: antiquity 
represented the primary cause of truth and authority in the Book of Life. 
104 Such an 
apparently straightforward forinulation predictably encouraged some difficult questions from 
Kenningham. If antiquity was the cause of authority and truth, for example, would we not 
then have to concede that the works of certain ancient poets, though impossible fictions, were 
also true? 105 Would not such an argument also be inconsistent with Augustine's claim that 
the writings of Enoch, on account of their great antiquity, held no authority for either Jews or 
Christians (De Civitate Dei, bk 18, Ch. 38)? 106 Wyclif responded characteristically by 
highlighting the distinction between antiquity in time and antiquity as eternity. Only in the 
latter sense, in which it was identical with the eternity of God, could antiquity be the cause 
103 See Ch. 3, above. 
1ým F7, p. 15; pp. 454-456. 
105 This is the first of four similar objections cited by Wyclif at the beginning of his first deternlination against 
Kenningham. See FZ, pp. 455-456. 
106 FZ, p. 15. 
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of authority and truth in the Bible. In its other sense, it was simply irrelevant. ' 07 
Whether Kenningham had actually confused the two meanings of antiquitas, or at the 
very least ignored its most significant sense, as Wyclif was suggesting, is unclear. Such 
confusion would certainly be consistent with his conceptualist assumptions about past and 
future instants, as well as with his apparent hostility to realist metaphysics more generally. 
Though he denies that Wyclif's distinction does anything to invalidate his own arguments, 
he continues to use the term antiquitas in a way which effectively avoids the distinction 
altogether. In defending Augustine's suggestion about the writings of Enoch, for example, 
he makes the following point: 
... Augustine said that their very great antiquity was the reason why the 
books 
mentioned above are not authenticated by the Church. And so my master 
assumed greater antiquity for them than Augustine supposed, for [Augustine] 
was speaking only of the antiquity of time, and my master speaks of the 
antiquity of eternity. Therefore, if on account of temporal antiquity these 
same writings are held to be suspect by the Church, by how much more [are 
they held to be suspect] on account of their eternal antiquity ... 
log 
Kenningham. is here apparently assuming that Wyclif would have accepted Augustine's 
argument for the non-authentication of certain apocryphal texts, but would then have 
concluded that the etenzal antiquity of such texts served as its basis. This would obviously 
have run contrary to Wyclif's beliefs about eternity as the foundation of scriptural authority, 
and could easily be dismissed as a deliberate misconstrual. of the basic premises of his 
argument. 
In his second determination against Wyclif, Kenningharn makes his criticism more 
explicit. In his reply to Kenningham's arguments, we are told, Wyclif maintains that 'the 
writings of certain saints are held to be suspect by the Church on account of their eternal 
107 'Ne... laboremus in aequivocis, dico, antiquitas accipitur ad modum loquendi Scripturae et B. Dionysii pro 
acternitate Dei, et aliquando accipitur pro senio, vetustate, vel veterascentia rerum. entium. Prima antiquitas est 
causa quare Scriptura sacra est insolubiliter vera de vi sermonis, secundum quamlibet ejus partem; secunda autem 
antiquitas est sibi impertinens. ' FZ, p. 454. 
108 , ... Augustinus dixit quod nimia antiquitas fuit in causa quare praedicti libri non auctenticantur ab ecclesia. Et jam magister meus ponit multo majorem. antiquitatem corum. quarn posuit Augustinus, quia ipse non 
loquebatur nisi de antiquitate temporis, et Magister loquitur de antiquitate aeternitatis; ergo si propter 
antiquitatem temporalem habentur eadem scripta apud ecclesiarn suspecta, multo magis propter antiquitatern 
aeternam... ' FZ, p. 15. 
132 
antiquity' ('scripta quorundam sanctorum habentur apud ecclesiam suspecta, propter aetemam 
eorum antiquitatem'). 109 Kenningham responds predictably to this unlikely piece of logic, 
denying that etermal antiquity can serve either as the grounds for rejection of apocryphal 
texts, or as the basis of scriptural authority. The first part of his denial rests on the premise 
that 'no text of any author is prior to, or older than, that same author' ('Nullum scriptum 
alicuius auctoris est secundum mensuram prius, vel antiquius codem auctore'). "o As the 
creation of a human author, Kenningham argues, Enoch's text cannot itself be eternal, since 
no such author is eternal. It is not possible, therefore, for the Church to regard the text as 
suspect on account of its eternity. 111 If it were known by the Church, on the other hand, that 
books such Enoch's ivere eternal, then the Church would also know that they were true, rather 
than false, since no falsity is eternal. ' 12 
Though Wyclif would have agreed with each of these conclusions, which were not 
inconsistent, as we have seen, with his own metaphysical or broad exegetical assumptions, 
he would not have accepted so readily the premises on which they are based. Indeed, the 
prernises themselves expose some of the major differences between nonýiinalist and realist 
suppositions about the nature of authorship, intention, and authority. VAiilst it was obviously 
true, for example, that no physical text could possibly be older than the human author who 
had produced it, the 'intelligible' forin of that same text was by definition infinitely older. 
For Kenningham. and the nominalists, of course, such an intelligible text did not exist. Even 
if they had been willing to concede that it could do, this text was clearly not the same thing 
as the text of the human author (though the latter could be a sign of the former), and so could 
not, presumably, have invalidated the major premise of Kenningham's argument. 113 
109 FZ, p. 43. 
"Olbid. 
Ill. 
... tam Enoch, quarn alius quiscunque sanctus, creatus est solum temporalis et non aetemus a parte ante; ergo 
nullius eorum scripturn acternaliter est antiquum, et per consequens hujusmodi scripta non propter aeternam. 
eorum antiquitatern. habentur ecclesiae suspecta. ' FZ, p. 43. 
112 'Si notum esset ecclesiae quod tales libri sunt aeterni , et acqualiter antiqui, tune eadem ecclesia sciret quod 
sunt veri, cum nulla falsitas sit acterna; sed dato quod ecclesia sciret hujusmodi libros esse veros, tune non 
haberet eosdem suspectos; ergo non propter antiquitatern aeternarn suspecti sunt apud ecclesiam. ' FZ, p. 44. 
113 See the discussion of the theory of authorship presented in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae in Ch. 5 (section 
1), below. 
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The second part of Kenningham's denial draws again on the apparently misguided 
assumption that Wyclif treated eternal antiquity simply as an extension of finite time. Wyclif 
had used the idea of eternal antiquity to defend the authority of the book of Enoch. This, 
Kenningham suggests, implies that the eternity of canonical and apocryphal texts is the same, 
which, according to Augustine's criterion for non-authentication, is impossible: 
The antiquity of holy Scripture is the same as [that] of these apocryphal 
writings, namely eternity. But the reason why they are apocryphal is their 
great antiquity, as appears from Augustine. Therefore, holy Scripture does 
not hold its authority by virtue of this same antiquity. But my Master says the 
opposite ... 
1 14 
Though Kenningham's argument would have given Wyclif no reason to doubt his own 
convictions about the nature of authority, it would clearly have posed a threat to the broader 
acceptance of his views within the academy. In De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, he 
accordingly goes to great lengths to clarify his position on the philosophical bases of textual 
authority. ' 15 The question of textual authority, and of the authorities of different forms of 
textuality - material and intelligible - lay at the heart of the debate between realist and anti- 
realist (or nominalist) hermeneutic theorists. We must still ask, nevertheless, whether it is 
entirely appropriate to speak of a 'nominalist' theory of textuality. This, of course, must 
depend partly upon our assessment of the philosophical standing of the textual theorists 
themselves, which will be the subject of the following section. 
5. KENNINGHAM, NOMINALISM AND TExTuAL THEORY 
What emerges most clearly from the issues debated by Wyclif and Kenningham, despite 
the marked ideological divisions that separated them, is that neither 'nominalist' nor 'realist' 
- at least without substantial qualification - is adequate to describe either of them. The 
114 'Eadem est antiquitas Scripturae sacrae et talium apocryphorum, scilicet aeternitas; sed causa quare ista. scripta 
Sint apocrypha est nirnia antiquitas corum, sicut patet per B. Augustinum; ergo propter candern antiquitatem 
Scriptura sacra non capit auctoritatem; cuius oppositurn dicit Magister meus. ' FZ, p. 44 
115 See Ch. 5 (section 1.2). 
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reasons for this have less to do with the idiosyncratic nature of their respective approaches, 
which, as we have suggested, has been greatly exaggerated in historical accounts of the past 
century, ' 16 than with the problematic status of the categories themselves - and others like 
them - more generally. This has not been helped by the tendency, in histories of the 
development of nominalist philosophy, to blur the distinction between terms such as 
'nominalism', 'conceptualism', and 'terrninism'. At different stages of his argument, 
Kenningham could clearly be identified in terms of one or more of them, but there are also 
points at which the application of any of these categories would amount to a gross over- 
simplification at best. His rejection of the theory of real predication, for example, is clearly 
consistent with both nominalist metaphysics and the broad terminist emphasis on the primacy 
of the linguistic proposition as a determinant of truth. As we have seen, however, 
Kenningham, like Wyclif, was often at pains to dissociate himself from many of the more 
characteristic tendencies of terminist thought. Supposition theory and the general terminist 
preoccupation with the properties of terms, for example, are both treated by him as marginal 
- if not altogether dispensable - concerns for the serious philosopher or theologian. 
117 
The elements in Kenningham's thinking which bear the closest resemblance to 
nominalism generally, and to Ockhamism in particular, are those which relate to 
metaphysical, rather than to logical, problems. His understanding of the nature of being is 
perhaps the most obvious example, affecting, as it does, most other aspects of his 
philosophical system. Such an understanding is certainly anti-realist in its basic premises, and 
has much in common, as we have seen, with the ideas of earlier norriinalists. His rejection 
of the assumption that universals were realities exparte rei provides a superficial affirmation 
of his nominalist leanings. Though the problem of universals itself plays a relatively minor 
role in most of the debates between Kenningham and Wyclif, its underlying significance is 
never in doubt. Its fundamental position in Wyclif's hierarchy of nests is the best indication 
of its perceived importance, as well as of the threat which could result from its abuse. 118 
116 See Introduction and Ch. I (sections 4 and 5). 
117 In analysing Wyclif's argument relating to the identity of intelligible beings and the divine essence, 
Kenningham speaks disparagingly of those 'who do not suppose there to be truths beyond signs' ('ipsi... qui non 
ponunt veritates a parte rei'). See Fascicidi Zizanioruni, p. 75. 
118 Cf. the position of the theory of universals in Wyciirs first hierarchy of scriptural defences in De Veritate 
Sacrae Scriptitrae (discussed in Ch. 5 (section S. 1), below). 
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Though Kenningham's determinations are perhaps the best evidence we have that 
nominalism - or anti-realism - potentially posed as great a threat in the late fourteenth century 
as Wyclif suggests, their significance extends far beyond their basic philosophical orientation. 
At least as important is the recognition within them of what was at stake - in ternis of textual 
and hermeneutic authority - for each of the respective philosophical parties. Wyclif's 
realism raised his own arguments and interpretative strategies effectively beyond the realm 
of doubt, whilst consigning those of his anti-realist opponents to the realms of irrelevance 
and inefficacy. Those who refused to admit the existence of intelligible natures were bound 
not only to misunderstand the nature of truth and predication, but were also blinding 
themselves to the true nature and significance of the Scriptures. The language of the Bible, 
and the logic which governed its composition and interpretation, were in their proper sense 
not subject to the laws of human interpretative communities at all. As Kenningham. 
recognized, this effectively ruled out any possibility of meaningful debate with Wyclif. 
[It is] quite difficult to find arguments against the opinion of such a doctor; 
for my arguments are nothing but wooden arrows to attack a nest which is 
outside the temporal world; they are as the stones of children thrown against 
the Pleiades; indeed, such is the comparison between a starred heaven and a 
spider's web, as is the difference between my reasons and the judgement of 
my master. Such grand words of the doctor, so solemn in meaning and style, 
come close to confusing me, for I know that neither Aristotle, nor the great 
Augustine said such things ... 
119 
Despite the manifest political advantages of a philosophical system which claimed to be 
founded on intelligible, pre-linguistic truths, any such system, as Kenningham clearly 
perceived, was itself potentially subject to the very constraints and conventions it sought to 
transcend. The desire Wyclif expresses in the De Ente Prinio in Conzinuni to dispense with 
the liber inaterialis completely, 120 and to attend to the eternal truths of the Book of Life, is 
one which was almost by definition unrealizable, as his own exegetical writings serve to 
illustrate. Many of Wyclif's own interpretative procedures, moreover, despite his numerous 
claims to the contrary, rest heavily on key assumptions about the nature of conventional signs 
119'... difficile satis [estj invenire colores contra opinionern tand Doctoris; cum argumenta mea non sint nisi baculi 
arundinei, ad impugnandum nidum qui est extra globum temporalium, et quasi lapides puerorum projecti contra 
Pleiades; immo qualis est comparatio inter coelum stellaturn, et telarn araneae, talis est differentia inter rationes 
meas, et sententiarn Magistri mei. Vere hujusmodi grandia verba Doctoris tam solemnis in scientia et sermone 
paene confundunt me, quia scio quod nee Aristoteles, nee magnus Augustinus talia dixerit... ' FZ, p. 67. 
120 See Ch. 2 (section 5), above. 
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and logical operations. This is true in particular, according to Kenningham, in the case of the 
concept of ampliatio temporis. What amplification amounted to for him, as we have seen, 
was not any extension of time itself, in the real world, but rather the extension of the simple 
signification of the words. Wyclif himself, therefore, could claim to be little better than the 
philosophers he was so eager to criticise: 
[Wyclif] does not amplify time externally, because its amplitude is not 
determined by the power of [the word 'is']; nor does he amplify any signified 
truth, since every such [truth] is caused by God, and is limited by him alone... 
Therefore only the sign, in terms of its signification, receives such 
amplification. And thus my master seems to do an injury to himself by 
disparaging the doctors of signs. 121 
Without signs, Kenningham argues, the Church would not be able to administer the 
sacraments, and the faith could not be taught. The rule andjudgement of the Scriptures could 
likewise not be exercised in any other way than through a series of signs. 
Kenningham's attempts to reinstate language and logic as significant deten-ninants of 
scriptural meaning highlight some of the most fundamental divisions between realist and anti- 
realist interpretative procedures. Among the most important of these are undoubtedly those 
which relate to the status of metaphorical language. Both Kenningham and Ockham, as we 
have shown, regarded metaphor as a secondary, indirect form of expression. Their particular 
reasons for doing so were clearly quite different, but were in each case compatible with the 
basic assumptions of nominalist thinking. Whether Kenningham would have endorsed 
Ockham's views in the form in which we find them must remain a mystery (since he 
nowhere addresses the issue of univocity and analogy explicitly), 122 but it is certain that he 
could have rejected none of them easily on philosophical grounds alone. Kenningham's views 
on time and predication, moreover, which form the basis of his own rejection of metaphorical 
language, find clear support in Ockham's philosophical writings (albeit in a very different 
context). 123 
121 . 
... tempus extra non ampliat, eo quod amplitudo cius non subiacet potestati 
illius; nec ampliat aliquam 
veritatem signatam, cum omnis talis sit causata a Deo, et ab eo solo limitata... Ergo solum signum quantum ad 
significationem recipit huiusmodi ampliationem: et sic Magister meus sibi ipsi facere videtur iniuriam, 
vituperendo doctores signorum. ' FZ, p. 64. 
122 For Ockham's interpretation of metaphor see Ch. 2 (section 3), above. 
123 On Ockham's rejection of real predication, see Ch. 3, above. 
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This shared distrust of metaphor, not surprisingly, had comparable effects on the 
exegetical practice of the two philosophers. The strict literalistic method for which Ockham 
has become renowned, 124 for example, was also applied, with essentially the same emphasis, 
by Kenningham. In both the first and the second deten-ninations, Kenningharn suggests that, 
as expositors of Scripture, we should not seek to imitate the figurative expressions it contains, 
but rather to explain their meaning in plain language. 125 This insistence on working with the 
mediated literal sense, rather than with the inu-nediate figurative meaning, is reminiscent of 
Aquinas's treatment of the literal sense in his Stanina Theologiae. The literal sense, for 
Aquinas, encompassed both the meanings of literal passages as they stood (in the case of non- 
metaphorical language), and of figurative passages whose literal meanings had been arrived 
at by a process of translation (in the case of metaphor or grammatical figuration). 126 Only 
from this sense, Aquinas argued, which formed the basis of all others, was it possible to 
develop proper logical arguments. 127 Kenningham was more extreme than Aquinas, who did, 
at least, allow exegetes and preachers to use figurative language outside the context of strict 
logical argumentation. ' 28 Such usage, for Kenningham, led only to needless confusion. 
Whether either Kenningham's or Ockham's literalism can be called a direct 
consequence of nominalist thinking must remain an open question. There were, after all, 
literalists (Aquinas himself being the key example) whose philosophical opinions were 
fundamentally incompatible with the basic assumptions of nominalism. Both Ockham and 
Kenningham, moreover, were working at a time of renewed logical rigour in the Schools, 
which exerted its own demands on exegetical procedures. Nevertheless, it is clear that there 
was, in each case, a firm philosophical basis for the negative assessement of figurative 
language. If nothing else, literalism was conveniently consistent with the more general 
premises of their respective epistemological systems. 
124 Ockham's literalism is discussed by Minnis, ' 'Authorial Intention' and 'Literal Sense' ', pp. 22-3. 
125 FZ, pp. 27-28-, pp. 68-70. 
126 This latter kind of meaning was known as the sensus parabolicus, which was seen to be contained within the 
literal sense, despite being mediated figuratively: '... sensus parabolicus sub litterali continetur, name per voces 
significatur aliquid proprie et aliquid figurative; nec est litteralis sensus ipsa figura, sed id quod estfigurattlin' 
Suinnia Theologide, ia. 1,10, res. ad 3 (my italics). 
127 . 
... omnes sensus fundentur super unum, scilicet litteralem. Ex quo solo potest trahi argumentum, non autem 
ex his quac secundurri allegoriarn dicuntur... ' Sumnia Theologiae, ia. 1,10, res. ad. 1. 
128 See Summa Theologide, ia. 1,9, res. ad 1-3 
138 
By focusing attention on the linguistic operations underlying both metaphorical and 
temporal expressions, and by highlighting Wyclif s own paradoxical dependence on the 
structures and conventions of language, Kenningham was effectively shifting emphasis away 
from the divine author and back towards human intention. This is a significant point to note, 
since it was a distinctive assumption of both non-iinalists and terminists, as William 
Courtenay has observed, that language and logic were fundamentally human, rather than 
natural structures. 129 As such, for Kenningharn at least, they were also structures which were 
subject to the control of human authors and translators, as well as to the norms and 
expectations of individual linguistic communities. The interpretation of scriptural texts, no 
less than that of any other form of discourse, therefore depended crucially on a full 
understanding of the human customs and intentions underlying them. Not surprisingly, 
human intention is invoked frequently by Kenningham as a means of justifying many of his 
own interpretations of metaphorical passages from the Bible. I-Es analysis of the problematic 
statement of the prophet Amos ('I am a herdsman plucking wild figs') is a very typical 
example, resting ultimately, as we have seen, on assumptions about the nature of popular 
language. The 'intentional' truth of a scriptural passage could often be defended when its 
literal meaning was false, as in the case of 'the blind see' (Matthew, 11: 5). 
130 In such cases, 
human intention, whether that of an author, translator, or speaker, supplied the basic means 
of preserving the truth of scriptural language. The intention of an author or translator could 
also be appealed to in cases of apparent grammatical inconsistency, such as those which were 
explained by Wyclif in terms of temporal amplification. For Kenningham, these could be 
explained as further examples of linguistic variation among speakers. 
Kenningham's arguments, then, though they reveal some of the real dangers which 
nominalist assumptions might have posed for Wyclif's hermeneutic system, were not 
necessarily themselves infonned by mainstream nominalist thinking. In real terms, this 
makes little difference to the claim that Wyclif was fundamentally opposed to anti-realist 
129 'Antiqui and Modenzi in Late Medieval Thought', Jounal of the History ofIdeas, 48/1 (1987), 3-11 (p. 7). 
Courtenay opposes terminism to the 'modism' of continental thinkers like Thomas of Erfurt, which rested on 
essentially realist assumptions about the nature of language. Though modistic logic did not last into the second 
half of the fourteenth century, the known hostility of the modists to both non-dnalism and terminism provides an 
interesting parallel to the later reaction of Wyclif and his followers. 
130 FZ, p. 28. 
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metaphysics, nor to our assessment of the philosophical coherence and consistency of 
Kenningfiam's critique of his opponent's teaching. The relationship between Kenningham's 
philosophical and hermeneutic convictions, moreover, can leave us in no doubt as to the 
subversive potential of particular forms of anti-realism (whether we choose to identify these 
as 'nominalisms' or not). His views on the nature of truth and time, as we have seen, served 
as the basis for his rejection of Wyclif's conception of literalistic interpretation. As such, they 
challenged not only a fundamental interpretative paradigm, but a much broader conception 
of textuality and authority. They threatened to restore to prorriinence all of those aspects of 
the interpretative process which Wyclif's metaphysic sought to deny or to obscure: human 
agency and intention, the active role of the interpretative community in the production of 
meaning, and the conventions (which modem linguists would describe as 'pragmatic') 
associated with figurative and other indirect forms of language. 
131 Wyclif was clearly 
sensitive to the implications of Kenningharn's critique of his hermeneutic method, and to the 
threat posed by his rejection of the metaphysical principle of intelligibles on which it rested. 
This much is clear from his own determination against the Carmelite. In De Veritate Sacrae 
Scriptitrae, Kenningham's arguments seem still to have been very much in his rriind, as is 
suggested by the defensive rhetoric he employs in his discussion of intelligible natures, real 
universals and temporal amplification throughout this later tract. The relationship between 
Kenningham's remarks and the hermeneutic theory of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae will be 
considered in Ch. 5, which will focus on the philosophical connections between Wyclif's 
mature hermeneutic views and the material of the Sunima de Ente. It will be argued that, 
besides representing an evolutionary progression, the exegetical concepts and strategies of the 
later work also stand as tacit concessions to key arguments in Kenningharn's critique of realist 
hermeneutics. 
131 Pragmatic considerations pertain to those aspects of meaning which rely on inferences of the speaker or the 
speech community. See Stephen C. Levinson, Pranwfics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Ch. 
I. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FROM THEORY TO EXEGESIS: SIGNIFICATION, INTERPRETATION AND 
TEXTUAL AUTHORITY IN DE VERITATE SACRAE SCRIPTURAE 
Wyclif wrote De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, his major treatise on Scriptural interpretation, 
in 1378, at a point still relatively early in his theological career., This was the fourth 
volume of his massive theological sinnina, composed inimediately after his controversial 
thesis on dominion, De Civili Donzinio. The political consequences of this work, and the 
hostile reaction of Pope Gregory XI to conclusions published within it, have tended to cast 
a shadow over Wyclif's philosophical activities in the Oxford theology faculty at this time. 2 
The perceived relationship between Wyclif's metaphysical convictions and the strong 
element of antifraternalism in the works published after De Veritate Sacrae Scriptilrae, 
moreover, has ftirther detracted from the philosophical significance of this text. 3 The close 
interdependence of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, the Suninza de Ente and the Logicae 
Continuatio has consequently attracted far less attention than it deserves, and still awaits 
a comprehensive and systematic investigation. 
The present chapter will focus on the development of the key hermeneutic concepts 
explored in Chapters 2 and 3- those of analogy, 'real' predication and the apprehension 
of textual and extra-textual meaning - and will investigate the plausibility of extending the 
claims made for anti-nominalist rhetoric in the early philosophical works to the texts of De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. It will be argued that, despite the very different contexts 
surrounding the production of the Suinina de Ente and De Vefitate Sacrae Scripturae, the 
latter having been composed with the exegete, rather than the philosopher or speculative 
1 On the dating of the tractate, see Thomson, Latin Writings, pp. 55-7. 
2 On the papal response to the conclusions of De Civili Doininio, see Kenny, 117yclif, pp. 53-55; Workman, 
John IVyclif, vol. ii, pp. 293-313; McFarlane, John IV)-clifand the Beginnings of English Non-confornlity, pp. 
83-88. 
3 On Wyclif's hostility to the friars, which followed largely from their rejection of his controversial theory of 
eucharistic remanence, see Penn Szittya, The Anti-fraternal Tradition in Medieval English Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 152-182. 
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theologian in mind, 4 the assumptions of metaphysical realism continue to be perceived as 
principles fundamental to the hermeneutic process. The effects of this form of realism, 
moreover, can now be seen to extend beyond the confines of theological sign theory - 
within which the hen-neneutic principles of the Suninza de Ente were conceived - and into 
the domain of textual theory proper. The rules of analogy, to take the most obvious 
example, are employed in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae not merely as a means of 
interpreting theological propositions (as is to be expected), but also as an interpretative 
paradigm for the terms and concepts of the hermeneutic enterprise itself. This tendency 
was already visible in the Stannia de Ente, in which we find analogy at work in the 
interpretation of fundamental hermeneutic and metaphysical terms such as 'being', 'logic', 
'truth' and 'universal'. In De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, however, the list is extended to 
include 'author', 'authority', 'book' and 'sense', all of which are found to be properly 
intelligible only in analogical terms. Exactly how such an extended system of analogical 
interpretation might have been received among contemporary exegetes must remain a 
matter for speculation. Unlike other aspects of Wyclif's metaphysical teaching (his theory 
of universals, intelligible natures and 'real' predication being the most obvious), the 
principles of analogy were often invoked without any recourse to explicit theorization. 
This would clearly have made them less outstanding targets for intellectual debate or assault 
at the hands of theoreticians like Kenningham. There can be little doubt, nevertheless, that 
the analogical system of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae would have provoked hostile 
responses from contemporary academic opponents of Wyclif. The disparaging references 
to Oxford philosophers and logicians within the treatise are a good indication that he was 
still very acutely aware of the threats posed by such figures. In his defence of the principles 
of scriptural truth, moreover, he is quite explicit about the dangers of an anti-realist 
philosophical outlook. Beyond the predictable problems Wyclif identifies within it (most 
of which follow from arguments presented in the Stannia de Ente), such an outlook would, 
of course, have made a nonsense of the analogical process. 
4 By the end of the Middle Ages, in part as a consequence of the rise of Aristotelianism in the twelfth century, 
theology and exegesis were operating effectively as independent disciplines. The marked difference in 
emphasis between the Suninia de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae, therefore, was far from unusual. 
See Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible, pp. 293-4. 
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The principles of analogy will be analysed below within both their traditional, and 
their extended hermeneutic contexts. Within the latter context, the concepts of the book 
(liber), the author (auctor) and authority (auctoritas) will be examined in detail. The 
implications of analogism for two other key ideas in Wyclif's hermeneutic programme - 
those of intentionality and language - will also be considered, principally within the context 
of the scriptural philosophy developed in the Suninza de Ente and the Logicae Continuatio. 
In the concluding section, Wyclif's metaphysical 'weapons' (annaturae), which draw 
conspicuously on the key metaphysical concepts of the Stunina de Ente - those of ideas, 
universals, real predication and anipliatio temporis - will be presented and analysed in 
turn. The introduction of the 'weapons' in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae is among the 
most explicit gestures Wyclif makes towards nominalist hermeneutic methods in the 
tractate. Though no nominalist is mentioned, there can be little doubt that contemporary 
anti-realists such as John Kenningham - who had opposed Wyclif, as we have seen, on 
precisely those issues embodied in the 'defences' - would have been among the primary 
targets. 
1. ANALOGY AND THE THEORY OF THE TEXT: DBER, A UCTOR, A UCTORITAS 
The questions of textuality, authorship and authority were seldom far removed from 
each other in scholastic theoretical discourse. 
5 In De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae, the 
principles of analogy provide a further conceptual link between the three, as well as serving 
implicitly to validate the hermeneutic metalanguage of which they are a part. As in the 
Suinnia de Ente, Wyclif focuses consistently upon the errors which arise if the principles 
of analogy - and implicitly, those of realist metaphysics more generally - are misapplied 
or simply ignored. Once again, it is those who choose to dwell upon the secondary 
analogate (in this case, the material codex, the human author, or worldly authority), rather 
than attempting to see beyond it, who are found to be the principal offenders. Among them 
5 For an overview of medieval conceptions of textual authority (and an analysis of the connections between 
this and the related probems of textuality and authorship), see Jacqueline T. Miller, Poetic License: Authority 
andAuthorship in Medieval and Renaissance Contexts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Introduction 
and Ch. 1. Scholastic theories of authorship are analysed in A. J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: 
Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages. 2nd ed. (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1986). 
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Wyclif would certainly have included Kenningham, and there is a strong likelihood that his 
remarks on authority in particular were being made with Kenningham's objections in mind. 
The textual implications of a neglect of the principles of analogy are far reaching, as 
Wyclif's analyses of the three related concepts illustrate. Like the materialistic scholars 
described in the Siannia de Ente, those who confine their attention to the physical text and 
the intention of the human author - who would have included, in Wyclif's mind, any 
nominalist or anti-realist - can have knowledge only of the world of existence (the lowest 
form of being). 6 In textual terms, this renders them incapable both of apprehending 
authoritative truths, and of making any proper claim to authority in their own discourses. 
Most importantly, as Wyclif reveals, it blinds them to the true nature of the book (liber) 
of Scripture itself, the authoritative text par excellence. 
1.1 Liber and Codex 
The question of the definition of the book (liber), and hence of the nature of a 
particular form of textuality, is introduced in the sixth chapter of De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, in which Wyclif considers an objection to his central thesis that Scripture is true 
in all of its parts. The objection is typical of the many which are cited in De Veritate 
Sacrae Scripturae, and betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of precisely those 
principles which enabled the mind to see beyond the secondary analogate (here, the codices 
scriptorian): 
... it is argued that 
it is not inconsistent [to say that] Scripture is false, since 
Scripture is nothing but the books of writers [codices scriptorian], and it 
is no wonder, when [these writers] are themselves more false than usual, if 
the works of their craft [ars] are more than usually falsified. 7 
This point, which has clearly been carefully chosen, invites the predictable response that 
neither material books (codices) nor sensible signs (signa sensibilia) are holy Scripture, 
which is rather a 'signified' truth (veritas signata), exisiting beyond books or signs. This 
6 See Ch. 2 (section 2), above. 
7, 
... arguitur, quod non est 
inconveniens scripturam sacram esse falsam, cum non sit scriptura nisi codices 
scriptorum, qui, cum sint plus falsi quarn solebant, non est mirum, si opera artis sue sint plus solito falsificata. ' 
De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, ed. in three volumes by Rudolf Buddensieg (London: TrUbner, 1905), vol. 
i, p. 107. 
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idea very clearly recalls Wyclif's desire, expressed in the Sionnia de Elite, to see beyond, 
and ultimately to dispense with, the liber niaterialis. 8 There are, he suggests, if the material 
book is itself included, five different forms of Scripture, ranging from the most to the least 
perfect. The hierarchical scheme which he presents follows the familiar Dionysian 
metaphysical pattern of the Sianina de Ente, and bears a very obvious similarity to the five- 
part classification of universals presented in De Universalibus 9: 
I have been accustomed to assuming five levels of holy Scripture: Firstly it 
is the Book of Life, of which we are told in Apocalypse 20 and 21; 
secondly, it is the truths inscribed in the Book of Life according to their 
intelligible being. And both kinds of Scripture are absolutely necessary, 
differing not according to their essential natures, but by reason, as it is 
explained in De Ydeis. In the third sense, Scripture is taken to be the truths 
which are to be believed according to their kind, which either according to 
their existence or effect are written in the Book of Life. Fourthly, it is truth 
to be believed as it is written in the book of natural man, as the soul. Some 
say that this kind of Scripture is the totality of acts and truths listed under 
the third heading; some say that it is an intellectual habit; and some say that 
it is an intention or an idea. But in the fifth sense, holy Scripture is the 
books, words and other artefacts, which are the signs by which prior truths 
are recollected. 10 
The Book of Life and the truths inscribed within it, like divine ideas and the divine essence 
(as we learn from the Siannia de Ente and from Wyclif's disputations with Kenningham), 
are only notionally distinct. There are, therefore, strictly speaking, only four levels of 
Scripture, the highest of which, in its two different forms, is kept wholly separate from the 
See Ch. 3, above. 
9 The correspondence between these two schemes has been observed by a number of commentators. See Jesse 
Gellrich, Discourse and Donzinion in the Fourteenth Century: Oral Contexts of Writing in Philosophy, 
Politics and Poetry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 91; Kantik Ghosh, 'Authority' and 
Interpretation in Wycliffite, Anti- Wycliffite and Related Texts: c. 1375 - c. 1430 (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1995), p. 46 n. 75. On the classification of universals in De Univcrsalibus, see Ch. 
3, above. 
10. 
... solebarn ponere quinque gradus scripture sacre: primus est 
liber vite, de quo Apoc. vicesimo et vicesimo 
uno, secundus; est veritates libro vite inscripte secundum esse earum intelligibile, et utraque istarum 
scriptuarum est absolute necessaria, non differens essencialiter, sed secundurn rationern, ut dictum est in 
materia De Ydeis. tercio sumitur scriptura pro veritatibus credendis in gcnere, que secundum existenciam 
vel effecturn inscribuntur libro vite. quarto sumitur scriptura pro veritate credenda, ut inscribitur libro horninis 
naturalis ut anima, quarn scripturam, quidam vocant agregatum ex actibus et veritatibus tercio modo dictis, 
quidam, quod est habitus intellectivus, et quidam, quod est intencio vel species. sed quinto modo surnitur 
scriptura sacra pro codicibus, vocibus aut aliis artificialibus, que sunt signa memorandi veritatem priorem... ' 
De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 108-9. 
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other three. The lowest, Wyclif suggests, can be understood in two different ways 
(according to a basic scholastic distinction). Either it is to be taken personally and 
concretely, in which case it is simply the material signs of the books themselves, regardless 
of what they signify, orsimply, assigns signifying the intention of God. " Itisinthelatter 
sense, he tells us, that he himself understands the 'sensible' form of holy Scripture 
(scriptura sacra sensibilis). 12 To understand it in the first of the two senses would be to 
think as a terminist or 'doctor of signs' (doctor signorian), a member of the broad group 
of thinkers regularly castigated in the Suninza de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. 
Both terminists and non-tinalists were clearly perceived by Wyclif as belonging to a single 
group of scholars, united not necessarily by a common set of philosophical concerns, but 
by a more general concern with knowledge of the lowest kind (the notitia coil (sa, or 
sense-knowledge which appears at the bottom of Wyclif's hierarchy of perception in the 
Suinina de Elite 13). Whilst noiriinalists rejected analogy on ontological grounds, tern-linists, 
for whom signs were themselves the primary objects of knowledge, would have had no real 
need to draw upon such apparently extraneous principles. 
Here, as in the works of the Summa de Ente, Wyclif is clearly anxious to separate the 
sign (in this case, a sequence of words on a page), from its prior cause and signatIIIII. 
Christ, he suggests, understands Scripture in terms of the first of the five definitions, as we 
learn from John 10, where we are told, 4he scripture cannot be broken'. 14 By the term 
liber, therefore, we should understand 'book' as an intelligible entity, rather than as the 
books (codices) of men. The analogical relationship between the Book of Life and the 
books of men is emphasized by the parallelism between the five different forms of 
Scripture and the hierarchy of universals from the Sununa de Ente. The principles of 
11 This distinction is usually applied to modes of supposition. Personal supposition occurs when a term 
supposits for an individual in the world (in this case, the verbal signs written in codices). Simple supposition, 
as we suggested in Ch. 3 (section 1), occurs when a term stands for a general significate. Since Wyclif 
regarded this as a universal nature, it had to be 'signs signifying the intention of God' (considered in their 
universal aspect) in this case. 
12 , sed hoc potest multipliciter intelligi, vel personaliter et concretive pro illis signis quornodocunque 
signaverint, vel simpliciter pro illis, ut signant sensum dei; et sic intelligo ego scripturam sacram sensibilem. ' 
De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 109. 
13 See Ch. 2 (section 5), above. 
14 John 10.35. 
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analogy are evoked more explicitly when Wyclif tells us that the Scripture which we find 
in sensible words and books is only holy Scripture in an equivocal sense. It is referred to 
as Scripture, he suggests, on account of sindlitude merely, just as a painting of a man is 
called a man. This latter comparison, farriihar from Wyclif's classification of the different 
kinds of analogy in De Logica, suggests that the relationship between scriptural codices and 
the Book of Life is to be understood in terms of analogy of attribution, the weakest form 
of analogy. 15 As a divine idea, Scripture is at once most proper and most holy. It is most 
proper because 'it is written in the form of the highest wisdom', and its writing is 'so proper 
to God that it cannot be communicated by another nature. ' It is most holy because of the 
sacredness of its subject, the strength of its meaning, and the utility of its purpose. Like 
Christ himself, we are told, it was sent to the world for the good of mankind. 
The advantages of interpreting Scripture in analogical terms becomes clear when 
Wyclif enumerates the logical consequences of the mistaken view that it is simply one 
material text among many: 
[If this were the case], all holy Scripture could be spoiled by a cobbler, 
could take its authority from a mere scribe; indeed, it would be capable of 
being destroyed by a dog and, as a thing which can be blemished, could be 
corrected by a clown. And all Scripture would be translatable to heresy by 
any man as he pleased, would be damnable and capable of being opposed, 
with neither virtue, direction, nor honour - and consequently without 
authority. ' 6 
The written form of Scripture, as a secondary analogate, can properly have no significance 4: 3 
except in respect of the primary analogate (the Book of Life) which it signifies. Crucially, 
as Wyclif is to explain in detail later in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, this also means that 
in itself, it has no authority. 17 From the perspective of the human reader, however, this 
secondary analogate provides the only means by which any conception of Scripture in its 
highest form can be arrived at. Wyclif is clearly not seeking to deny this, but rather to 
15 See Ch. 2 (section 1), above. 
16 & 
... sic esset omnis scriptura viciabilis a sutore, autorizabilis a scriba, ymmo 
a cane solubilis et corrigibilis 
a scurra sicut maculabilis , et omnis scriptura 
foret a quotlibet hominibus hereticabilis, dampnabilis et 
adversabilis, nullius virtutis directive vel honoris et per consequens nullius autoritatis. ' De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. I 11. 
17 See section 1.2 of the present chapter. 
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ensure that the written signs of the scriptural codices do not also become signata in their 
own right (as they had apparently become for the materialistic nominalists and terminists 
of the Oxford Arts faculty). In the ninth chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, he is 
willing to concede that the material codex has a very significant part to play in our 
apprehension of the higher forms of Scripture. Holy Scripture, we are told here, is 'an 
aggregate of the codex and the holy meaning which the catholic takes from that material, 
as a sign'. 18 The diversity of human understanding, however, means that there are as many 
forms of material Scripture, understood in terms of the fifth and final category listed in 
Chapter 6 of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, as there are catholic readers of the codices. 
19 
Nevertheless, Wyclif suggests, the act of understanding is more truly holy Scripture than 
are lines on a page, which ar, - only holy insofar as they approximate to that act. 
Likewise, 
the Scripture of the mind (scriptura mentis) is itself only holy by virtue of the objective 
scripture (scriptura obiectiva) which it apprehends. 
20 
Wyclif's analogical conception of the scriptural text, whilst open to philosophical 
criticism from logicians who rejected the notion of intelligible being, was not in itself 
controversial. The issues of textual authority which such a hierarchical conception of the 
book brought with it, however, must have provoked angry responses both from within and 
outside the academy. Kenningham, as we have seen, had been highly critical of Wyclif's 
pronouncements on the nature of authority and authorship. The effiýcts of this criticism are 
clearly evident in the more detailed analysis of these concepts presented in De Veritate 
Sacrae Scripturae. Kenningham would have been regarded by Wyclif as one among the 
many who were squandering their intelletual resources on the problems and processes of 
human authorship and authority. His rejection of Wyclif's conception of authority, 
however, would also have placed him on a level with those who would confuse the 
authority of Scripture and the Decretals. Nominalists and papalists, it would seem, were 
18 Knam sacra scriptura est aggregatum ex codice et sensu vel sentencia sacra, quani catholicus habet de illa 
materiali ut signo. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae, vol. i, p. 189. 
19 1 
... ex quo patet quod, quotquot sunt catholice 
intelligentes codices scripture sacre, et idem materiale in 
numero, to sunt scripture sacre quinto modo dicte propter diversitatern actus intelligendi. ' De Veritate 
Sacrae 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. 189. 
20 'ilia enim mentalis intelleccio est verius scriptura quarn lineacio membrane, que non est scriptura sacra, nisi 
per habitudinern ad illam, nee scriptura mentis est sacra, nisi per scripturarn obiectivam, quam concepit. ' De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 189. 
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not systematically distinguished in Wyclif's mind (not, that is, as far as potential 
hermeneutic error was concerned). His theories of authorship and authority will be 
examined in detail in the following section, and will be related explicitly, where 
appropriate, to Kenningham's critique. 
1.2 Auctoritas and the Auctor 
The realist conception of divine and human authority brought with it a group of very 
distinctive problems. Wyclif's understanding of the complementary concepts of authorship 
and authority, moreover, highlight some of the most significant connections between the 
philosophy of the Sunnna de Ente and the exegetical theory of De Veritate Sacrae 
Scriptyrae. Many of the issues Wyclif attempts to address in his treatment of authorship 
relate directly to the problems inherent in the conception of truth, intention and speech he 
presents in the Stannia de Ente .21 These, as we 
have shown, had already attracted the 
attention of Kenningham, whose question on the nature of scriptural truth is left without an 
entirely satisfactory answer. 22 In the fifteenth chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, 
though not mentioning Kenningharn. by name, Wyclif provides what perhaps comes closest 
to a response to this earlier question. The problem under discussion is the familiar one of 
truth to divine intention. Since all truths are produced in accordance with the intention of 
God, as Wyclif has argued in the Suninza de Ente, then all must be of equal authority: 
It seems firstly that every truth is of equal authority with every other. For 
every truth, insofar as it is such, is the word of the Lord. Every word of the 
Lord is of equal authority with everv other, first because it is essentially the 
highest authority, and then because it proceeds from the same author. 
Therefore every truth is of equal truth with any other. 23 
21 See Ch. 3 (section 1), above. 
22 See Ch. 4 (section 2.2), above. 
23 , et videtur primo, quod onmis veritas sit paris autoritatis cum qualibet. Nam ornnis veritas in quantum 
huiusmodi est verburn domini, omne verburn domini est paris autoritatis cum quolibet, turn quia est 
essencialiter summa autoritas, turn eciam quia ab equali autore procedit, igitur ornnis veritas est equalis 
veritatis cum qualibet. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 390. 
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Wyclif's claim is met with the predictable objection that if every truth is equal, then so 
would be the authority of any proclaimer or recorder of that truth. As we soon discover, 
however, this objection rests on the mistaken assumption that the authority of truth can be 
gauged by the authority of the human author (the auctor ininediatits). If this were so, 
Wyclif argues, then three unacceptable conclusions about the nature of authority and 
authorship in Scripture would follow. First, we would have to assume that the word of 
Christ is infinitely more authoritative than the word of any other author of Scripture. The 
words of all authors of Scripture, however, as Wyclif is at pains to point out elsewhere, are 
equal expressions of the intention of God, and should therefore be equally true. Similarly, 
we would have to assume that the authors of the New Testament - Peter, John, James, 
Matthew, Judas, Mark and Luke - wrote with different degrees of authority, since in life 
they differed both in terms of sanctity and authority. This, Wyclif suggests, is apparently 
inconsistent, since we learn in Acts 3 that they spoke with one voice. Lastly, we would 
have to concede either that the Decretals are of the same authority as the writings of Saint 
Peter, and hence more authoritative than the writings of any other saint (including Saint 
Paul), or, by attending to the sanctity of the author's life, or to the truth of his message 
(sentencia), that the writings of the four fathers of the Church (Ambrose, Augustine, 
Jerome, Gregory) hold greater authority than the Decretals of Popes or Cardinals. 24 
Underlying these three unacceptable conclusions, Wyclif believes, are the familiar 
problems associated with an ignorance of the principles of analogy. He responds with 
exposition on the nature of authorship and authority, drawing conspicuously on the 
24 'item si veritas caperet gradurn autoritatis ab inmediato autore, tune videntur sequi tria falsa. primum, quod 
omne verburn Cristi sit infiniturn maioris autoritatis quarn verburn alterius autoris scripture; videtur secundo, 
quod illi septem autores novi testamenti, scilicet PeLrus, Johannes, Jacobus, Mattheus, Judas, Marcus et Lucas 
scripserunt scripturas disparis autoritatis, sicut et ipsi erant disparis autoritatis et sanctitatis, quod non videtur 
conveniens, cum uno ore locuti sunt, ut dicitur Act. tertio. item videtur iuxta illud, quod epistole decretales 
vel sint paris autoritatis cum epistola beati Petri et per consequens excedentes decreta et epistolas Pauli ac 
aliorurn sanctorum, vel, si sanctitas vite aut veritas sentencie attendatur, tunc a probabili sancti quatuor 
doctores cum aliis sanctis postillantibus scripturas forent in scriptis suis maioris autoritatis quarn aliqui pape 
vel cardinales in scribendo epistolas decretales. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 390. 
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Thomistic concept of participation introduced in the Sunzina de Ente. Wyclif begins 
characteristically by explaining the meanings of the terms 'authority' and 'author' 
themselves: 
Here it is to be supposed firstly that authority is that by which somebody is 
formally an author. Secondly, we should distinguish how someone is an 
author of himself and in himself, as God is alone, and how someone [is an 
author] derivatively and by participation, as men are, to whom God imparts 
His power for the use of the Church. And those authorities are infinitely 
removed, and are fully equivocally so-called, for which reason the professor 
of Scripture could call the secondary power not * 
'authority', but a proxy 
office for the precognition of the meaning of the Lord. Thirdly we should 
note that, since authority of the first kind is said to be the same as the 
author, authority of the second kind is said to be an accident in respect of 
the first, by which, and finally, on account of which, it appears that just as 
truth can be understood in two ways, so the authority of truth can also be 
understood in two ways. For truth can be understood as an entity in respect 
of its primary being, and thus all truth is God, just as every being is God; 
or in respect of its secondary being, which is existence in general. And thus 
there are many kinds of truth. 25 
The three points listed here follow the familiar pattern of Wyclif's analogical arguments in 
the Sianina de Ente. God, whose essence is uniquely identical with the analogon itself - 
in this case, authority - is the only being who can properly 
be called an author. Human 
authors, as he goes on to explain, are authors only by participation (participative), 
possessing authority accidentally (as all creatures possess different qualities in different 
ways), rather than essentially (as all qualities inhere perfectly in God, being identical with 
him). Wyclif is clearly anxious to distance human authority from the authority of the divine 
as far as possible. Human authority, as a mere accident, is placed in the lowest category of 
26 being (and hence, truth) . Its relation to 
divine authority, moreover, is described in terms zn 
25 'hic oportet primo supponere, quod autoritas sit illud, quo quis est formaliter autor. secundo oportet 
distingwere, quomodo aliquis est autor de se et in se, ut solus deus, et aliquis participative et derivative tit 
homines, quibus deus participat potestatem suam ad utilitatem ecclesie. et iste autoritates infiniturn distant 
et sunt satis equivoce, racione cuius professor scripture catholice posset vocare secundam potestatern non 
autoritatem, sed vicarium officium ad praecognizandurn sensum domini. tercio oportet notare, cum autoritas 
primo modo dicta sit idem cum autore, autoritas autem secundo modo dicta sit accidens respiciens principium, 
a quo, et finem, gracia cuius, patet, quod, sicut dupliciter potest intelligi veritas, sic dupliciter potest 
intelligi 
veritatisautoritas. potest enim intelligi veritas sicut entitas quoad esse suum primum, et sic omnis veritas est 
deus, sicutomneensestdeus, velquoad essesecundum, quodestexistenciaingenere. etsiesuntmulta 
genera veritatum. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 391. 
26 Cf. the four-place hierarchy of created being in De Universalibus, according to which, as here, accident and 
essence are represented as opposite metaphysical extremes. See the discussion in Ch. 2 (section 1), above. 
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of equivocation, rather than analogy. There can, within this framework at least, be no 
place for a theory of authorship which measures truth according to the authority of the 
human author, nor which measures human authority by the divine truth which is conveyed. 
The consequences of this conclusion for Wyclif's theory of scriptural authorship are 
elaborated in the four separate points which follow it. Firstly, we are told, every truth 
spoken by God, who is the speaker of all truths, is equal with any other. Wyclif turns here 
to the definition of truth given in the Suninza de Ente, namely that truth is adequacy of a 
thing to the divine intellect. In terms of truths intended by God, such adequacy is no 
different from identity, which, as Wyclif explains, is not subject to different degrees of 
completeness. Scripture, as the word - and as such, the intention - of God, is thus of equal 
authority in each of its parts. Human authors, on the other hand, are described as 'nothing 
but scribes or heralds of God, whose purpose is to record his law'. 
Wyclif clarifies the basic division between human and divine authorship in his second 
point, by explaining how different kinds of truth (and hence, of authority) can exist only in 
the temporal world. This is a key point in his argument, since it confronts directly the 
problem of reconciling the absolute truth of all things which are intended by God, and 
which have been created by him, with the variety of truths and falsehoods which are known 
to exist in the created world: 
Although every caused truth is of equal authority with any other, 
... nevertheless 
formally distinct and subjective truths are of proportionally 
different authority, as they are more necessary or prior. The first part 
appears from this: that every truth, like every entity, according to the first 
idea of truth, is God himself, just as Augustine says in his On Truth, and as 
it is shown in the material of On Ideas, how every creature, according to its 
intelligible being, is God himself, according to the principle in John 1: 
'What was made, in him was life'. And the second part appears from this: 
because accidental authority and authority in respect of a thing is received 
[in proportion to its] goodness or priority. 27 
27 'licet omnis veritas causata sit paris autoritatis cum qualibet quoad duplicem racionem, tamen veritates 
distincte formaliter et subiective sunt autoritatis disparis proporcionaliter, ut sunt magis necessarie vel priores. 
prima pars patet ex hoc, quod omnis veritas sicut omnis entitas secundum primarn racionem veritatis est ipse 
deus, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro suo De Veritate et patet in materia De Ydeis, quomodo omnis creatura 
secundum esse intelligibile est deus ipse iuxta illud Joh. primo: quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. et secunda 
pars patet ex hoc, quod accidentalis autoritas et respectiva rei capitur penes eius bonitatern vel prioritatem. ' 
De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 392-393. (1 have here, as before, departed from the Douay-Rheims 
translation of John 1: 3-4 in order to retain the sense of the Latin passage as cited by Wyclif). 
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Absolute truth, as Wyclif suggests here, is something which exists only in respect of the 
intelligible natures of things. Unlike the 'subjective truths' of the world, which are 
'formally distinct', such a truth is unitary, being identical, we are reminded, with God 
himself. No subjective truth is absolutely authoritative in this sense, but nor is it 
necessarily of equal authority with any other truth of its kind. This latter point, implicit in 
the closing section of the passage, is clearly a significant one for Wyclif, both in the 
immediate context of scriptural authorship, and in relation to the broader questions of social 
and political theory. 
In the text which follows this exposition, Wyclif makes the relationship between the 
different forms of 'accidental' authority more explicit. Goodness (bonitas) and priority 
(prioritas), we have been told, are the basic indices of this form of authority. Wyclif gives 
the example of an abbot and his vicar, and of a father and his son, the former, in each case, 
having greater authority than the latter. The principle, he suggests, can be extended to the 4-: ý 
priesthood, whose most authoritative members are called 'presbyters, or seniors. These 
priests are priests by the law of grace, and it is through this divine gift alone that they 
receive their dignity. Priests of this kind, Wyclif reasons, are more worthy of honour than 
priests of the IaNv of nature (sacerdotes legis naturae) or priests of diaconal law (sacerdotes 
legis leviticae). The presbyter of Christ, honoured by sacerdotal grace, is thus to be 
honoured by his inferiors. In accepting the office of priest, he receives his greatest honour 
by making known, through Scripture, the law of Christ. This concluding observation leads 
Wyclif to his third point, which relates to the authority of the text of Scripture, and to the 
idea of Christ as author: 
The whole of holy Scripture, insofar as it is the authority of the head of the 
Church, is of infinitely greater authority than any other writing in respect of 
its proper and individual author. It appears from this that Christ, by virtue 
of [his] vision, infinitely surpasses any of his brothers. As author to author, 
so authority to authority; therefore, the conclusion. 29 
28 4 tota scriptura sacra quoad autoritatem capitis ecclesie est infinitum maioris autoritatis quam aliqua scriptura 
aliena quoad autentieacionem sui proprii et privati autoris, patet ex hoc, quod Cristus ex gracia visionis 
inrinitum excellit quemlibet alium fratrem suum. sed ut autor ad autorem, sic autoritas ad autoritatem, igitur 
conclusio. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 394. 
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The supreme authority of Christ, as the proper auctor of Scripture, becomes the guiding 
principle in Wyclif's theory of authorship. Human authority, as we learn from the 
preceding point, inheres most properly in the priests of Christ, the humble proclaimers of, 
and adherents to, his law. It is on his account, therefore, and not their own, that they have 
any right to be identified as authors. Wyclif turns to a passage from Psalm 141 for support: 
Theirjudges falling upon the rock have been swallowed up. 29 
The rock, Wyclif explains, following Augustine's commentary on the Psalms, is Christ, 
beside whose authority the judges of this world, powerful and learned, are thrown down. 
Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras are all compared with the rock, by whose side they are 
similarly cast down. 30 All such authors, Augustine tells us, so long as they are seen to say 
anything, are compared to the rock. Wyclif passes over these observations without adding 
further comments, until he reaches Augustine's suggestion that anyone who uses the words 
of Christ is to be thanked, but not personally to be followed .31 The truth which 
is thus 
spoken, Wyclif suggests, is itself a prior truth. His exact meaning is possibly related to the 
remainder of Augustine's text (which is not, nevertheless, cited), in which the truths spoken 
by Christ, and the Christian truths which may have been found earlier in Aristotle, are 
explained in terms of absolute, rather than temporal, priority. 
32 The basic sense, however, 
directs us again to the notion that speakers of Christian truths are themselves nothing more, 
than vessels, whose truth and authority is never properly their own. Towards the end of 
the passage he states explicitly that Christ is the first principle of truth, from whom every 
statement of a human author which is worthy to be valued takes its origin. 
33 
29 Psalms 141.6. Buddensieg notes (n. 11) that Wyclif substitutes 'iuxta pctram' for the 'iuncti petrae' ol the 
Vulgate: 'absorpti sunt itiva petrain hidices eorum' (De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 394). 
30 ,, petra, " inquid, "erat Cristus, iuxta quem comparati ipsi iudices, magni, potentes et docti absopti sunt. 
dixit de moribus vel quarneunque sentenciam Aristotelis. adiunge illum petre, et absorptus est. quis est 
Aristoteles? audiat, Christus dixit et aput infero scontremescit. dicit hoc Pictagoras, dixit hoc Plato. adiunge 
illos petre. compara. autoritatern eorum autoritati ewangelice, compara, inflatos Cristo crucifixo" ct apsorbti 
sunt. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 394. 
31 t, propterea si inventus fuerit aliquis hoc dixisse, quod dixit et Cristus, gratulamur illi, non illum sequimur". 
Nam si qua vera loquitur, prior est ipsa veritas. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scriptlerae, vol. i, p. 394. 
32 Enarratio in Psalmunt CXLI, 8 (PL, 37,1838). 
33 . videre potuit, quod fuit quantumlibet maioris autoritatis quarn aliqua alia creatura et nullum dictum suum 
valere, nisi de quanto traxerit a Cristo originem, cum sit veritatis primurn principium. ' De Veritate Sacrae 
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It is according to this last principle that, in the last of his four points, Wyclif justifies 
his prioritization of Scriptural texts above all human forms of writing. Here, the focus is 
upon the authority of the Decretals (epistolae decretales), from which, we are told, the 
authority of Scripture is infinitely far removed. This observation, Wyclif explains, relates 
specifically to the nature of the auctor (or conditor1scriba) proxinuts of the text, a term 
which remains undefined at this stage, but which is later identified with the human author 
of Scripture. The Decretals, we are told, are the products of the Pope and his subjects, 
whereas Scripture is authorized directly (ininediate) by God. The notion of directness is of 
central importance here. Anything communicated directly by God, or apprehended directly 
from him, draws its authority and meaning from him alone, without the intervention of the 
hunian intelleCt. 34 As Wyclif goes on to explain, 'the word of God conceives of all of its 
knowledge and delivers it directly to its scribes, who add nothing of their own invention'. 35 
This view, he tells us, is affirmed by Scripture itself, by the Church in its practices, and 
by all other faiths. It is not the scribes themselves, however, who choose to make this 
Scripture, because if it were, then Scripture would receive its authority from its auctores 
proxind, rather than from God: 
It would indeed be unreasonable, when Christ had to give the law of his 
Scripture to the Church, for him to have done other than dictate it into the 
hearts of the humble scribes, encouraging them in the form of writing and 
showing which he had chosen. But we should not believe this of other 
apostles or vicars of Peter, because, if they had assembled a sense of 
Scripture before the one laid down, which was equal to the authority of the 
holy Scripture of God, ... it could not nevertheless be that 
it is made equal 
in its authority by its conditor proxinius. 36 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. 395. 
34 Wyclif invokes the concept of directness in a similarway in the context of scriptural literalism. See section 
5.2, below. 
35 . verburn dei adinvenit onmern cius scienciarn et inmediate tradidit scribis suis, qui nichil addiderunt de 
adinvencionibus propriis. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 395. 
36 'irracionabile quidem fuisset, cum Cristus debuit dare legern scripture sue ecclesie, nisi ipsemet dictasset 
earn in cordibus scribarurn humilium, excitans eos ad formarn scribendi et ostendendi, quarn ipse elegerat. 
hoc autern non oportet sic credere de affis apostolis vel Petri vicariis, quod, si congregar-unt unarn sentenciarn 
scripture prius absconditarn, que sit paris autoritatis cum scriptura sacra, quoad deum, ... non tamen esse potest, 
quod parificetur in autoritate quoad proximurn eius conditorem. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 
396. 
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If the auctor (or conditor) proximus became thus the cause of truth in any scriptural text, 
Wyclif suggests, then he himself would be Christ. By the same token, as he points out later 
in the chapter, if papal bulls - or, presumably, the Decretals - were authoritative on 
account of their auctorproximus, then the Pope would be Christ. 37 If any author 'is moved 
by God to promulgate in such a way', on the other hand, then the text 'is itself most 
authentic according to God. 08 Wyclif proposes that, through this distinction, all laws 
which appear to make the decretals of equal authority with the Gospel can be abolished. 
Any decretal which affirms scriptural ideas may indeed be of equal authority with the 
Scriptures, but the basis of this authority, once again, is the word of God, and not the 
intention of the Christian auctor proximus. The directness of Christ's authorship of 
Scripture, Wyclif suggebLS, is made explicit in the words of the apostle in Galatians 1.8: 
I make known to you, brothers, the Gospel, which is preached by me, 
because it is not according to man, nor from a man have I taken or learned 
it, but through the revelation of Jesus Christ. 39 
Wyclif would argue that no claim to personal authority is being made in this passage. From 
the perspective of the faithful human author (the auctor proxinius), the composition of 
Scripture is therefore regarded as an essentially passive process in terms of the operations 
of the mind itself. Wyclif is clearly anxious, at every stage, not merely to marginalise, but 
to exclude from consideration, the processes of human discursive reasoning. What we axe 
left with appears to rest on the operations of what Grosseteste, following Aristotle, had 
called the intellectits passivits. 40 Though Wyclif nowhere uses of the term himself, he 
would certainly have been aware of it, having already made use, as we have seen, of the 
complementary notion of the intellectus agens in his discussion of universals. 41 There is, 
then, a direct communication of divine intention from God, the auctor ininediatits, to the 
37 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 408. 
38 De Veritate Sacrae Scriplurae, vol. i, p. 396. 
39 . notum vobis facio, fratres, ewangelium, quod ewangelizatum est a me, quia non est secundum hominem, 
neque enim ab homine accepi illud neque didici, sed per revelationern Jesu Cristi. ' The Latin text is cited 
in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 397-8. 
40 See the discussion in James McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), pp. 346-351. 
41 De Universalibus, 3.3540. See Ch. 3, above. 
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soul of the auctor proximus, who records it. The auctor proximus, however, is also, in 
another sense, an auctor inmediatits, as Wyclif goes on to explain: 
... Scripture has a threefold author, namely God, the humanity of Christ, and 
their scriba proxinats. God, moreover, is the auctor ininediatits insofar as 
he is first in the ordo ascendendi, but the vicar of Christ is the auctor 
ininediatits insofar as he is the authentic instrument in the ordo descendendi. 
The writer (scriba), however, to whom no revelation is made, or the 
stationer, or another possessor or editor of signs, is not an author. 42 
The use here of the term ordo recalls the hierarchical conception of knowledge and being 
which we find in the Sianina de Ente, and points very clearly, once again, to the influence 
of Grosseteste and Pseudo-Dionysius. The two senses of the term ininecliatits, as applied 
to opposite extremes of the hierarchy, are clearly very different, and it would seem that 
Wyclif makes use of the common term primarily as a means of separating the human 
authors of Scripture from those scribes 'to whom no revelation is made. ' Unlike the human 
scriptural authors (the auctores proxind or scribae proxind of Scripture 43) who convey 
truths instrianen tally (as instnanenta autentica), these latter writers, as we learn here, are 
not properly authors at all. 44 As such, they have an entirely passive r6le in the 
communication of scriptural truths, and cannot be related to the divine author in analogical 
terms. 
In contrast to many of the most influential commentators of the preceding century, 
as we suggested in the Introduction, Wyclif has no interest in the respective 'literary' r6les 
of the scribe, the compiler or the editor. 45 All are effectively the same, as the broad 
42 '... habet scriptura. autorem triplicem, scilicet deum, Christi humanitatem et corum scribam proximum. deus 
autem est autor inmediatus quoad prius requisiturn in ordine aseendendi, sed Cristi vicarius est autor 
inmediatus quoad instrumenturn autenticurn requisitum in ordine descendendi. Scriba enim, cui non fit 
revelatio, vel stacionarius aut alius signorum possessor vel conditor non est autor. ' De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. 398. 
43 In Wyclif the term scriba ('scribe', 'writer'), when modified by proximits, is synonymous with auctor or 
conditor. When unmodified, it is generally used of the writer 'to whom no revelation is made' (see discussion 
above). There are, however, exceptions, as when Peter (the auctorproxinius par excellence) is described as 
a 'scribe of Christ' (scriba Christi). See n. 50, below. 
44 On the Aristotelian concept of instrumentality as applied to the theory of authorship in the Middle Ages, 
see Minnis, ' "Authorial Intention" and "Literal Sense" '. See also the discussion of the human author as 
instrumental causa efficiens in Minnis, Medieval Theory ofAuthorship, p. 83. 
45 On the growth of interest in the 'literary activity' of the human author in the thirteenth century, see Minnis, 
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reference to 'possessors of signs' would suggest. This markedly conservative evaluation 
of the significance of the human author is rooted very firmly in Wyclif's analogical 
interpretation of the hermeneutic process. It marks a significant departure from the 
Aristotelian interpretative paradigm which, as Alastair Minnis has argued, had led theorists 
of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to devote greater attention to the interdependency 
46 
of divine and human authors. The concepts of instrumentality and causality, each of 
which played a significant part in this process, are still clearly visible in Wyclif's writings. 
The mention here of the 'authentic instrument' and the 'threefold author' of Scripture, 
however, which have obvious parallels in the Aristotelian instrumental efficient cause and 
twofold efficient cause (duplex causa efficiens), does little to offset Wyclif's negative 
assessment of the function of the human author. 47 
1.3 Human Authors and Scriptural Tradition 
Though the basic terms of Wyclif's three-part schema (God-Christ-scriba proximus) Z! D 
serve to resolve the main problems of relative and absolute authority with which he began 
his discussion of authorship, there remains the question of the relative authority of the 
scriptural authors themselves. Insofar as all of the authors of Scripture communicated their 
message in accordance with divine intention, their words, as we have seen, would have 
been deemed to have equal authority. This simple principle, however, does not always 
apply straightforwardly. Wyclif considers an example from Galatians 2: 11-14, in which 
St Peter (Cephas) and St Paul apparently make competing claims to truth. Peter, we are 
told, had eaten with the Gentiles before the arrival of the Jews, but had later (in the 
company of the Jews) distanced himself from them. It is in response to these actions that 
Paul questions him: 
Medieval Theory ofAuthorship, pp. 94-103. 
46 Medieval Theory ofAuthorship, p. 8 1. 
47 We must assume that by 'authentic instrument' (instrumentitni autenticuni), Wyclif means simply 'the 
instrument of the divine author'. It seems unlikely, judging by what is said on the relationship between the 
authority of the human author and that of the (divine) truth he conveys, that this label identifies the human 
author with any form of authority. 
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11 But when Cephas was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, 
because he was to be blamed. 12 For before that some came from James, he 
did eat with the Gentiles: but when they were come, he withdrew and 
separated himself, fearing them who were of the circumcision. 13 And to his 
dissimulation the rest of the Jews consented, so that Bamabas also was led 
by them into that dissimulation. 14 But when I saw that they walked not 
uprightly unto the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas before them all: If 
thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles, and not as the 
Jews do, how dost thou compel the Gentiles to live as do the Jews? 
If, Wyclif suggests, St Paul and St Peter were to be treated as equal authorities, then both 
would have to be believed. He rejects, however, the argument (attributed here to St 
Jerome) that Peter did not sin, but was censured by Paul lest he should sin. A true account, 
he suggests, would hold Peter to blame for his hypocrisy. He cites Augustine's epistle to 
Jerome, in which Peter is said to have sinned and to have been reprehended by Paul on 
account of his sins. If Augustine's account were mistaken, he argues, then Scripture itself 
would be false, which is impossible. God, according to Augustine, permitted Peter to sin, 
but did not, in so doing, approve of Peter's actions. This, Wyclif suggests, is the 0 
interpretation favoured by the Church, according to which God ordained this sequence of 
events for the good of Peter. He concludes that the faith implicit in the writings of the 
scribes of the law of Christ is to be valued above their actions, except insofar as these are 
consistent with the law of God. 
Closely related to the problem of the relative authority of Peter and Paul is that of the 
relative authority of their successors within the Christian tradition. Wyclif addresses this 
in the section immediately following his discussion of the passage from Galatians 2, in 
which he draws on his earlier suggestion that Christian authority increases in proportion to 
the goodness or priority of the subject. Here it is argued that those who follow Peter may 
indeed have been equal to him in respect of rank and jurisdiction (Potestas ol-dinis et 
hirisdiccionis), but that Peter had many other graces which his successors did not share (the 
power to work miracles, of understanding obscure passages from Scripture, and of 
interpreting idiomatic expressions are listed as examples). The faith of any apostle of 
Scripture, he suggests, is to be followed in preference to that of any successor to the 
apostles, even when the word of the latter is identical with that of the former. 
48 This 
4a , ... est maior fides adhibenda scripture cuiuscunque apostoli quarn 
illius eorum vicarii, eciam quoad dictum 
, quod uterque dixerit tanquam suum. ' De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 400. 
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conclusion has its basis, we are told, in four observations (all of which relate more or less 
explicitly to the notions of temporal priority or greater goodness). According to the first 
of these, the earlier fathers (priores patres) were more holy, and adhered more closely to 
Scripture in their words and writings than their successors in the later Middle Ages. 
Likewise, secondly, their message (sententia) was 'more spiritual', and was 'made suspect 
less by avarice', than the decretals. 49 Wyclif is careful to point out here that propinquitas 
is being used in a very specific sense, and refers to the closeness of particular natures or 
habits to the 'root of truth'. To this extent, he tells us, the word of Peter is to be believed 
to an infinitely greater degree on account of his being a scriba of Christ (and hence, like the 
auctor, conditor or scriba proxinuts, a channel for divine intention), than on account of his 
being a successor (vicarius) of Christ. 50 
The laws of priority which govern Wyclif's conception of authorship would appear 
to leave little room for writers outside the Christian tradition, and less still for those whose 
work lies outside the disciplines of philosophy and theology. The theory of analogy itself, 
as we have seen from the Stannia de Ente, implicitly marginalises the language of poets 
and storytellers, for whom metaphor is not underpinned by the metaphysics of analogy. 51 
The authority of non-Christian poets and philosophers, as Wyclif has argued in De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, is never to be placed above that of Christian writers, even 
when, as in the case of the ancient Greeks, they precede them in time. We have already 
seen, however, that Christ must be regarded as the author of any truth conveyed by Aristotle 
which is consistent with scriptural teachings. Such a view is by no means exceptional. 
Surprisingly, nevertheless, it did not attract any comment from Kenningharn in his lengthy 
critique of Wyclif's conception of authority in the second Detenninatio. 52 The problem of 
pre-Christian authorship is discussed in detail by Wyclif in the eleventh chapter of De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, in which he considers the relationship between the authorities 
of the Old and the New Testaments. It is often assumed, we are told here, that there are 
49 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 400. 
50 '... loquor de propinquitate morum, verumptamen .... 
infiniturn plus creditur dicto Petri in quantum scribe 
Cristi, quam in quantum Cristi vicarius. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 400. 
51 See Ch. 2, above. 
52 See Ch. 4 (section 4), above. 
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many truths of holy Scripture contained within the writings of poets. Homer, Vergil and 
Ovid are given as examples, the first two of whom, Wyclif reminds us, are mentioned by 
St Jerome in the sixth chapter of his prologue to the Bible. 53 He goes on to consider the 
way in which the New Testament is used to establish the authenticity of writings of the Old, 
and asks why poets whose words are accepted by an author of the New Testament should 
not themselves be regarded as authentic scriptural writers. His own answer to this question 
is prefaced by a list of basic observations relating to the nature of truth, textuality and 
authorship: 
There are three things to be noted. First, that every faithful person should 
believe every truth in its universal aspect, and that truths should be believed 
in their particular aspect by a child, who is disposed [to believe them] in this 
way. 
Secondly it is to be noted that no individual books [singulares 
codices], as far as the substance of the faith itself is concerned, are rather the 
sense or the truths which they signify, than animal hides. If they were, then 
the faith would die if they were burned or destroyed. 
Thirdly it is to be noted that more attention is to be paid to the way 
in which authors or witnesses are mentioned, as well as the mode of 
speaking or of declaring. 54 
The first two points rely heavily on the realist conception of truth used throughout De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae and the Sitninza de Ente. It is according to the first, Wyclif 
suggests, that we are able to deduce that poets can indeed assert the truths of faith (veritates 
fidei), even if they are themselves pagans. He cites a passage from 1 Timothy 3, in which 
we are told that, 'he must have a good testimony of them who are without'. 
55 As in the 
case of the truths of the authors of Scripture themselves, whose own invention, as we have 
been told, adds nothing to the truth conveyed, the truths of poets and pagans are not truths 
53 . assurnitur enim comuniter, quod in scriptis poetarum sunt multe veritates scripture sacre, ut patet de 
Homero et Vergilio Marone, sicut recitat leronymus in epistola posita in Prologo Biblie, sexto cap. et idem 
patet in Ovidio de vetula, in sibilla et quotlibet affis dicentibus veritates ewangelicas. ' De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. 237. 
54 , pro isto sunt tria notanda, primo quod omnem veritatern oportet omnem fidelem credere in universali et 
aliquas veritates oportet adulturn ad hoe dispositurn credere in particulari, de qua materia est grandis sermo. 
H secundo notandurn , quod nulli singulares codices sunt pocius quarn 
bestie de substancia fidei pro se ipsis, 
sed sensus vel veritas , quarn signant, quia tunc 
illis combustis vel aliter pereuntibus perit fides. H tercio 
notandurn, quod modus allegandi autorem vel testern sicut et modus dicendi vel asserendi est plurimum 
attendendus. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 237-38. 
55 1 Timothy 3: 7. (De Veritate Sacrae Scripturac, vol. i, p. 238) 
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of faith because they were spoken by these people, but because they were said by God. 56 
Wyclif is careful to point out that the existence of such truths in pagan writings does not 
make all of the writings or statements of the author in question authentic scriptural 
writings. Such a conclusion would clearly be absurd, though in the absence of supporting 
theological arguments, Wyclif's metaphysical system would offer only a relatively weak 
defence against it. He turns to Augustine for support, and to the seventh book of the 
Confessions. Here, Wyclif reminds us, Augustine found ten conclusions of John the 
Evangelist. It is not difficult to see why Augustine's argument would have been attractive 
to Wyclif, emphasizing as it does the sense of the conclusions (the meaning which, for 
Wyclif, was the intention of God), rather than the particulars of their actual form: 
[In the books of the Platonists] I read, not of course in these words, but with 
entirely the saine sense and supported by numerous and varied reasons, 'In 
the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was 
God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and 
without him nothing was made. What was made is life in him; and the life 
was the light of men. And the light shone in the darkness, and the darkness 
did not comprehend it. ' Moreover, the soul of man, although it bears 
witness of the light, is 'not that light', but God the Word is himself 'the true 
light which illuminates every man coming into the world'; Further, 'he was 
in this world, and the world was made by him, and the world did not know 
him'. But that 'he came to his own and his own did not receive him; but as 
many as received him, to them he gave power to become sons of God by 
believing his name', that I did not read there (John 1: 1- 12). 57 
A number of the biblical passages cited here are used by Wyclif elsewhere in De Veritate 
Sacrae Scripturae and the Stannia de Ente, as we have seen. When, like Augustine, we 
draw parallels between these and passages in Plato or another author, Wyclif suggests, we 
do not refer to the latter as authors who give proof on the basis of faith (per locian afide), 
56 , nee sunt veritates tales ideo fides, quia ab eis dicte, sed quia a deo dicte. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, 
vol. i, p. 238. 
57 , et ibi legi non quidem his uerbis, sed hoc idern omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in 
principio erat uerbum et uerbum erat apud deum et deus erat uerbum: hoc erat in principio apud deum; omnia 
per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihiI, quod facturn est, in co uita est, et uita erat lux hominum; 
et lux in tenebris lucet, tenebrae earn non comprehenderunt; et quia hominis anima, quarnuis testimonium 
perhibeat de lumine, non est tamen ipsa lumen, sed uerburn deus est lumen ucrum, quod inluminat omnem 
hominem uenientem in hunc mundum; et quia in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus 
eum non cognouit. quia uero in sua propria uenit et sui cum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt cum, 
dedit eis potestatern filios dei fieri credentibus in nomine eius, non ibi legi. ' Confessiones, vii. 9 (CCSL, 27; 
trans. Henry Chadwick as Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199 1), p. 12 1). 
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but rather as authors who give proof by human testimony (per locian topictan a testinionio 
htunano). 58 The latter, unlike the inspired authors of Scripture, could not presumably be 
identified as 'instrumental' authors, even though they necessarily act in accordance with 
divine intention. Their authority, correspondingly, is limited. They may be used, 
nevertheless, Wyclif suggests, to support the argument of one who regards their messages 
as 'authentic', just as we may wish to argue against infidels by mentioning their own 
authors to them. 59 Wyclif here emphasizes once again the necessity of regarding all 
scriptural meanings conveyed by human authors (those meanings, that is, to which they 
'add nothing of their own invention') as the word of God. Drawing on a taxonomic scheme 
developed in De Logica, he explains that any declarative mode of speaking (niodus dicendi 
assertive) may function either to express an opinion, to give a proof from reason, or to give 
precognition of a meaning intended by God. This final mode, he suggests, is proper to the 
authors or prophets of Scripture, who live as Christ and make known his meaning. No 
prophet who lives otherwise, we are told, can be regarded as a true prophet. 60 
What emerges most clearly from the analysis of these three fundamental textual 
concepts (the book, the author and authority) is that analogy, though not consistently 
employed in the self-conscious, programmatic manner of the Suninza de Ente, nevertheless 
plays a definitive role in the textual theory of De Veritate Sact-ae Scripturae. A number 
of the objections which are considered by Wyclif (especially those relating to truth, 
authority and antiquity), as we have seen, bear a close resemblance to those raised by 
Kenningham in his detenninationes. 61 His extended treatment of the relationship between 
human and divine authority, moreover, is a good indication of his sensitivity to the points 
which Kenningham was making. The close interdependency between the three textual 
concepts and the metaphysical principles of the Stunina de Ente (truth, intention, 
universalism) provides a strong suggestion that, whilst nominalists and other anti-realists 
58 De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae, vol. i, p. 238. 
59 , 
... tale testimonium valet arguendo ad 
hominem, allegando sibi testern, quem ipse acceptat tanquam 
autenticurn, ut arguendo contra fideles allegamus eis proprios autores. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. 
i, p. 238. 
60 , modus... dicendi hominis dividitur in hec tria. aliqua enim dicit assertive, alia recitative vel interrogative 
et aliqua yronice. assertive tripliciter: vel opinando vel racione probando, vel ut sentenciam dei 
precognizando. et hoe est proprium autoribus scripture sacre... ' Pe Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 239. 
61 See Ch. 4 (sections 2 and 4), above. 
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were not the sole targets of Wyclif's frequent philosophical complaints in De Veritate 
Sacrae Scripturae, they were clearly perceived to be more than a trivial threat. His 
analogical definitions of textuality and authority, as Kenningharn. clearly realised, were a 
covenient means of denying them access to a particular form of textuality, and hence to the 
broader discursive domain of authoritative exegesis. 62 Two related areas in which analogy 
and textuality interact closely are those of intention and language. Both, as we have seen, 
had attracted attention from Kenningham, and both were areas which divided nominalists 
from realists. They will be considered in turn below. 
2. FROM SCRIPT TO SENSE: INTENTION, LANGUAGE AND SCRH"TURAL LOGIC 
Any theory of authorship would be meaningless without some corresponding 
conception of intention. Throughout his expositions on authorship and authority in De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, as we have seen, Wyclif invokes the notions of intention and 
truth to intention to support his claims about the meaning and metaphysical status of the 
different kinds of Scripture. On a more practical level, these same ideas are drawn upon 
as a means of resolving apparent verbal ambiguities or inconsistencies in scriptural 
writings. By the rules of analogy, intentio, as a hurnan phenomenon, is always secondary 
to the intention of God. The intention of the human writer, nevertheless, is still to be given 
priority over bare words on a page. In the third chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, 
Wyclif cites Pseudo-Dionysius, who in his treatise On Divine Nanzes, labels 'unresonable' 
and 'stupid' any reader who privileges linguistic expressions (dictiones) above the force of 
intention (virtits intentionis). 63 The consequences of attending too closely to such 
expressions are illustrated from a passage taken from Grosseteste, 
64 in which he discusses 
62 See Kcnningham's remark about throwing stones against the Pleiades, discussed in Ch. 4 (section 5), 
above. 
63 ,, est, " inquit [Dionysius], "irracionabile, ut estimo, et stulturn, non virtuti intencionis attendere, sed 
diccionibus, et hoc non est divina intelligere volencium proprium, sed sonos nudos suscipiencium. " ' De 
Veritate Sacre ScHpiure, vol. i, p. 43. Cf. De Divinis Nontinibits, 708C: ' 'EGTI [tF-V yap 'dXoyov, (ýq 
dipaý 
,I 
51)V(EpCt TOý CYKWMý iTpo(YtXctv 'a)Act Ta7tq Mýeutv. ' (Corpits Dionysiactim, i. 156). K& CFKU16V Tb Pý Tl^ 
64 The reference here is obscure. Buddensieg remarks in his edition that 'verba ipsa Rob. Grosseteste in 
Epistolis nusquam inveni' (vol. i, p. 43, n. 5). 
164 
the interpretation of the Greek words ereos ('love') and ereo ('I love'): 
'In eloquent language, ' says [Lincolniensis], 'are found the noun ereos and 
the verb ereo, used to designate divine and chaste love; either of them is 
used properly [decenter] in the case of divine and chaste love, and 
improperly [indecenter] in the case of unclean love. Thus, those hearing the 
noun ereos used in divine eloquence, and understanding by the word itself 
the frequency of dishonourable love, as often happens to the force of verbal 
intention in common speech, do not attend to what is actually used in the 
holy Scriptures, but to the word as it is commonly accepted, which is stupid 
and unreasonable. 165 
The opposition between 'the word as it is commonly accepted' (vox conun till iter slinipta) 
and 'the force of verbal inmaition' (virtits intentionis verbi) is clearly founded on the more 
fundamental Augustinian distinction between vox, the word in its material form, and 
verbuni, its basic meaning. 66 For Wyclif and Grosseteste alike, this simple distinction, 
which Augustine inherited from the classical tradition (and which was subjected to 
Christian metaphysical interpretations throughout the Middle Ages), was among the most 
important for the serious exegete. It served at once to objectify verbal and propositional 
meaning, and to marginalise the r6le of the human linguistic community in its 
determination. 
This latter function of Grosseteste's distinction is one which Wyclif is careful to 
emphasise. Dionysius himself, as we have been told, urged us to attend to the verbal 
intention, and hence to the intention of the author, as a means of resisting interpretations 
arising out of popular usage of language. 67 Such interpretations, we learn in the Divine 
Naines, are not consistent with the will to understand divine things. They consist merely in 
the apprehension of bare sounds (soni nudi), which are sufficient, according to Dionysius, 
only for those whose intellects are not receptive to their full meanings. Ancient 
65 ' "in eloquiis, " inquit [Lincolniensis], "inveniuntur hoc nomine ereos et hoc verburn ereo posita in 
designacione divini et casti amoris, quod decenter est in hoc amore, sicut in turpi amore indecenter. unde 
audientes nomen ereos in eloquiis divinis positurn et comprehendentes per ipsum vehemenciam amoris 
inhonesti, ut consueturn est fieri in sermone w1gari virtuti intencionis verbi, secundurn quod in eloquiis sacris 
ponitur, non attendunt, sed voci communiter sumpte, quod est stultum et irracionabile. " ' De Veritare Sacrae 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. 43. 
66 On the significance of verbum in Augustinian philosophy and theology, see D. W. Johnson, Terbum in the 
Early Augustine (386-397)', Recherches Augustiniennes, 8 (1972), 25-53. 
. 67 See Wyclif's reference to De Divinis Nominibus, 708C (cited above 
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theologians, Wyclif suggests, laboured for this reason to cast aside the senses of infidels 
and children, and to attend to the meaning of the single, true author (God). He turns here 
to the heuristic schema of the Siannia de Ente, highlighting once again the analogy between 
learning to read (which involves a progression from alphabetic analysis to 'syllabication', 
reading and understanding) and learning to read the Book of Life (in which the reader 
progesses from grammar to scriptural grammar, authorial intention, and finally to the sense 
of the Book of Life itself): 68 
Just as a child who learns first the alphabet, secondly to split words into 
syllables, thirdly to read, and fourthly to understand, has at each of those 
stages a distinct sense of that which he learned at first, and later, on account 
of confusion, cast aside, so the theologian, after the doctrine of grammar, 
learns secondly the grammar of Scripture, adapted to its sense (the first 
[grammar] having been put aside), [and] attends thirdly to the sense of the 
author, having turned away from sensible signs, until fourthly he has seen, 
without covering, the Book of Life. 69 
The process of learning Wyclif describes here, with its emphasis on denial and re- 
assessment, is conspicuously Dionysian. Progress would be hindered if it were not 
possible, at each stage, to dispense with the less perfect - and potentially confusing - 
modes of understanding. 70 The sense of Scripture, imparted by the holy Spirit, is here 
likened to its fruit, which is to be taken first by the faithful reader. The leaves and rind of 
the words are always to be taken after the fruit itself, except insofar as they are disposed 
towards the sense. Words which lead us away from the sense, we are told, are as a poison, 
and are to be treated accordingly. The dangers of attending too closely to language, at the 
expense of the prior sense it is intended to communicate, were evident to Christ and many 
of the saints. It was for this reason, Wyclif argues, that they chose not to write, except as 
a sense on the tablets of the heart (tabidae cordis). The opposition between body and soul, 
68 As described in De Ente Primo in Communi, p. 109. See the discussion of this passage in Ch. 2 (section 
5), above. 
69 , sicut puer primo discens alphabetum, secundo sillabicare, tercio legere, et quarto intellegere, habet in 
quolibet istorum graduum sensurn suum distincte intenturn circa illud, quod primo discit, et posterius propter 
confusionern excutit primurn sensum, sic theologus post doctrinam grammatice discit secundo granimaticarn 
scripture, aptatam ad sensurn relicta priori, tercio relictis signis sensibilibus attendit ad sensum autoris, 
quousque quarto viderit sine velamine librum vite. ' De Veritate Sacre Scripture, vol. i, p. 44. 
70 Compare the discussions of the six kinds of knowledge in De Ente Prinzo in Communi and De Ydeis, which 
are analysed in Ch. 2 (section 5), above. 
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or heart, running through this exposition, and the contempt for words (voces), the bodily 
aspects of language, again reveals Wyclif's indebtedness to the Augustinian tradition. 
Wyclif s belief in the centrality of intentio and its metonyms (niens, anima, cor, etc. ), 
which have occupied a conspicuous place in the passages analysed above, is reflected in 
the system of logic presented in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. Logic was the second of 
the three verbal arts which, with grammar, supplied the basic metalanguage of medieval 
scriptural exegesis. 71 In the third chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, in the section 
immediately preceding his discussion of the nature of intention, we are exhorted in our 
interpretation and exposition of holy Scripture to learn a 'new grammar' and a 'new logic', 
of a kind which is not found in standard pedagogic treatises. 72 Here, once again, we are 
being encouraged to think in analogical tenns. Human logic should bejudged against the 
highest logic, which is the divine logic of Scripture itself. In evaluating human systems of 
logic, Wyclif suggests, we should follow the advice of Augustine in De Doctrina 
C hristiana, where we are told that all harmful things are condemned in Scripture, but that 
all useful things are found there. The logic of Aristotle, by this simple standard, can be 
defended, but only where it is found to be consistent with the most perfect logic of 4-. ) 
Scripture itself. It is not, therefore, on account of the authority of Aristotle that we should 
uphold Aristotelian logic, but rather by the supreme authority of Scripture. 73 This, we are 
told, is the same as God himself, who is the auctor inniediatits of any correct sense which 
is found in our books. Wyclif argues from this point that holy Scripture includes within 
itself every kind of logic (insofar, presumably, as such logic is consistent with divine logic), 
and should therefore be observed by every kind of man in his own speech. 74 
71 See the essays by Jeffrey F. Huntsman and Eleanore Stump in D. L. Wagner, ed., The Seven Liberal Arts 
in the Middle Ages (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 58-95; 125-146. 
72 ," oportet in scripturam. sacrarn exponendo vel intelligendo adiscere novarn grammaticam. ac novarn 
logicam, sicut patet per beaturn Gregorium. et alios sanctos, qui exponunt autoritate scripture novos sensus 
terminorurn scripture, qui nusquarn originantur ex libris grammatice. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. 
i, p. 42. 
73 ,- logica Aristotelis, que ut plurimurn est recta, sit logica scripture, dicente Augustino epist. tercia Ad 
Volusianum, quod ibi est logica, quoniarn veritas lumenque anime racionalis non nisi deus est, iuncto illo 
tercio De Doctr. Christiana quadragesimo uno, "si aliquid noxium. est, ibi dampnatur, si utile est, ibi 
invenitur". ideo logica Aristotelis non est sustinenda ut Aristotelis, sed ut scripture sacre, cum ipsa sit autor 
summus et prima regula... ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp, 47-48. 
74 The issue of the relationship between human and scriptural language/logic is broached by Wyclif in the first 
chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, in which it is concluded (by following Augustine) that such systems 
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Like other analogates, divine logic represents the principle of unity and harmony which 
should serve to regulate the diverse and chaotic logical systems of the world of existence. 
The relationship between the two is summarised in familiar Aristotelian terms, according 
to which the diverse species in any genus are unified by a single, universal principle. In the 
case of logic, we are told, holy Scripture itself - or the system of logic inscribed within it 
- acts as the unifying principle: 
... since there 
is one originary principle in every genus, which is the metre and 
measure of all the others, it appears that in the genus of logic, either holy 
Scripture should be the rule of other logics, or the contrary. Since no other 
logic regulates [Scriptural] logic by the principle that, 'if there is anything 
harmful there, it is condemned, and if useful, it is approved', it follows that that 
logic is the rule of all others. And since the derivative of that principle is more 
correct the closer it is to that principle, it is clear that our own logics are more 
subtle according as they are more similar to it. 75 
The fundamental law of the logic of Scripture, as we learn in the Siannia de Ente, is 
conformity with, or truth to, intention (in its different forms). 76 The multiplicity of different 
forms of logic in late scholasticism, like the variety inherent in language itself, represented 
for Wyclif an inevitable departure from such conformity. Just as the confusion of tongues 
(Genesis 11: 1-9) had resulted ftom the sin of pride, so, he suggests, the decline of logic, 
which scholasticism was seen to have brought with it, bore the traces of sin in its divisions 
and disputations. Exactly which aspects of late-medieval logic he has in mind here is 
unclear, though the assault would appear to be a general one, rather than one directed at a 
specific group of thinkers. Later in the same chapter, Wyclif speaks of logical systems in 
Oxford lasting barely longer than twenty years, and typically undergoing frequent 
modifications. There are, he suggests there, as many varieties of human logic as there are 
should be used imitatively, but never authoritatively: 'secunda conclusio Augustini De Planis Locucionibus 
Autorurn Scripture est ista: "licet de literis autorum scripture, que sine difficultate intelliguntur, sumamus 
exempIa rethorice vel logice loquendo conformitcr, turn in hoc debemus imitari eos tamquarn humiles corurn 
discipuli, non tamquam in autoritate cis parificati. " ' (vol. i, p. 4. ) 
75 ý ... cum in omne gencre sit unum principium, quod est metrum et mensura omnium aliorum, patet, quod 
in 
genere logice oportet, vel logicarn scripture esse regularn aliis logicis vel e contra. et cum aliena logica non 
regulat illam eo, quod, "si quid noxium ibi est, dampnatur, et si utile, approbatur, " sequitur, quod ista logica 
sit regula omnium aliarum. et cum principiaturn sit reccius ut principio suo propinquius, patet, quod logice 
nostre sunt co subtiliores, quo sunt sibi similiores. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 48-49. 
76 See Ch. 3, above 
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logicians guided by the proud affectation of propriety. 77 Throughout the chapter, we are 
exhorted to resist the temptation to retreat into diversity, and instead to speak together, 
without contradiction. This is the advice, Wyclif reminds us, of Peter and Paul in Acts 15, 
who urge us to speak the words of God with one voice. 78 He is careful to point out, 
however, that such conformity consists simply in the observation of the logic of Scripture 
whilst now one particular kind of logic is employed, and now another. The choice of 
which kind of logic is to be used, we are told, is to be determined by the spirit of counsel 
and the rules of charity (ex spiritit consilii et regidis caritatis). Hence, in the exposition 
of the mysteries of the Scriptures, we should use the plain logic of Scripture (namely, that 
which applies to non-metaphorical language), but in our own use of those terms by which 
the mysteries of faith are concealed, we should use the mystical logic of Scripture (that 
which applies to figurative, 'mystical' language). 
All of these precepts, of course, presuppose that the basic principles of logic are to 
be found within the pages of Scripture itself. In the Sunnna de Ente, as we have seen, 
Wyclif had identified a passage from St Matthew's Gospel as embodying the essential 
philosophy of scriptural logic: 'Let your speech be yea, yea: no, no' (5: 37). This simple 
precept of Christ is rehearsed once again in De Writate Sacrae Scripturae, in which it is 
identified by Wyclif as being the necessary logic of the viator, and sufficient for all 
communication. Any individual who could follow it without-fail, we are told, would 
thereby be perfect, and would commit no sin in language. The appropriateness of such a 
principle to the realist conception of intention and truth outlined earlier in the same chapter 
is not difficult to understand, and had been made very explicit, as we have seen, in the 
Stanina de Ente. The principle itself, Wyclif argues, teaches us to extricate the poison of 
any 'superfluous' and 'harmful' logical method, which would have included, presumably, 
any of the contemporary terminist approaches to language. All such approaches, we learn, 
are excesses; to follow such dialectical methods is an act of curiosity, which was not 
indulged by the antiqui sancti. The words of Christ in Matthew's Gospel are cited again 
77 , ut patet in Oxonia, vix durat una aliena logica. per viginti annos, sed sepissime variantur, quia, quot sunt 
capita logicorum, tot ex affeccione proprietatis superbe sunt logice variate. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, 
vol. i, p. 54. 
78 'Petrus et Paulus precipiunt onmes uno ore loqui sermones dei; patet ergo quod expediret sine repugnantia 
communicare concorditer. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 50 (Acts 15: 25,27). 
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by Wyclif later in the same chapter, as proof that the principles of logic can be found in 
Scripture itself. Here, the close interdependency of logic, language and truth-to-intention 
is very clearly highlighted: 
If it were asked wereabouts holy Scripture teaches logic, I reply... that it is 
in the precept of Christ: 'Let your communication be yes-yes, no-no. ' For 
Christ, the best master, did not convey this principle of logic with a meagre 
meaning, since it informs the Church fully, both in manners and in the logic 
of verbal communication. To this extent it should be learned, because in 
serving this maxim the preacher would also be following the truth, within 
and without, in affirmation and negation, and would be excluding false 
duplicity if agreement of mental and verbal intention were everywhere 
observed. 79 
Here, Wyclif makes explicit the distinction between mental intention (intentio mentis) and 
verbal intention (intentio verbi) which informs the other parts of his argument. 
Significantly, the distinction was not highlighted in his earlier references to the intention 
of the divine author, which, as we have seen, was simply identified with the intentio verbi. 
Wyclif concludes his discussion with a final exhoration to his readers to embrace the 
principles of scriptural logic, and to leave behind the other logical systems which, 'on 
account of their imperfections and their remoteness from their final end, it was not pertinent 
for holy Scripture to discuss. ' 80 The emphasis on correspondence in the passage from 
Matthew's Gospel, as we suggested in Chapter 3, served to affirm for Wyclif his own 
fundamental belief that Scripture represented truth to divine intention. It also implicitly 
affirmed the analogical principles underlying his own Dionysian conception of the 
exegetical process. These will be the subject of the section following. 
79 s et si queretur, ubi scriptura sacra docet logicam, dico... quod in illo precepto Cristi sit sermo vester est est, 
non non. Cristus... magister optimus dedit hoc principium logice non parce sentencie, cum simul informat 
ecclesiam plene tam in moribus quam logica communicacionis verbalis, quantum oportet adiscere, quia 
servando hanc maximam servaret sermonizans veritatern intus et extra in affirmacione et negacione, et 
excluderet falsam duplicitatem, si concordancia intencionis mentis et vocis foret ubilibet observata. ' De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 53. 
80 'cum ergo hoc, quod continet omnia, scienciam. habet vocis, secundum quarn scienciam docuit hanc 
logicam, quis fidelis imponeret sibi defecturn sive calumpniam! alias autem privatas logicas propter ear-urn 
imperfecciones et remociones a fine ultimo non pertinuit scripture sacre in particulari discutere. ' De Veritate 
Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 54. 
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3. EXEGESIS AND REALISM IN DE VERITATE SACRAE SCRIPTURAE 
The exegetical procedures of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, unlike the hermeneutic 
concepts introduced in the preceding sections (auctor, liber, intentio), do not represent 
significant advances in Wyclif s textual philosophy. Though he is often less explicit about 
the philosophical ideas he is invoking, most derive directly from the system developed in 
the Suninza de Ente. The familiar problems of analogical interpretation, to take the most 
significant example, occupy Wyclif throughout the text. Most conspicuous among these 
is the question of the relationship between literalism and metaphoricity, which he seeks, as 
in the Suninza de Ente and the detenninationes against Kenningham, to confine to the 
secondary, derivative discourse of the human language sciences (grammar, logic, rhetoric). 
What is most revealing about this sustained attempt to marginalise language, as before, is 
not the resistance of the linguistic sciences to any such categorisation, but the difficulty of 
excluding definitively their 'non-linguistic' counterparts (crucially, the theory of analogy 
itself) from the same marginal domain. 81 The same problem surrounds the related concept 
of literalism (as Kenningham's remarks in his second determination would suggest), 
82 
which also features prominently in discussions of exegetical theory throughout De Veritate 
Sacrae Scripturae. 
3.1 Properties of Figurae and Figurata: The Realist's Distinction between Analogy and 
Metaphor 
The principle of analogy is introduced as an exegetical tool in the first chapter of De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. Having rejected the proposition, presented at the beginning of 
the chapter, that the language of Scripture - whether plain or obscure - is not to be inritated, 
81 The problem which confronts Wyclif may be understood in terms of the opposition between metaphysics 
and rhetoric (the latter, like the linguistic sciences in Wyclif, acting as 'supplement' to the former) on which 
medieval logocentric discourses depended. See the discussion in Ralph Flores, The Rhetoric of Doub(fid 
Authority: Deconstnictive Readings ofSetf-Questioning Narratives: St Augustine to Faulkner (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), pp. 1943. Flores identifies Augustine as a 'self-questioning' author, whose works 
consistently challenge (if only implicitly) the logocentric premises of Western metaphysics (pp. 44-66). 
Significantly, Wyclif reads Augustine in terms which attempt to affirm, rather than to deny or question, these 
premises. (See the discussion of ampliatio temporis in Ch. 3 (section 4), above. ) 
82 See Ch. 4 (section 2.3), above. 
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Wyclif moves on to consider the interpretative problems surrounding figurative passages. 
Here, he turns to a text from Augustine's commentary on the Homilies of St John, in 
which he explains how different things, 'by resemblance and other means', are called 
'Christ': 
[Augustine] says that "many things by resemblance and other means, which 
it would be lengthy to recollect, are called 'Christ'. Now, if you were to 
break up the properties of the things which you have been used to seeing, 
it is clear that he is not a rock, which is hard, nor is he without feeling; nor 
is he a door, because a craftsman did not make him; nor is he an angular 
stone, because he was not fashioned by a sculptor; nor is he a shepherd, 
because he is not the protector of four-legged sheep; nor is he a lion, 
because he is not wild, nor a lamb, because he is not a beast. He is therefore 
said to be all of those things by similitude. ' 83 
Those who argue from this passage, Wyclif suggests, too often accept it 'without respecting 
the differences on either side of the argurnent. ' It is perfectly possible, for example, for 
holders of contradictory opinions to support their arguments from Augustine's statement 
(diction). Earlier in the same passage, Wyclif reminds us, Augustine was willing to 
concede that Christ could be both a door and a shepherd. Peter, Paul and the other 
apostles, we are told, can also be called shepherds, as can any good bishop. Only Christ, 
however, can be called a door, having taken this name for himself personaliter. By 
following Augustine, the careful doctor is able to concede that Christ is, and is not a door, 
without fear of contradiction. Augustine's logic, Wyclif insists, is founded on the principle 
(rehearsed ceaselessly in the Sinnina de Elite and the Logicae Contilillatio 
84) that ill 
equivocation there is no contradiction. Equivocation, we are told, is not simply 
equivocation of a name, but of a thing and a name. 
85 Contradiction would presumably be 
seen to arise only in cases in which the name, or linguistic sign, was being privileged above 
the things signified by that name. The distinction between equivocation and analogy was 
83 '[Augustinus] dicit, quod "multa per similitudines; et alia, que conunemorare longum est, dicuntur Cristus. 
Si autem proprietates discucias rerum, quas videre consuisti, nee petra est, quia durus, et sine sensu non est, 
nee ostium est, quia non eum faber fecit, nee lapis angularis est, quia non est a sculptore compositus, nee 
pastor est, quia custos ovium quadrupedum non est, nee leo est, quia fera non est, nee agnus est, quia pecus 
non est. Omnia igitur ista, propter similitudinem. ' De Veritare Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 7. 
84 See Ch. 3 (section 1), above. 
85 De Veritate Sacrae Scripitirae, vol. i, p. 9. 
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not an absolute one, though Wyclif generally treats the latter as a means of understanding 
the former. In addressing the problem of how figurative language is to be understood, he 
presents a detailed summary of the analogical method. As in the Siannia de Elite, our 
attention is drawn to the fundamental distinction between properties of the genits of a 
creature, and the perfection of those properties in the analogon. It is on account of this 
distinction, we are told, that the name is used of God only equivocally: 
It remains to consider in what sense figurative language in Scripture should 
be understood. Indeed, I have often said that it should be understood in the 
mystical sense, the spiritual sense, symbolic and analogical, as 
commentators on Scripture tell us, namely thus: the signs in a mystical 
theological proposition, in which at one extreme is the name of a creature, 
attributed nevertheless to God, should be observed as conditions of analogy 
which establish properties according to the genits of the creature from which 
the name is taken. And by attending to that which is of perfection in the 
analogon, but also to the properties of imperfection in the genits, the 
aforesaid [word] is attributed to God according to an equivocal sense. 
86 
To illustrate how this process of analogical comparison operates, Wyclif turns to one of the 
terms discussed most frequently in late-medieval exegetical theory, 'lion'. For unskilled 
grammarians (nudes grannnatici), he suggests, the term signifies simply a four-legged 
roaring beast. Theologians, however, perceive that 'lion' can at one time signify Christ, 
and at another the devil. This is consistent, he reminds us, with the argument of Gregory 
in the Morals. 87 Wyclif turns to the book of Apocalypse, in which we are told that 'the lion 
of the tribe of Juda, the root of David, hath prevailed to open the book, and to loose the 
seven seals thereof. ' (5: 5) This example, in which the lion is clearly Christ, is compared 
with another from I Peter 5: 'your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about 
see-king whom he may devour. ' (v. 8) Drawing on a popular exegetical convention, Wyclif 
isolates natural dominion, strength, and life-giving force as the properties which must form 
the basis of the analogy with Christ. Just as the lion is the natural king of the beasts, so 
86 4 restat videre, ad quem sensurn locuciones huiusmodi figurative scripture debent intelligi. et sepe dixi, quod 
debent intelligi ad sensum nýisticurn, sensurn spiritualem, simbolicum et proporcionalem, ut sancti postillantes 
scripturam loquuntur crebrius, sic videlicet, quod signata una proposicione mistice theologie, in qua alterum 
extremum est nomen creature et tamen atrributurn deo, notari debent condiciones analogice fundantes 
proprietates secundurn genus in creaturis, cuius nomen accipitur. et colando illud, quod est perfeccionis in 
illo analogo, ac adiciendo proprietates imperfeccionis in genere, attribuendurn est illud predicaturn deo ad 
sensum equivocum. ' De Veritare Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 14-15. 
87 Wyclif refers to Moralia in Iob, 3, Chs. 4,17 and 18. 
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Christ is described in Apocalypse 19 as having in his loins the writing 'king of kings and 
lord of lords'. 88 As the lion is the strongest of beasts in relation to its size, so Christ is the 
strongest in terms of spiritual powers. We learn from St Matthew's gospel, Wyclif points 
out, that every power in heaven and earth was given to him mortally. The lion rouses its 
cub from sleep to movement with its roar, just as Christ raised Lazarus from the tomb with 
his call. 
The propriety or impropriety of the analogical term 'lion', as applied to Christ, is 
considered in the third chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. It has been argued, 
Wyclif suggests here, that Christ is properly a lion, since he is a lion in the mystical sense, 
which is uniquely consistent with itself. To the extent that Christ is properly the ruler of 
his kind, on this view, so he is properly a lion. For the sancti doctores, however, as Wyclif 
goes on to argue, Christ is improperly a lion, since he is figuratively so called, according 
to the principle of similitude (sindlitudo). 89 These two opposing perspectives are resolved 
by positing a twofold definition for proprietas and improprietas. Each tenri, Wyclif argues, 
can be applied according to the figure itself (the lion as a four-legged roaring beast), or 
according to the thing figured (Christ). In terms of the impropriety of the figure, Christ is 
not a lion, since he is not identical with the animal signified by the word 'lion'. 
Nevertheless, lie is properly a lion if we speak of the analogical propriety of the thing 
signified (loquendo de proprietate analogata figurati), which encompasses, we are told, 
th, _- properties listed in Apocalypse 5. This distinction 
is consistent with the Thomistic 
definitions of metaphor and analogy given in De Trinitate, and is supported, Wyclif argues, 
by the statements of Augustine, Grosseteste and Gregory. 90 Augustine, as we have seen, 
was willing to concede that Christ could properly be and not be a door, without any danger 
of contradiction. We learn from Grosseteste, likewise, that names can belong properly to 
both corporeal and spiritual things together, albeit not in an identical sense. Gregory, in the 
last place, argues that what cannot be predicated essentially of God, must be predicated 
figuratively, since God does not assume the nature of a beast as he does the essence of a 
88 Apocalypse 19.16. 
89 For examples of this patristic interpretation of leo in the early medieval exegetical tradition, see Gillian 
Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), pp. 53-6. 
90 See Ch. 2 (section 2), above. 
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man. 
The opposition between analogical and linguistic propriety in De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae lends further support to the claim - introduced in Chapter 2- that the 
Aristotelian division between poetic and speculative/theological discourses was reinforced 
by the medieval (predominantly Thomistic) understanding of analogia entis. 
91 The nature 
of this opposition, as Wyclif perceived it, is clarified in the fourth chapter of De Veritate 
Sacrae Scriptitrae, in which the properties of figurative and 'fictive' language are examined 
in detail. Here, Aristotle, Aquinas and Augustine are cited in support of the claim that 
scriptural fictions and parables are used to express truths, even though they have no 
historical basis. Figures used in Scripture, Wyclif argues, are either figures of syntax 
(figurae constructionis), such as conceptio, synesis, or zeugma, or figures of speech 
(figitrae loClItiollis). 92 The latter category is the most significant of the two within the 
context of metaphor and analogy, and encompasses allegorical, parabolic and fictional 
expressions (locittiones allegorice, parabolice, et ficte). No attempt is made to relate any 
of these figures explicitly to the concept of analogia entis, and it is clear from the 
definitions supplied by Wyclif that none of the three metaphorical modes strictly 
presupposes analogy. There is, rather, in each case, the possibility that the figurative 
expression may have an analogical referent. 
Of the three difterent kinds of figure, Wyclif tells us, only allegory is based upon the 
historical sense of Scripture, though all are equally true in terms of the meanings which they 
communicate. Allegory, we are told, occurs 'when through the history of Scripture, 
expressed literally, the future which is to be believed of the Church is signified. ' Wyclif 
gives the example of the slaughtered paschal lamb of the Old Testament, which signifies 
Christ. The slaughter and consumption of the lamb, he suggests, which are identified as 
true historical events by Augustine, may be understood in terms of the spiritual eating of 
which we learn in St John's Gospel: 'Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink 
91 See Ch. 2 (section 3), above. 
92 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 65. This distinction is drawn from the grammatical tradition, in 
which there were traditionally two forms of figure, or scheina: 'Schemata lexeos sunt et dianoeas, id est 
figurae verborum et sensuum. sed schemata dianoeas ad oratores pertinent, ad grammaticos lexeos. ' Donatus, 
Ars Maior, iii. 4.5 (GL, 4, p. 397). 
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93 his blood, you shall not have life in you. ' (6: 53). The relationship between Christ and the 
lamb of Old Testament history can clearly be construed in analogical terms. The basic 
terins; of the allegory, however, as the passage Wyclif cites from Augustine makes clear, are 
the two acts of consumption, the one literal and the other spiritual. To this extent, analogy 
is here functioning as a condition of a particular form of allegorical signification, but is not 
coterminous with it. The other two metaphorical modes are similarly only potentially 
linked with analogical meanings. The definitions and examples which Wyclif supplies only 
serve to highlight the lack of correspondence which is often to be found between the two 
systems. Parabolic locutions, for example, which are defined as fictional passages 'narrated 
according to a certain similitude', seldom have any need of analogy. As in the case of the 
parables of Christ (which Wyclif supplies as an example), they are used primarily in a 
moral, rather than a theological context, and do not function as analogical signs of the 
transcendent. 94 
Wyclif's systematic distinction between analogy and metaphor might easily be 
dismissed as a routine theological exercise. As we have seen, there was nothing 
fundamentally new about his arguments concerning figurae andfigurata. To confuse or 
conflate the categories of analogy and metaphor, however, would be to threaten the very 
basis of Wyclif's theory of textuality. The authority of the sacred text, after all, rested on 
its status as an intelligible entity, for which the material text acted simply as a sign. Here, 
as elsewhere, Wyclif was clearly anxious to separate linguistic categories and operations 
(the province of the poet or the grammarian) from entities and relationships in the real 
world (the unique products of divine intention). Kenningham's determinations had 
revealed how easily 'reality' - as conceived by realist metaphysicians - could be reduced 
to a series of logical and linguistic principles. Analogy, from the perspective of the anti- 
realist logician, would have been anything but an exception to this rule. This was not the 
93 ý unde Augustinus; octavo Super Genes. Ad Literam sic scribit quarto cap.: "recte quippe appellatur, quod 
ad eum signandurn precessit: ipse est ovis, que inmolatur in pascha, et illud non tanturn dicendo figurabatur, 
sed eciam faciendo. numquit erat ovis? plane ovis erat et occidebatur et manducabatur". intelligo de 
manducacione spirituali, de qua Joh. sexto: nisi manducaveritis carnent fiIii hominis et biberitis eitts 
sangivinem, non habetis vitain in vobis. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 66. 
94 . secunda vero locucio parabolica est, quando narratur quevis sentencia in scriptura secundum quandam 
similitudinern, licet res non sit historizata in scriptura sacra, ut patet in ewangelio de multis parabolis 
salvatoris. et de ista, locucione facit Augustinus mencionern octavo Super Genes. Ad Literam sexto capitulo. ' 
De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 66. 
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only principle, however, which was placed under threat by Kenningham's nominalistic 
emphasis on logical and linguistic categories. Wyclif's conception of divine intention - on 
which the theory of analogy ultimately rested - could also be undermined by anti-realist 
argumentation. This is significant, since the theory of intention lay behind the second of 
the two problematic concepts highlighted at the beginning of this section: literalism. We 
have already seen how Kenningham's Detenninatio de Esse Intelligibili Creaturae 
95 threatened the metaphysical pren-tises of Wyclif's theory of intention. There can be little 
surprise, then, that divine intention played such a conspicuous r6le in his analysis of the 
scriptural senses in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, nor that he was so insistent on 
privileging authorial intention above meanings arrived at through the discourses of the 
interpretative community. Here, as in his expositions on analogical exegesis, however, the 
distinction between the real and the linguistic, the originary and the derivative, the divine 
and the human, was one which often became strained. Whether this is to be read as a direct 
result of Kenningham's critique or not, there can be no doubt - as it will be argued in the 
following section - that the determinations would have cast a dark shadow over his earlier 
arguments about literalism and intention. 
3.2 Literalisin, Intentionalism and the Four Senses of Scripture 
Though De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, as we have argued, made few significant r) 
philosophical innovations on the level of exegetical praxis, it did bring the hermeneutic 
theory of the Stunina de Ente more closely into contact with the paradigms of patristic and 
medieval biblical interpretation. It is only here that literalism, as an 'intentionalist' 
construct (as distinct from the literalism necessary for syllogistic argumentation, or for the 
formation of a 'univocal' concept of God in Ockhamism or SCotiSM96), is applied to the 
Alexandrian four-fold categorization of the scriptural senses. In the fourth chapter, we 
learn that any of the three senses traditionally regarded as 'spiritual' (the allegorical, the 
tropological and the anagogic), may themselves be literal: 
95 See Ch. 4 (section 2.3), above. 
96 See Ch. 2 (section 4), above. 
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... Although any sense which the 
letter has may be called 'literal' de virtate 
sennonis, the holy doctors nevertheless all call the literal sense the sense of 
Scripture which the Holy Spirit first revealed so that the soul may ascend 
towards God. And [this sense] is now historical, as is evident from the 
deeds of Christ and from the deeds of the fathers in both testaments; now, 
however, it is moral or tropological, as we see from the section of Scripture 
concerning wisdom, such as the passage in Deuteronomy 6 and Matthew 22: 
Love the Lord your God ivith your whole heart, etc.; now it is allegorical, 
as is clear from the Apostle in I Corinthians 10: All are baptised ill Moses; 
now, indeed, it is anagogical, as is clear from the statement of the saviour 
in Matthew 22 and Luke 20: In heaven they do not marry, nor are they 
married, but are, as it ivere, angels of God. 97 
The association of the literal sense with the meaning intended by the divine author is not 
in itself either original or remarkable. Thomas Aquinas, whose numerous pronouncements 
on literalistic interpretation have attracted more attention than most, identified both 
authorial intention and historical meaning with the literal sense of Scripture. 98 He 
distinguished the literal from the spiritual senses by their modes of signification, the first 
signifying through wordsonly (which may be used by human and divine authors alike), and 
the latter group through things (which, like terms in an analogical proposition, can be 
'intended' only by the divine author). 99 Wyclif departs from the Thomistic model in his 
inclusion of the three 'spiritual' senses within the literal sense. He would not necessarily 
have rejected Aquinas's basic distinction, and is careful to emphasise that each of the four 
senses, despite being potentially literal, is still generically distinct from the others (since 
it has different subjective parts). As Wyclif is careful to explain, however, the senses are 
97 . quamvis autem quilibet sensus, quem habet litera, possit de virtute sermonis dici congrue litcralis, doctores 
tamen comunitur vocant sensum literalem scripture sensurn, quem spiritus sanctus primo indidit, ut animus 
fidelis ascendat in deum. et est nunc historicus, ut patet de gestis Christi et de gestis patrum utriusque 
testamenti, nunc autem est moralis vel tropologicus, ut patet de parte sapienciali scripture, ut est illud Deut. 
sexto, et Matth. vicesimo secundo: diliges dontinum, delint natin, ex toto corde etc. nune autem est 
allegoricus, ut patet per illud apostoli prima Cor. Decimo: oinnes in Moyse baptizati sunt; nunc vero est 
anagogicus, ut patet per illud dictum salvatoris Matth. vicesimo altero et Luc. vicesimo: in celis nec nubent 
nec nubentur, sed sunt sicut angeli dei. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 119-120. 
98 See, for example, Stannia Theologiae, la. 1,10, in %vhich we are told that 'Ilia... significatio qua voces 
significat res pertinet ad primunm sensum, qui est sensus historicus vel litteralis. ' (p. 36) Later in the same 
passage, Aquinas suggests that 'sensus litteralis est qucm auctor intendit, auctor autern sacrae Scripturae Deus 
est qui onmia simul suo intellectu comprehendit. ' (p. 38) On the duality. of the literal sense in Aquinas, see 
F. A. Blanche, 'Le Sens Littdral des tcritures Waprýs Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Contribution a I'histoire de 
I'Exdgýse Catholique au Moyen Age', Revite Thomiste, 14 (1906), 192-212 (pp. 192-196). 
99 'Dicendum quod auctor sacrae Scripturae est Deus, in cuius potestate est ut non solum voces ad 
significandurn accommodet (quod etiam horno facere potest) sed ctiarn res ipsas. ' Summa Theologiae, Ia. 
1,10 (p. 36). 
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not thereby distinct ex opposito, as a man and an ass are distinct, '()o but only secunduln 
rationenz (namely, according to a division imposed by the mind). 
Wyclif defines the historical and the three 'spiritual' senses in turn, drawing on the 
traditional assumption - associated here with the doctor subtilis, Duns Scotus - that 
meanings expressed mystically in Scripture (through the sensus secundits) are elsewhere 
to be found in their literal form (the sensitsprinuts). 101 The literal, or historical, sense, he 
tells us, 'is that by which the letter first teaches the truth'. The allegorical sense, on the 
other hand, goes beyond historical signification, but is 'endorsed elsewhere by the letter. ' 
To illustrate the relationship between history and allegory, Wyclif turns to Galatians 4, in 
which the allegorical significance of Abraham's two sons in the book of Genesis is 
considered: 
22 It is written, in Genesis 17, that since Abraham had nvo sons, ... 
24 these are 
the tivo testaments. Look: beyond the historical sense Abraham, who is 
taken to be the father of many races, signifies God the Father, and his two 
sons, with their circumstances, signify the two testaments, Ismael the old 
and Isaac the new... 102 
The text, Wyclif suggests, may be read according to either the historical or the allegorical 
sense, or in respect of both together. Here, once again, he is careful to emphasise that the 
possibility of following both senses at once, for which he finds confirmation in the writings 
of Rabanus Maurus, by no means denies the validity of distinctions drawn between them, 
just as the distinctions themselves 'do not deny their identity in many suppositions'. Wyclif 
goes on to explain how these conventional definitions of literalism and allegory relate to 
his more idiosyncratic understanding of the relationship between literalism and authorial 
100 , ... quamvis isti quatuor sensus secundurn. sua genera 
distingwuntur eo, quod genera non sunt ex equo idem, 
sed habent aliquas partes subiectivas nature disparis et utrobique disparem racionem, tamen non distingwuntur 
ex opposito sicut homo et asinus... ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 120-21. 
10, '... Iegens scripturam ad sensum primum sine sensu secundo habet solum sensum historicum, ille autem, 
qui superaddit sensum secundum, habet de eadem litera sensum allegoricum. et ista videtur michi sentencia 
doctoris Subtilis super primo Sentenciarum, conclusione tercia sic dicentis: "dico, quod, quicunque sensus 
in una parte scripture non est literalis, in alia parte est literalis, et ideo, licet aliqua pars scripture habeat 
divcrsos sensus, tamen tota scriptura omnes istos sensus habet pro sensu litcrali". ' De Veritate Sacrae 
Scriptitrae, vol. i, pp. 121-22. 
102 , scripturn est Genes. Septimo decimo, quoniam Abraham duosfilios habuit, hec enim sunt duo testamenta. 
ecce, preter sensum historicurn Abraham, qui interpretatur pater multarum gencium, signat deurn. patrem, 
et duo filii eius cum suis circurnstanciis signat duo testamenta, Ysmael vetus et Ysaac novum... ' De Veritate 
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intention. If any faithful reader were to understand the mystical sense of Genesis 17 
4purely', he suggests, without at the same time disregarding its historical dimension, then 
the allegorical sense of the text would thus be 'literal' to that reader. To this extent, 
allegorical passages which lack an historical foundation - and hence which lack a literal 
sense as conventionally defined - may still be said to be identical with the literal sense. 
Such an identification, however, as Wyclif points out, is only tenable so long as the sense 
of the text is that which is first in the order of understanding (sensits... prinzo in ordine ab 
hoinine conceptits de scriptitra). 103 By this -definition of literalism, he suggests, we can 
see that Aquinas spoke truly when he claimed that the sensits parabolicits (which 
encompassed all meanings conveyed metaphorically through words) was part of the literal 
sense. 104 Similar rules apply to the other two spiritual senses. The moral or tropological 
sense, we are told, sometimes has an historical sense which is apprehended first, but might 
also be the literal sense elicited immediately (ininediate) from Scripture. The anagogic 
sense likewise, insofar as it teaches immediately the truth which is to be expected in the 
triumphant church (in ecclesia triuniphante), is literal. 105 Any of the senses, therefore, can 
be apprehended inediate or ininediate, the allegorical teaching us what is to be believed, the 
moral what is to be done for the sake of merit, and the anagogic what is to be hoped for. 
These separate definitions, Wyclif argues, correspond respectively to the theological 
virtues of faith, hope and charity. 106 As is to be expected, none of the senses is strictly 
literal unless it is apprehended ininediate ('directly'): 
Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 121. 
103 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 122. 
104 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 122-23. Wyclif refers to the definition of senstis parabolicus 
given in the Sitinnia Theologiae, Ia. 1,10: 'sensus parabolicus sub litterali continetur, name per voces 
significatur aliquid proprie et aliquid figurative' (p. 40) Aquinas's inclusion of the sensusparabolicits within 
the literal sense follows from his claim that 'sensus litteralis est quem auctor intendit' (Ia. 1,10 (p. 38)). The 
parallelism which Wyclif perceives between his own conception of literalism and that of Aquinas presumably 
rests on his awareness of this important claim. 
105 . sensus autem moralis vel tropologicus quandoque habet sensum historicum prius inductivurn, et 
quandoque est sensus literalis inmediate elicitus ex scriptura, cum quicunque sensus scripture sit moralis, in 
quantum inmediate allicit ad virtutes, est eciam anagogicus, in quantum docet veritatem expectandarn in Zý 
ecclesia triumphante... ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 123. 
106 , ... istorum trium sensuum misticorum sensus allegoricus 
docet mediate vel inmediate credenda, sensus 
anagogicus docet mediate vel inmediate speranda, sed sensus tropologicus docct mediate vel inmediate 
meritorie agenda. et sic correspondent per ordinem fidei, spei et caritati. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. 
i, p. 123. 
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Those for whom it is pleasing to distinguish the literal sense according to 
a definition, or to its subjective parts, from the others, should say that by 
definition the literal sense is that which is the catholic sense elicited 
immediately from Scripture, and that the other three senses, if they have 
been elicited from Scripture immediately, are then literal. But if they are 
elicited mediately, then they are either the allegorical, the tropological or the 
anagogical sense, but not the literal. 107 
Wyclif contrasts this simple definition with the 'useless divisions' (rangae inutiles) he was 
previously accustomed to drawing in connection with the scriptural senses. 108 As in the 
case of the many similar claims made elsewhere, we are given no firm indication of either 
the time or the context of these earlier practices. There can be little doubt, however, that 
he would have consigned them mentally to the same vague period of youthful impetuosity 
and extravagance with which he associated his misguided devotion to nominalist and 
ten-ninist methodologies. His former way of speaking in regard to the senses of Scripture, 
he declares here, has now been recognised as 'lacking foundation' (infundabilis) and 
'unnecessarily burdensome' (superflue onerostun). 109 It is sufficient, he suggests, drawing 
very conspicuously on the analogical theory of knowledge and perception developed in the 
Sumina de Ente, to understand the word sensits itself in terms of four interrelated 
definitions. Three of these relate to the powers of the mind and the intellect (created or 
uncreated), and hence - in textual terms - to the process of reception. The fourth - and for 
Wyclif, the most significant - describes either these same powers (of the created mind), or 
their object (obiectunz), which is the Book of Life itself. 
... 'Sense' at one time means the corporeal power of the mind, since there are 
five exterior and five interior senses; and indeed, it sometimes means either 
the created or uncreated intellective power, as in Romans 11: Who hath 
known the nzind of the Lord? And thirdly, it designates the act of such a 
power. Fourthly, however, it signifies the object which such a power 
perceives as the truth, and which the orthodox Christian understands from 
Scripture. This is called the sense of Scripture, as Christ says in Luke 24: 
107 'illi autem, quibus place distingwere sensum literalem secundum racionem vel partes subiectivas ab aliis, 
debent dicere, quod de racione sensus literalis est, quod sit sensus cathoficus inmediate elicitus ex scriptura, 
et alii tres sensus, si inmediate eliciuntur ex scriptura, tunc sunt literales. si autem mediate, tunc sunt sensus 
allegoricus, tropologicus vel anagogicus, non Iiteralis. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 123-124. 
108 'quandoque autem contendebam distingwendo hos quatuor sensus ex opposito per rangas inutiles... ' De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 124. 
109 Ibid. 
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Then he opened their understanding ['senswn'], that they inight understand 
the Scriptures. But although 'sense' can there be understood as the 
cognitive power of the disciples, which was previously veiled, nevertheless 
it is clear that it would be consistent if it were taken to be the meaning 
written in the law of Moses, in the prophets and in the Psalms of Christ... 
And that meaning is the Book of Life ... 
1 10 
Wyclif s literalism, as we have seen, had attracted some hostile criticism from Kenningham 
during the course of his deten-ninations in the early 1370s. 111 If Wyclif's own comments 
are to be believed, he would have received nothing better from the majority of his 
contemporaries in Oxford. The reasons for this are unlikely to have been purely 
philosophical, but it is nevertheless true that the principles of his literalism ran contrary to 
the most fundamental precepts of nominalist logic and metaphysics. Ockham's theory of 
univocal predication, as we have suggested, allowed no room for metaphorical language, 
and it would have been meaningless to suggest that any figurative statement was literally 
(literaliter or de virlute sennonis) true. Theological propositions had to be translated into 
their literal equivalents before any understanding of the divine could be arrived at, however 
imperfect. An almost identical principle, as we have seen, lay at the heart of Thomistic 
literalism ('frorn the literal sense alone can an argument be drawn'), though its primary 
justification there was logical rather than metaphysical. ' 12 Though the Thomýistic principle 
is likely to have had an effect on Ockham's exegetical method, it is of comparatively little 
significance within the context of nominalist hermeneutics. For Wyclif, clearly, it would 
have been Ockhamism, and not Thomism, that posed the most significant threat to his own 
analogist-intentionalist system of interpretation. 
The application of the principles of analogy to the problems of metaphoricity and 
literalism in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, despite being for the most part unexceptional, 
I 10 '-sensus quandoque dicat vir-tutem anime corporalem, ut sunt quinque sensus exteriores et quinque sensus 
interiores. quandoque vero dicit vim intellectivarn creatam vel increatam, ut Rom. undecimo: quis cognoveril 
sensunz doinini, et tercio signat actum talis virtutis, sed quarto signat obiectum, quod virtus talis sentit, ut 
veritas, quam catholicus sentit de scriptura, vocatur sensus scripture, quomodo loquitur Cristus Luc. vicesimo 
quarto: tutic apperuit eis sensitnt, tit intellegerent scripturas. quamvis autem ibi sensus possit intelligi vis 
cognitiva discipulorurn. prius velata, tamen pertinencius videtur sumi pro sentencia scripta in lege Moysi, 
prophetis et psalmis de Cristo... et ista scntencia est liber vite... ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 
124-5. 
111 See Ch. 4 (section 2.3), above. 
112 See Ch. 4 (second paragraph), above. 
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is among the clearest illustrations of the strength of Wyclif's commitment to a realist 
metaphysic. As such, however, as we have seen, it also serves to highlight the inherent 
weaknesses of a system which seeks to marginalise, as far as possible, linguistic and 
discursive processes. Kenningham's critique of the concepts of real predication, intelligible 
ideas and (implicitly) the intelligible book clearly left Wyclif with few options but to insist 
more strenuously on the necessity of analogy and its metaphysical premises. Kenningham's 
suggestion that Wyclif himself, despite his many claims to the contrary, depended as 
heavily on material signs and physical texts as any of the sign-doctors he was opposing, 
made the rigid opposition between (real) analogism and (linguistic) metaphoricity more 
difficult to sustain. 
4. WYCLIF'S SCRHYIURAL DEFENCES: A RESPONSE To KENNINGHAM? 
In the eighth and ninth chapters of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, Wyclif presents a 
series of philosophical defences against those who seek to deny the truth of holy Scripture. 
As elsewhere in the tractate, he remains vague about the identity of his opponents, but 
there is a strong likelihood - given the thematic structure of the defences - that 
Kenningham was intended as the principal target. The key metaphysical concepts which 
Wyclif discusses are identical with those which Kenningham attacked so relentlessly in the 
determinations. Together with Wyclif's own determinations against Kenningham, the two 
groups of weapons provide the clearest indication of the magnitude of the threat which 
Kenningham's arguments were perceived to have posed. They are also a good indication 
that the arguments themselves - and possibly also the anti-realism which underlay them - 
were exerting an influence in the contemporary academic community of Oxford. 
There are two groups of weapons or armatures (annaturae), the first of which, we 
are told, is to be used against the callidae sophistae who seek to discover falsehoods in 
Scripture. 113 The second is the medium through which we are to achieve knowledge of 
scriptural truth. ' 14 The first armature is principally metaphysical in nature, and relates to 
113 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 167. 
114 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 194. 
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the philosophical bases of the five-fold definition of Scripture presented in the sixth 
chapter. Its five parts have been carefully chosen, and seem likely to have been intended 
as correctives to the interpretation of philosophical realism presented by Kenningham in 
his determinations. The first part of the armature is the doctrine of ideas, a cornerstone of 
Wyclif's philosophical realism which was criticised in the final determination (De Esse 
Intelligibili Creaturae). The related principle of real universals (universalia exparte rei), 
the first of the three 'nests' presented in Wyclif's determination against Kenningham, forins 
the second part of the armature. The third part, according to which there is unity in diverse 
genera and species, is effectively presupposed by the first two. The fourth, the 
metaphysical principle according to which all past and future instants are present to God, 
recalls the concept of temporal extension which Kenningham criticised in his second 
detem-iination (De Anipliatio Teinporis). The final part concerns the relationship between 
logic, and reality, and is presented in the form of the logical maxim introduced in the 
Sununa de Ente: 'non est contradictio in signis equivocis'. 115 
The second armature is henizeneutic. Its primary function is not, unlike that of the 
first, to reinforce the realist definition of Scripture itself, but to resolve some of the 
problems surrounding its human reception! 16 There is a strong likelihood that Wyclif's 
remarks here, as in the case of his discussion of the first armature, reflect anxieties 
awakened by Kenningham's comments in the deten-ninations. Considered as responses to 
these conu-nents, however, they are less satisfactory. Wyclif makes no explicit concessions 
to Kenningham, though the the armature as a whole serves as a tacit acknowledgement of 
the difficulties inherent in a rigid anti-materialist hermeneutic. 
1'5 See section 3.1, above. 
116 1 use the term 'hermeneutic' in broadly the same sense as it is given in Chapter 1. Here, however, it also 
serves to distinguish textual concerns (the processes of editing, reading and interpretation) from the more 
metaphysical aspects of Wyclif's exegetical theory. The labels 'hermeneutic' and 'metaphysical' are not 
applied to the armatures by Wyclif himself. 
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4.1 Freeing the Sivord of the Spirit: The Metaphysical Annature 
The first of the two an-natures is presented after a brief excursus on the propriety of 
God's law and the nature of heresy in the eighth chapter, and occupies the remainder of the 
text. 117 Its quintuplex structure is compared with the five-fold categorization of Scripture 
presented in Chapter 6 of the same work, and with the spiritual defences listed by 
Augustine in his book to the Holy Spirit, namely the shield of faith, the helmet of salvation, 
the breast-plate of justice, the ointment of the gospel of peace and the girdle of truth . 
11 8 
These parallelisms, like the numerous others which are highlighted in De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, direct us once again to the fundamentally analogical nature of Wyclif's 
thought. More crucially, the description of the five points illustrates the significant 
hermeneutic connections between the diverse philosophical concepts examined by 
Kenningham in the detenninationes. Wyclif begins his exposition with the theory of divine 
ideas or intelligible natures, the first principle of his metaphysical teaching. As we have 
seen, this acted as the foundation for the three basic elements in Wyclif's hermeneutic 
theory: analogia entis, 'real' truth and ampliatio temporis. 119 It also provided the 
philosophical basis for his theory of real universals and equivocation, which acted 
respectively as the second and the fifth principles in the metaphysical armature. As in the 
De Universalibits, in which divine ideas are presented as the highest form of being the 
archetypes of the created world, Wyclif cites the passage from St John's Gospel (1: 3-4) to 
support his arguments about their nature and reality: 120 
There are ideas coetemal with God, which are in him as principles or 
exemplars, according to which the universe was created, as in that passage 
in John 1: 'What was made, in him was life. ' Through this it is possible to 
understand how in that passage in Genesis 1, God said, 'Let there be light', 
and there was light. And this is a pregnant sentence, so that firstly 'to say' 
is the word of God; secondly, 'Let there be' is the principle of the exemplar; 
and thirdly, 'there was' describes the making of the thing and the existence 
of the creature. Through this, moreover, it is possible to understand in 
117 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 167-182. 
118 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 168. 
119 See Chs. 2 (analogia entis) and 3 (truth and time), above. 
120 Cf. De Universalibits, Ch. 7,11.35-38 (also: Ch. 15,11.306-10). See the discussion of this passage in Ch. 
2 (section 1), above. 
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many places the fecundity, profundity, and sublimity of Scripture, as 
Augustine has often mentioned. 121 
Here, the metaphysical system of the Sunnna de Ente is very clearly visible, beginning with 
divine intention, proceeding through the ideal exemplar, and concluding with the existence 
of the creature itself. An understanding of this system is presented by Wyclif as a necessity, 
rather than as a useful accessory. He cites Augustine's remark from his forty-sixth question 
in support of his argument: 'without any conception of ideas, nobody is either wise or 
blessed. ' 122 Kenningham's critique of Wyclif's argument about the essential identity of 
the divine essence and intelligible being is not mentioned, though the presentation of the 
armature is itself an indication that it had remained in his n-dnd. Wyclif nowhere attempts 
a rational justification of this argument in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, though the 
principle of essential identity is explicitly invoked in his discussion of the relationship 
between the two highest forms of Scripture in the sixth chapter. 123 
The second of the five weapons - the doctrine of real universals - follows naturally 
from the first, drawing heavily upon the metaphysical system of the S11111111a de Elite. Like 
the first, it very explicitly marginalises any logician who fails either to accept or to 
understand the basic precepts of philosophical realism. There can be no doubt, in this 
121 . *** est dare ydeas deo cocternas, que sunt in eo raciones vel exemplaria, 
iuxta que universitas est creata, 
iuxta illud Joh. primo: quod facturn est, in ipso vita erat. per hoe enim potest intelligi, quomodo ista scriptura 
Gen. primo dixit deus: ffiat lux et facta est lux, sit onusta sentencia, ita quod primum 'dicere' sit verbum dei, 
sccundum 'ffiat' sit racio exemplaris , et terciurn 'facta cst' dicat faccionern rei et existenciam creature. per 
hoc eciarn potest intelligi in multis locis scripture fecunditas, profunditas atque sublimitas, ut sepe meminit 
Augustinus. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scriplurae, vol. i, p. 168. (Here, as above, I have departed from the Douay- 
Rheims translation of John 1: 3-4. ) 
122 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 168. Buddensieg observes that Wyclif does not reproduce 
Augustine's exact words here (n. 21). 
123 See section 1.1, above. 
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particular case, that Wyclif has nominalists of past and present generations in mind. The 
reference to signs in the opening sentence is possibly an oblique response to Kenningham's 
remarks on the doctors of signs - and to his provocatrive claim that Wyclif himself should 
be counted among them - in his second determination: 
The second weapon is that there are universals exparte rei, beyond signs, 
as in the passage from Genesis 1: 'God created every living and moving 
creature which the seas brought forth in their kind, and every flying thing 
according to its kind. ' And a knowledge of these creatures is a common 
medium for understanding the uncreated Trinity, as Augustine teaches in his 
Dialogue to Felicianits. And here Anselm says, in the second chapter of On 
the Incanzation, that those denying such universals are 'heretics of logic'. 124 
Here, as in De Trinitate, we are reminded of the analogical relationship between the nature 
of universals and the nature of the Trinity. Wyclif once again draws attention to the 
significance of this analogy for a proper understanding of the nature of the Trinity. There 
is not, he suggests, any fallacy concerning the Trinity which does not have an analogue in 
relation to the nature of universals. By implication, any philosopher who seeks to dispense 
with the notion of real universals - as would any nominalist or anti-realist - is also guilty, 
or potentially guilty, of trinitarian heresy. Kenningham makes no reference to Wyclirs 
pronouncements on the relationship between realism and orthodox trinitarianism in his 
surviving determinations, though there can be little doubt that he would have been sensitive 
to their implications for his own metaphysical teaching. The armature itself, we are told, 
is like the Augustinian breastplate, 'according to which genera and species, through 
differences in their supposits, are connected (contexta)'. 125 Its prominent position among 
the five weapons - recalling its situation ainong the three metaphysical 'nests' mentioned 
by Wyclif in the ongoing academic debate with Kenningham - reflect its perceived 
centrality as a hermeneutic tool. 
124 . secunda armatura est, quod ex parte rei est dare universalia preter signa, iuxta Mud Gen. primo: creavit 
deus onzirenz aninzanz viventem alque motabilent, quant produxerant aque in species suas et onine volatile 
secundum genits sminz. et noticia istarum creaturarurn comunium est medium ad intelligendurn trinitatern 
increatam, ut docet Augustinus in Dialogo Ad Felicianum. et hinc dicit Anselmus in De Incamacione secundo 
cap., quod negantes talia universalia sunt "dialectice heretici. "' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 169. 
125 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 169. 
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Wyclif's arguments about universals and the Trinity lead him very logically into a 
consideration of the third of the five weapons, according to which all things of one species 
or another, despite being distinct in terms of time or place, in reality form a single whole. 
This principle of unity in diversity, as we have seen, lies at the heart of the epistemological 
system of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. The processes of analogical reasoning themselves 
rest fundamentally on a progressive return to unity, without which true knowledge cannot 
be achieved. Wyclif's contempt for the diversity which he finds in contemporary logic, and 
for the nominalist preoccupation with knowledge of the singular, are both important 
consequences of his own determined application of this third weapon. 126 He describes it 
here as a 'staff to the soul' (incitatorhan pedum anime), which is used to maintain 
evangelical unity and to defend the truth of Scripture de virtitte sennonis. 127 
The fourth armature is a product of the extended notion of time developed in the 
Suninza de Ente and the Logicae Continuatio. Once again, anipliatio temporis is linked 
inextricably with the theory of intelligible being, the subject of the preceding three points: 
The fourth armature is as the strongest shield of the highest metaphysic, 
which says that all things that were or will be are to God, not only 
according to their intelligible being, but according to their real being in their 
present time, as in the passage from Ecclesiastes 3: All things have their 
season, and in their times all things pass under heaven. (v. 1) And thus the 
Scriptures can be saved, doctors can be in agreement, and the insoluble 
difficulties of others, who imprison [i. e. restrict] the present tense, can be 
done away with. 128 
126 See section 2 of the present chapter. 
127 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 169-70. 
128 'Quarta an-natura quasi scuturn tutissimurn est illa alta metaphisica, que dicit, quod omnia, que fuerunt vel 
erunt, sunt aput deurn nedurn secundurn suum. esse intelligibile, sed secundurn esse reale, pro tempore suo 
presencia, iuxta Ecclesiastes tercio: oninia tempus habent et suis spaciis franseunt universa sub sole. et sic 
possunt salvari scripture, concordari doctores et tolli faciliter insolubiles difficultates affis, qui incarcerant 
presens tempus. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 17 1. The text of the vulgate has 'sub caelo' for 
Wyclif's 'sub sole'. I have used the Duoay-Rheims translation (which follows the former) here. 
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The 'real' being of past and future moments 'in their present time', though Wyclif nowhere 
attempts to explain these expressions, must presumably be equivalent to their mode of 
existence prior and subsequent to their becoming past and future times, respectively. The 
present time, thus understood, is fundamentally different in kind from the past and the 
future, being the only time which is both intelligible and existential at once. Wyclif's 
description of those who 'restrict' (literally, 'imprison') the present tense by failing to apply 
the principles of anipliatio, though it is far from explicit, might easily have been intended 
as a veiled criticism of nominalist methods. Kenningharn. would presumably have been 
numbered among those who restrict the present, having argued, as we have seen, that 
'Scripture extends the vignification of tenns to connote past and future times' (my 
italics). 129 The expectation that the theory of amplification will bring contemporary 
doctors into agreement, however, is an indication that the target may have been devotees 
of terminist methodologies more generally, whose interpretations of time and tense, being 
oriented towards the proposition rather than a group of 'real' categories, were far from 
uniform. The scriptural passages which are cited here, though they are not glossed 
individually, suggest that the theory of ainpliatio is being applied in essentially the same 
way as in the Stinuna de Ente: 
Before Abraham was made, I am (John 8: 58) 
Go and tell that fox, Behold, I cast out devils, and do cures to day 
and to morrow, and the third day I am consummated. (Luke 13: 32) 
I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, 
and the God of Jacob. (Exodus 3: 6) 130 
All three passages must be accepted as expressions of truths, or, as Wyclif remarks in 
respect of the first two, as propositions in which 'the truth speaks pertinently and 
truthftilly'. There are, nevertheless, apparent temporal anomalies in the first two cases, and 
the words of the last, as we are told, were spoken 'long after' the saints in question had 
died. In what is an apparent attempt to justify these inconsistencies, Wyclif explains that 
129 Fascicieli Zizaniorum, p. 27. See the discussion of this passage in Ch. 4 (section 3), above. 
130 All three examples are cited together by Wyclif. See De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 171. 
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it is necessary that all things in the created world happpen in their own thne. Drawing on 
a range of scriptural passages containing the expression in tenipore sito (or something very 
similar), he argues that the confusion would be too great if God allowed the whole of the 
created universe to come into being at the same instant. This, we are told, is the reason why 
the prophets speak 'so variously' (tain varie) and 'with different tenses' (clun differenciis 
teinponint). He turns here to Augustine, in whose commentary on the Psalms we learn that 
'it often happens that a prophet, speaking of the past, declares the future'. Wyclif cites a 
passage from Psalm 22 as an example: 'They have dug my hands and my feet' (v. 17). 131 
As in the Suinina de Ente and the Logicae Continuatio, the true exegete is expected to 
understand that such passages, far from representing figurative locutions or verbal 
anomalies, are entirely consistent with the realities of time and eternity. This is because 
'all future events', from the perspective of the divine, 'have already happened'. 132 
Besides resolving the apparent verbal anomalies frequently encountered within the 
pages of Scripture, Wyclif's theory of extended or 'amplified' time is also applied in De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae to the problem of future contingents. This was among the issues 
over which nominalists and realists were most conspicuously divided in the latter half of 
the Middle Ages, and it is quite possible that Wyclif has contemporary nominalists in mind 
at this point in the treatise: 
Through this armature... the matter of predestination is known, and the 
necessity of future and contingent events in their respective contexts. The 
solution of the following argument [is also known]: Christ [our] God 
asserted this, therefore it ivill happen. For the future is as necessary as the 
past, since it happens in either case that nothing was. Hence, without the 
shield of faith, by which we know that creatures mutably succeed [each 
other in time], and that the immutable God, by reason of eternity, stands in 
every past and future [instant], I do not see how metaphysical writings 
relating to the intuitive knowledge of God, or the philosophy of successives 
as it is taught, could be upheld. 133 
131 , ,. hec racio, quare prophete loquntur tam varie cum differenciis temporum, ut notat Augustinus 
Super Psal. 
centesimo vicesimo quinto: "solet, " inquid, "fieri, ut propheta de preterito loquens futura pronunciet, " ut in 
psalmo vicesimo secundo: ffodenint manus meas etpedes ineos, futura, erant et quasi facta cantabantur. ' De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 172. 
132 , omnia enim, que futura sunt, deo iam facta sunt... ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 172-3. 
133 , per hanc itaque armaturarn cognoscitur materia de predestinacione, de necessitate futurorurn cum 
contingencia ad utrumlibet et solucio illius argumenti: Christus deus hoc asseruit, ergo evenict. nam, tam 
ncccssarium est futurum sicut preteriturn, cum contingit ad utrumlibet, quod nichil fuit. unde sine isto scuto 
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The passage reproduces, in a summary form, the arguments about future contingents and 
predestination presented in De Logica and the Sionina de Ente. 134 Here, as in the two 
earlier texts, the significant point for Wyclif is clearly not that contingent events are in 
some sense necessary (a view which was widely held 135) , but that temporal amplification 
is the means by which such contingent necessities are to be understood. It was the 
metaphysical system underlying the principle of amplification, after all, which divided 
Wyclif from anti-realists like Ockham, Aureol and Kenningham, and not the issue of 
contingency and necessity itself. In respect of the latter, his opponents seem more often to 
have been fellow realists than nominalists. 1 36 
Wyclif s fifth and final weapon draws on the theories of equivocation and real 
predication developed in the Suninza de Ente. As in the earlier text, these are held to have 
been misunderstood by contemporary philosophers - almost certainly terminists, and 
possibly also nominalists - because of a mistaken identification of truth and falsehood with 
linguistic signs. Academic interest in equivocation and (apparent) contradiction had grown 
with the development of insolubilia-literature in the later Middle Ages, and Wyclif had 
himself contributed a short treatise on the subject early in his career (c. 1365). 137 This 
would certainly have made him aware of the principal approaches to the problem of 
ambiguity (both of nominalist and realist scholars), and cannot have improved the 
assessment of contemporary logical scholarship which he gives - many years later - in De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. Here, as elsewhere, he appeals to the logic of Scripture itself 
(another primary analogate), as his guide. The theologian, we are told here, looks beyond 
fidei, quo credimus creaturas mutabiliter succedere et deum inmutabilern racione eternitatis omni preterito 
vel futuro assistere, non video, quomodo salvaretur scriptura methaphysica de dei noticia intuitiva vel 
philosophia de succesiva edocta. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, pp. 173-74. 
134 See Ch. 3, above. 
135 For a concise survey of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century interpretations of the concept of future 
contingency, see Calvin Normore, 'Future Contingents' in Kretzmann ct al., The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy, pp. 358-382. 
136 According to Robson, Wyclif was especially critical of the views of Fitzralph and Bradwardine. He 
acknowledges, nevertheless, that the Ockhamist conception of grace 'as a simple relation between God and 
creatures' was also implicitly rejected. See IVyclif and the Oxford Schools, pp. 207-214. 
137 'Be treatise has recently been edited by Paul Vincent Spade and Gordon Anthony Wilson, Johannis IV), clif 
summa insohibiliunt (New York: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1986). See also 
Thomson, Latin IVritings, pp. I 1- 12. 
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verbal signs, in which he seeks to find neither truth, falsehood nor contradiction. By 
following Christ, he learns to use logic as it is found in Scripture, avoiding the inevitable 
difficulties which human - or, at the very least, anti-realist - logical systems were giving 
rise to: 
The fifth armature [is] as a belt embracing [the body]. Herein lies all of the 
knowledge of the equivocation of terms in Scripture, by which it is known 
that there is no contradiction in equivocal signs, as is illustrated in the first 
chapter from Scripture and from the testimony of Augustine. For 
philosophical equivocations, lying hidden, are expressed in our books. 
When the theologian has recognised them, he can understand the truth, 
which does not lie in the outer garment of the words, just as falsity or 
contradiction does not lie there. He who with pure love seeks the lord Jesus 
Christ, rather than vain sophisticated glory, uses logic in the likeness of 
Scripture, as is explained in the third chapter [of the present work]. 138 
To illustrate how equivocation should be understood, Wyclif presents separate examples 
from ethics, natural science and logic. ' 39 The first, he suggests, serves to make consistent 
two passages from the Now Testament: 
Be without offence to the Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the church of 
God: As I also in all things please all men. (I Corinthians 10: 32-33) 
If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ. (Galatians 1: 10) 
According to Augustine, we are told, the proposition et ego placeo et ego non placeo ('I 
please and I do not please') may be true without representing a contradiction. Each part of 
the proposition, Augustine argues, is evident to the good and pious interpreter, who finds 
no contradiction between them to obstruct him. From this Wyclif draws three conclusions 
about the hermeneutic philosophy of Augustine and the saints (sancti), each of which 
powerfully reinforces the metaphysical arguments of the Sitnuna de Ente. The first - and 
138 , quinta armatura quasi cingulum latum amplectens hec omnia est noticia equivocacionis terminorum 
scripture, qua cognoscitur non esse contradiccionern in signis equivocis, ut exemplaturn est primo capitulo 
tam ex scriptura quam ex testimonio Augustini. equivocaciones enim subtilissime latentes philosophos in 
nostris codicibus exprimuntur, quas, dum theologus cognoverit, potest intelligere veritatem, que non iacet per 
se in verborum velamine, sicut nee falsitas vel repugnancia et ille, qui casto amore diligit dominum Jesum 
Cristurn, non gloriam vanam sophisticam, utitur hac logica instar scripture, ut dictum est tercio capitulo. ' De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 174 
139 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 174-182. 
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least remarkable - is that the saints strove to exclude falsity and contradiction from 
Scripture. 140 The second relates to the interpretation of the ambiguous term placeo itself. 
Here we are told that to please a creature for its own sake (placere... creature finaliter 
propter se) is the same as pleasing a man simply (placere homini shlipliciter). To please 
men with a view to pleasing God, on the other hand, is to please secundian quid, without 
any 'equivocal contradiction' between the two kinds of pleasing. 14 1 As in the case of the 
relationship between God and his symbols in the theology of the Sunillia de Elite, the 
avoidance of contradiction is only perceived to be possible so long as there exists some 
kind of metaphysical continuity between created and uncreated being. For nominalist 
thinkers, and for critics of Wyclif's metaphysical system like Kenningham, no such 
continuity would have been apparent. Wyclif's third conclusion concerns the term 
homilies ('men'). By 'all men', we are told, the saints understand 'all kinds of men', both 
within and outside the Church. When the apostle says, 'If I pleased men, I would not be 
a servant of Christ', he speaks of men as bodily creatures (caniales). Augustine, in De 
Verbis Domini, we are told, draws the distinction between one who lives sectindilln 
honzinein, and one who lives secunduni Detun. Wyclif uses as an example the apostle's way 
of speaking in I Corinthians 1: 26-29. The ten-n is also applied to those who live secluldiall 
delini, such as those who are described in Psalm 81: 6: 'You are Gods and all of you the 
sons of the most high'. b 
Wyclif s second example (from natural science) concerns the signification of names 
of material substances. These, he suggests, signify either material essences - which have 
an accidental substantial form - or the union of these essences with a material form. An 
example of the first mode of signifying is found by Wyclif in St John's gospel, in which we 
learn that water is made into wine. 142 In this case, he explains, the same material essence 
is at different times both water and wine, the latter being produced 'by various processes 
of mixture'. A second example is taken from the first two lines of Genesis, in which a 
single material essence (the prinia materia) is called earth, water and an abyss. This same 
140 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 175. 
141 t ecce secundo, quod placere sic creature finaliter propter se, cst placere homini simpliciter et placere 
hominibus sub racione placendi deo finaliter, quod est placere secundurn quid, est placere equivocurn 
contradiccionem excludens. ' Ibid. 
142 John 2: 9. 
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mode of signifying, Wyclif suggests, can be used to explain how priests are said to have 
been partially in the loins of Abraham in Genesis 3 and Hebrews 7, and how all material 
substances are said to have been created at once in Ecclesiasticus 18.1 43 He turns to St 
Anselm for support, citing a passage from his treatise De Conceptit Virginali: 
It is certainly not possible to deny that Adam's children were within him 
when he sinned, but they were within him causally or materially, just as if 
they were in a seed; in themselves personally they are, because in him they 
were the seed itself. 144 
Wyclif finds in Anselm not only a precedent for his own metaphysical arguments about 
scriptural meaning, but a comparable contempt for logicians and philosophers who seek to 
deny the truth of the Bible. Anselm had argued later in De Conceptit Virginali that anyone 
who rejected his claim that 'in the singular itself there are different persons', would also 
have to deny that Christ was in Abraham, in David, and in the other fathers. Though the 
argument is presented purely in the form of a hypothesis, there is a strong suggestion that 
Anselm had a specific group of exegetes and philosophers in mind. Wyclif is in no doubt 
whatsoever, declaring that 'in the time of that saint there were heretical dialecticians who 
denied holy Scripture, and who dismissed its logic as vain. ' 145 
The third and final example relates to conurion terms, and to the problem which arises 
when such terms are 'restricted' to singular referents. Because the term 'Christ' is 
common to both the humanity and the divinity of Christ, Wyclif argues, he is said on 
different occasions to be both created (factits) and uncreated (nonfactus). In each case, the 
term would presumably be seen to have been 'restricted' in a different way. The principles 
143 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 177. The references are to Genesis 3: 15 ('1 will put enmities 
between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed: she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait 
for her heel. '), and to Hebrews 7: 10 ffor he was yet in the loins of his father, when Melchisedech met him. '). 
The reference to Ecclesticus is from 18: 1 ('He that liveth for ever created all things together. God only shall 
be justified, and he remaineth an invincible king forever. '). 
144 ,, equidern negari nequit, infantes Adam fuisse, cum peccavit, sed in illo causaliter seu materialiter veIut 
in sernine fuerunt et in se ipsis personaliter sunt, quia in ipso fuerunt ipsurn semen. " ' De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. 177. Cf. the text of De Conceptit Virginali in PL, 158, col. 431-466 (this passage: col. 
454). 
145 . ecce, quod tempore huius sancti fuerunt dialectice heretici negantes scripturam sacrarn et abicientes eius 
logicarn tamquarn vanam. ' De Veritate Sarae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 178. 
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of restriction also apply to temporal terms such as esse, fitisse and fore, which Wyclif 
describes as being common respectively to present, past, and future times. The terms, in 
this case, are restricted, or 'limited', to particular times in the present, past, or future. 
Scripture, Wyclif suggests, often restricts temporal terms to particular times, as in the case 
of Genesis 2.20: 'For Adam there was not found a helper similar to himself'. Here, he 
explains, we must supply the phrase, 'not before Eve was created. ' Likewise, when we read 
in Jeremiah 31 that 'Rachel, weeping for her children, refused to be consoled, because they 
are not', we must supply, 'the children of predestination, as the children of Leah, martyred 
for Christ. ' By Rachel, Wyclif suggests, the saints understand the contemplative church 
(ecclesia contemplativa). Since wickedness of the flesh (111bricitas canlis) is completely 
contrary to contemplation, any sinner who indulges in such wickedness is not, according 
to the modus loquendi of Scripture. 146 
The theory of equivocation, like the principle of anipliatio temporis which precedes 
it in the list, is clearly perceived to have a special place among the hermeneutic weapons. 
It is analysed at greater length than any of the others, and is held to be adequate to resolve 
all of the recognisedfallaciae of scholastic logic. Both amplification and equivocation, 
as we have seen from Wyclif's disputations with Kenningham, were vulnerable to criticism 
on logical grounds, and both could very easily be understood purely (or principally) as 
linguistic or logical phenomena. 147 The-division between linguistic and real categories 
could easily be blurred, and Wyclif would have found it difficult to deny that linguistic 
operations played as significant a role in the theories of equivocation and amplification as 
the putative realities underlying them. That these two mainstays of realist textual theory 
should be so carefully and exhaustively defended in a treatise on hermeneutics should not, 
then, be any cause for surprise. All five weapons, like the metta-hermeneutic concepts used 
throughout De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, are said to have their bases within the text of 
146 , non sunt filii partis contemplative ecclesie, quarn sancti intelligunt per Rachelem, cum lubricitas carnis 
sit maxime contemplacioni contraria, et esse sic peccatorern est quoddarn non esse iuxta modurn loquendi 
scripture. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 179. 
147 See Ch. 4, above. 
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Scripture itself (though no specific parts are mentioned at this point in the treatise). We 
should not, Wyclif argues, accept any principle of knowledge which does not have such a 
basis: 
I do not see that we should admit [any] science or conclusion which does 
not find testimony from Scripture. Thus, from that passage in Genesis 1: 
'Let us make man to our image and likeness' (v. 26), it seems to me that five 
notable truths are taught. First, that God the creator is the Trinity, since 
otherwise he would not speak pertinently [in saying] 'let its make'. Second, 
that the whole personality of a man is stored in the soul, since it is said, 'let 
us make man'. Third, that the soul is triune, since it is the image of God 
himself. Fourth, that man was created in grace, since he was made in the 
likeness of God; and fifth, that the whole Trinity is one simple essence, 
since it is said singularly, 'in our image and likeness'. And this is so in 
other parts of Scripture, if ignorance of it does not obstruct us. 148 
All of these theological ideas are familiar from the discussion of the soul-Trinity analogue C) 
in De Trinitate. 149 Wyclif's gloss on the Genesis passage is far from controversial, though 
it seems unlikely that the five weapons would have been so readily accepted by his 
contemporaries as these basic principles of Trinitarian theology. Both, nevertheless, were 
held to be founded upon explicit scriptural teaching. Like all other biblical signata, the 
five weapons were - in Wyclif's eyes - products of divine, rather than of human intention. 
At the end of the eighth chapter, the weapons are identified explicitly as ideas in the mind 
of the auctor ininediatus of Scripture: 
I urge catholics that they do not learn or defend any one of the five weapons 
as though it were mine, but rather as something given and revealed to the 
faithful through the saints by the author of the first [kind of] Scripture, so 
that the sixth invasive weapon, namely the sword of the spirit, which is the 
word of Scripture, is not tied up, but can in its form have a free course. For 
then Scripture would be in authority, reverence and even efficacy as it 
formerly was. 150 
148 , nee video, quod oportet admittere scienciarn vel conclusionern, que non habet testimoniam ex scriptura. 
unde ex illo Gen. primo: facianius hominein adyntaginenz et sinzililudinent nostrant, videntur michi doceri 
quinque notabiles veritates. primo, quod deus creator est trinitas, cum aliter pertinenter non diceret: 
'faciamus'; secundo, quod tota personlitas hominis servatur in anima, cum dicitur 'faciamus hon-ýinem'; tertio, 
quod anima sit trina, cum sit ymaginem dei sui; quarto, quod homo fuit creatus in gracia, cum factus est ad 
similitudinern dei sui; et quinto, quod tota trinitas est una simplex essencia, cum dicitur singulariter 'ad 
ymaginem et similitudinem nostram'. et sic de aliis partibus scripture, si non obest eius ignorancia. ' De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 180-18 1. 
149 See Ch. 2 (section 2), above. 
150 'adiuro autem catholicos, quod non discant vel defendant aliquam illius armature quintuplicis tamquam 
meam, sed tamquarn autoris prime scripture per sanctos suos detectarn et datam fidelibus ad finem, quod sexta 
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The lost age of perfection to which Wyclif refers in this passage is the same, undoubtedly, 
as that which was held to have existed before the decline of logic (and the rise of 
Aristotelianism, nominalism and terminism) in the Oxford schools. The freeing of the 
sword of the spirit is suggestive of a liberation from the materialistic concerns of the 
schools and the contemporary church, and of a restoration to the meaning of God, the true 
author. The problems which surrounded the production and interpretation of the physical 
text nevertheless remained an obstacle even for the committed realist. Wyclif goes some 
way towards confronting these problems in his discussion of the second armature. 
4.2 The Henneneutic Annatitre and Knowledge of Scriptural Truth 
The second armature is introduced in the ninth chapter, which is devoted to questions 
of interpretation and scriptural authority. After an extended exposition on the dangers of 
attending too closely to human intention and the material forms of Scripture, Wyclif 
presents the five components of the armature in turn: 
armatura. invasiva, scilicet gladium spiritus, quod est vcrbum scripture, non sit ligaturn, sed possit in forma, 
qua hactenus, habere liberum cursum suum. tune enim foret scriptura in autoritate, reverencia ac enim 
efficacia sicut olim. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 182. 
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It is to be noted that, just as Scripture itself, in the sixth chapter [of the 
present work], is five-fold, and the armour for its defence in the eighth 
chapter is five-fold, so the medium leading to knowledge of its truth is five- 
fold, namely the correction of the books of Scripture, instruction in the logic 
of Scripture, consideration of the parts of Scripture together, the virtuous 
disposition of its devoted students, and the internal instruction of the first 
master. 151 
Though Wyclif remains committed to the idea that knowledge of the liber 111aterialis 
should not be an end in itself, his paradoxical dependence upon the written forrn of the text, 
as we suggested earlier, only becomes clearer as his argument progresses. It is made the 
more conspicuous by the influence of Robert Grosseteste, a philosopher whose 
Aristotelianism left his own views on the transcendent similarly compromised. 152 WyClips 
first weapon, for example, takes the form of the adequately corrected text. Such a text, he 
suggests, though the product of human scribes, copyists and editors, should not be guided 
by the principles of human knowledge, but should be corrected according to the reader's 
conception of the author's meaning (ut lector concipiat sentenciani alltoris). ' 53 Such a 
conception, of course, as Wyclif would certainly have conceded, was always bound to be 
imperfect. By directing his attention towards divine authorship and the highest form of 
Scripture, however, the reader could hope to minimise these imperfections as far as 
possible. 
The second defence Wyclif offers against the falsification or distortion of scriptural 
meaning is a knowledge of the logic of Scripture. Such knowledge, he suggests, following 
the argument developed in the third chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, prevents the 
theologian from becoming imprisoned by words. Here, once again, he turns to Aucrustine, C) 
endorsing the claim - made in De Doctrina Christiana - that the scriptural Ynodus loquendi 
is learned through the habit of reading and listening. 
151 ; 
... notandurn quod, sicut quintuplex est scriptura ex sexto capitulo et quintuplex armatura pro eius defensione ex octavo capitulo, sic quintuplex est medium disponens ad sue veritatis notitiam, scilicet codicurn 
scripture correccio, logice scripture instruccio, parcium scripture magis collacio, sui devoti studentis virtuosa 
disposicio et primi magistri interna instruccio. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 194. 
152 On the effects of Aristotelianism on Grosseteste's epistemology, see McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert 
Grosseteste, p. 20; pp. 326-345. 
153 . 
... correccio codicum non fflat secundum ornacionern sumptuosam nec secundum rectificationern factam iuxta humanam scientiam, sed proporcionaliter, ut lector concipiat autoris sentenciam. ' De Veritate Sacrae 
Scripturae, vol. i, p. 195. 
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Wyclif's third defence, which states that scriptural interpretation should proceed 
according to the fullest reading of its parts (crebra leccio parthan), recalls the debate with 
Kenningham over the status of literal truth. 154 It is often necessarily the case, he 
acknowledges here, that one part of Scripture explains another. In such cases, any attempt 
to interpret the text de vi vocis, according to the truth of isolated words, would presumably 
fail. Likewise, just as we must allow for a 'safe variety' in interpretation, which is always 
explained by 'reciprocal truth', so we must allow for variation between the Gospels, as 
between other texts. Though these may add or introduce changes to material which appears 
elsewhere, the same meaning nevertheless remains (vel addunt vel variant stante eadenz 
sentencia). It was according to these principles that Augustine, in his De Concensit 
Evangelistarian, was able to resolve the apparent contradictions which he found among the 
evangelists. The example is given of his treatment of the following passage from St 
Matthew's Gospel, which, Wyclif suggests, is preserved from falsehood: 
Then was fulfilled that which was said by the prophet Jeren-dah, who said: 
'and they took thirty pieces of silver, the price of him that was prized, who 
was prized of the children of Israel. ' 155 
The difficulty with this passage, we are told, is that the statement attributed to Jeremiah is 
not actually found in Jeremiah at all. Wyclif presents Augustine's solution in terms of three 
interrelated responses. The first concerns the text itself, whose corrected codices, it is 
suggested, use the term propheta, rather than Jerendas. The passages which do use 
Jerendas are therefore not holy Scripture, but erroneous texts which should be cast aside. 
Augustine, we are told, finally rejects this solution, since the majority of corrected texts, 
even those which rely on Greek exemplars, retain the problematic term. The second 
response is directed towards the problem of the authorship of the passage. Jeremiah, 
Augustine suggests, wrote and said many things with one voice, by the authority of divine 
inspiration. These things, however, were not translated into human writing by him, but left 
to another prophet to be so translated. Jerome, Wyclif suggests, claimed to have found the 
said passage in a Hebrew book bearing the title of Jeremiah, though the book itself is 
'-'ý4 See Ch. 4 (section 2.3), above. 
155 Matthew 27: 9. Cited in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 196. 
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among those prophetic writings which are unavailable to us. 
156 The third response is the 
only one, we discover, which Augustine found fully satisfactory. Its significance for 
Wyclif is clear from the terms in which it is glossed: 
[T]he third response... consists in the following: that the holy Spirit 
ordained that Matthew write the name Jeremiah to indicate that all holy 
prophets had communicated in language with a single spirit, so that 
whatever the holy Spirit said through them, he also said singulars to be of 
all things, and all things to be of singulars. And thus the holy Spirit moved 
the mind of Matthew to write in this way, so that he would teach the church 
among the saints to be as the power of communion, so that every saying of 
Zachariah would agree most congruently with Jeremiah. 
157 
The focus here is much broader than in Wyclif's earlier discussion of the distinction 
between the force of the word (vis vocis) and the force of discourse (virtits sennonis). The 
resultant shift in emphasis away from human language and towards a single underlying 
spirit, from singulars in themselves to a recognition of the interdependence of singulars and 
universals, and from the multiple voices of the prophets (God's instrumental authors), to 
the unifying force of divine intention, is nevertheless fundamentally the same. The process 
of reading, Wyclif suggests in his concluding section, should proceed according to an 
understanding of its harmonious elements, and through a rejection of any appearance of 
contradiction. 158 
The fourth defence relates to the disposition of the discipithis scripture, the reader of 
the sacred text. Such a figure, we are told, should be of a virtuous disposition, lest his or 
her spirit should be injurious to the process of reading itself. God reveals and conceals his 
book, so that anyone who is a friend to this master (naniely, to God himself), takes the fruit 
156 The reference to St Jerome here is obscure. Buddensieg adrnýits to having been unsuccessful in his attempts 
to locate the passage. See De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 197, n. 12. 
157 4 tercia responsio... stat in isto, quod spiritus sanctus ordinavit Mattheurn inserere, nomen Jeremie ad 
denotandum, quod omnes sancti prophete uno spiritu... comunicaverant in loquela, sic quod quecunque per 
eos spiritus sanctus dixerit, et singula esse omnium et omnia singulorum; et. sic spiritus sanctus movebat 
mentern Matthei sic scribere, ut discat ecclesia inter sanctos esse tantarn concordiam, ut onme dictum Zacharie 
congruentissime competeret Jeremie. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 197. 
158 'prodest crebro legere partes scripture pro habendo conceptu sue concordancie et excludenda apparentia 
sue repugnantie. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 197-98. 
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of leaming away from the arrogant or the proud student. 159 This is known to us, Wyclif 
suggests, from the testimony of Scripture itself, as from that of the sancti doctores. He 
directs us here to Jesus' words (spoken to God) in Matthew 11: 25: 
thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them 
to the little ones. 160 
The nature of the 'virtuous disposition' can be explained, Wyclif suggests, in terms of three 
principal qualities or gestures. These are a humble acknowledgement of Scriptural 
authority, conformity with the laws of Scripture and of reason, and acceptance of the 
testimony of the fathers. All of these points, as we have seen, had been a source of 
disagreement between Wyclif and Kenningharn. 161 
The metaphysical and epistemological systems of the Stannia de Ente are most 
conspicuous in Wyclif's description of his fifth and final hermeneutic weapon, divine 
instruction. This, we are told, is most necessary, since it is impossible to learn anything 
without the teaching of the prinia sapientia ('first wisdom'). We learn this, Wyclif 
suggests, from Augustine's De Magistro, and from a passage in St John's Gospel: 'All ZD 
things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made. ' (1: 3). 162 
The' principle is also central to the theory of truth expounded by Grosseteste in his De 
Veritate, a work which had certainly been used by Wyclif in the earlier part of his 
philosophical career. 163 It is summarized here in terms of the theory of knowledge and 
being which is found in the Suninia de Ente. Just as all beings have being through God, we 
are told, so every truth is true through God, who is the first truth and the first known. 
Wyclif relates this pattern to the theory of participation, illustrating how all aspects of 
159 , cum oportet deum aperire et claudere illum librum, patet, quod, quicunque fuerit an-ýicus huius magistri, 
habet fructurn discipline superbis absconditum. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 198. 
160 , sic enim dicit Cristus Matth. undecimo, quod pater abscondidit n-ýsteria scripture a sapientibits et revelavit 
ea parvulis' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 198. (NVyclif here provides a third-person paraphrase 
of the passage translated above. ) 
161 See Ch. 4 (esp. section 4), above. 
162 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 201. 
163 On the argument of De Veritate, see McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, pp. 321-326. 
Citations of De Veritate in the edited works of Wyclif are listed in S. H. Thomson, The Writings of Robert 
Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 119. 
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creation - individuals, species and genera - have being and truth through participation in 
their superiors, and ultimately through participation in the highest being. The first being 
and the first truth, we learn, are the primary cause of all forms of created knowledge, just 
as the light of Christ illuminates every man, or as the sun illuminates celestial or earthly 
lights: 
Everything, just as it has to be, has to be known, but nothing can be true 
except through the first truth, or through participation in it; therefore it 
cannot be known, either. For this reason philosophers say that [the first 
truth] is the first known. For no individual in general can be a being or be 
true, except through participation in its species, nor a species except through 
participation in its genus, nor a genus except through participation in the 
first and most general being, to which it is assigned in entity and truth, and 
consequently in causality of knowledge. For the first truth itself is the first 
cause of any created knowledge whatsoever... For since Christ is the true 
light, which illuminates every man, it is clear that it is absolutely impossible 
for the sense of a man to be illuminated so that he knows anything, except 
as it shines first through him, just as it is impossible, ex suppositione, for the 
light of a star or of a torch to show anything except by virtue of material sun 
showing this first, as it is agreed by many philosophers. 164 
The shift from participation to illumination in the second half of this passage betrays the 
influence, once again, of Augustine. Wyclif directs us to the seventh book of the 
Confessions, in which, we are told, Augustine traces his ideas on illumination to the books 
of Plato. 165 Wyclif's own theory of illumination almost certainly owes as muCh to 
Grosseteste's interpretation of the Augustinian doctrine as it does to Augustine directly, and 
he was clearly anxious to emphasise the complementarity of their respective systems of 
thought. 166 The significance of Grosseteste's contribution becomes clear when Wyclif 
164 , unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse, sic ad cognosci, sed nichil potest esse verum nisi veritas prima vel 
eius participacione, ergo nee cognosci. id. -o dicunt philosophi, quod ipsa est primurn cogniturn. nullum enim 
individuum in genere potest esse ens vel verurn nisi participatione sue speciei, nee species nisi participacione 
sui gencris, nee genus nisi participacione entis pfin-fl et comunissimi, ad quod est status in entitate ct veritate 
et per consequens in causalitate noticie. ipsa enim prima veritas est prima causa cuiuscunque noticie create... 
cum... Cristus sit lux vera, que illuminat onmem hominem, patet, quod absolute impossibile est, sensurn 
hominis illuminari, ut quidquarn cognoscat, nisi per eum primo irradiantem, sicut est impossibile, ex 
supposicione lucem astri vel candele quidquarn ostendere nisi in virtute solis materialis hoc prius ostendentis, 
ut placet multis philosophis. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 201-02. 
165 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 202. 
166 On the Augustinian concept of illun-dnation, and its relation to rational knowledge, see Robert E. Cushman, 
'Faith and Reason', in Roy W. Battenhouse, ed., A Companion to the Study of St Augustine (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 287-314 (pp. 292-295). 
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makes the connection between an illuminatory theory of knowledge and the interpretation 
of Scripture more explicit. Our attention is drawn again to the five-fold classification of 
Scripture presented in the sixth chapter of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, and to the 
different epistemological processes associated with each level. The processes linked to the 
lower four levels, Wyclif suggests, are simply routes to the first and highest, as the 
Christian theory of illumination reveals. Here he turns to Grosseteste's commentary on the 
Posterior Analytics, in which the distinction is drawn - following Augustine - between the 
outward man and the true, 'inward'doctor (interius verits doctor). 167 The former, and the 
signs used by him, are nothing but instruments (instrumenta) moving accidentally, whereas 
the latter illuminates the mind and shows the truth. Thus, Wyclif suggests, Augustine 
speaks truly in the third book of De Doctrina Christiana, when he tells us that the most 
outstanding and most necessary thing to the disciples of Scripture is that they pray so that 
they understand. 168 
Wyclif's references to illumination in his discussion of the last of the five 
hermeneutic weapons mark an emphatic return to the theory of truth and intention which 
we found in his exposition on the literal sense of Scripture. Once again, we are being 
encouraged to think in rigid analogical terms about the nature of the text. The secondary 
analogates whose r6le in the communicative process Kenningharn. had been keen to 
emphasise - the material text and human logical and linguistic systems - are here relegated 4-P 
to the status of mere instruments. Though they have a part to play in the hermeneutic 
process, they have no significance on their own account, as Wyclif's reference to 
'accidental' movement suggests. 
167 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 202. On the notion of the interior homo ('inner' man), a central 
concept in Augustinian theology, see Grodin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 32-39. 
168 , ... dicit Lincolniensis primo Posteriorum in prologornagister et signa eius non sunt nisi 
instrumenta. quedam 
per accidens movencia, sed est interius verus d, quod octor, qui mentern illuminat et veritatern ostendit. et 
sic vere dicit Augustinus tercio De Doctrina Christiana, trecesimo septimo, quod precipuum et maxime 
necessarium est discipulis scripture scare, quod orent, ut intelligant. ' De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, 
p. 202. 
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The pervasive analogism of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, whilst it can leave us in 
little doubt as to the strength of Wyclif's mature philosophical convictions, betrays a clear 
anxiety about the logical and metaphysical claims which had been established in the Stunina 
de Ente. Analogy provided an important butress against the anti-realism of Kenningham 
and his followers, but was not sufficient to silence their objections. It did contribute very 
clearly, however, to some of Wyclif's most outstanding and original exegetical innovations. 
His theory of the text, which systematically opposed the authority of human writers and 
material texts to that of God and the intelligible forrn of Scripture, was one which, like the 
philosophical nests described by Kenningharn, effectively excluded certain forms of 
discourse (in this case, both Aristotelian and nominalist exegetical treatises and 
commentaries) from the realms of serious academic consideration altogether. His defence 
of the intelligible text, he claimed, was itself rooted in Scripture, which meant effectively 
that neither could be contradicted (since Scripture, in its ultimate form, was not the same 
as the material texts on which his opponents based their arguments). His conception of 
metaphor and literalism was perhaps his most controversial innovation, which cannot have 
been formulated without some awareness of the difficulties it was likely to give rise to. The 
detailed presentation of the metaphysical and hermeneutic weapons in the eighth and ninth 
chapters of De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae marks Wyclif's clearest recognition of his 
vulnerability -- here and elsewhere - to philosophical assault. Kenningham posed the 
greatest threat, both to the philosophical and the exegetical aspects of Wyclif's thinking, 
and there can be little doubt, as we have suggested, that the ten weapons were formulated 
with his very carefully argued objections in mind. 
Despite the high degree of consistency in Wyclif's hermeneutic arguments, and in his 
defence of scriptural truth, it cannot be said that Kenningham and the philosophical 
nominalists (narrowly defined by their rejection of 'real' ideas, universals and propositions) 
were being singled out in De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae as the sole cause of exegetical 
corruption. As we have suggested, the 'modem doctors' and 'doctors of signs' of Oxford 
may have included non-tinalists among their number, but the labels are often applied in very 
general terms in De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae, and are likely to have identified a broad 
group of Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian (terrninist) logicians. References to William of 
Ockham, whose philosophical claims were explicitly attacked in the Siannia de Ente, occur 
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only four times throughout the whole of De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae (a much longer 
treatise than any tract of the Suninza de Ente). In this later work, moreover, Wyclif is as 
anxious to distance himself from Ockharn's views on Franciscan spirituality - with which, 
we are told, 'a certain doctor' had attempted to associate him 169 _ as to oppose him 
explicitly on metaphysical issues. Ockharn is not presented as the perpetrator of heresies 
relating to either universals or ideas, despite the incriminations which had been made in this 
connection in De Universalibus. This is surprising, given the space which Wyclif devotes 
to these fundamental hermeneutic concepts in De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae. 
Academic opponents of Wyclif's exegetical theory, and of his literalism in particular, 
were not, of course, solely philosophers. Though Kenningham's objections posed an 
immediate and obvious threat to Wyclif's conception of scriptural meaning, they were no 
worse than the less narrowly philosophical arguments of his other famous opponent, the 
Franciscan William Woodford. We should therefore be cautious about seeking 
philosophical influence where none can be expected. It is for this reason that the S11111111a 
de Ente has played such a significant part in our analysis of the hermeneutic system of De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. Wyclif's philosophy has the virtue of being highly consistent, 
and it is not difficult, as we have seen, to trace key hermeneutic principles (analogy, 
anipliatio teinporis, real predication, intelligible being) back to their philosophical origins 
in the Stunnia de Ente. Kenningham himself rejected Wyclif's ideas on philosophical 
grounds, as the titles of his determinations confirm, but he was clearly an exceptional 
figure. We cannot risk assuming that he had a wide philosophical following in Oxford, 
especially if Courtenay's remarks about nominalist influence in England are true. 170 
Equally, however, we can be in little doubt that Wyclif the Bible scholar perceived anti- 
realism - in Kenningham's determinations and elsewhere - as a significant hermeneutic 
obstacle. His arguments about the nature of authorship, intention, and authority, in 
particular, make this abundantly clear. If we are to do these arguments justice, it would 
seem, we must accept Wyclif's responses to medieval nominalism without assuming that 
they served as ends in themselves. As the debates with Kenningham have revealed, 
nominalism and realism merely supplied the framework within which conflicting 
169 De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. i, p. 345-46. 
170 See the discussion in Chapter I (section 2.2), above. 
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conceptions of textuality (and the theories of truth and time on which they largely 
depended) could be debated; they had become, by the time of the composition of De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, the means to a textual end. 
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CONCLUSION 
Among the few things that can be said with any certainty of the relationship between Wyclif 
and those who have been described, rightly or wrongly, as 'nominalists', is that it was not 
an easy one. The central objective of the present study has been to determine how far this 
unease was properly the result of philosophical nominalism (as defined in Chapter 1), and 
in what ways it could have influenced the development of Wyclif's hermeneutic thought. 
The assumption has been made, throughout, that such a problem can properly be 
approached only from within the context of Wyclif s relatively neglected philosophical 
writings (the logical works and the Stannia de Ente). These, as we have seen, shed some 
important light on the possible responses to medieval nominalism which we find in the De 
Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, as well as highlighting some of the main inadequacies of the 
term 'nominalism' itself They also illstrate the fundamental relationship between 
philosophical theory and textual authority, whose significance in Wyclif's scriptural 
writings can hardly be exaggerated. 
Each of the three general hermeneutic concepts highlighted in the title of the present 
study - truth, time and textuality - is defined in Wyclif's writings by the metaphysical rules 
first laid out in the Sinnina de Ente and the two tractates on logic. In the second chapter, 
we illustrated how the realist principle of analogia entis supplies the foundation for 
Wyclif's interpretation of scriptural signs, and how it ipforms the broader metaphysical 
ideas in his philosophy. The relationship between analogy and univocity was considered, 
and we illustrated ways in which a commitment to the the latter - which played a central 
r6le in nominalist logic - might lead to some of the hermeneutic errors highlighted by 
Wyclif in the Stunnia de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae Scriptitrae. A link was posited, 
tentatively, between univocity and the literalism which has been. seen to characterise 
&nominalist' exegetical methods. We concluded with the observation that Wyclif's theory 
of analogy attracted relatively little explicit opposition from within the university. Indirect 
opposition, nevertheless, can be found in Kenningham's powerful critique of the concept 
of intelligible natures (which we analysed in Chapter 4). It was suggested in Chapter 5, 
moreover, that three textual concepts informed by analogical reasoning (the book, the 
author, and authority) were also challenged by Kenningham's anti-realism. In the third 
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chapter, we presented two of the most controversial aspects of Wyclif's hermeneutic 
realism, his theory of 'real' propositions (propositiones in re) and temporal amplification 
(anipliatio temporis). Neglect of these theories, which were both fundamentally 
incompatible with the assumptions of nominalist metaphysics, lay for Wyclif at the very 
heart of contemporary confusion over the nature of scriptural truth. As we have suggested, 
opposition to the principles of analogia entis or to either of the theories presented in 
Chapter 3 did not necessarily entail a commitment to philosophical nominalism. There is, 
nevertheless, a strong likelihood that the opposition to these views which Wyclif 
encountered, whether voiced in academic debates in the Arts faculty or recorded in 
philosophical treatises or sununae, would have been influenced principally by nominalist 
logic and metaphysics. Within the Summa de Ente, as we have seen, Wyclif makes explicit 
reference to Ockharn's erroneous pronouncements on the nature of universals, and it is not 
insignificant that the De Universalibus is among the longest tracts of the Sunnna de Ente. 
The relationship between the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae and contemporary 
nominalist discourses is more obscure. In broad metaphysical terms it is a realist text, and 
there are close structural correspondences, as we have seen, between the ideas developed 
here and those presented in the De Universalibits. In the later tract, however, as Wyclif 
suggests, he was writing as a theologian, having left behind (with some relief), the tedious 
logical processes and analyses which were part of life in the Arts faculty. It is perhaps for 
this reason that lie is more dismissive of the assumptions and methods of the logical and 
grammatical arts generally, than of nominalist logic and metaphysics in particular, in the 
De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. As we have argued, there is no evidence within the text 
itself to connect the doctores signorian or the modend exclusively with the assumptions of 
nominalist metaphysics, and Ockharn himself is seldom explicitly associated with these 
terms. 
The most significant links between the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae and the 
philosophy of the Siannia de Ente, beside the structural correspondences and the 
pervasiveness of analogy as an analytical and hermeneutic principle, are those which are 
highlighted by Wyclif's debate with Kenningham. Though Kenningharn is mentioned 
nowhere by name in the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, the correspondence between 
concepts explicitly challenged in the detenninationes (those of divine ideas, universals, real 
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predication, temporal amplification and literalism) and those which collectively constituted 
Wyclif's five-fold metaphysical and hermeneutic annaturae is striking. All of these ideas 
(with the exception of literalism, which is not principally a metaphysical concept) had their 
origins in the Sinnina de Ente and the Logicae Continuatio. 
Kenningham's own significance for Wyclif studies goes beyond his distinctive 
philosophical perspective on his contemporary's work. He contributed very decisively, as 
we suggested in Chapter 4, to the development of Wyclif's ideas on specific henneneutic 
issues such as literalism and authority (neither of which would normally have been regarded 
as philosophical). Wyclif's extension of Thomistic intentionalism to the three 'spiritual' 
senses would have been controversial even beyond the realms of philosophical disputation, 
and Kenningham clearly found no difficulty in presenting logical arguments against it. 
Whether Kenningham's reliance on principles consistent with Ockhamist logic is reason 
to describe his views on literalism as 'nominalistic' is therfore, as elsewhere, a question of 
definition. There can be no doubt, nevertheless, that the principal threat to Wyclif's 
'intentionalist' conception of the literal sense was a metaphysical one, nor that it had its 
origins in a form of anti-realism which had elements in common both with contemporary 
'moderate' nominalism (as defined by Courtenay) and Scotism. There is a very clear 
progression from the responses to Kenningharn presented by Wyclif in his own 
detenninatio - which necessitated significant modifications to his earlier scriptural theory 
- to the hermeneutic concepts assembled in the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturcle. Unlike 
William Woodford, Kenningham has attracted relatively little scholarly attention, despite 
having been recognised as one of the shrewdest of Wyclif's contemporary critics. I 
Wyclif's own literalism has not received the attention it deserves, and its philosophical 
significance has been largely overlooked. This problem would certainly be rectified if 
Kenningham's own very distinctive philosophical position, as well as his skills as a 
dialectician, were brought into the foreground. 
1 See for example Robson's discussion in Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, pp. 162-170. Catto remarks that 
'Kenningharn was clearly able to put up a vigorous case and perhaps had the better of the argument', 'NVyclif 
and Wycliffism', p. 195. 
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The uncertainty which surrounds many of the doctrines and ideas which could be 
characterised as 'nominalist' in Wyclif should not deter us from drawing conclusions about 
responses to nominalism in his writings. Part of the purpose of this study has been to 
highlight ways in which existing definitions of nominalism, as applied to the teaching of 
Wyclif's opponents, has often been inadequate or misleading. Despite the significant 
revisions which have been made to the historical understanding of nominalism over the past 
three decades (by Courtenay and Oberman in particular), relatively little has changed in the 
academic assessment of Wyclif's opponents. Opposition to Wyclif's metaphysical views, 
as we have suggested, had a range of potential philosophical sources, not all of which 
would normally be characterised as 'nominalist'. The views of Ockham and Scotus, for 
example, - especially in relation to the theory of predication - had much in common, 
though only the former is usually described as a nominalist. Followers of Scotus (Peter 
Aureol being the obvious example), no less than contemporary Ockhamists, would have 
found many of Wyclif's metaphysical conclusions unacceptable. John Kenningham, whose 
arguments had a more tangible influence on the development of Wyclif's later 
philosophical teaching than any other contemporary, does not adhere rigidly to the 
principles set down by Ockharn or any other 'nominalist' thinker of the fourteenth century. 
Though he has not been described as a nominalist, his rejection of Wyclif's teaching on 
ideas and universals would be good reason to identify him as such, if only in respect of his 
ontological convictions. 
There is, then, a twofold problem with the term 'nominalism' and its existing 
definitions. Firstly, it is clearly too narrow a label to apply to Wyclif's philosophical and 
logical opponents collectively. On a metaphysical level, as we have suggested, the broader 
term 'anti-realist' is more descriptive of their shared assumptions. This alternative label 
also implicitly separates those who were opposed to philosophical realism, and whose 
metaphysics Wyclif implicitly or explicitly rejected, from those whose logical methods he 
criticised on the grounds that they privileged the signian and its properties above the 
signation. These, as we have argued, were strictly tennininists, but need not necessarily 
have been metaphysical anti-realists. None of these alternative labels and definitions 
renders the term 'nominalism' or 'nominalist' redundant, of course. It is often appropriate, 
in the analysis of Wyclif's anti-realism, to isolate principles peculiar to, or charcteristic of, 
fourteenth-century nominalism. The more general term, however, gives proper recognition 
210 
to the principles of anti-realism which were found in writers from outside the nominalist 
tradition (as defined by recent 'revisionist' histories of fourteenth-century thought), 
but which were nevertheless potentially significant influences on Wyclif's ideas and their 
reception. 
The second difficulty with 'nominalism' is that it has tended to marginalise figures 
who, like John Kenningham, have not been associated with any specific medieval 'school' 
or group. In Kenningham's case, the result has been a lack of recognition of the 
significance of one individual's position within the broader dialogue between Wyclif and 
anti-realist thinkers. The identification of Kenningham's ideas with a form of anti-realism 
provides a possible solution to this problem, whilst doing nothing to obscure the important 
continuities which exist between his own philosophy and that of the fourteenth-century 
nominalists. 
Changes in terminology and definition should not be regarded as an end in 
themselves, and we must ask what hermeneutic insights are to be gained from the study of 
anti-realism and its representations in the writings of John Wyclif. As we have seen, 
constructions of truth, time and textuality in anti-realist discourses posed a threat to 
Wyclif's hermencutic theory precisely because they exposed the subjective, dialogic nature 
of meaning production and reception. Kenningham's systematic assault on Wyclirs 
conception of intelligible being, divine knowledge, and real propositions left little room 
for a hermeneutic theory in which the sense of the biblical text could be apprehended 
inmediate from its divine author. The text as Wyclif understood it, and from which his 
hermeneutic arguments drew their authority, became little more than a fiction at the hands 
of so deterriiined an opponent of realism as Kenningharn. Wyclif's responses to 
Kenningharn, as we have seen, reveal a very acute sensitivity to the dangers posed by his 
opponent's nominalistic philosophical rigour. 
The competing claims to authority which were made by Wyclif and his philosophical 
adversaries, though they would have little meaning in the absence of an established 
tradition of theoretical reflection on biblical interpretation, had important consequences 
beyond the realm of scriptural hermeneutics. In the De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae alone, 
they entered into broader debates relating to the nature of heretical, sinful or untruthful 
211 
discourse. 2 In each of these areas, Wyclif's thinking was very clearly informed by the 
principles of being and truth which had served to define his hermeneutic system. The 
textual and philosophical principles which underly his conception of authority (as described 
in Chapter 5)3 served to define his understanding of the nature of heretical texts and 
practices. Nominalism itself, on both hermeneutic and philosophical grounds, would 
presumably have represented an obvious source of heretical doctrine. Issues of the 
perceived relationship between heresy and nominalism, however, or of the meaning of 
realist and nominalist ethics, must be reserved a future chapter in the history of late 
scholasticism. 
2 See De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, vol. ii, pp. 1-99 (on the nature of lying); vol. i, pp. 159-167; 331-374; 
vol. 3, pp. 274-3 10 (on heresy). 
3 See Ch. 5 (section 1). 
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APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF LATIN TERMS' 
The references supplied in braces under each entry are to chapters, with section numbers in 
parentheses. No reference is given for terms in general use throughout the thesis. 
accidens: accident. Anything which exists in a subject (as a property or attribute), but not 
independently of it. One of the nine Aristotelian accidental predicates (quantity, quality, 
relation, place, time, position, state, action, affection). See also substantia, subiectunz. 
[Ch. 2 (1 and 3)] 
aetendtas: eternity. The term usually applies to the extra-temporal, rather than to an 
infinite succession of temporal instants. [Ch. 3 (2.3)] 
ampliatio (-verbi, -dictionis, -tennini): extension (of a word, statement, tenn). In post- 
Aristotelian logic, the expansion of the supposition of a term beyond its conventional 
limits (as when a verb in the present tense is used to signify a future time). Broadly 
equivalent to Augustine's concept of distentio aninzae (q. v. ). In Wyclif, ampliatio is 
used principally of time itself (hence, ampliatio temporis), which in its extended 
metaphysical sense is visible to God in its entirety (past, present and future). See also 
restrictio. Cf. distentio aninzae, below. [Ch. 1 (3); Ch. 3 (2.4)] 
analogattim: analogate. One of the two entities sharing in different degrees the quality of the 
analogon. See analogum, below. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
analogia verbi: analogy of the word ('verbal' analogy). 
analogia entis: analogy of being. This form of analogy, which obtains between different 
entities (entes), was divided by Thomistic scholars into three fundamental types: 1. 
Analogy of proper proportionality (as between the divine essence and accidental 
properties ('goodness', 'mercy', 'kindness') in man). 2. Analogy of attribution (as 
between entities whose relations to the analoguin (q. v. ) are of different kinds ('healthy 
man', 'healthy urine'). 3. Analogy of inequality (as between entities which share a 
name but are not proportionally related (e. g. celestial and worldly bodies)). Wyclif 
regarded this as a form of equivocatio (q. v. ). [Introduction; Ch. 2; Ch. 5 (1)] 
analoguin: analogon. The entity or quality to which analogates are compared (e. g. 
'goodness', 'love', 'authority', 'author'). [Ch. 2 (1); Ch. 5 (3.1)] 
autor: author. 
- inniediatus: 'immediate' or direct author. This terrn applies primarily to God, the 
'immediate' author in the ordo ascendendi, but can be applied to the inspired 
human author, the immediate author in the ordo descendendi (see entries under 
these terms, below). [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
1 The orthography in this section has been standardised, and will differ from that used in some of the editions cited 
in the text. Hence, e> ae (aetendtas); cc >a (distinctio); y>i (idea). 
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- proximus (also: conditor proximus; scriba proximus): 'proximate' 
author/composer. This term is applied exclusively to the (inspired) 
human author. [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
categoreniation: a 'categorematic' term in a proposition. Categorematic terms signify 
properties and things in the world. See syncategoreniation. [3 (2.1)] 
causa: cause. In Aristotelian philosophy, one of the four causes (Gk. Wvrictt). These 
causes were described as efficient, fomial, material andfbial. 
- efficiens: efficient (or 'motive') cause. The cause of change (or lack of change) in 
a condition or state of being. [Ch. 3 (1)] In the Aristotelian commentary 
tradition, this was the author of the text (whether divine or human). The concept 
of the duplex1triplex causa efficiens, used to describe the respective r6les of 
human and divine authors, supplies an important analogy to Wyclif's theory of 
the threefold authorship of Scripture. [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
-fonnalis: formal cause. In Aristotle, the forrn or structure of an entity. In the 
commentary tradition, this was the structure imposed on a literary 
composition by its author. 
- nzaterialis: material cause. In Aristotle, the substance from which something is 
composed (e. g. wood, in the case of a wooden table). In textual theory, the 
physical book (Wyclif's liber materialis or codex (qq. v. )). 
See also materia, below. [Ch. 5 (1.1)] 
-finalis: final cause. The end to which something happens or is brought about. 
The purpose or intended effect of a textual composition. [Ch. 3 (1)] 
causatum: 'thing caused'; effect. Wyclif frequently applies this term to the effect of an 
efficient cause (causa efficiens), though it is also found in other contexts. 
codex: book (considered as a material entity). See causa inaterialis, above. 
[Ch. 5 (1.1)] 
cognitio: cognition. 
- intititiva: 'intuitive' cognition. See notitia intuitiva, below. 
[Ch. 1 (2.2); Ch. 4(3)] 
- abstractiva: 'abstractive' cognition. See notitia abstractiva, below. [Ch. 1 (2.2); 
Ch. 4(3)] 
complexian: a complex expression. Any logical expression which comprises more than a 
single categorematic element. 
conchisio: the conclusion of a syllogistic argument (See under ininor and maior, below). 
conditor: composer. See under aittor, above. [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
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contemplatio (adj. contemplativits, a): contemplation (contemplative). 
contradictio (also: repugnanthan): contradiction. The process by which the truth of one 
term (or proposition) entails the logical negation of the other in a proposition (e. g. 
&a man is a dog'). [Ch. 3 (1); Ch. 5 (4.2)] 
decenter: 'properly'. This terrn is found only in passages cited from Grosseteste. The 
sense is similar to that of proprie (q. v. ). 
detenninatio: determination. An academic debate, usually held between a master and his 
student before an audience of scholars. [Ch. 4, passinz] 
distentio animae: the extension of time in the soul. Augustine uses the concept of 
extension to explain the individual's experience of the passage of time. Though time 
itself consists in singular, indivisible instants (which are not extensible), it is 
experienced as though it were extended. The root of this experience, for Augustine, is 
psychological, resting on anticipation and recollection. Cf. anipliatio, above. [Ch. 3 
, 
(2.2)] 
distinctio: distinction. 
-fonnalis: 'formal' distinction. A real distinction existing within a single entity. 
Ockham dismissed such distinctions as mental constructs. [Ch. 1 (2.2)] 
- essentialis: 'essential' distinction. The distinction which is drawn between two 
different entities (by virtue of their being different essences). [Ch. 1 (2.2)] 
duratio: duration. Non-successive, 'eternal' time. The term is also applied to the duration 
of the world in finite time. See tempus (2), below. [Ch. 3 (2.3)] 
equivocatio (-nominis, -entis): equivocation (of a name or a being). An equivocal name 
is applied to entities which are not related in proportional terms. Equivocal being 
represents an impossibility. [Ch. 3 (1); Ch. 5 (4.2)] 
ens: 1. a being; 2. essence (when opposed to esse). 
- prinium: 'first' being (God). See esse commune, below. 
- secundum se: The being which an essence has by virtue of being itself-, essential 
(as opposed to accidental) being. Cf. ens secundum accidens, below. 
- secundunt accidens: 'accidental' being. The being which something has by virtue of 
being an accidental property. 
esse: 1. being in general; 2. existential, as opposed to essential being (ens). 
esse coinnuine (also: ens coinintine, ens prinnan): lit. 'common' being. The being in 
which creatures participate. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
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esse intelligibile (also: ens intelligibile): being as apprehended by the intellect, rather 
than through the senses. All existential beings have intelligible counterparts, though 
it is possible for intelligible beings to have no existential forna. 
[Ch. 2 (1 and 3); Ch. 4 (2.1)] 
esse reale: 'real' being. This term, which occurs very rarely, is used of existential 
being. See existentia, below. 
existentia: existence (sometimes used interchangeably with ens). The lowest forrn of 
being in Wyclif's metaphysical hierarchy. Being as experienced in the temporal 
world. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
fictian (also: figmentitin): in Ockham's philosophy, a natural (non-arbitrary) concept in 
the mind. For Ockham, universals were principallyficta. [Ch. 1 (2.2)] 
figura: a figure. 1. A linguistic figure. When unqualified, the term usually refers to a 
figure of speech (figura locutionis). 2. A category. Synonymous in this sense 
with predicanzens (q. v. ). 
- constnictionis: figure of syntax. Any one of a number of forms resulting from a 
syntactic substitution or translation. E. g. when the gender of an adjective 
agrees with the natural gender of the thing signified by a noun, but not with 
the grammatical gender of that noun (a form of synesis). [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
- locutionis: figure of speech. In Wyclif, this is usually a metaphor. [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
figuratian: 'thing figured'. The thing signified by a figure of speech. [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
fonna: form. The fonn of an existential being. See materia, below. Cf. causa 
fO 17nalis. 
genus: genus. The class to which a group of species of a common kind belong. E. g. 
fruit is the genus to which the species apple, banana, plum and pear (among others) 
belong. 
grannizaticus: grammarian. This term is used disparagingly throughout Wyclif's writings, 
often as a label for contemporary terminists. 
idea: an idea in the divine intellect (unlike ratio, this term is not applied to ideas in the 
human mind). 
illuminatio: illurnination. The process by which knowledge is conveyed by God directly to 
an individual. An Augustinian tenn. Cf. notitiafidei, below. 
impositio: imposition. The process by which a name is assigned (arbitrarily) to an 
entity in the world. 
incomplextun: an 'incomplex' expression (one consisting of a single lexical item). 
[Ch. 3 (2.1)] 
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indivisibilis: indivisible. Used of points in space and time (instans indivisibile, punctitin 
indivisibile). 
ininediate: 'immediately', directly. Used of any sense apprehended from the divine author 
without the intervention of discursive reason. [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
insolubilium: an 'insoluble' proposition. A proposition to which a truth value cannot be 
assigned (usually because this would entail a contradiction); a self-contradictory 
proposition. E. g. 'I am a liar'. [Ch. 3 (1); Ch. 5 (4.2)] 
instans: instant. An indivisible point of time. 
instrunientum: instrument. In Aristotelian and Thornýistic philosophy, anything which is 
used by an agent. 
- autentician: 'authentic' instrument. Applied to the inspired human author, 
whose writings convey divine intention. Identical with the 'instrumental' 
causa efficiens (q. v. ) of the Aristotelian commentary tradition. [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
intellectus: the intellect. 
- agens: the 'agent' (or 'active') intellect. This refers to the abstractive power of 
the intellect, necessary to the apprehension of universal natures. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
- passivits: the 'passive' intellect (not used by Wyclif, but found in the philosophy 
of Robert Grosseteste). 
intelligibilis: intelligible. Perceptible to the intellect, rather than to the senses. 
(See esse intelligibile, above). 
intentio: 1. intention; 2. (of a term or expression) sense or meaning. 
- autoris: intention of the author (human or divine). [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
- mentis: intention of the mind ('ment, -J' intention). [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
- verbi: intention of the word ('verbal' intention). This is the basic sense of a Nmdor 
proposition, divorced from cultural associations. The intention of the divine 
author is identical with the verbal intention of his text. [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
- pritna: first intention. Terms of first intention supposit for entities in the world. In 
the medieval commentary tradition, the expression intentio prinia also identifies 
the intention of God, the first author. 
- seciazda: second intention. Terms of second intention supposit for other 
propositional terms. See under suppositio, below. 
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liber materialis: physical book. See also codex and causa materialis, above. [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
littera: letter. In the medieval grammatical tradition, the letter was the minimal unit of 
analysis. [Ch. 1 (5)] 
locittio: utterance. 
- intrinsica (also: verbitin intrinsicum): 'internal' utterance/word. Anything which is 
spoken or understood inwardly, as a word or text in the mind (mens) or ft, hczd 
(cor). 
- vocalis (also: verbum vocalis, dictio vocalis): 'vocal' utterance/word/statement. 
Anything which is spoken physically, rather than inwardly. 
inaior: 'major'. The major premise of a syllogistic argument (the italicised clause in the 
example below): 
All people are hunian 
I am a person 
Therefore, I am human. 
materia: matter. The material from which an existential being is composed. In Aristotel- 
ian philosophy, this is opposed to itsfonn (fonna). Wyclif observes this opposition 
throughout his writings. See also causa inaterialis, above. 
ininor: 'minor'. The minor premise of a syllogistic argument (the italicised clause in 
the example below): 
All people are human 
I ain a person 
Therefore, I am human. 
modus dicendi: way of speaking. The two principal ways of speaking ('moods') were 
declarative and interrogative. 
nuttabilis: 'mutable'. Used of any entity which is subject to change. 
noininalis: nominalist. This term, which is used nowhere by Wyclif himself, describes any 
logician who supposes universals to be (1) concepts (such as Ockham and the 
fourteenth-century Oxford nominalists) or (2) words (such as the vocales of the 
twelfth century). See also vocalis. [Ch. 1 (2-5) etpassint] 
notitia: knowledge or perception. 
- abstractiva: 'abstractive' cognition. For Ockharn, the process by which the mind 
arrives at universal concepts. This forrn of knowledge relied on successive 
acts of intuitive cognition. See notitia intuitiva (below). 
- confitsa: 'confused' knowledge. Knowledge arrived at through the senses. 
[Ch. 2 (5)] 
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- distincta: 'distinct' knowledge. Knowledge arrived at through the intellectus 
agens (q. v. ). Universals may be known distinctly. Human knowledge of 
God is also a form of notitia distincta. [Ch. 2 (5)] 
- elicita: 'elicited' knowledge. Knowledge of God which is 'elicited' by the blessed. 
This fonn of knowledge, we are told in the De Ente Pritno inCommuni, dTcnds 
on an analogical (or hermeneutic) conception of the world. [Ch. 2 (5)] 
-fidei: knowledge by faith. The knowledge an individual has by virtue of his or 
her faith. Such knowledge, through which the Book of Life itself is known, 
depends on a process of divine illumination. [Ch. 2 (5)] 
-intuitiva: 'intuitive' knowledge/cognition. In Ockharn's epistemology, knowledge of 
singulars; arrived at through the senses. Analogous to Wyclif's notitia confusa 
(q. v. ). [Ch. 1 (2.1)] 
ex opposito: 'by opposition'. Two things are disntinguished ex opposito if they 
are reafly distinct (rather than distinct secundum rationem (q. v. )). [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
ordo ascendendi, descendendi: order of ascending, descending. Analogous to the 
Dionysian concepts of return (by which man comes to know God through symbols) and 
procession (by which God is made known to man). [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
pars subiectiva: subjective part. This term is applied to inferior categories in a system of 
classification (united by a common superior term). 'Dog', 'cat', 'horse', etc. are 
subjective parts of the class 'animal'. Wyclif remarks that the four scriptural senses, 
being generically distinct, have different partes subiective. 
[Ch. 2 (2); Ch. 5 (4.2)] 
exparte rei: this phrase denotes a real, rather than a conceptual, mode of being. (For 
the realist, universals are held to exist exparte rei. ) See alsopraedicatio exparte 
rei, below. [Ch. 5 (5.1)] 
participatio: participation (adv. participative, 'by participation'). The process by which 
entities in the temporal world 'share in' a property or essence which is perfected in 
the divine nature. [Ch. 2 (1); Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
personaliter (also: concretive): (of modes of supposition) 'personally', 'concretely'. A term 
supposits personally when it stands for an individual entity in the world. (e. g. in 'Peter 
is good', 'Peter' supposits for Peter the man). [Ch. 5 (1.1)] 
ad placitunz (signiftcatio-): used of an arbitrary system of signification, such as that of 
human language. Such a system is said to signify adplacititin. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
posse (also: potentia, esse possibile): possible being; potency. Any form of being which is 
potential, but not actual. For Wyclif, this form of being was as real as actual being, 
since it was ultimately an idea in the mind of God. 
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praedicamens (also: categoria): predicate. Any one of the ten Aristotelian predicates 
('categories'). See under accidens and substantia. 
praedicamentalis (ens-): used of beings which are subject to the ten Aristotelian 
predicates. 
praedicatio: predication. The process by which one term in a logical (or 'real') 
proposition is 'said of another (e. g. in the proposition 'Peter is good', goodness is 
predicated of Peter. ) See propositio, below. 
- per se: Something is said to be predicated per se of another thing when the 
reference is generic or specific (rather than accidental). (e. g. 'Peter is a 
man') 
- per accidens: 'accidental' predication. Something is said to be predicated per 
accidens of a subject when it is an accidental property of that thing. (e. g. 
'Peter is good. ') 
- exparte rei (also: - realis): 'real' predication. Any fonn of predication which 
occurs in reality, rather than in a linguistic proposition. Wyclif divides real 
predication into three principal kinds: praedicatiofonnalis, praedicatio 
secundum essentiant, praedicatio secundum habitudinem (qq. v. ). See 
propositio realis. 
-fonnalis: 'formal' predication. One thing is predicated formally of another if the 
two are fonnally identical (as a particular and its genus or species). 
[Ch. 3 (1)] 
- secundian essentiam: 'essential' predication. One thing is predicated essentially of 
another if the two are not formally identical, but are identical by virtue of 
some other principle of being. [Ch. 3 (1)] 
- secundum habitudinem: 'habitudinal' predication. [Ch. 3 (1)] 
propositio: proposition. When used by Wyclif, the reference is almost invariably to 
propositiones realesfin re (see below), rather than to linguistic propositions. 
- realis (also: -in re): a 'real' proposition. A proposition which is true by virtue 
of the reality of the subject and predicate (e. g. Peter and his humanity 
constitute a true proposition in which the universal species 'human' is 
predicated of the singular subject, 'Peter'). [Ch. 3 (1); Ch. 4 (2.2)] 
proprie: tenns are said to be applied proprie ('properly') either when they are used litemlly 
(i. e. non-metaphorically), or when they are predicated of a perfect or intelligible form 
('love' as predicated of God). 
punctus: a point in time or space, usually, though not invariably, indivisible. 
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quiditas: quiddity ('thisness'). That which makes a thing what it is (in Wyclif, this is its 
generic or specific nature). [Ch. 3 (1)] 
ratio: an idea conceived by the human or the divine intellect. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
- pritnaeva: lit. 'primitive idea'. The ideal fonn of any being in the mind of God. 
- vitalis: lit. 'living idea'. An idea in the mind of God. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
secandian rationein: lit. 'by reason'. Used of a distinction or category which is 
consciously imposed by the mind, rather than being real or natural. [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
restrictio: 'restriction'. Applied to the suppositional properties of a categorematic 
term (see categorenzatitin). A term which supposits for a given range of supposita is 
said to be 'restricted' to those supposita. A temporal term which refers only to the 
present time, for example, is thereby 'restricted' to the present. [Ch. 3 (1 and 2.1)] 
sapientia: wisdom. This term is found principally in citations from Grosseteste. 
printa -: 'first' wisdom (i. e. God). 
scientia: knowledge. 
scriba: writer, scribe . In Wyclif, this term can apply either to an 
inspired author of 
Scripture (scriba proxinzits, scriba legis Christi, scriba Christi), or to an uninspired 
writer who properly has no auctoritas. In the latter sense, it is synonymous with 
scriptor (q. v. ). See also auctor, above. [Ch. 5 (1.2)] 
scriptor: writer. This term is applied exclusively to the uninspired human writer, usually a 
scribe or a copyist. 
sententia: lit. 'sentence' (translated throughout as 'message', 'meaning'). 
The meaning of an author, a text or a proposition. [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
sensibilis (e. g. signum sensibile, ens sensibile): sensible. Perceptible to the senses. In 
Wyclif and elsewhere, this tem is typically opposed to intelligibilis (q. v. ), which is used 
of entities perceptible to the intellect. 
sensits: the meaning or sense of a text, passage, or proposition. 
- litteralis: 'literal' sense. 1. (also: - historicus) the literal record of historical 
events in Scripture. 2. the sense intended by the divine author, and apprehended 
directly from him. In Wyclif, any of the three spiritual senses (see below) could 
thus be regarded as literal, as well as the historical sense itself. [Ch. 4 (2.3); Ch. 
5 (3.2)] 
- allegoricus: 'allegorical' sense. According to the traditional mnemonic, the 
allegorical sense teaches 'what you should believe' ('quid credas allegoria 
[docet]'). Wyclif cites the example of Abraham's two sons, Ismael and Isaac, 
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who may be taken to signify allegorically the Old and the New Testaments, 
respectively. This is a fitting example, since allegory (according to Augustinian 
convention) provided the usual means of reconciling events recorded in the Old 
and the New Testaments (the former usually being regarded as allegorical 
prefigurations of the latter). [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
- inoralis (also: - tropologicus): 'moral' or 'tropological' sense. The moral sense 
teaches 'what you should do' ('moralis quid agas [docet]'). According to 
Wyclif, it is the sense which gives us knowledge of meritorious acts. 
[Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
- anagogicus: 'anagogical' sense. The anagogic, or eschatological sense, Wyclif 
suggests, signifies 'the truth which is to be expected in the triumphant Church'. 
It is the sense which looks to the future ('quo tendas anaogia [docet]'), and 
towards the kingdom of heaven. [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
- parabolicus (also: -figitratus): 'parabolic' sense. In Thomistic exegetical 
theory, any meaning which is conveyed through words metaphorically. 
Aquinas considered this to be part of the literal sense. 
[Ch. 4 (5); Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
- prinuts: 'primary' sense. The historical sense of a scriptural passage. See sensus 
litteralis (1), above. [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
- secundus: 'second' sense. Any meaning conveyed through one of the three 
mystical senses (sensits inoralis, sensits anagogicus, sensits parabolicus 
(qq. v. )). [Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
signation: lit. 'signified', 'significate'. Anything signified by a sign (signum). [Ch. 2 (1); Ch. 
4 (2.2)] 
significatio: signification. The process by which a sign (linguistic or real) refers to an 
entity in the world (or in a proposition). See suppositio, below. 
signum: a sign. In Wyclif, the term applies primarily to linguistic signs (e. g. 'human'), 
sacramental symbols (e. g. the bread and the wine of the Eucharist), and natural signs 
in their various forms. [Ch. 1 (5); Ch. 4 (2.2)] 
sinipliciter: (of modes of supposition) 'simply'. A term supposits simply when it stands for 
its general significate. For Wyclif (like Burley), this was a real universal nature; for 
Ockham, it was a universal concept. [Ch. 3 (1); Ch. 5 (1.1)] 
singidare: singular. Any singluar (existential) entity. See existentia, above. 
species: species, kind. The class to which entities of a particular kind belong (e. g. 'apple', 
'banana', 'plum', 'pear' are all species of fruit. 
subiectian: subject. The term (or entity) of which something is predicated. (e. g. 'Peter' 
in 'Peter is a man' or 'Peter runs') 
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- ad existentiam: In Ockham's logic, a real ('existential') subject. [Ch. 3 (1)] 
- ad praedicationem: A propositional subject, of which another term is predicated. 
[Ch. 3 (1)] 
substantia: substance. What something is. Substance is the first of the ten Aristotelian 
predicates or categories. It is the only category which may act as the ultimate subject 
(see subiectian, above) of a proposition, and which is separable (i. e. which can exist 
independently of another subject). [Ch. 2 (1 and 3)] 
suppositio: supposition. The process by which a term in a proposition 'stands for' 
another entity or tenn. See also simpliciter. 
- inaterialis (also: - personalis, - concreta): material supposition. A term supposits 
materially when it stands for another term in a proposition. (E. g. in 'goodness 
is a term', goodness stands for the term 'goodness', rather than for the quality or 
essence to which the term refers. ) [Ch. 3 (1)] 
supposition: supposit. The thing for which a ten-n in a proposition suppoits (see 
suppositio, restrictio, above). [Ch. 3 (1)] 
syllabicare: lit. 'to syllabicate'. Syllables were regarded by the grannnatici (from 
Donatus onwards) as grammatical units. Letters (littera) were the minimal units, 
which in turn constituted syllables. In the process of reading, therefore, the student first 
learned the alphabet, and then how to split words into syllables. This 
latter process was described as 'syllabication'. See also littera. 
[Ch. 1 (5); Ch. 5 (2)] 
syncategorenzatitin: a 'syncategorematic' term in a proposition. These are non- 
referential terms in a proposition (i. e. terms which do not signify a substance or 
quality for which there is an Aristotelian category). They include conjunctions, 
prepositions, and determiners. 
teinpus: 1. time (in general) [Ch. 3 (2.1-2.4); Ch. 4 (3); Ch. 5 (4.1)]; 2. 'successive' 
time (as opposed to duratio) [Ch. 3 (2.3)]; 3. grammatical tense. [Ch. 5 (4.1)] 
tenninare: 'to tenninate'. This verb is applied by WyClif in the sense 'to provide an end 
for'. To tenninate the act of perception or knowing is to supply it with a known. [Ch. 
4 (2.1)] 
tenninus: in scholastic usage, a term in a proposition (rarely found in Wyclif). 
universale (also: universalium): universal. 1. a universal nature; 2. a universal term or 
concept (i. e. one predicated of all particulars of a given kind). 
- causatione: universal by causality. Any cause which is common to a number of 
effects (as genera and species are common to groups of created singulars). 
See causa (finalis), above. [Ch. 3 (1)] 
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- communicatione: universal by community. The common nature shared by a 
group of supposits (supposita). [Ch. 3 (1)] 
- repraesentatione: universal by representation. A conceptual or linguistic 
universal. For Wyclif, this was regarded merely as a sign of the first two 
kinds of universal, and was strictly only equivocally a universal. [Ch. 3 (1)] 
univocits (univociter, etc. ): 'univocal'. A term is predicated univocally if it applies to a 
single concept (which may be shared by different predicates), or a single thing. 
(E. g. the term 'human' as applied to human beings. ) In Ockham's logic, terms 
such as 'good' may be predicated univocally of God and man. [Ch. 2 (1)] 
verbitin: 1. a word; 2. the meaning of a word (see under vox, below); 3. a verb. 
- substantimm: 'substantive' word. A noun (or a verb used substantively, such as 
the infinitives esse, fore, andfitisse). 
virtits sennonis (also: vis sennonis, vis vocis): lit. 'force of language' (-vocis: 'force of 
the word'). This expression has a long history, and is usually taken to refer to the 
literal meaning of a proposition. In Wyclif, it encompasses all meanings which are 
arrived at ininediate (q. v. ), without the aid of discursive reasoning. As such, within the 
context of scriptural interpretation, it is often applied to metaphorical, as well as to 
literal expressions. [Ch. 3 (1); Ch. 4 (2.3,3); Ch. 5 (3.2)] 
vocalis: 'vocalist'. The name applied to logicians of the twelfth century who regarded 
universal categories (genera and species) as words (voces). [Ch. 1 (3)] 
vox: a word. Wyclif generally observes the ancient distinction between VOX (a word in 
its phonic or graphic form) and verbuin (the meaning of the vox). 
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